APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendants, Anthony Hall, Eric Murrell, and Erica Williams were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Defendants Murrell and Hall were sentenced to eighteen years and Defendant Williams was sentenced to fifteen years, in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claimant, an employee of Wal-Mart, was charged with possession of cocaine and pled guilty to a misdemeanor possession, and was then discharged for violating company policy. Claimant was not at work nor on Wal-Mart's property when the offense occurred. The agency found that claimant was discharged under disqualifying conditions and denied unemployment benefits. Throughout the appeals process, denial of benefits was upheld. On appeal to this Court, we hold that claimant violated Wal-Mart's policies by failing to report his conviction under a criminal drug statute to his employer within three days as required under the employer's policy. We affirm the denial of unemployment benefits to claimant.

The defendant, O'Neal Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joel Keener, appeals as of right the Warren County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2005, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of facilitation of manufacturing methamphetamine and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the denial of his petition was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that counsel failed to seek severance of the charges, failed to seek suppression of the petitioner's statement, and failed to challenge admission of a photograph showing iodinestained hands. He argues that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Baldomero Galindo, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in dismissing his motion for new trial on the basis it was untimely, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his inculpatory statement, and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to disclose discovery materials in a timely manner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated child abuse, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to obtain a defense expert medical witness and that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13, which restricts funding for expert witnesses in non-capital postconviction proceedings, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Daniel Stewart, entered open guilty pleas to two counts of Class C felony theft, one count of forgery, and one count of passing a worthless check, also Class C felonies, for which petitioner was sentenced, following a sentencing hearing, as a Range I standard offender to six years confinement for each count, to be served concurrently. In this appeal from the court's denial of his post-conviction petition, petitioner asserts that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) his guilty plea was entered involuntarily; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding waiving his right to appeal he did not effectively waive his right to appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Justin Dewayne Rogers, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred in admitting the victim's medical records in violation of his right to confrontation. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Defendant, Eddie Lattimore, was found guilty by a Dekalb County Circuit Court jury of possession of schedule II hydromorphone with the intent to sell, a Class C felony; possession of schedule II morphine, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. __ 39-17-417(a)(4), -418(a), -425(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years' confinement for possession of hydromorphone with intent to sell and to eleven months, twenty-nine days' each for possession of morphine and possession of drug paraphernalia, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joy C. Lindsey ("Plaintiff") sued Walgreen Company ("Walgreen"), Robert Cortney ("Cortney"), and Kane David Stackhouse ("Stackhouse") after David Z. Lindsey, Sr. was shot and killed by Stackhouse in a Walgreen's parking lot. Approximately ten months after filing their answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Walgreen and Cortney filed a motion to amend to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse. The Trial Court denied Walgreen and Cortney permission to amend. We granted permission for an interlocutory appeal on the sole issue of whether Walgreen and Cortney should be granted leave to amend to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse. We reverse the Trial Court's order and grant Walgreen and Cortney permission to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse.

The Defendant, Steve Billman, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law, a Class C misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant for DUI, second offense, to 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation following the service of 60 days in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI and that (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a mistrial. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

Earl and Faye Faulkner ("Plaintiffs") hired Tom Emmett Construction Company ("Defendant") to construct a new driveway at their home in Knox County. Plaintiffs refused to pay $ 8,000 of the total $ 18,000 contract price because they were dissatisfied with the workmanship of the driveway. Plaintiffs sued Defendants seeking as damages what it would cost to remove and replace the allegedly defective driveway. Defendant asserted that the driveway was properly constructed and filed a counterclaim for the remaining $ 8,000 balance owed on the oral contract. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court [*2] concluded that any problems with the driveway were not sufficient to require that it be removed and replaced. Because there was a problem with how the concrete on one portion of the driveway had been poured, the Trial Court required Plaintiffs to pay Defendant only $ 5,000 of the remaining $ 8,000 owed on the contract. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm as modified.

The petitioner, Jeremy Crosby, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury convictions of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he contends that appellate counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to raise or effectively argue certain issues on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Courtenay Darrell Robertson, of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated arson, a Class A felony; and felony evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years at 35% for attempted second degree murder, thirty-five years at 100% for aggravated arson, and four years at 35% for felony evading arrest, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the aggravated arson sentence consecutively to the attempted second degree murder sentence and to serve the sentence for felony evading arrest concurrently with the other two sentences, for a total effective sentence of fifty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated arson conviction; (2) dual convictions for aggravated arson and attempted second degree murder violate double jeopardy principles; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Linda Blair, pled guilty to TennCare fraud, a Class E felony, in May 2007. She subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that she entered the guilty plea unknowingly due to ineffective assistance of counsel. She now appeals the postconviction court's denial of relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The question before this Court is whether the issuance of a beer permit in violation of a county's distance rule is non-discriminatory if it results from an agreed order resolving litigation. We conclude that a beer board's decision to effectively exempt a single premises or subset of premises from the enforcement of a valid distance rule is impermissibly discriminatory, even if it results from an agreed order. Because the discriminatory issuance of a single permit in violation of a county's distance rule may invalidate the rule, we reverse and remand.

The pro se petitioner, Miko Burl, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On February 7, 2000, the petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary, for which he was sentenced to thirty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his conviction for especially aggravated robbery is void because this court vacated his conviction for aggravated assault on direct appeal. After careful review, we conclude that the summary dismissal of the petition was proper, and we affirm the judgment from the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Spencer Peterson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Rodney Jeffries, appeals the habeas corpus court's order summarily dismissing his "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or in the Alternative, Petition to Re-open Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas court's denial of relief.

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Derrick Lemon Goode, of one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, see T.C.A. _ 39-17-417(a)(3) (2006), and one count of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, see id. _ 39-17-417(a)(2). The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of 12 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to excuse a juror for cause, that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial request for material pursuant to Rule 26.2 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the trial court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the defendant's prior convictions, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Robert Lee Miller, was found guilty of the first degree murder of the victim, Krystal Dubuque, during the perpetration of an aggravated rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues (1.) that the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped interview of the appellant dressed in his prison uniform; (2.) that the trial court should have excluded the testimony of Rodney Perkins identifying the appellant as the person he saw near the victim's car; (3.) that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial when the State disclosed that recent blood testing had revealed that blood in the victim's underwear was not that of the appellant; (4.) that the trial court erred in not granting the appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (5.) that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of prior act evidence regarding the appellant's dealings with other women and specifically regarding statements about his desire to be sexually involved with the victim; (6.) that the trial court erred in not suppressing all statements made by the appellant as they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel as secured by the Tennessee State Constitution Article I, Section 9 and Amendments Five and Six of the U.S. Constitution; and (7.) that the appellant's right to a speedy trial was violated. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we must remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction to reflect the appellant's guilt of count one, felony murder, instead of count two, premeditated first degree murder.

The Defendant, Cecret C. Williams, was charged with one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect. Following a jury trial, she was convicted of both offenses; however, the trial court merged the two counts. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to convict her on either count; (2) the trial court erred in failing to fulfill its duties as the thirteenth juror; and (3) the trial court erred in entering separate judgments and sentences for each of her convictions. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court misconstrued its authority to grant a new trial under the thirteenth juror rule, Rule 33(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial.

A trial jury found the defendant, Andre Jabbar Johnson, guilty of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six months in the county jail, with a release eligibility of 75%. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to properly weigh the mitigation factors against the enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.