APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant’s property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm.

The appellant, Markquitton Sanders,pled guilty to two felony drug offenses and was allowed to serve his sentences in community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of violating his community corrections sentences and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a term of incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Dwayne R. Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments in this case, and the State moves this court to affirm the circuit court’s order summarily via Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the circuit court’s order is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging defendant owed money on a loan. Defendant defended on the ground that the contract was oral and the statute of frauds barred any collection. The Trial Court awarded Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

This is a modification of child custody case. Mother and Father entered into a consent order naming Father primary residential parent and giving Mother visitation. Mother petitioned the juvenile court to change custody. The court denied the petition to change custody, but modified Mother’s visitation. Mother appeals.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joshua Lee Brown, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of felony murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-12-101 (2010), 39-13-403 (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each of the felony murder convictions, to twenty years’ confinement for attempted first degree murder, and to ten years’ confinement for attempted especially aggravated robbery. The attempted first degree murder conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to redact a portion of the video evidence; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole; (3) the trial court erred bydenying his motion to strike the felony murder aggravating circumstance from the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; (4) the trial court erred by granting the State’s requestto augmentthe pattern juryinstruction on the “heinous,atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred by rejecting his requested sentencing instruction regarding the statutorymitigating circumstance thathe acted underthe substantial domination of another person; (6) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court failed to give the jury meaningful guidance or directions as to their deliberations during the punishment phase of the trial; (7) the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to establish the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance as to one of the victims during sentencing. We conclude that although the trial court erred when giving a special jury instruction, the error was harmless in light of the whole record. Furthermore, we conclude that although the evidence was insufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance and the trial court failed to make the necessary findings when imposing consecutive sentences, the sentences imposed were appropriate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster “engaged in” an ultrahazardous activity or “participated” in a “drag race,” and we remand on these issues.

Much aggrieved by his guilty-pleaded convictions of rape and introduction of drugs into a penal institution, the petitioner, Daniel Ewing, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered as a product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a landlord-tenant dispute involving commercial property with a known and disclosed “leaky roof.” The lease states that the "property”  is leased “as is where is.” In an email sent prior to the execution of the lease, the landlord stated it would “talk about” repairing the roof after the first year. The leakage increased dramatically after the first year. The tenant began withholding rent. The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and the tenant filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the leaky roof. A bench trial ensured. The court held that, by telling the tenant it would “talk about” repairing the roof, the landlord misrepresented that the roof was repairable when the landlord knew it could not be repaired, and that the landlord had a duty under the lease to repair the roof. The landlord appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the damages due the landlord under the lease.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, George Eugene Cody, of two counts of criminally negligent homicide, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006), two counts of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery,see id.§ 39-13-202(a)(2), two counts of especially aggravated robbery,see id.§ 39-13-403,and two counts of identity theft, see id. § 39-14-150. At sentencing, the trial court merged the criminally negligent homicide convictions into the felony murder convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of life plus 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The petitioner, Danny E. Rogers, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account.

The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court.

This case involves the plaintiff’s motion seeking an order holding her former husband in contempt for failing to make certain monthly payments of $1,071 from his military retirement as required by the terms of a marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the parties’ divorce judgment. The wife’s former spouse stopped making the payments after the wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that the payments in question were alimony subject to modification rather than a property distribution as the wife contends. The court held that Mr. Cornwell “properly” stopped paying the “alimony” when his former wife remarried. The wife has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the wife’s motion.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of  the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, Joshua W. Eads, was convicted by a Union County jury of facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the instant crimes; and (2) charging the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary because the evidence indicated that the defendant did not promote or assist in the crimes. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, Anthony M. Reliford, pled guilty to domestic assault and aggravated assault, receiving concurrent sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. The court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $830.19. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a fully incarcerative sentence and (2) improperly ordering restitution. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences of incarceration but remand for reconsideration of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff’s suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties, parents of two minor children, divorced pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. After post-divorce custody disputes arose, the parties went through mediation and arrived at an agreed parenting plan. The next day, the mother repudiated the agreement. The father then filed a motion to enforce the mediation agreement. The mother requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement embodied in the mediated parenting plan was in the best interest of the children. The trial court declined to hear any evidence, and found that the mediated parenting plan was a valid, enforceable contract. It entered an order enforcing the mediated parenting plan. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the trial court erred in applying contract analysis to the mediated parenting plan, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement in the mediated parenting plan is in the best interest of the minor children.
 

The State appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a sobriety checkpoint. The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that the Defendant was unreasonably seized at the checkpoint due to the failure of the advance publicity to comply with Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410-1. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Renwick A. Earls, Jr., pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of forty years as a Range II offender. He now appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial court did not have the authority to sentence him to forty years, rendering the judgment void. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his judgment is void or that he is otherwise entitled to relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Wayne Boykin, was convicted of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain goods with a value in excess of $60,000, which is punishable as a Class B felony. The Circuit Court of Madison County sentenced the defendant to ten years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants, Benjamin Patterson and Charles P. Yokley, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 1 and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 2. Following a jury trial, Defendants were both convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the delivery offenses with the sale offenses. Defendant Patterson was sentenced as a standard offender to serve three years incarcerated,and Defendant Yokley was sentenced as a multiple offender to serve seven years incarcerated. Both defendants raise several issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, alleged errors regarding the jury instructions, and the trialcourt’s refusal to exclude certain evidence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

After more than seventeen years of marriage, Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson (“Wife”) sued Matthew Scott Albertson (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce on December 17, 2010 nunc pro tunc to November 8, 2010. In the Final Decree of Divorce the Trial Court, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, awarded Wife transitional alimony, divided the marital assets and debts, entered a permanent parenting plan with regard to the parties’ minor child, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals the property division and the award of alimony. The record on appeal contains no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm.