APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Lawrence D. Ralph, was convicted of driving under the  influence (DUI), fourth offense; DUI per se, fourth offense; driving on a revoked driver’s license, fifth offense; violation of the habitual traffic offender status; and two counts of evading arrest. The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction with the first count and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the habitual traffic offender conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years each for the DUI, fourth offense conviction; the habitual traffic offender status conviction; and the felony evading arrest conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective 12-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI, fourth offense and (2) that the trial court’s sentence was excessive. Following our review, we  affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a complaint to dissolve a partnership. The plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant, an unmarried couple, acquired real property through joint efforts. She further alleged that she contributed to the improvement of the property and an increase in its value, giving rise to a partnership for profit and a right to a distribution of the partnership’s assets following dissolution. The defendant denied that a partnership existed and counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fees arising out of the plaintiff’s refusal to vacate the property following their break-up. At the ensuing bench trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the plaintiff’s claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, specifically finding that the plaintiff was unable to prove the existence of an express or implied partnership for profit between the parties. We affirm.

The defendant, Randy Parham, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony; and domestic assault causing bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to thirty-five years at 100% for the attempted first degree murder conviction, fifteen years at 100% for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years at 35% for the theft conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction. Finding the defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for his felony convictions be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of fifty-six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated robbery conviction with the theft conviction and the attempted murder conviction with the assault conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing. Based on our review, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions but that the defendant’s domestic assault conviction should have been merged into the conviction for attempted first degree murder. We further conclude that the trial court did not make adequate findings in support of the sentences imposed. We, therefore, merge the domestic assault conviction into the conviction for attempted first degree murder and remand for resentencing and for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect the merger and the fact that the defendant was convicted in count four of theft of $1000 or more, rather than theft of $10,000 or more as erroneously marked on the judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of the father’s petition to be named the minor child’s primary residential parent. Finding that the father met his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the requested modification and that the change was in the child’s best interest, we affirm.

The defendant, Terence Alan Carder, appeals the order entered against him by the McNairy  County Circuit Court, ordering that he pay $80,000 in restitution. The defendant pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to two years of probation following the service of sixty days in jail. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to pay $80,000 in
restitution at a rate of $1000 per month. On direct appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the  sentence but remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the amount of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay. On remand, the trial court, while acknowledging that the defendant would not be able to pay the entire $80,000 in restitution during the term of his sentence, nonetheless, entered an order that the amount of restitution ordered would remain at $80,000. However, the court did modify the terms of repayment to $100 per month. On appeal, the defendant again contends that, given his financial resources and ability to pay, the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $80,000 in restitution. We agree. Because it is unclear from the record exactly how many months the defendant has remaining on his sentence in light of his recent incarceration for a separate crime, we must again remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order of restitution reflecting a total amount of $100 times the months remaining on the defendant’s sentence in which he is expected to pay.

Plaintiff foreclosed on defendant's property and filed suit in Sessions Court to obtain possession of the property. Defendant appealed the Judgment for possession to Circuit Court, which granted plaintiff summary judgment. Defendant has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court, awarding possession of the property to plaintiff.

This appeal involves a doctor’s challenge to disciplinary charges brought against him by the Department of Health, Division of Health Related Boards. After the trial court denied the doctor’s request for a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with a hearing on the disciplinary charges, the doctor filed a notice of appeal to this court. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims raised by the doctor, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Petitioner filed to establish his parentage of the child born to defendant, Lori Jane Martin. He asked to have his parentage established, that he share parenting time, and expressed the desire to provide child support, as well as pay half the medical expenses for the mother and child. He also asked that the child then bear his last name. In a series of motions, the mother moved to relocate to Hawaii, which the trial court denied. She then moved the Court to allow her to move to North Carolina to allow her to pursue a graduate degree. The trial court then allowed this move, and entered a series of orders relating to visitation, travel, etc. The mother appealed to this Court and we remand to the trial court because the remaining issues that the petitioner raised in his Petition have not been ruled upon by the trial court. The appeal was premature.  Case remanded.

The defendant, Michael Martez Rhodes, pursuant to a plea agreement, entered an Alford “best interest” plea of guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The agreement provided for a four-year sentence for each conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served in the Department of  Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation and in imposing consecutive sentences. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. However, we note the transcript shows an Alford “best-interest” guilty plea. The judgment reflects a plea of nolo contendere. We remand for a correction of the judgment.

Leta V. Myers (“Mother”) and Robert A. Myers (“Father”) were divorced in 1999. Approximately ten years later, Father filed a petition seeking to have his child support payment reduced after the oldest of the parties’ four children became emancipated. Mother responded to the petition. Mother also filed a counter-petition seeking a modification of the parenting plan as well as to have Father found in contempt of court for willfully violating numerous provisions of the final decree. When Father failed to respond timely to the counter-petition, Mother filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion for default. Approximately three hours after the order granting the default judgment was entered, Father filed a response to the counter-petition. The trial court eventually found Father in contempt of court for numerous violations of the final decree. After Father’s motion to set aside the default judgment was denied, Father appealed challenging only the initial entry of the default judgment. We affirm.

The petitioner, David A. Romano, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner pled guilty to one count of Class D felony forgery, two counts of Class E felony forgery, and one count of Class A misdemeanor theft of property. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of twelve years, two six-year sentences, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the respective convictions. He was further ordered to serve the sentences in confinement. After a period, the trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to serve the balance of the sentences on probation; however, his probation was later revoked and the petitioner remainsincarcerated to date. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to allow him to serve his sentence on probation because his sentence was greater than ten years, which precluded his eligibility to receive a probationary sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is currently restrained pursuant to an illegal sentence, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Fayette County Circuit Court.

In November 2006, the Putnam County grand jury indicted Appellant, Robin Blaskis, for one count of theft over $60,000. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based upon the violation of her right to a speedy trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss was correct because the four factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), did not weigh in her favor. We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Larry C. Thompson, Jr., has appealed from the trial court’s order which denied defendant’s “Motion to Reopen and Suspend Sentence.”  The sentence which defendant sought to “reopen” and suspend was entered May 10, 2004. The motion to “reopen” and suspend the sentence was not filed until over five years later in July 2009. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Veronica Lynn Floyd, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of theft of property over $10,000, Class C felonies, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. She was sentenced as a Range I offender to five years on each of the theft over $10,000 convictions, with two of the counts to be served concurrently and one count consecutively to the others, and three years on the theft over $1000 conviction, to be served consecutively to the other counts, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. The defendant was ordered to serve nine months of her sentence in the county jail with the remaining term on community corrections. On appeal, she argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Luis Castanon, filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301-313. Petitioner sought DNA testing of evidence in the trial resulting in his convictions for four counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary. The State filed a response in opposition to the petition, and the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that Petitioner had not satisfied the statutory requirements to authorize DNA testing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition and by failing to require the State to submit proof that “DNA evidence” no longer existed. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After Husband and Wife filed cross petitions for orders of protection, they entered Consent Injunctions restricting communications between them. Subsequently, the parties filed competing petitions for contempt, alleging violations of the Consent Injunctions. On appeal, Husband argues that the Consent Injunctions were improperly entered, and therefore, that the trial court’s criminal contempt conviction, which was based upon violations of such injunctions, cannot stand. We affirm the decision of the chancery court, and finding the appeal frivolous, we remand for a determination of damages.

The defendant, Jermario Divine Warfield, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement, which he now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After eighteen years of marriage, Jennie F. Ingraham (“Wife”) sued Patrick Garrett Ingraham (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment on December 7, 2009, inter alia, granting Wife a divorce and dividing the marital property. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the valuation and distribution of the marital property. Wife raises additional issues concerning the property distribution and attorney fees. We affirm as to the Trial Court’s valuation of items of marital property, the determination that the Exxon stock is Husband’s separate property, and the denial of an award to Wife of attorney’s fees. We, however, remand this case for proof on the issue of whether Husband’s combined SEP and IRA fall under the definition contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) pursuant to our Supreme Court’s Opinion in Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2009).

Plaintiff filed a cause of action asserting breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Acts. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Memphis Light Gas & Water Division based on the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.

This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s action when another related lawsuit, filed prior to this Hamblen County Chancery Court action, was pending in Knox County Chancery Court. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s action under the prior suit pending doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm.

The defendant, Deredious Otis, stands convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four and a half years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant presents seven issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to enter his own statement to police as evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses of self-defense and defense of a third party; (4) whether the trial court erred by restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination; (5) whether the trial court erred by threatening defense counsel with contempt; (6) whether the trial court committed a Batson error in the composition of the final jury; and (7) whether the trial court improperly applied sentencing factors. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute based on competing surveys. The plaintiffs, Doyle and Gloria Sweeney (“the Sweeneys”), and the defendants, Charles and Valerie Koehler (“the Koehlers”), own adjoining real properties. The Sweeneys brought a declaratory judgment action against the Koehlers, seeking to have the boundary line declared between the parties. The Koehlers counterclaimed. The trial court found that the statutory bar codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 did not apply to the Koehlers and that the Sweeneys were not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of ownership to the disputed land under § 28-2-109 based upon the payment of property taxes on the tract for over 20 years. The trial court determined the common boundary line as contended by the Koehlers. The Sweeneys appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The father of a minor child appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. He contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions because the State failed to present evidence he had the ability to pay or that his failure to pay was willful. We agree and reverse the holding of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Dana Kennedy Walls, was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine in count one, a Class C felony; facilitation of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine in count two, a Class E felony; and promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine in count three, a Class D felony. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to serve concurrent sentences of five years with service of 365 days in confinement for count one, two years with service of 90 days in confinement for count two, and three years with service of 250 days in confinement for count three, for an effective sentence of five years with 365 days in confinement prior to serving the remainder of her sentence on probation. On appeal, Dana Walls argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempt for each of the charged offenses, and (3) her sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs were injured in a car accident in which their car collided with a stolen car. They sued the City of Murfreesboro and its police department, arguing that the stolen car was being pursued by the police immediately prior to the accident. The plaintiffs also sued the person who was using the car with its owner’s permission prior to the theft, arguing that he had acted negligently in leaving the keys in the car. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants. With respect to the city and its police department, we affirm. With respect to the user of the offending car prior to its theft, we reverse and remand.