APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the grant of Appellees/Defendants' Tenn. R Civ. P 12.02 motion to dismiss. Appellant Jane Doe, who is HIV positive, was employed by Appellee Walgreens. In an effort to keep her medical condition private, Ms. Doe had her prescriptions filled at a Walgreens location other than the one at which she worked; therefore, Ms. Doe was also a customer of Walgreens. A co-worker of Ms. Doe's accessed Ms. Doe's prescription history in the Walgreens' database, and then disseminated her medical information to other coworkers and to Ms. Doe's fianc_. Ms. Doe and her fianc_ filed suit. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Does' exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation act. Finding that the injuries sustained by Ms. Doe do not arise out of her employment with Walgreens, and that she has sufficiently pled causes of action outside workers' compensation law, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand.

The Defendant, William Alexander Beasley, IV, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court: (1) erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence; and (2) failed to properly apply pre-trial jail credit to his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence of incarceration, but we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment that includes jail credits of 205 days.

A Marion County jury convicted the Defendant, Thomas David Johnson, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to three years, to be suspended after the service of sixty days in jail. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion; and (3) that the trial court erred when it denied him full probation. After a thorough review of the law and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark A. Owens, was convicted by a Lake County jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Amy E. Cardwell ("Petitioner") was sexually abused by Donald Christopher Hutchinson ("Respondent"), who was the Youth Leader at petitioner's church. Petitioner, who is mentally disabled, filed for and obtained an order of protection prohibiting respondent from having any contact with petitioner. Respondent also was prohibited from attending the church where he abused petitioner so long as petitioner continued to attend that church. The order of protection expired in one year, at which time both petitioner and respondent agreed to extend it for another one year period. At the expiration of the second one year term, petitioner filed a motion seeking another one year extension. Respondent opposed the second extension. Following a hearing, the trial court extended the order of protection for another year. Respondent appeals, and we affirm.

Petitioner, James Lee Johnson, appeals from the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued that the trial court erred by failing to merge his three convictions and that the sole remaining conviction had expired. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus because Petitioner has failed to establish that his judgments were void or that his sentences have expired. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. I believe the Claims Commission erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the contract, and as this was the purported basis for the Claims Commission’s decision, I would reverse the decision of the Claims Commission and grant judgment to the Tennessee Department of Transportation.

A Moore County jury convicted the Petitioner, Thomas M. Goss, of one count of rape and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a lawsuit filed against a nightclub and several individuals who, according to Plaintiffs, were owners of the nightclub at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to two of those individuals, finding that they had produced "conclusive" evidence that they had no ownership interest in the club at the relevant time. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The pro se defendant, Jeffrey S. Zarnik, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reduce or discharge his fine for his 2006 DUI conviction, arguing that the court denied the motion under the erroneous belief that it had no authority to waive the minimum fine in a DUI case. We agree with the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the trial court to consider the defendant's motion on its merits.

The Petitioner, William Edward Watkins, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, for which he is serving consecutive life sentences plus three years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the jury instructions on lesser included offenses and for failing to raise the issue in his motion for new trial in order to preserve the issue for appellate relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, James Parker, aka "Self," was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; and delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony. The alternate delivery counts merged into the sale counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to six years for sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, eight years for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, eight years for sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-five years for sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. The court ordered that the twenty-five-year sentence be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for an effective term of thirty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the judgment in count seven incorrectly identifies the defendant's conviction for delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school as a Class B felony; therefore, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

This is a child custody dispute between a biological father and the children's maternal grandmother. The trial court awarded custody to the grandmother. We affirm.

The only parties left litigating in what started out as a complex construction dispute are, on one side, Dillard Construction, Inc , and, on the other, Dillard's demolition subcontractor, Havron Contracting Corp. After a bench trial and several post-trial motions, the court held that (1) Dillard, while not having a contract with Havron, was required by quantum meruit to pay Havron $91,100 for work performed by Havron's subcontractors; (2) Dillard was not entitled to an offset against that judgment for damage done to electrical equipment by Havron's subcontractor; (3) Havron was entitled to recover from Dillard, under a "passthrough" indemnity theory, the attorney's fees awarded against Havron and in favor of its subcontractor; and (4) Havron was not entitled to recover the attorney's fees that it, Havron, incurred in defending against the claims of its subcontractor. Dillard appeals challenging both the quantum meruit award and the denial of an offset. Havron challenges the trial court's denial of indemnification for attorney's fees Havron incurred in defending the claims of its subcontractor. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the father on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The father appeals, arguing that the Department of Children's Services did not clearly and convincingly show that it made reasonable efforts to help him address his addiction to methamphetamine, clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination, or clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Because DCS did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with his children, we reverse.

Brenda Carrol Bivens ("Wife") filed this divorce action against Donald Eugene Bivens ("Husband") in the Hamilton County Circuit Court in the Eleventh Judicial District. At the time of the parties' separation, they lived in Grundy County in the Twelfth Judicial District. Husband has lived in Grundy County his entire adult life. Husband filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue which he claims was granted orally by the trial court. No order dismissing the case ever was entered. The trial court later entered a final decree and marital dissolution agreement submitted by Wife and signed by Husband. Husband filed a motion to set aside the final decree. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Husband had waived any objection to venue and refused to set aside the final decree. Husband appeals. We conclude that Husband did not waive his objections to venue and that the proper venue in this case never has been Hamilton County. Accordingly, we vacate entry of the final decree and remand this case to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County with instructions to transfer this case to an appropriate court in Grundy County.

Katrina B. Martins and her husband filed suit against Williamson Medical Center for injuries sustained when Ms. Martins fell in her hospital room. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim based on medical malpractice and dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the complaint sounded in common law negligence. We affirm.

This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. Plaintiff sued defendant under a negligence theory and sought damages. After a jury trial, the jury equally allocated fault between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict is not supported by material evidence and that the trial court erred in permitting testimony regarding plaintiff's intention to use a shortcut. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. The mother of the child tested positive for cocaine when the child was born, and DCS removed the child from the mother's custody and developed a safety plan for the mother. The child was eventually placed in the custody of the petitioners, who are the mother's cousin and her husband. During the time period at issue, the mother's visitation with the child consisted primarily of attending family gatherings and visiting with the child at these gatherings. She paid no child support. After the mother went to the petitioners' home to say that she intended to seek custody of the child, the petitioners filed this petition for termination of the mother's parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. The mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court's finding of abandonment for failure to support and for willful failure to engage in more than token visitation with the child during the four-month time period preceding the filing of the termination petition, and affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

The Petitioner, Milton L. Byrd, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking his 1992 convictions of aggravated assault and second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the judgments are void because (1) they were imposed in contravention of the law concerning the service of sentences for offenses committed while on bail, and (2) he was erroneously declared infamous. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The defendants, Anthony Hall, Eric Murrell, and Erica Williams were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Defendants Murrell and Hall were sentenced to eighteen years and Defendant Williams was sentenced to fifteen years, in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claimant, an employee of Wal-Mart, was charged with possession of cocaine and pled guilty to a misdemeanor possession, and was then discharged for violating company policy. Claimant was not at work nor on Wal-Mart's property when the offense occurred. The agency found that claimant was discharged under disqualifying conditions and denied unemployment benefits. Throughout the appeals process, denial of benefits was upheld. On appeal to this Court, we hold that claimant violated Wal-Mart's policies by failing to report his conviction under a criminal drug statute to his employer within three days as required under the employer's policy. We affirm the denial of unemployment benefits to claimant.