APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Raymond Douglas Myers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. See State v. Raymond Douglas Myers, Sr., No. M2003-01099-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 911280, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 20, 2004), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004). The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and the conspiracy to commit murder conviction with the three convictions for first degree murder. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, and a consecutive twenty-four year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *7. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in a lengthy pro se petition. Counsel was appointed. After a hearing on the petition for relief, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner has appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that the postconviction court should have determined that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Joel Adam Alexander, was indicted for possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to deliver, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 16, 2008, defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to sell, with an agreed sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the trial court's determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed petitions seeking increased library access as well as his release from incarceration. Because Appellant has been unconditionally released from prison, we find his appeal moot and affirm the trial court's dismissal of his claims.

The trial court in this matter granted a motion to dismiss and entered a default judgment for the plaintiff, American Legion Post 212 ("Post 212"). The defendant, Hollis F. Summers ("Mr. Summers"), who was not present at the hearing, had removed the action to federal court days earlier. Under 28 U.S.C. _ 1446(d), once a case is removed to federal court, a state court has no authority to take further action in the matter. Accordingly, because the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, we must summarily reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

Plaintiff hospital filed a lawsuit against defendant patient for unpaid medical expenses. Defendant patient filed a third party complaint against defendant insurance company alleging that the insurance company was responsible for the unpaid medical expenses pursuant to a health insurance policy. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the insurance contract was ambiguous and construed it against the defendant insurance company. Defendant insurance company appeals. After reviewing the record and the health insurance policy, we conclude that the policy was not ambiguous and the insurance contract specifically excluded coverage of patient's pre-existing condition. Accordingly, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Veric Dean Osgood, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He received a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this action plaintiff asked the Court to declare that he had an interest in property which he inherited by will, and for a partition and sale of the land. The trial court determined that plaintiff was judicially estopped to claim an interest in the land and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

An inmate appeals a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice and 42 U.S.C._ 1983 claims against the correctional facility's psychiatrist. Since the defendant's doctor negated essential elements of both claims with her expert affidavit and plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment to defendant attorney in an action alleging professional malpractice, fraud, and violation of the consumer protection act. We affirm.

This case concerns the priority of lienholders' respective interests in real property. The plaintiffs/appellees, Trustmark National Bank and FirstBank, filed this joint action as amended for declaratory judgment against the defendants/appellants, Long Beach Mortgage Company, Sonya R. Thomas, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, and for enforcement of their liens through judicial sale of the property. The plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted that Trustmark and FirstBank held judgment liens against the property that were valid, enforceable, and superior to the defendants' interests. The defendants responded in pertinent part that they were entitled to priority under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, even if the plaintiffs held prior-recorded judgment liens against the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the plaintiffs' liens were enforceable and superior to the defendants' later-recorded deeds of trust and that the defendants were not entitled to equitable subrogation. The defendants appealed, challenging only whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the question of equitable subrogation. Because the plaintiffs failed to negate an essential element of equitable subrogation or show that the defendants cannot establish an essential element of equitable subrogation at trial, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in part and remand.

The petitioner, Phedrek T. Davis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily denying his petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Herman Majors, Jr., appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence for his conviction of aggravated assault, alleging that the trial court erred in not returning him to community corrections or placing him on probation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Gary Wayne Armstrong, appeals from his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of assault and aggravated assault. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erroneously sentenced him. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This case involves the award of attorney's fees and costs against the Appellant City of Memphis for its alleged failure to comply with the appellee's document request, made under the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _10-7-501 et seq. The trial court awarded fees and costs against the city under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 10-7-505(g), which requires a finding of knowledge and willful failure to comply with the public records act. Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) the trial court made no specific finding concerning the city's alleged willful failure to comply, and (2) the record does not support a finding of willful failure to comply on the part of the city. Reversed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of one count of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, see T.C.A. __ 39-17-417(a)(3), (j)(5); 39-12-103 (2003), and one count of possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, see id. _ 39-17- 417(a)(4), (j)(5). The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Brandon Taylor Fisher, stands convicted of robbery and kidnapping, both Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years for robbery and four years for kidnapping and ordered him to serve the sentences consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court failed to make findings sufficient to justify consecutive sentences under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) and remand for a new sentencing hearing solely on the issue of whether consecutive sentences are appropriate in this case.

The defendant, Edward Thompson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition to suspend his sentence to probation. The defendant pled guilty to attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and received an agreed sentence of ten years. However, as part of the agreement, he reserved the right to request that the trial court sentence him to probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in its decision by "not appropriately bas[ing] the denial of probation upon the sentencing considerations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated 40-35-103." Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the petition.

The Petitioner, Kardius Wilkes, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder. This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and his application for permission to appeal was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Kardius Wilkes, No. W2001-02172-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 818255 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 26, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 7, 2002). He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because his trial counsel failed to: (1) impeach a particular witness using transcripts of the Petitioner's first trial, which ended in a mistrial; (2) adequately meet with the Petitioner before his second trial; (3) call the Petitioner's brother as a witness; and (4) adequately investigate and interview potential witnesses. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Defendant, Jonathon C. Hood, appeals the dismissal of his motion to discharge fines. More specifically, he contends that because his sentence was expired, the trial court erred in dismissing the motion. The State argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide for an appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to discharge fines. We agree. Additionally, the record is incomplete. Therefore, Defendant's appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, the defendant claims that his due process rights were violated because the judge presiding over his probation revocation had previously served as a member of his drug court team and had received ex parte information regarding the defendant's conduct at issue by virtue of his prior involvement. After due consideration, we agree that the Due Process Clause requires that a defendant's probation revocation be adjudicated by a judge who has not previously reviewed the same or related subject matter as part of the defendant's drug court team. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below and remand the defendant's case for a new hearing in front of a different judge.

Purchasers of real estate brought suit against the sellers as well as against the appraiser, the sellers' real estate agent, the agent's managing broker and brokerage firm alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of duty to disclose adverse facts related to the property purchased. Upon their motions for summary judgment, the appraiser, real estate agent, the agent's managing broker and brokerage firm were dismissed as defendants; the purchasers appeal the dismissal of the real estate agent, the managing broker and the brokerage firm. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Carlos Kennedy, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Chester County of rape of a child, a Class A felony, attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for rape of a child, ten years for attempted rape of a child, eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault, and four years for coercion of a witness. The trial court ordered the sentence for attempted rape of a child to be served consecutively with the sentence for rape of a child. It also ordered the sentences for assault and coercion of a witness to run concurrently with the conviction for rape of a child. Thus, Kennedy received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Kennedy claims: (1) that the conviction for rape of a child is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning the victim and her mother about a prior allegation of sexual abuse made by the victim; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant-Appellant, Mario Chambers, entered guilty pleas to four Class E felonies and one Class A misdemeanor. Specifically, Chambers pled guilty to possession of Morphine with intent to sell, possession of Hydrocodone with intent to sell, possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell and possession of marijuana. As a part of his plea agreement, Chambers received concurrent two-year sentences for each of the felony convictions to be served in the county workhouse and a concurrent thirty-four day sentence to be served in the county jail for the misdemeanor conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Chambers argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.