APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. The parties had two children, still minors at the time of the divorce trial. After the trial, motions to alter and amend were filed, one of which disputed the number of parenting days awarded each party. The divorce decree was amended in response to the motions to alter or amend, and the trial court ordered the parties to try to resolve the dispute on the number of parenting days and report back to the court on the issue. Without attempting such resolution, the father filed his notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Jerry Phillips (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for four counts of aggravated sexual battery, resulting in an effective sentence of fifty-four years. Specifically, he contends that the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony render the evidence insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Chancy Jones, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-four years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s exclusion of certain orders of protection, which had been sought and entered against the victim by persons unrelated to this case, and which the Defendant sought to admit in an effort to prove that the victim was the first aggressor. The trial court held that the orders of protection themselves were not relevant, but offered the Defendant the opportunity to introduce the testimony of the persons who obtained the protective orders against the victim. For his second issue, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, William A. Osborne, of three counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property between $500 and $1000, one count of theft of property between $500 and $1000, and one count of theft of property between $1000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to an effective sentence of thirty-six years, to be served at 60%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to find the Defendant guilty on Count 1 after the jury had previously announced it could not unanimously agree as to Count 1; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial following prejudicial statements made by the State’s witnesses; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court, and we affirm those judgments.
 

This is a grandparent visitation case. Appellant is the former stepfather of the Appellee. After approximately twenty-five years of marriage, Appellant and Appellee’s mother divorced. During the marriage, Appellant maintained a close relationship to Appellee and Appellee’s child. Even after the divorce, Appellee allowed Appellant to regularly visit with her child. After Appellee began limiting Appellant’s contact with her child, Appellant filed a petition for grandparent visitation. The trial court concluded that Appellant did not fall within the definition of “grandparent” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(e), and dismissed the petition for lack of standing. We affirm.

This appeal requires us to construe a provision of the parties’ 1987 divorce decree with respect to the amount of Bonnie Jean White Cain’s (“Wife”) share of Gregory Lee Cain’s (“Husband”) military retirement benefits. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in interpreting the 1987 divorce decree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.

Defendants made a series of loans to Plaintiffs and a dispute arose as to the interest and principal owed. A judgment was entered in favor of Defendants. However, Defendants appealed the award, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, which allegedly reduced the judgment amount, and in refusing to hold all shareholders of the Plaintiff companies liable for the judgment. Plaintiffs also claim, on appeal, that the Special Master and the trial court set an incorrect “starting point” for determining the judgment owed. We affirm the Special Master and the trial court in all respects.
 

After obtaining a sizable judgment against her former husband in a Canadian court, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Tennessee in 1999 seeking to have property allegedly owned by the former husband sold in partial satisfaction of the judgment. After the former husband failed to appear or defend the Tennessee lawsuit, the circuit court also entered a default judgment against the former husband. However, other related issues involving other parties were tried and eventually appealed over the next several years. In 2011, the trial court finally ordered the sale of the former husband’s property in partial satisfaction of the judgment. Husband appealed from the entry of that order, and he argues on appeal that the wife’s attempt to execute on his property is time-barred under various statutes and Rules of Civil Procedure. Finding no merit in his arguments on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal arises from an alleged agreement concerning a waste collection business. In 2007, U.S. Waste Atlanta, LLC (“U.S. Waste Atlanta”), filed suit against Mark Englund and William Englund Sr. (“the Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that the Defendants improperly took possession of certain trucks. U.S. Waste Atlanta argued, among other things, that written documents demonstrated that William Englund Sr. had an agreement with Clarence Emmer, owner of U.S. Waste, LLC (“U.S. Waste”), to transfer trucks to U.S. Waste Atlanta in exchange for an interest in the company. Clarence Emmer, on behalf of U.S. Waste Atlanta, made finance payments on the trucks but the transfer never happened. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court partially granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding Clarence Emmer a judgment against William Englund Sr. for $36,073.90. The Trial Court also made this a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. William Englund Sr. appeals, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an agreement existed bars summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against the defendant housing authority. The plaintiffs alleged the housing authority was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. The housing authority filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted the plaintiffs’ negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The trial court denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. We granted review to determine whether the plaintiffs’ negligence claim is preempted by federal law or, in the alternative, whether the housing authority is immune from suit under the discretionary function exception of the GTLA. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ negligence suit is not preempted by federal law. We further conclude that the housing authority’s failure to evict is an operational decision and that the housing authority is not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

Defendant, Carol Ann Tully, pled nolo contendere to DUI, first offense, and properly reserved a certified question of law to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), after her motion to suppress evidence was denied. Defendant asserts that there was not a valid basis for the traffic stop which directly led to her arrest and that she was therefore subjected to an unconstitutional stop and seizure. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a grandparent visitation case. The child at issue was adjudicated dependent and neglected; the appellant paternal great-grandmother was awarded legal custody. Months later, the child’s mother died. The appellee maternal grandmother then filed a petition in juvenile court seeking both custody and alternatively grandparent visitation. The order denying the grandmother’s petition was appealed to the circuit court for a de novo hearing. The circuit court denied the grandmother’s petition for custody, but awarded grandparent visitation. The custodian great-grandmother now appeals. We reverse and dismiss the grandmother’s petition.
 

The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, was convicted by a Blount County jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a theft, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. Lowe subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Blount County Circuit Court, which was dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Lowe argues that the judgments are void because numerous constitutional errors deprived the trial court of authority to try and sentence him. He asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly, that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure and admission at trial of evidence, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by his counsel’s performance at trial, and that his right against double jeopardy and due process rights were violated by multiplicitous indictments. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This is an appeal of an order setting aside a default judgment. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was granted. The order setting aside the default judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff now appeals. We find that Rule 54.02 certification was improvidently granted, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances occurred that warranted a modification of the parenting plan and the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of their children. Mother also appeals the termination of her alimony payments and an award of attorney’s fees to Father. We affirm the finding that a substantialand material change of circumstance occurred and that it is in the best interests of the children that Father be the primary residential parent. We affirm the termination of alimony to Mother and the award of attorney’s fees to Father.
 

The petitioner, Jacob L. Peachy, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him that his sentence was to be served on probation. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a legal malpractice action. Appellee attorney drafted a contract for Appellant medical provider; the contract contained a fee-split clause in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225. When the other party to the contract, a hospital, allegedly breached the contract and sued the medical provider, the medical provider counterclaimed for breach of contract. The hospital answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the contract was illegal and unenforceable.The trial court ruled that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6225 did not apply to the contract at issue. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the medical provider for more than one million dollars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225 invalidated the contract, and remanded the case for dismissal. Within one year of the Court of Appeals opinion, the medical provider filed this legal malpractice case against the drafting attorney. The trial court dismissed the case as beyond the one-year legal malpractice statute of limitations. We affirm.
 

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Brown, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The conviction for simple possession of cocaine was merged with the Class B felony, and Brown received an effective twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession with intent to deliver, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tray Turner, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Criminal Court for Knox County. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 14 years incarceration at 100 percent service. The Defendant contends (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve 100 percent of his sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2008, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ray Turner, of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivering 300 grams or more of cocaine. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 22, 2010). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he alleged that his indictment was void because the State improperly amended the indictment to include that he committed the offenses in a school zone and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. On appeal, he contends the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.
 

Nero Oswald Jones (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing statements made by the Defendant to law enforcement officials; (2) excluding the Defendant’s line of questioning on cross-examination of a witness regarding potential bias based upon alleged romantic interest; (3) excluding testimony of one witness purporting to impeach the testimony of another witness; and (4) allowing the testimony of a lay witness based on her experience with firearms. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Joel Scott Stephens, guilty of driving on a revoked license and violating the financial responsibility law. He was found not guilty of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total sentence of six months in the Hamblen County Jail, with ninety days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of ninety days of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Trial Court held Man Keng Ho liable for unpaid rents on commercial property that Ho had leased from his landlord. Ho claimed against Soon Lee Pang, appellant, on the grounds that Pang was the guarantor on the lease. At the subsequent trial between Ho and Pang, Ho acting as an interpreter for Pang, the Trial Court entered Judgment against Pang for the full amount of the Judgment against Ho as guarantor under the terms of the lease. Pang then filed a Rule 60 Motion seeking relief from the Judgment, principally on the grounds that he was entitled to an interpreter and the Trial Court erred in utilizing his co-defendant, who had an interest in the case, as Pang's interpreter. The Trial Court overruled the Rule 60 Motion and Pang appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not complying with Rules 41 and 42 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remand for a retrial on the merits.

The defendant, Princeton Moody, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years at 100 percent for the second degree murder conviction, eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction, with the murder and aggravated assault sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his second degree murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a hearsay statement as an excited utterance, in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior convictions for reckless endangerment, in admitting the victim’s medical records, and in allowing the medical examiner to testify with respect to an autopsy report that she did not create. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.