APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A trial jury found the defendant, Andre Jabbar Johnson, guilty of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six months in the county jail, with a release eligibility of 75%. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to properly weigh the mitigation factors against the enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Johnny M. Burroughs, of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property over $1000, and it imposed a life sentence for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years for his robbery conviction and to two years for his theft conviction, to be served concurrently with his life sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court's judgment.

Appellee sold a vehicle to a third party, retaining a security interest duly perfected on the vehicle's certificate of title. Appellant later leased custom wheels and tires to the third party without the knowledge or consent of appellee. After the lease was signed, appellant modified the body of the vehicle to accommodate the custom wheels and tires, installed the custom wheels and tires on the vehicle, and gave the third party the old wheels and tires. The third party defaulted on both the security agreement with appellee and the lease with appellant. Appellee repossessed the vehicle and refused to relinquish the custom wheels and tires to appellant. The third party could not be located for service of process or recovery of the old wheels and tires. Appellant sued for recovery of the custom wheels and tires. The trial court found that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-2A-310, the wheels and tires became accessions at the point of installation, Appellant's leasehold interest in the accessions was superior to appellee's security interest in the vehicle as a whole, and appellant was liable for physical injury it caused to the vehicle when installing the accessions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs, the guardians and grandparents of a fourth-grader at Amqui Elementary School filed this wrongful death action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. While at school, the decedent became ill. After school employees cared for him for a period of time, his condition worsened; school employees then called 911 and performed CPR while awaiting for the paramedics. Tragically, the child died on the way to the emergency room. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not properly train or supervise its school employees and that Defendant's employees were negligent in failing to secure proper medical care. The trial court summarily dismissed the action upon findings that Defendant had not breached a duty to the decedent and that its actions were not the proximate cause of decedent's death. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse finding there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

The defendant, Krystal Johnson, pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony. She received an eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. She petitioned the trial court for probation, which the court denied after a hearing. The defendant now appeals the denial of probation or alternative sentencing. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court (1) did not consider all of the factors enunciated in Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1974) when denying probation; (2) improperly considered that the defendant pled guilty to a Class B felony when the grand jury indicted her for a Class A felony; and (3) did not consider a sentence involving community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Final Decree in a divorce action. Wife filed a complaint for divorce; Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint. Later in the proceedings, Wife filed a motion for default judgment and other relief against Husband due to his failure to comply with the court's discovery deadline. The trial court entered an order granting a default judgment against Husband, striking his pleadings, and deeming Wife's discovery requests admitted. Husband timely filed a motion to set aside the order on the ground he did not receive proper notice of the hearing, which the trial court denied. We have determined that Husband did not receive proper notice; as a consequence the order granting the default judgment and other relief is void. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Husband's motion to set aside the order. The court's failure to set aside the order also greatly impaired Husband's right to assert the defenses and affirmative claims that were stricken. Accordingly, the Final Decree is also reversed and we remand for a new trial of the issues properly raised by the parties in their pleadings subject, of course, to Husband complying with discovery and the trial court's orders.

The Defendant, Kenneth Meyer, was found guilty by a Bledsoe County Circuit Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. _ 39-13-211 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years' confinement. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting only part of a 9-1-1 tape into evidence, (3) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay into evidence, (4) the state improperly withheld exculpatory evidence, (5) the trial court erred by refusing to issue a self-defense instruction requested by the defendant, (6) the trial court erred by considering prior criminal convictions that were not proven by certified copies of conviction and were not disclosed to the defendant before the sentencing hearing, and (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Wayne County jury acquitted the Defendant, Jimmy Daniel Prater, of driving under the influence and mitigated criminal littering, but it found that the Defendant violated the implied consent law and violated the open container law. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violation of the implied consent law. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Siron S. Shields, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Montorius G. Herron, stands convicted of identity theft, a Class D felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with a release eligibility of 75% for the misdemeanor conviction concurrent with twelve years as a career offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction with a release eligibility of 60% for the felony conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for identity theft and the trial court committed plain error by not charging fraudulent use of a credit card as a lesser-included offense of identity theft. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wife appeals the trial court's designation of Husband as primary residential parent of the parties' two children and reduction of Wife's parenting time with one of the children. We vacate the trial court orders at issue and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Booth, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felonies; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Booth received concurrent sentences of twenty years for each of the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and three years for the aggravated assault conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Booth argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument; (3) his separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault violate due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) and State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; (5) the trial court erred in failing to merge the two convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we merge the dual especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into a single conviction and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the merger of these convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant-Appellant, George John Byrd, was convicted by a Knox County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for each aggravated rape and to twelve years for aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issues presented for our review are whether the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony of certain thefts by Byrd; and (2) allowing a nurse to testify about statements made by the victim during her medical examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Shelby County Correction Center as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief.

Defendant, Jose A. Iniguez, was convicted by a Madison County jury of stalking, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving while unlicensed, a Class C. Misdemeanor. For stalking, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months, 29 days and for driving while unlicensed a sentence of 30 days, to be served concurrently in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant's sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his stalking conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Discharged city employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his termination by the city. The trial court remanded the case to the board of mayor and aldermen based upon the court's determination that there was evidence of bias on the part of one alderman and that the record did not allow the court to determine the grounds relied upon by the board in terminating the employee. We have determined that the trial court erred in remanding this case. The city employee waived the issue of possible bias on the part of one alderman by failing to raise it at any time during the hearing before the board. Moreover, the board was not required to make specific findings on the reasons for its decision.

Machine Tool & Die, Inc., now known as CMTD, Inc. ("the Seller"), and Modern Machine Corporation, a Tennessee corporation ("Modern Tennessee" or "the Buyer"), regarding a machine that the Seller had agreed to build for the Customer. After the Seller agreed to build the machine, the Seller entered into an agreement with the Buyer to sell its assets to the Buyer, including the Seller's contract to build the machine for the Customer. The machine was never built, prompting this lawsuit. Following a bench trial, the court held that the Seller and Buyer were liable to the Customer for the down payment made on the machine purchase. The court further held that the Buyer was liable to the Customer under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"), trebled the Customer's damages, and held the Buyer responsible for the attorney's fees of the Customer. The court also held the Buyer liable to indemnify the Seller, including the attorney's fees of the Seller. The court also pierced the corporate veil of the Buyer and held parties related to the Buyer jointly liable with the Buyer. The Buyer and its related parties appeal. We reverse in part and modify in part. Except as modified or reversed, the judgment is affirmed. Case remanded.

Plaintiff filed suit in chancery court to challenge an assessment of Plaintiff's franchise tax liability by the Department of Revenue. The chancery court upheld the assessment. We affirm.

The defendant, Dionis Nick Papa, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering a sentence of confinement, we affirm.

Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the coram nobis court properly dismissed the petition after finding that the "newly discovered" evidence relied upon by Petitioner would have provided "insignificant assistance to the defense of the charges" had it been presented at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The defendant, Jonathan Greer, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that his conviction is precluded by State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tenn. 2000), because the State failed to establish that the taking of the property was contemporaneous with the use of violence or fear. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Terry James Lee aka Terry Lee Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation. He initially entered guilty pleas to felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He served six months of his sentence before being placed on intensive probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and contends his sentence had expired. The State has moved the Court to affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20.

Defendant, Lindsey Ray Butler, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in a one-count indictment for possession of marijuana with intent to sell in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(a)(4)(g)(1). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession of marijuana, and the judgment reflects that he was sentenced by the trial court to serve 11 months and 29 days, consecutive to a five-year sentence he is currently serving. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the legality of a search of his residence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Johnny Lee Lewis, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-11-403, -13-210, -14-302. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Johnny Lee Lewis, No. M2002-01350-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22398394 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 21, 2003). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered; (2) trial counsel failed to interview and present witnesses; (3) trial counsel failed to object, based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the use of enhancement factors during the Petitioner's sentencing hearing; (4) trial counsel failed to object, based on the Confrontation Clause, to testimony regarding a co-conspirator's statements; and (5) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors denied him a fair trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.