APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Torrez Talley, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to sufficiently argue the standard of reasonable doubt during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Rodney Laron Thomas, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for a delayed appeal concerning the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. He urges that his delay in filing his appeal should be excused because (1) his post-conviction counsel never pursued an appeal despite assuring him to the contrary, and (2) the circuit court clerk never provided him with a copy of the final order, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-112. We conclude that this petitioner has no right to appeal from a denial of a motion for delayed appeal of a denial of post-conviction relief. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Ivory Williams, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the first degree premeditated murder conviction and sentenced Williams as a violent offender to life imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the felony murder count of the indictment on the ground that no underlying felony was specified in the indictment; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s mother to authenticate pictures of the victim at trial; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (5) the trial court erred in considering Williams’ prior arson conviction for impeachment purposes. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, John Anthony Lethco, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; possession of burglary tools, see id. § 39-14-701; theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(5); and theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-13-103, -105(2). At sentencing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of 27 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to sever offenses, (2) by allowing hearsay testimony from witnesses other than the victim concerning ownership of stolen items at trial, (3) by denying him the opportunity to confront his accuser at trial, (4) by denying his motion for new trial, and (5) by allowing argument by the State at trial concerning his reputation as a drug dealer. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to filing his motion for new trial, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial. Thus, any issues raised therein are waived. We discern, however, an anomaly in the judgment of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 that requires correction on remand. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Wayne Flowers, who pled guilty to one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to one year on community corrections, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a common law writ of certiorari review of a student’s ten-day suspension for a violation of the Student-Parent Code of Conduct for reckless endangerment. The student was suspended by the school principal following an incident where he drove his vehicle toward a group of students resulting in injury to one student. The suspension was appealed to a disciplinary panel, then to a discipline administrator, and lastly to the school board. The suspension was upheld at each level. Thereafter, this petition for common law writ of certiorari was filed. The trial court found that the suspended student’s due process rights were violated by the failure to provide an impartial panel and that the decision was arbitrary as it was not supported by the evidence. The court also awarded the petitioners their attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse finding the student’s due process rights were not violated and that the decision was not arbitrary because it is supported by material evidence.

A Grainger County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Michael C. Bennett, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and twelve years for the theft conviction. The sentences were to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court’s failure to rule on his pretrial motion to prohibit the State from impeaching him with prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609, Tennessee Rules of Evidence, affected his right to a fair trial. The State contends that the issue is waived. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant waived the issue and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In Hamilton County, Appellant, Antonio T. Smith, pled guilty to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for resale and one count of attempted possession of contraband in a penal facility. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eight years to be served on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation report was filed, and the trial court held a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his six-year sentence in confinement and his remaining two-year sentence on probation. Appellant appeals the revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the testimony of the arresting officers was not credible. He also claims the trial court erred in denying his request for a mental evaluation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Margo Freshwater, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the jury to imprisonment for 99 years. In 1970, she escaped from the Tennessee Prison for Women and was at large until 2002, when she was arrested in Columbus, Ohio, and returned to Tennessee to resume service of her sentence. She filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis which twice has been remanded to the trial court. The main issue in this appeal is whether the State withheld from the petitioner’s counsel the statement of Johnny Box that the petitioner’s co-defendant told him that he had been the lone shooter of the victim, which, had it been revealed to her counsel, more probably than not, according to the petitioner, would have resulted in a different judgment. Following our review, we concur with the argument of the petitioner in this matter. Accordingly, we reverse the petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Jason R. McCallum, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, methamphetamine, within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to eighteen years as a Range I offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Walter Odell Savage, pled guilty to three counts of sale of . 5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Nabeeh Jameel Mateen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Robert B. Ledford, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions of second degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft. Because we conclude that coram nobis relief is not available to provide relief from a guilty-pleaded conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Javon Frazier, appeals the trial court’s termination of his judicial diversion, arguing that he was denied due process at the revocation hearing, and the State concurs. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.

This is a dependency and neglect case. The child’s mother is deceased, and the child’s father has a long history of physically abusing family members. Both the juvenile court and the circuit court, on de novo appeal, found the child to be dependent and neglected and determined that the child’s best interests were served by remaining in the custody of his maternal uncle and aunt. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se defendant, Kevin Millen, appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court affirming the Shelby County General Sessions Court’s finding that he was guilty of contempt. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid at the defendant’s store. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing it did not have a reasonable opportunity to clean the floor, warn the customer of the clear liquid, or take adequate precautionary measures upon receiving notice of the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff appealed. Having determined the defendant effectively moved for and received only partial summary judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On October 11, 2006, the petitioner, Jonathan K. Price, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, solicitation of a minor, and two counts of statutory rape. He received a negotiated sentence of six years on probation. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and thus, he did not enter his guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Montrel Gilliam, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years, twenty-two years, and twenty years, respectively, for the attempted murder convictions, for an effective term of life plus sixty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions and argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on his silence as a tacit admission to the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s determination on remand that the Appellee did not breach the parties’ contract when it constructed the Appellant’s house without through-wall flashing and weep holes, as required by the applicable building code. The parties’ contract provided that the builder would construct the house in accordance with “good building practices.” The trial court concluded the builder constructed the house in accordance with good building practices even though it was not in strict conformance with the building code. We affirm this holding. The Appellants also appeal the trial court’s failure to award them their attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in their first appeal. We remand this matter to the trial court with directions that it award to Appellants reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in their first appeal, as determined by the trial court.

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that plaintiff was ousted from the property at issue, that defendant Pearl Elliott was the presumptive owner of the property due to recordation and payment of property taxes, and that plaintiff’s suit was statutorily barred. We affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to four children. Father’s rights were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit the children within four months prior to the filing of the petition and wanton disregard for the children’s safety based on his criminal history; Mother’s rights were terminated on grounds of severe child abuse, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Ben W. Watkins, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the trial court correctly found that the petitioner failed to present a cognizable habeas corpus claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. Mubashir Mahmood (“Husband”) appeals from a judgment of the trial court raising four issues, including an issue challenging the trial court’s decree awarding Maryam Mubashir (“Wife”) attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The judgment from which Husband seeks to appeal is not a final judgment. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees and awarded $20,000.00 in attorney fees to Appellee. In this appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding the fee because it failed to consider the requisite factors regarding fee reasonableness, it failed to differentiate between time spent on fee-generating versus non-fee-generating duties, and because it failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. From our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $20,000.00 in attorney fees. Accordingly, the award is affirmed.