APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Paul Leon Cox, filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from a traffic stop conducted by a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officer outside of TVA property. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tobias Senter, a/k/a Toby Senter, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a life sentence imposed by a federal district court. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Majid Farraj, pled guilty to theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to five years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Valentino L. Dyer, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault. The trial court modified the conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, merged the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment into the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated burglary conviction and thirty-two years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to the defendant’s sentences in another case. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the indictment was defective for failing to state sufficient facts; (2) whether he adequately waived his right to testify in his own defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by disallowing evidence of the victims’ alleged activity as drug dealers to show their reputation for dishonesty; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (5) whether the trial court properly sentenced him as a Range II offender and whether the sentences were excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The losing candidate filed an election contest alleging that the election commission made a mistake byplacing the candidate who eventually won the election on the ballot. The election commission admitted iterred in determining thatthe candidate who later won had a sufficient number of valid signatures on her nominating petition. The trial court found that the losing candidate failed to carry his burden of proof and dismissed the case. He appealed. We affirm, finding that this was not a proper election contest and that a challenge to a person’s appearance on a ballot should ordinarily be filed before the election.
 

The petition filed by the father asked that the father become primary residential parent of the child, and that child support be set pursuant to Tennessee child support guidelines. At an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge granted the father temporary custody of the child and gave the mother parenting time with the child on two weekends each month. The father's obligation of child support was suspended, and the Trial Court set the matter for further hearing five months later. At the conclusion of that hearing the Trial Court determined that the mother's income was "not less than $90,000.00 per year" and ordered child support and a back judgment pendente lite for child support. The mother appealed. We hold the Trial Court's Judgment should be modified because the evidence does not support income at the level set by the Trial Court. We modify the amount downward to $52,000.00 a year and remand for the purposes of establishing child support in accordance with these guidelines.
 

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, Willie Michael Richardson, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and evading arrest. The trial court merged the first two convictions and sentenced the appellant to twelve years in confinement. For the evading arrest conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty nine days to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that his twelve-year sentence is excessive and that consecutive sentencing is improper. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract to execute mutual wills. Ina Ruth Brown(“Mrs. Brown”), and her husband, Roy Brown, Jr. (“Mr. Brown”), executed mutual wills as agreed by contract. After Mr. Brown’s death, Mrs. Brown executed a new will. Mrs. Brown died. Rockford Evan Estes (“Defendant”), Mrs. Brown’s son, submitted the new will for probate. Mr. Brown’s adult children, Roy E. Brown, III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis (“the Plaintiffs”) filed this will contest suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”), contesting the new will on the basis that, among other things, the mutual wills between Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown were irrevocable. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion, granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and voided the new will created by Mrs. Brown. Defendant appeals. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Trial Court did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this will contest based on this breach of contract claim. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after also finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to execute mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Malcolm Dudley Thomas, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by ruling that the State’s rebuttal witnesses could testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial by placing or attempting to place prejudicial and irrelevant facts before the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State’s rebuttal witnesses to testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

When Father failed to pay child support as ordered, the State filed a petition for contempt against him. The juvenile court found him in civil contempt based upon his willful nonpayment.  We affirm.

The defendant, Jason Wayne White, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother and Father, the divorced parents of two minor children, filed a joint motion in the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court denied the joint motion and Mother appeals.

A pro se litigant failed to pay the court costs resulting from complaints he had filed, and the Circuit Court entered an order in 2006 that allowed it to refer future complaints by that litigant to a Special Master for screening. The court’s order directed the Special Master to determine whether the court costs had been satisfied and to file a written report recommending whether the complaint should be allowed to proceed or be dismissed. The trial court was empowered to dismiss the complaint without a hearing if the recommendation of the Special Master was that the case not proceed. In the appeal before us, the litigant appealed from a general sessions judgment that denied him any relief for the purchase of a lawn mower that he alleged was defective. The Special Master’s investigation revealed that the litigant had failed to pay any of the court costs previously assessed against him and that additional costs had accrued since then. In accordance with the Special Master’s recommendation, the court dismissed his complaint. We find that the trial court acted within its authority, and we accordingly affirm.

In this dispute over child support arrearage, father argues that the trial court erred in increasing the amount of his monthly payment. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Angelica S. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Irene S. (“Mother”) and Jose S. “Father”). When the Child was five, Mother left her with Father. Mother never returned. Father, an illegal immigrant, subsequently married Melissa S. (“Stepmother”) and made her the Child’s legal custodian. In 2009, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took custody of the Child after the Child alleged that Stepmother had abused her. The following year, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the court granted 1 the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had abandoned the Child by failing to visit her in the relevant four-month time period and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the forfeiture of personal property seized in connection with a criminal investigation. The petitioner’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home. Items of his personal property were seized by authorities, and later forfeited and sold. The petitioner property owner filed this lawsuit, arguing that administrative protocols regarding forfeiture proceedings were not followed and contesting the forfeiture of his personal property. The administrative law judge held that the forfeiture and sale were valid, and the property owner appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed. The property owner now appeals to this Court. We affirm.
 

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy to commit that tort. Appellees were invitees, and there is no evidence that they exceeded the scope of the invitation despite the fact that Appellees had ulterior motives in procuring admission. Appellants failed to show that Appellees’ actions were objectionably unreasonable or highly offensive, which are essential elements of the invasion of privacy tort. Furthermore, in the absence of an underlying tort, there can be no conspiracy to commit the tort. Affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Courtney Watkins, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony of several witnesses, that photographs depicting the victim’s injuries were prejudicial, that the trial court erred by allowing him to be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A final forfeiture was entered against the Appellant, Gary’s Bonding Company, in the Marion County Circuit Court ordering the complete forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Judson Layne. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering a final forfeiture and in denying its petition for exoneration. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Dissatisfied with his conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Keith Lonell Richardson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. Discerning no error, we affirm

Husband filed a petition to modify the amount of alimony in futuro set in the divorce decree, asserting that health problems and a decrease in his income arising after the divorce constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of alimony. Husband appeals the denial of the petition and award of attorneyfees to Wife. Finding that Husband was entitled to modification and that the award of attorney fees was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the award of alimony.
 

The appellant, Markquitton Sanders,pled guilty to two felony drug offenses and was allowed to serve his sentences in community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of violating his community corrections sentences and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a term of incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Dwayne R. Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments in this case, and the State moves this court to affirm the circuit court’s order summarily via Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the circuit court’s order is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings.