APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted the State permission to appeal to determine whether the defendant’s dual convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse violate either the federal or state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Following briefing, oral argument, and a careful study of Tennessee law governing the issue presented, we ordered the parties in this appeal, and two other pending appeals involving related issues, to submit additional briefs addressing certain specific questions concerning the analyses that Tennessee courts apply in single prosecution cases when determining whether separate convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. We also scheduled consolidated reargument of these three appeals and invited certain prosecutorial and defense organizations to submit amicus curiae briefs. Having thoroughly reviewed relevant federal and state precedent and carefully considered the briefs provided by the parties and by the amici curiae, we have concluded that the four-factor test set forth in State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996) should be abandoned. Furthermore, we have not found, nor have we been provided with, any textual reason or historical basis for interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution differently from the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we adopt the same elements test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) as the test for determining whether multiple convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Applying this test, we conclude that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse are not the same offense because their elements differ. Thus, the defendant’s dual convictions do not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment merging the reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction, and we reinstate the reckless homicide conviction. However, we affirm that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment remanding this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

We have determined that we have no means of reaching the issue of the validity of the Agreed Order itself. I believe that the appropriate procedure to challenge the agreement at this point in time is by petition for post-conviction relief, which Mother is pursuing. Nonetheless, we are troubled by the procedure used herein that resulted in an original punishment of six months incarceration for Mother.
 

After robbing a Clarksville restaurant, the defendant was indicted for burglary, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. A jury convicted the defendant on all three counts, after which he filed a motion to set aside the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping as violative of due process, relying on State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). The trial court denied the motion and sentenced the defendant to an effective twenty-five year term. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and dismissed the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping on due process grounds. This Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. Following briefing and oral argument, we ordered additional briefing and argument addressing the application of due process principles to dual convictions for kidnapping and an accompanying felony, such as rape or robbery. We hold that the legislature did not intend for the kidnapping statutes to apply to the removal or confinement of a victim that is essentially incidental to an accompanying felony, such as rape or robbery. This inquiry, however, is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard. Because the defendant is entitled to a new trial with specific instructions as to the especially aggravated kidnapping charge, the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
 

The appellant, Brandon Trevon Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The issue appealed in this case is the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance requested by the Appellant. After two prior continuances were granted, the Appellant again moved for a continuance, supporting the request with documentation indicating that the Appellant was undergoing diagnostic testing the day before the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied the continuance. When the Appellant failed to proceed with the trial the following day, the trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute. We affirm.

Joshua Caleb Morris (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, three counts of theft, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to a total effective sentence of six years, to be suspended on twelve years probation under the supervision of the Community Alternative to Prison Program. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Glenn Davis and Lisa Davis (“Plaintiffs”) sued Charles Bowers and Wilda Bowers (“Defendants”) and Greene County, Tennessee (“Greene County”) seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment with regard to whether a passageway of approximately 198 feet in length on the north end of Duncan Lane was a private driveway or a public road. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the 198 foot section was not part of the public road. Defendants appeal raising issues regarding the purported dedication of the 198 feet, and the admission of evidence at trial. We affirm.

Defendant, Brandon Trent Patterson, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. By agreement between the parties, Defendant was also charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of attempted first degree murder and convicted of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In February 2005, the Defendant, Benjamin William Riffey, alias, pled guilty to facilitation to commit aggravated robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years and was placed on probation. Subsequently, the Defendant was transferred to enhanced probation. On February 22, 2011, a violation of probation warrant was filed, the third against the Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s sentence of probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal from trial court’s finding that their neighbors, the defendants, were not in violation of an Agreed Order, which stated that the neighbors’ land could be used only for residential purposes or for commercial use as a stable and for pasturing of horses, but for no other purpose. Plaintiffs contend that horse shows conducted on the property violated the terms of the Agreed Order. The trial court found that horse shows were an aspect of the commercial stabling business in Sequatchie County and, therefore, did not violate the terms of the Agreed Order. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Tyrone E. Montgomery, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction and life sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred and that his conviction is void because: (1) the indictments did not allege the “knowingly” and “intentionally” mental states; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on premeditation and felony murder; (3) he was charged with “Murder By Use of A Firearm” but convicted of first degree felony murder, a crime for which he did not have proper notice from the indictment; and (4) his judgment of conviction is facially invalid and void. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment.

The employee fell at work. He was then diagnosed to have a brain hemorrhage. The evidence showed that the fall occurred in an open area, that it was unlikely that the employee either slipped or tripped, and that he struck his head on the floor but not upon any objects. Employee had no recollection of the fall. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, asserting that the fall did not arise from his employment. The trial court found that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof as to causation. Employee has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this workers’ compensation suit, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his back. His employer denied that an injury occurred and further contended that, if an injury did occur, it did not arise from or in the course of his employment. The trial court held that the injury was the result of the employee’s attempted assault on a co-employee and, therefore, did not arise from his employment. The complaint was dismissed, and the employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s finding was in error. We affirm the judgment.
 

I cannot concur in the majority opinion. The petitioner alleges that he entered his guilty plea and signed the waiver of right of appeal as a part of an agreement with prison officials that his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a five dollar fine. He alleges that, instead of the promised punishment, his visitation privileges were suspended for six months. It seems to me that, if he can prove all of this, his plea and waiver of right of appeal would be rendered invalid. If this be the case, his right to appeal would remain intact. I also believe his petition filed July 13, 2010, was timely as I believe the time for filing did not begin to run until Commissioner Ray’s May 20, 2010, decision.

In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property and debts and its order requiring him to provide wife with his residential address. We find no error in the division of the marital estate, but agree that the trial court acted prematurely by including in the divorce decree a requirementthathusband provide wife with his residential address.
 

The Defendant, Claudia O. Draime, pled guilty to theft over $60,000, a Class B felony, for an agreed Range I sentence of eight years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence and restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied probation and ordered the Defendant to serve her eight-year sentence in confinement. It is from that judgment that the Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly imposed a sentence of full confinement. After a thorough review of the law and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court granted father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and denied mother’s subsequent petition to modify the parenting plan. We affirm the trial court’s decisions.
 

The Petitioner, Michael Wayne Davis, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Larry Wayne Webb, guilty of forgery in an amount over one thousand dollars and identity theft, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a vehicle certificate of title into evidence at trial; and (3) his convictions for forgery and identity theft should merge. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, who is incarcerated, was charged with possession of a cell phone and pled guilty. He filed a Writ of Certiorari after punishment was levied against him, contending that he understood his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a $5 fine, but the punishment meted out was suspension of visitation privileges for six months. The Trial Judge upheld the suspension and dismissed the Petition, finding that petitioner pled guilty and waived his right to appeal, and the writ was filed after the sixty day time frame had elapsed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The issue in this appeal of a parental termination proceeding is whether the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the minor child. We agree with the father that the trial court was required by Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules to appoint a guardian ad litem. Because the court failed to do so, the trial court’s decision must be vacated.
 

Husband filed a petition to terminate or modify the amount of alimony in futuro he was obligated to pay, asserting that a post-divorce decrease in his income as well as the fact that Wife secured employment after the divorce constituted substantial and material changes in their circumstances which warranted the elimination of or a reduction in the amount of alimony. The trial court held that, while the loss of Husband’s job was not anticipated, there was nota substantialand materialchange of circumstances because Husband had otherassets from which to continue to make the alimony payments; the court accordingly dismissed the petition and awarded Wife her counsel fees. Husband appeals the dismissal of the petition and award of attorney fees to Wife. We affirm the holding that Husband’s assets are available to satisfy his alimony obligation and the award of attorney fees to Wife. We vacate the dismissal of the petition and remand for further consideration.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee alleged that he was working as a carpenter for the defendant, Wayne Neeley, when he fell from the roof of a house and seriously injured his right ankle. Neeley denied that he was the employer and also denied that he was a subcontractor for the defendant, B & L Construction, the general contractor. The trial court held that the employee was employed by Neeley and that Neeley was a subcontractor of B & L Construction. Because Neeley did not have workers’ compensation insurance, the trial court found B & L Construction liable for workers’ compensations benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 and awarded both temporary total disability benefits and accrued medical expenses, but nothing else. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits. In response, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by awarding temporary disability benefits. We hold that the trial court properly awarded temporary total benefits, but erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits to the employee. The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, his insurance company, claiming a burglary loss. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run, but plaintiff argued that under contract law the statute of limitations is six years. The Trial Court enforced the one-year statute of limitations contained in plaintiff's policy of insurance and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court which held that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the policy was applicable to this claim.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Nickolus L. Johnson, of premeditated first degree murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), for the shooting death of Officer Mark Vance of the Bristol Police Department. Following penalty phase proceedings, the jury found the presence of the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) that thedefendant previously had been convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known when he committed the murder that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (9) (2006). After finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors presented by the defense, the jury sentenced the Defendant to death. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (2006). In this appeal, the Defendant challenges both his conviction and accompanying death sentence. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented during the guilt phase was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statute violates article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution; (3) whether the exclusion of jurors from the jury based on their views on the death penalty violates article I, sections 6 and 19 of the Tennessee Constitution; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the videotape of the Defendant taken in Officer Graham’s patrol car immediately following the Defendant’s arrest; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to require defense counsel to present mental health mitigation evidence despite the Defendant’s objection to the presentation of such evidence; (6) whether individual and cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument at the penalty phase denied the Defendant his right to a fair trial and should have resulted in the trial court declaring a mistrial; (7) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s requests for special jury instructions during the penalty phase in response to the prosecutor’s assertion during closing that the Defendant had failed to express remorse; (8) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s oral motion for a change of venue based on the effect pretrial publicity in the case had on potential jurors; (9) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for authorization of funds with which to hire an expert to support the claim that pretrial publicity in the case required a change of venue in order to protect the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; and (10) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for additional peremptory challenges during jury selection. Following our review of the record, and our mandatory review of the sentence, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006), we affirm the judgments including the sentence of death.