APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Husband filed for divorce after twenty-five years of marriage alleging inappropriate marital conduct as grounds for divorce. Wife filed a counter-claim for divorce also alleging inappropriate marital conduct. After a bench trial, the court found that the parties had lived separately for at least 10 years; awarded a divorce to Husband; and awarded alimony in futuro to Wife. Wife appeals challenging the trial court's award of a divorce to Husband, the division of the marital property, and the award of alimony. Upon review of the record, we affirm.

The trial court entered judgment against the borrowers and guarantors on two promissory notes. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in striking their jury demand and that they are entitled to relief under an alleged written commitment for permanent financing or under various equitable theories. We find the defendants' arguments to be without merit and affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a judgment summarily holding attorney Herbert S. Moncier in direct, criminal contempt of court. Because the trial court improperly exercised its summary contempt authority several weeks after the cited conduct occurred, we vacate its judgment and remand this case for additional proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Vershawn McCoy, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court inadequately responded to a jury question raised during deliberation requesting a definition of "state of passion." After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Contractor agreed to build duplex for property owner, with plaintiff providing construction financing. At closing, contractor was paid, but contractor did not pay plaintiff as agreed. Plaintiff sued property owner, contractor, and bank. We previously affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, finding that contractor and plaintiff were in a joint venture, such that payment to contractor was payment to plaintiff. Property owner then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because we find no separate agreement between property owner and plaintiff requiring repayment directly to plaintiff, plaintiff's cause of action against property owner is precluded, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

International Market and Restaurant, Inc. and Patti Myint, owner of the P.M. Café, sued the Belmont University and the Metropolitan Government because representatives of Belmont and the United States Secret Service informed the plaintiffs that the streets and sidewalks around plaintiffs’ establishments would be closed for security purposes the evening of the Presidential debate at Belmont pursuant to a plan developed by the Secret Service. The plaintiffs closed the businesses that evening; however, the sidewalks were not closed. The plaintiffs claim that they lost revenue by closing and seek compensation based on negligent representation, constructive fraud and breach of the indemnity agreement between Belmont and Metro. The trial court granted Belmont’s motion for summary judgment and Metro’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

Plaintiff timely filed a complaint for medical malpractice, but failed to file a certificate of good faith within ninety days as required. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for enlargement pursuant to Rule 6.02 and a proposed certificate of good faith. The trial court granted defendants' motion, finding plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "good cause" for failing to file the required certificate. Because we find that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either "good cause" or "excusable neglect," we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

The petitioner, Rick D. Hanebutt, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving concurrent sentences of life and twenty years for his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to continue the postconviction hearing; and (2) denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the court erred in denying relief because he claims he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate the case and present viable witnesses, proof, and argument as to self-defense; (2) obtain a ballistics expert; (3) obtain unadulterated copies of phone records and obtain the phone records of another witness; (4) properly impeach a witness with inconsistent evidence, statements, and testimony; (5) contest the search warrant; (6) renew a motion to change venue; (7) object to statements made by the prosecution during voir dire; and (8) request additional jury instructions on drug usage and witness credibility. He further contends that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

Robert Bailey, Lisa Bailey Dishner, and Richard Neal Bailey ("the Baileys") were sued by Arthur B. Roberts and Tia Roberts with regard to a boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a third party complaint against Dale Littleton, Alice Littleton, Kimber Littleton, Mark Lee Littleton ("the Littletons"), and Charlotte Dutton seeking to quiet title to real property, including the property involved in the boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Littletons. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment and certifying the judgment as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The Baileys appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Evelyn Cotton Self, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days with defendant's sentence suspended and defendant placed on probation after service of seventy-three days in confinement. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning prescription medicines; (4) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of defendant's psychologist; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve seventy-three days in confinement. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to a strip of land along a former railroad line. Defendant, an adjacent landowner, asserts that plaintiff has no interest in the disputed property because the deed that purportedly conveyed the property to plaintiff was champertous and void due to the fact defendant was adversely possessing the property under color of title at the time of the deed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous or that defendant had acquired title by seven years of adverse possession under color of title for thirty years. We have determined the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard by holding that defendant had to prove seven years of adverse possession to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous. Instead, defendant need only prove that he was in adverse possession at the time of the deed to plaintiff. Defendant established he was in adverse possession under color of title of the disputed property at the time of plaintiff's deed; accordingly, the deed is champertous. Champertous deeds are void; therefore, plaintiff never acquired a legal interest in the disputed property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court quieting title in favor of plaintiff. As for defendant's prayer that he be declared the owner of the disputed property, we have determined that an indispensable party is missing, the grantor of the deed to plaintiff; therefore, we make no ruling concerning defendant's claim that he owns the property by adverse possession of at least seven continuous years under color of title pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-105.

The defendant, April Jennifer Warren, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a sentence of ten years a Range II, multiple offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ladarius Tyree Springs, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Hamilton County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to six years incarceration suspended to intensive probation after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. While on probation, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault. A violation of probation warrant issued and, following a revocation hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The paternal grandmother of a three-year-old child filed a petition seeking visitation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-306. The grandmother contended that the child's mother prevented the grandmother from seeing the child following the death of the child's father. Grandmother also contended that she had a significant existing relationship with the child and that the loss of this relationship was likely to cause severe emotional harm to the child. The trial court granted the petition and awarded the grandmother three hours of visitation every third Sunday at the grandmother's home. The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in making the award to the grandmother, because the mother did not oppose visitation. Alternatively, she argued that the proof did not support a finding that the grandmother had a significant existing relationship with the child or that the child would be severely emotionally harmed from severance of that relationship. We affirm the trial court's determination that the grandmother is entitled to three hours of visitation every third Sunday.

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lanny Wayne Waddell, of domestic assault, see T.C.A. _ 39-13-111(b) (2006), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant Jimmy L. Gladden Jr., appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Ray Sender, pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, with an agreed sentence of four years and the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion, and ordered the defendant to serve thirty days of his four-year sentence in confinement, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion and ordered a sentence of split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Domonte O. Briggs, of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years' incarceration to be served consecutively to previously imposed sentences from North Carolina. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Aubrey Tremaine Eisom, of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery and convicted the defendant, Cedric Moses, of two counts of the facilitation of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Mr. Eisom to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for both of the felony murder convictions and a consecutive sentence of 40 years' incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced Mr. Moses to 25 years' incarceration for each of his three convictions and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of 25 years. In this appeal, Mr. Eisom contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of Mr. Moses, that the trial court erred by prohibiting him from presenting a "third party defense," and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Mr. Moses also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claiming that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of accomplice Ewan Dewayne Anthony. Mr. Moses additionally asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his trial from that of Mr. Eisom and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in the judgments of the trial court in Mr. Eisom's case, we affirm Mr. Eisom's convictions and the accompanying sentence. Because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony relative to Mr. Moses' involvement in the crimes, we reverse Mr. Moses' convictions and dismiss the charges against him.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, William Anthony Jones, of aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erroneously prohibited him from"argu[ing] that the defendant lacked the mental state of intentionally or knowing[ly] with respect to causing serious bodily injury." Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Nelson, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

In Davidson County Criminal Court, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, No. M2004-02462-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2874654, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 31, 2005); State v. Billy J. Coffelt, No. M2002- 01214-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22116628, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 11, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2004). After direct appeal to this Court and resentencing, Petitioner's effective sentence was ninety years. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, 2005 WL 2874654, at *6-7. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. Petitioner specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel: (1) refused to allow Petitioner to testify at trial and failed to request a Momon hearing; (2) failed to request Pattern Jury Instruction 8.02 and an instruction on the elements of false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) failed to request a jury instruction for the natural and probable consequences rule; (4) failed to raise in either the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the issue of stipulation of the offense for which Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of his escape; and (5) failed to request a severance from the co-defendant. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The father was paying child support, became disabled and filed a Petition to suspend child support payments until his disability insurance began paying. By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his disability insurance began paying a monthly amount. The Trial Judge ultimately refused to lower the child support payments, finding that the father established no variance between his income before and after his disability. The father tendered his income tax return for the year when the child support obligation was set, but the Trial Court refused to consider this evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand.