APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case, Kathryn M. Claiborne sought to set aside a quitclaim deed relating to property given to Larry W. Goldston. The trial court set aside the deed but awarded damages to Larry W. Goldston based upon his counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Kathryn M. Claiborne appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Appellant, Steven Thacker, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, James Alton Campbell, appeals the partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The parties’ Parenting Plan required that major decisions regarding religious upbringing be made jointly, and if no consensus could be reached, that the dispute be submitted to a mediator. Mother had the parties’ children baptized without Father’s knowledge or consent, and Father filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against Mother. The trial court found Mother in civil contempt, but it dismissed the criminal contempt petition, apparently for insufficient notice. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother was in civil contempt, and its award of attorney fees to Father based upon the civil contempt finding. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s criminal contempt petition, and we remand for further criminal contempt proceedings.

The petitioner, Tarina Simmons, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, entered best-interest guilty pleas to two counts of second degree murder and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years. Thereafter, she filed a post-conviction petition alleging that her guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately consult with her about the plea process and review the evidence against her; (2) overemphasizing the possible number of years the petitioner could receive in jail, resulting in the pleas being coerced; and (3) allowing the petitioner to proceed when her mental state was not stable enough to allow her to properly participate in the process. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The petitioner, Ydale Banks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated burglary, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. He argues that: (1) the post-conviction court erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by the instructions submitted to the jury that contained the trial court’s handwritten corrections; (2) the post-conviction court erred in determining that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in not granting a new trial due to cumulative error. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A jury convicted Antonio Sellers (“the Defendant”) of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years of incarceration. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary issue regarding leading questions on redirect examination and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is entitled to no relief on the issues raised. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consumer protection case, we must determine which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applies to a motion that seeks relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion has been filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court has not expressly directed the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Rule 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint have been determined. We hold that Rule 54.02, rather than Rule 60.02, applies in this situation; however, we also hold that the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of “excusable neglect.” We also hold that actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-109(a)(2001) of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the default judgment, vacating the award of damages, and remanding the case to the trial court for a new hearing on the amount of damages.
 

The mother and stepfather of a three year old girl filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father on the ground of abandonment so that the stepfather could adopt her. After hearing the proof, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioners had not met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the father’s failure to visit the child or his failure to provide child support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition were willful. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, William L.A. Church, challenges the trial court’s denial of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis relief from his convictions for passing a forged check and aggravated assault, alleging that newly discovered evidence warrants relief. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner failed to allege any “newly discovered evidence” and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed Appellant’s claims upon concluding that the State was not negligent, and that in the alternative, Appellant was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Claims Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission and dismiss.
 

The Petitioner, Tommy Earl Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based upon its finding that the petition was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State’s motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
 

After twenty-five years of marriage, Kenneth A. Ritchie (“Husband”) sued Elizabeth Widmaier Pew Ritchie (“Wife”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Judgment for Divorce, which inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, distributed the marital assets and debts, and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Husband appeals to this Court raising an issue about the alimony in solido. Wife raises an issue about the Trial Court’s refusal to award her attorney’s fees, and also requests an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm, and decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

This is a post-divorce parental relocation case. The mother seeks to relocate to Grand Prairie, Alberta, Canada, with the parties’ seven (7) minor children, in order to reside with her new husband, a Canadian citizen she met on the internet. The father opposes the relocation. The mother spends substantially more time with the children, thus Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6108(d) applies. Finding there was no reasonable purpose for moving to Canada, that the move would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the children, and that the move is not in the best interests of the children, the trial court denied the request to relocate. We affirm.
 

After an automobile accident between the insured’s van and a motorcycle, the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the van was covered under a commercial policy with a liability limit of $500,000 or a personal policy with liability limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. The insurer alleged that before the accident the insured had instructed his insurance agent to transfer the van from the commercial policy to the personal policy. The insured denied this and alleged that he had instructed the agent to retain the van on the commercial policy. The trial court ruled that because the insurer had sent the insured a letter and premium bills showing the change in coverage and the insured had paid the bills without objection, he had ratified the transfer and the van was covered under the personal policy. The Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the action of the insurance agent in transferring the van to the personal policy was not subject to ratification by the insured because the insurance agent was not acting in the insured’s stead or for his benefit when it made the transfer. We further hold that the insurer is estopped from denying coverage under the commercial policy. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, although on different grounds.
 

In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals a judgment for child support arrearages and award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Finding that the court erred in its determination of the amount of arrearages, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. The award of attorney’s fees is affirmed.
 

We granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in this case to determine whether an insured,who requested replacementinsurancecoverageonhispersonalandbusiness vehicles in order to reduce his premiums, is entitled to more coverage than that provided in his new personal policy when he failed to read the amended policy declarations and to notify the insurance company that he desired different coverage on one of his vehicles. Applying settled legal principles to the essentially undisputed facts of this case, I would hold that the insured accepted the new coverage by failing to review the amended policy declarations and to give the insurance company timely notice that the coverage was less than he desired.
 

Petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, housed at Morgan County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wayne County Chancery Court seeking review of the prison disciplinary proceedings for his conviction for the disciplinary offense of “violation of state law” while incarcerated at South Central Correctional Center in Clifton, Tennessee. Based upon the filing of an Inmate Affidavit filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-801 et seq., a certified copy of his Inmate Trust Fund Account and a Uniform Civil Affidavit of Indigency, the trial court filed an Order allowing filing on pauper’s oath. Upon motion of respondents, the court was advised that Petitioner falsely stated that he had no income from anysource. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-804, the trial court dismissed the petition upon the finding that the inmate’s affidavit of indigency was false. We affirm.
 

This appeal involves the question of whether a city’s ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits implicates Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) (Supp. 2008) which permits pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a “zoning change.” After the Cityof Jefferson Cityannexed the propertyon which a fireworks retailer’s business was located, the retailer filed suit in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b) permitted it to continue to sell fireworks. The trial court dismissed the retailer’s complaint in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, No. E2009-02355-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272744, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010). We granted the retailer’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to clarify the application of the “substantial interference” test in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. 2004) to ordinances such as the one involved in this case. We have determined that our decision in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville requires consideration of both the terms and effects of the challenged ordinance. Thus, the courts must first determine whether the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s “general plan of zoning.” If the courts determine that the challenged ordinance relates to the city’s general plan of zoning, then, and only then, may the courts ascertain whether the ordinance results in a “substantial interference” with the use of land. Based on this record, we have determined that Jefferson City’s challenged ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits is not related to the city’s general plan of zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the courts below.
 

The appellant, Aaron Switzer, was convicted in the Blount County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and domestic assault, and he was granted probation after service of nine months in confinement. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation for failure to comply with the terms of release. After the revocation, the trial court imposed a sentence of split confinement, and the appellant appeals that ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a garnishment action. Erlanger Medical Center (“Erlanger”) obtained a judgment against Angela Strong (“Strong”), an employee, by the time of trial, of Shoney’s North Georgia, LLC (“the Garnishee”). Erlanger sought to garnish Strong’s wages. Erlanger argued that Strong’s tips should be included in the calculation of her disposable earnings for the purposes of garnishment. The Garnishee disagreed, arguing, among other things, that federal law and labor policy stood for the proposition that tips were not to be included as wages for garnishment purposes. The Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) held that tips were, in fact, to be treated as wages subject to the calculation for garnishment purposes. The Garnishee appeals. We hold that tips are not to be included in the calculation of disposable wages for the purposes of garnishment. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment.

I concur with the majority opinion in result only for the reason that the post-conviction trial court erred by granting Petitioner a delayed appeal as to her sentence. The post-conviction trial court filed a fifteen-page order of disposition of the post-conviction petition, setting forth in detail its findings of fact and conclusions of law. I have carefully reviewed this order and have found no findings of fact by the post-conviction trial court which support the granting of post-conviction relief to Petitioner to the extent of granting a delayed appeal of the sentence imposed upon her. In fact, I find the term “delayed appeal” mentioned only in the order’s introduction, (“The Court, however, shall grant Petitioner the opportunity to seek a delayed appeal as to her sentence.”) and in its conclusion (“The Court, however, shall grant Petitioner the opportunity to seek a delayed appeal as to her sentence.”). No reasons are provided for the granting of the delayed appeal. The proof at the post-conviction hearing was that trial counsel informed Petitioner that he would not be representing her on appeal of her sentence, but that he informed her she was entitled to an appeal of the sentence. Furthermore,the record reflects that trial counsel was retained to represent Petitioner in the trial court, but had not been retained to represent her on appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se “Notice of Appeal,” but on the advice of the inmate “law clerks” at the correctional facility, she voluntarily dismissed her appeal. There is nothing in the post-conviction trial court’s comments from the bench following the hearing, or in its order on the post-conviction petition, setting forth any deficiency by the trial counsel, or, obviously, any resulting prejudice to Petitioner as a result of deficient representation by trial counsel regarding appeal of the sentence. It appears from the record that the post-conviction court gratuitously granted Petitioner a delayed appeal with no constitutional basis found to grant such relief. Trial counsel may have provided deficient representation ;if so,Petitioner may have been prejudiced thereby. However,the post-conviction court made no factual findings to either support or reject these conclusions. Accordingly, I would reverse that portion of the order granting a “delayed appeal” and affirm the dismissal of the Petition for post-conviction relief.

A Lake County jury convicted the Petitioner, Steven Ray Thacker, of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and sentence. See State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208 (Tenn. 2005). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal; (3) the sentence of death violates his constitutional rights; (4) the aggravating circumstances of his case do not preclude a finding that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance; and (5) he is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post conviction court’s judgment.

In two separate cases, the Petitioner, Donna Leigh Pearson, pled guilty to burglary and theft of over $1000. The trial court sentenced her to ten years on each count, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction at 45%, and, because the Petitioner committed one offense while released on bond for the other offense, the trial court ordered consecutive sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition but granted the Petitioner the opportunity to seek a delayed appeal of her sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) she received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) her guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition and we affirm her sentence.

After Metro’s waste-to-energy facility was damaged/destroyed by fire, Metro and the facility’s insurer filed suit against Defendants. Prior to trial, Defendants’ expert was precluded from testifying regarding the facility’s value, its condition prior to the fire, and the alleged pre-fire plans to discontinue its operation. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, and Defendants appeal. On appeal, Defendants challenge the exclusion of certain evidence, the jurycharge regarding damages, and an adverse inference juryinstruction given as a sanction against Defendants. Additionally, Plaintiffs challenge the denial of prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court in all respects.