APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this negligence case, Kristie Jackson sued Williamson & Sons Funeral Home (the “Funeral Home”) for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress following the burial of her mother, Edna Louise Lewis. Ms. Jackson alleged that the Funeral Home was negligent in failing to delay the burial after learning that she objected to the arrangements that had been made and that the Funeral Home’s actions caused her emotional distress. The Funeral Home moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the Funeral Home had affirmatively negated an essential element of Ms. Jackson’s claim by showing that it did not owe a duty to her under the circumstances of the case. Ms. Jackson appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer (“truck”) collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated (“PBTCI”) and Loudon County Trucking (“LCT”), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking (“PBT”). Mr. Jackson’s truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively “Trucking Company”) for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 1 The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court’s final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal.

The petitioner, James G. Watson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he failed to receive statutorily mandated pretrial jail and good behavior credits toward his sentences, which rendered his confinement illegal. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, at the motion for new trial, and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Alvin Green, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty-six years, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Dexter Johnson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, receiving an effective life sentence in the Department of Correction. In the instant petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner alleges that his convictions are void based upon the State’s failure to provide a factual basis to support the pleas. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that nothing in the petition would support a finding that the convictions were void. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court erred in its summary dismissal. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Ray Tipton, was convicted by a Washington County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to a twenty-two year term of imprisonment for each conviction, with two sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective forty-four year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Tipton raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the three counts of aggravated rape should be merged into a single conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing an emergency room physician to testify regarding the effect of intoxication on a man’s ability to ejaculate; (4) whether the sentence length for each conviction was excessive; and (5) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Bradford Stewart, Appellant, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for one count of reckless endangerment, one count of vehicular assault, one count of failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and two counts of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of reckless aggravated assault and one count of vehicular assault, both Class D felonies. Appellant pled guilty to failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility. The trial court merged the convictions for reckless aggravated assault and vehicular assault into one conviction for vehicular assault and sentenced Appellant to twelve years in incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on Community Corrections. The State appealed. On appeal, the following issue is presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court imposed an improper sentence by allowing Appellant to serve a sentence of split confinement. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that as a Career Offender sentenced to twelve years, Appellant was statutorily ineligible for a CommunityCorrections sentence. Accordingly,the matter is reversed and remanded for resentencing.

This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

A contract for the sale of a sixty-four acre tract of land provided that a vacant house on the tract and the lot immediately surrounding it would automatically revert to the seller if the buyers did not install a water line across the property within a year of the contract’s execution. The same condition was set out in the warranty deed. The buyers failed to install the water line, but the seller, a Texas resident, did not immediately attempt to retake possession of the house and lot. Five years after the contract was signed, the seller filed a “notice of automatic reverter of title,” followed by a declaratory judgment suit to quiet title and to recover damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the seller, ruling that the contract and the deed created a fee simple determinable and, therefore, that ownership of the disputed property reverted to her by operation of law one year after the contract of sale was executed. A hearing on damages resulted in an award to the seller of about $142,000 in compensatory damages, which included income that the buyers had collected from renting out the house prior to the filing of the notice of reverter. Buyers contend on appeal that the estate created by the contract of sale was not a fee simple determinable, but rather a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, a form of future interest under which the property does not revert to the seller until the seller takes some action to retake possession of the property. Such an interest would result in a much smaller award of damages against the buyers under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract of sale created a fee simple determinable, but we modify its award of damages to correct an error.
 

Employer filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari to challenge the order of the Tennessee Department of Labor, issued pursuant to the Request for Assistance protocol, that it provide temporary disability and medical workers’ compensation benefits. Upon the motion of the Departmentof Labor,the trial court dismissed the petition on two grounds: that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision and that the employer possessed another adequate remedy at law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6238(b)(6). We affirm.
 

This is an appeal from an administrative hearing wherein the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners suspended a physician’s medical license for one year and imposed other conditions after finding that, among other things, the physician had violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12) (2010). Upon review, the trial court affirmed the Board’s ruling; however, because the Board failed to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board was required to articulate the standard of care in its deliberations. Therefore, we vacate the ruling of the trial court to the extent that it affirms the Board’s decision that the physician violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12). However, rather than reversing the Board’s decisions, we are remanding the matter to the Board and instructing it to conduct deliberations based on the existing record and articulate the applicable standard of care as required by the statute.

The Petitioner, James L. Lessenberry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for nine offenses: rape, a Class B felony; incest, a Class C felony; four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies; and three counts of attempted rape, Class C felonies. Under the plea agreement, he is to serve twelve years for rape as a violent offender and six years as a Range I offender for each of the remaining convictions, with all sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a previous drug conviction for which the trial court revoked his five-year community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying his post-conviction claim that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The majority asserts that the Board must “articulate what the standard of care is in its deliberations.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(g)(2010). To this end, the majority today has found “the standard of care” to be unambiguous. I also find this language to be unambiguous. My reading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-214(g), however, compels a different conclusion.

An Obion County jury convicted the Defendant, Walter Andrew Ware, of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to sixteen years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented, which was circumstantial, is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court made an improper ruling during voir dire. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. While the appellant father was incarcerated, the child was taken into protective custody because of the mother’s drug use. The mother surrendered her parental rights. The father remained incarcerated. After a trial, the father’s parental rights were terminated on several grounds, including failure to comply with the permanency plan. The father appeals, and on appeal the State waives all grounds except for failure to comply with the permanency plan. After review of the record, we conclude that this ground for termination was not established because the record does not show clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father and to reunify parent and child. Therefore, we reverse.

The defendant, Deangelo M. Radley, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2006), and attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2), concerning the legality of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The trial court granted a divorce to the parents of three minor children. The permanent parenting plan incorporated into the decree of divorce designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ twin sons and younger daughter and granted the father standard visitation. The parties lived in Warren County prior to the divorce, in close proximityto the school the children attended. Two years after divorce, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, and Mother moved to another county. The children all testified in chambers that they wanted to spend half the time with their father and to remain enrolled in the Warren County schools. The court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the two boys that their parenting be shared equally between the parties, with custody alternating weekly. The residential plan for the nine year-old girl was left unchanged. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that there had been a material change of circumstances, and she asks us to restore the previous parenting plan. We affirm the trial court, but modify the judgment to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ sons.
 

The husband and wife had separated, and the wife then filed for an Order of Protection against the husband, which was granted by the Trial Court. The wife then filed a Complaint for divorce, which was ultimately granted and in the final divorce decree the Trial Court incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement which contained a mutual restraining order which restrained the parties from coming about, harassing or threatening or assaulting each other. Subsequently, the wife filed a motion in this case to extend the Order of Protection, and after an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court extended the Order of Protection for five years, as allowed by statute. The husband appealed, and on appeal argues that the divorce decree, voided the Order of Protection. We hold that the Trial Judge acted in accordance with the statute in extending the Order of Protection, and the divorce decree did not remove jurisdiction from the Trial Court to issue the extended Order of Protection.
 

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, appeals the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kenneth D. Hubanks, for possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, obtained by execution of a search warrant upon his residence, which the trial court denied. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to all of the charges but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search warrant established probable cause to search his residence. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of mother and father on the grounds of persistence of the conditions that required the child’s removal and substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans. Both parents appealed. The mother and father argue the Department of Children’s Services did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination of parental rights and did not clearly and convincingly prove termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The mother also argues the trial court erred in determining she waived her right to appear at the termination hearing. We affirm.

The defendant, Will Rogers Salmon, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to DUI, first offense, and violation of the implied consent law and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to supervised probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant attempted to reserve the following two certified questions of law: (1) whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, justified his traffic stop and detention; and (2) whether the arresting officer’s intrusion into his vehicle constituted a custodial environment that required the suppression of any post-arrest statements pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Based on our review, we agree with the State that the trial court properly found that the traffic stop and detention were justified. We further agree that the defendant’s second certified question of law is not dispositive of his case and, thus, is not properly before this court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Leon Cox, filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from a traffic stop conducted by a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officer outside of TVA property. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tobias Senter, a/k/a Toby Senter, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a life sentence imposed by a federal district court. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.