APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marty Ray Harris, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. He received a four-year sentence, to be served in split confinement of two months and the balance on probation. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by his crime. We reverse the portion of the judgment awarding restitution to Christopher Edwards, and we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the proper amount of restitution for the named victim, John Witherspoon.

This appeal involves the application of a decision by the United States Supreme Court to legal issues in a matter pending before a state trial court after being remanded by a state appellate court. In 1998, a group of commercial waste haulers filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the validity of a flow control ordinance enacted by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The trial court granted the Metropolitan Government's motion for summary judgment. However, in 2002, the Court of Appeals, relying on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed the trial court with regard to part of the application of the ordinance and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., 122 S.W.3d 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). While the case was pending in the trial court, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision relied upon by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The trial court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision. The Court of Appeals, relying on the law of the case doctrine and equitable principles, affirmed. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., No. M2007-00528-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 454183 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009). We granted the Metropolitan Government's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that Tennessee's courts are not free to disregard applicable intervening changes in federal constitutional law announced by the United States Supreme Court while a case is pending on remand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This is a divorce case. The plaintiff husband is a successful physician and the defendant wife is a stay-at-home mother. They have one minor child. After twelve years of marriage, the husband left the marital home and filed for divorce. The wife counter-claimed for divorce, and protracted and contentious litigation ensued. The initial trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem. After several trial judges recused themselves, a senior judge was assigned. After nearly three years of dispute, the case proceeded to trial. The trial court granted a divorce to the wife; it found that she was economically disadvantaged but capable of partial rehabilitation, and that the husband had the ability to pay spousal support. The wife was awarded alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, attorney fees as alimony in solido, and discretionary costs. The husband appeals the award of alimony, attorney fees, and costs. We affirm, finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion under the circumstances.

The defendant, Lisa Christina Simpson Tuttle, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of her suspended sentence. Because the defendant failed to file a proper notice of appeal and because the interests of justice do not require that this court excuse the failure to file the notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The employee sustained two compensable injuries on the same day. Before he reached maximum medical improvement, all of the stock in his employer was sold to another corporation. The trial court held that this transaction caused a loss of employment for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d) and awarded 33% permanent partial disability to the left arm, an amount in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that a loss of employment occurred as a result of the change of ownership and that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis B. Reece, pled guilty to second degree murder in October 2005. In September 2008, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the convicting court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) ("Gomez II"), created a new constitutional rule entitled to retrospective application and that this court should deem the one-year statute of limitations period to extend from the publication of Gomez II. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Benny Taylor, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2008 Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiffs advanced monies for the creation and operation of a bonding company, in which plaintiffs were to be partners with the defendant. A dispute arose between them about the bonding operation, and plaintiff sued defendant for a percentage of the profits of the bonding company and defendant counter-sued for a monetary judgment as well. The trial court ruled that no partnership existed, but plaintiffs were entitled to recover $15,000.00 from defendant. Defendant's counter-action was dismissed. On appeal, we affirm.

The sole issue presented in this workers’ compensation claim is whether a corporate transaction involving the sale of the employer amounted to a loss of employment for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The trial court found that it did and awarded permanent disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Joseph Shaw, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the sexual battery conviction into the rape conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim without issuing a limiting instruction and by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard P. Alexander, Regina Phillips, Gail Young and Judy Sprinkles ("Plaintiffs") filed this products liability suit against Antonio Zamperla, S.p.A. and Zamperla, Inc. ("Defendants"), as a result of June Alexander's death that occurred while riding an amusement park ride manufactured by defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants summary judgment, finding the act of a third party constituted both a superseding cause of the death and an alteration of the product which relieved defendants of liability. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

E & J Construction Company ("Plaintiff") purchased a metal building from Liberty Building Systems, Inc. ("Defendant"). The metal building was purchased by plaintiff for one of its customers, Camel Manufacturing Company ("Camel"). Plaintiff constructed the metal building for Camel and connected it to an existing building. Almost from the outset, there was a problem with leaking. Plaintiff sued defendant raising various claims including, among others, breach of contract. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial on the few remaining claims. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the grant of a directed verdict on plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings. The judgment of the trial court otherwise is affirmed.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation of the defendants that the only notice of appeal received by the trial court clerk was a facsimile filed notice of appeal. As such is insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this court, the appeal is dismissed.

Employee suffered a compensable back injury in the course of his employment for the State of Tennessee. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, the State contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment.

A Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ron "Cotton" Seals, of one count of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine; one count of possession with intent to deliver dihydrocodeinone, a schedule II controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver alprazolam, a schedule IV controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half ounce or more of marijuana; one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, kept, or sold; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 20 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The employee, who suffered two separate injuries during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the employer, settled his first claim for workers' compensation and filed suit on the second. Shortly after being laid off because of an unexpected work shortage, the employee elected to retire in order to maintain medical insurance coverage rather than face an indefinite furlough without pay or benefits coverage. When the trial court reconsidered the settlement and awarded benefits in excess of the lower statutory cap on the second claim, resolving the issues in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, and the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. Because we have concluded that the employment relationship terminated when the employee was laid off, rather than when he subsequently retired, the employee was not meaningfully returned to work, and, therefore, qualifies for reconsideration of his first injury and is not subject to the lower cap on the second. The judgment of the Panel is reversed, and that of the trial court is reinstated.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation. Therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff, individually and as the guardian of her minor child, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claims that she and her child were harmed by the defendants' disclosure of their private health information. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

This matter was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for a frivolous appeal. Appellant challenges only the award itself and not the amount decided by the trial court. The party awarded the fees argued that the trial court erred in the amount awarded. Finding no error, the trial court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to three children, asserting that the findings of the juvenile court that he had abandoned his children by failure to support and that the conditions which led to the children's removal persisted were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father also asserts that the court erred in finding that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that the judgment is void because the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment at least ten days before the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this medical malpractice case, we are asked to determine whether various employees of a medical corporation were agents properly authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation and/or one of its physician employees. We hold that none of the individuals who accepted service in this case were agents authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of either the corporation or the individual physician. With specific reference to the attempted service of the amended complaint, we hold that the authority to sign for and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of process. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lori Turner (“Employee”) sought reconsideration of her prior workers’ compensation settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Her claim had been settled for 14% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole, based upon a 7% anatomical impairment. Upon reconsideration, the trial court awarded an additional 21% PPD, for a total of 35% PPD to the body as a whole. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. (“Employer”) has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the amount of the award. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Terry Lynn Craft, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-213(b)(2). In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court violated the hearsay rule in admitting a recording of a 911 call. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donnie Edward Braddam, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.