APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. Bennie Joe Poteet, II, individually and by and through his mother, Evelyn Poteet, as his conservator (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), sued Adam E. Fall, M.D. (“Dr. Fall”) and National Healthcare of Cleveland, formerly doing business as Cleveland Community Hospital (“the Hospital”) (collectively “the Defendants”) for medical malpractice after Mr. Poteet suffered a stroke while admitted at the Hospital which rendered him completely paralyzed from the nose down. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on Mr. Poteet’s later added claim of negligence per se based on a bonus incentive plan allegedly maintained by the Hospital that indirectly set forth the reduction of MRIs ordered by Dr. Fall as a factor in his annual bonus determination. The trial court granted the Hospital’s dispositive motion on the issue, as well as the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on the bonus issue. Prior to trial, the court also granted the Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude any evidence of the bonus incentive plan offered to Dr. Fall, but denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude all testimony of one of the Plaintiffs’ neurology experts. At the close of the case, the trial court submitted a special verdict form to the jury which instructed that the question regarding the Hospital’s negligence based on insufficient neurology coverage was to be disregarded if neither Dr. Fall nor the treating nurses were found to be negligent. The jury subsequently returned a verdict favorable to the nurses and Dr. Fall, leaving the question on the adequacy of neurology coverage unaddressed. Judgment was entered on the jury’s findings. The Hospital thereafter filed a motion for directed verdict on the neurology coverage issue while the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial but granted the Hospital’s motion for directed verdict as well as the Defendants’ motions for discretionary costs. The Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the movant, attorney Martin Seiler, shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff Joseph Barna for purposes of summary judgment. Admittedly, Mr. Barna did not refute the affidavit of Mr. Seiler, but I submit he did not have to because Mr. Barna was not obliged to come forward with countervailing evidence to create a dispute of fact. This is due to the fact that Mr. Seiler failed to provide a sufficient affidavit or other proof. Specifically, Mr. Seiler’s affidavit, which is the only evidence to support his motion for summary judgment, is insufficient because he failed to provide any specific material fact for this court to consider that pertains to the legal services he actually rendered. Mr. Seiler only informed us of the fact that he has many years of experience as a lawyer in the field of security litigation, which is a relevant and material fact, but by itself is insufficient to refute the specific allegations in the complaint as to what Mr. Seiler failed to do in his representation of Mr. Barna.

The Petitioner, Frank Peake, III, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2004, the Petitioner was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and was, thereafter, sentenced to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner later filed a post-conviction petition and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure (1) to investigate and interview witnesses that would have corroborated his self-defense theory and (2) to request a limiting instruction as to the prior threat made by the Petitioner. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed against various healthcare providers. Before the trial court, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with an identical lawsuit he had filed against the same defendants in another county. The motion to consolidate was denied. The trial court later dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against one of the defendant physicians for improper venue, and the other defendants were dismissed for various reasons not relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim against the physician for improper venue, and he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to consolidate. We affirm.

The Defendant, Phyllis A. Polk, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with credit for time served and the remainder in community corrections. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jose Hermes Gomez, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402(b), -14-403(b). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that his five-year sentence and two of his ten-year sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) The trial court erred when it denied two of the Defendant’s challenges for cause to potential jurors; (2) The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of three counts of aggravated robbery; and (3) The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms for each of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions.

In January 2009, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Kenny LaMont McGee for three counts of aggravated sexual battery. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to the plea agreement Appellant was ordered to serve an effective sentence of twelve years on community corrections. In January 2010, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. In February 2010, Appellant’s community corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging that Appellant had violated the conditions of the community corrections sentence. Appellant pled guilty to the violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the twelve-year sentence in confinement. In addition, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years and six months for his violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the community corrections sentence. However, we vacate the consecutive sentence, order the new sentence to be served concurrently to the prior imposed sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The defendant, Michael W. Kemp, was convicted by a Smith County Criminal Court jury of three counts of reckless vehicular homicide and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for each vehicular homicide conviction and one year for each reckless endangerment conviction. The court merged the reckless endangerment convictions into the vehicular homicide convictions and ordered that the terms run consecutively with all but one year served on probation. The defendant appealed and, on direct appeal, this court remanded for reconsideration of the consecutive sentences because the trial court failed to make the proper findings. Upon remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences, which the defendant now appeals. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing and order that the defendant’s sentences be served concurrently.

The Defendant, Michael Deshawn Smith, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-three years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue is when Husband shall pay $250,000 in cash awarded to Wife in the division of the marital estate and whether post-judgment interest shall accrue. In the Final Decree, payment of the $250,000 was deferred pending Husband’s receipt of an expected inheritance from his recently deceased uncle. The Decree, however, expressly provided that Wife could petition the court for relief in the event the deceased uncle’s estate was not closed within one year. As authorized by the trial court, one year later, Wife filed a motion requesting that Husband be ordered to pay the $250,000 award. The trial court denied Wife’s request for immediate payment of the money and denied her request for post-judgment interest. Wife appeals contending that the trial court erred in not awarding the immediate payment of the full amount and post-judgment interest. Finding it inequitable for Husband to have the use and benefit of the marital estate, much of which is income producing, while Wife is deprived of the bulk of her share of the marital estate, we reverse and remand with instructions for the entry of a judgment in favor of Wife of $250,000 plus post-judgment interest from the filing of the motion for relief.

In this breach of contract action, the defendant appealed the Judgment of the Trial Court, who entered a monetary judgment against defendant and awarded attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed, and on appeal we reverse the award of attorney's fees, vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand, with directions for the parties or the Court to prepare a complete Statement of Evidence.

This dependent and neglected action involves the defendant’s minor biological child and two minor stepchildren. The defendant appeals the finding by the circuit court that he severely abused his two stepchildren. He contends that DCS failed to state a claim against him upon which relief could be granted because he is not the biological or legal father of the children. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to find that he committed severe child abuse. We have determined the petition states a claim against the defendant, and that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings that all three children are dependent and neglected, and that the defendant severely abused the two stepchildren children. Thus, we affirm.

The Defendant, John M. Bailey, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and failure to appear, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-609 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for aggravated assault and a consecutive four-year sentence for failure to appear. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by affording undue weight to enhancement factors and by failing to apply mitigating factors supported by the evidence. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Williams, a/k/a Paul Williams El, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and was sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court’s method for selecting the alternate juror resulted in the exclusion of the only African-American on the panel; (2) there is newly discovered evidence that should be considered; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in revoking his probation on a previous conviction and in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Homeowners’ Association of a high-rise condominium building filed this action against an owner/occupant of a condominium unit alleging she was in violation of the Master Deed and Bylaws due to grossly unsanitary conditions in the defendant’s unit and extremely offensive odors that emanated from her unit into common areas. The Association requested that the defendant’s condominium unit be sold at a judicial sale and that it be awarded its attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the defendant’s acts and omissions violated the Master Deed and Bylaws and that the Association was entitled to the relief it requested; accordingly, the court ordered that the unit be sold and awarded $116,037.77 in attorneys’ fees against the defendant. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jeffrey White (“Employee”) sustained work-related injuries while employed by Nissan North America, Inc. (“Employer”). He returned to work after each injury and settled both claims. In 2005, he was terminated, allegedly for failure to comply with Employer’s policies concerning medical leave. He filed for reconsideration of his previous settlements, as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 241(a)(2). Employer contended that he had been terminated for misconduct and was not eligible for reconsideration. Following a full trial, the trial court found that Employee was eligible for reconsideration, but that Employee failed to prove that his industrial disability was greater than the amount of the settlements. Employee filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04, requesting that the trial court permit the taking and presentation of additional evidence. The trial court granted the motion. After a second trial, the trial court awarded additional permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits. Employer has appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion to alter or amend and reverse the judgment.

The Defendant, Bryan K. Howard, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, with the length of his sentence and manner of service left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee filed a pro se post-judgment petition alleging that her employer had improperly denied court-ordered medical benefits to her, and she sought damages. Her employer moved to dismiss based upon expiration of the statute of limitations and other grounds. The employee contended that she was incompetent for an extended period of time after the alleged denial of medical care and that the limitation period was therefore tolled. The trial court held that her petition was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed it. The employee has appealed from this decision. We affirm the judgment.

This defamation action arises out of the publication of a statement to an internet website. The trial court held that plaintiffs were unable to show actual malice in order to sustain defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a compensable injury. She returned to work for her employer in the same job, at the same hourly wage. However, her earnings were reduced because she declined offers of additional work, which she had usually accepted before her injury. She declined these offers because she could no longer safely perform them. The trial court held that she did not have a meaningful return to work, and awarded benefits in excess of one and one-half times the impairment. Her employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that she did not have a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee healthcare provider after its determination that Appellant patient’s medical expert did not meet the locality requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Ray Billings, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, Multiple Offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment; (2) the trial court committed plain error when it denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude identification testimony; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Randall Henry, II, of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 2002, the employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of his employment. The employee filed suit for benefits. The employer disputed the claim, asserting that the employee had failed to give proper notice and had not sustained any permanent injury as a result of the accident. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Smith, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, 522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about instances of sexual contact between her and the Defendant other than those charged in the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview to be played for the jury; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine the Defendant about an expunged criminal conviction; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction on count two of the indictment because the State’s proof materially varied from the allegations in the indictment; (5) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on counts two, six, and seven; (6) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial which was based on newly discovered evidence; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.