APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jeffrey A. Waggoner, appeals the denial of error coram nobis relief by the trial court. He was convicted of first degree murder on February 2, 1984, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis relief, alleging that a witness who had testified against him at trial had recanted his testimony. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Donald Ray Blevins, for two counts of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount of less than 0.5 grams, and one count of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount of 0.5 grams or more. These offenses were based upon three drug transactions involving a confidential informant's telephone calls to Appellant and further dealings with two other individuals. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of facilitation of delivery of cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, delivery of cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, and delivery of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender and imposed an effective nine-year sentence to be served at thirty percent. Appellant appealed his convictions arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever offenses. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's convictions of the delivery offenses based upon the theory of criminal responsibility. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of delivery. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the telephone calls were part of a common scheme or plan and for that reason the denial of Appellant's motion to sever offenses was proper. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Plaintiff, a non-resident, brought this action against defendant real estate agent for releasing funds from a sale to defendant Hays, who had been employed by the plaintiff to sell items of personalty for plaintiff and improve plaintiff's real estate properties for sale. Further, that Hays improperly filed a lien against plaintiff's property, resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted the real estate agent summary judgment and, after a trial, entered a monetary judgment against Hays in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the issue of summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent, and Hays appeals the monetary judgment entered against him in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendants-Appellants, Erica Harrison and Alexis Harrison, each entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than five hundred dollars ($500) but less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Both requested judicial diversion, which the court denied. The trial court sentenced Erica Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 180 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her two-year sentence to be served on supervised probation and sentenced Alexis Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 90 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her sentence to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Erica and Alexis Harrison argue that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying judicial diversion and (2) denying full probation. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Defendant, Anthony Douglas Dansby, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI"), violation of the implied consent law, violation of the seatbelt law, violation of the open container law, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the stop of his vehicle, which led to his indictment and guilty plea, was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the stop of the Defendant's vehicle was constitutional; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. After a trial, the court entered a divorce decree and divided the marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Husband, and Wife, a pro se litigant, appeals the trial court's division of the marital property. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand.

Prospective buyers entered into a contract with construction company for purchase of a home; the contract was amended to provide that a garage would be constructed. A letter was subsequently prepared specifying a time for the buyers to tender payment for the garage. The buyers failed to secure a loan to finance construction of the garage until a year after closing. When the construction company refused to build the garage for the amount specified in the contract amendment, the buyers initiated this action. The trial court found that the letter clarified the amendment by setting a time for performance and that the buyers' failure to pay within that time was a breach of the agreement which relieved the construction company of its contractual obligations; the court consequently dismissed buyers' action. Finding that there was not an agreement between the parties, the trial court's determination that the letter clarified the amendment is reversed. Finding that a reasonable time for performance was 90 days from closing on the home, and that the buyers' failure to tender payment within such period was a material breach, we affirm the trial court's determination that the construction company was relieved of its contractual obligations.

The Petitioner, Delwin O'Neal, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty plea convictions for multiple drug offenses for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years as a Range II, multiple offender. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner requested a reduction of sentence, and the trial court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it could not modify the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs, commercial and residential consumers of natural gas, purchased natural gas from utilities, which had acquired the product wholesale from the defendants. In this class action antitrust suit, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in various anticompetitive practices, including making false statements about natural gas transactions and engaging in “wash trades” and “churning.” After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the claims were barred by both field pre-emption and the filed rate doctrine, the chancellor dismissed the claims. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claims were not subject to dismissal. Because the Natural Gas Act and subsequent federal legislation pre-empt state actions in this particular field of regulation, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and all claims are dismissed.

The Defendant, Jason Allen Ruiz, pled guilty to one count of sale of cocaine and one count of delivery of cocaine, both Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation following an 11 month and 29 day period of confinement in the local jail on work release. Following the filing of a revocation warrant and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery Boyd Trusty, was convicted by a Smith County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property over $1000. The trial court merged the two first degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years as a violent offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and four years as a Range I offender for the theft of property over $1000 conviction, for an effective sentence of life in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially eight issues on appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, that the State failed to prove venue in Smith County beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the State's burden to prove venue, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's requests for special jury instructions, allowing hearsay testimony that the victim feared the defendant, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the search procedures employed to locate the victim's body and the evidence uncovered during those searches, allowing a police officer to offer legal opinions and conclusions, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the defendant's possession and movement of firearms, and not allowing each of the defendant's counsel to deliver a separate closing argument. Having reviewed the record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of an elderly woman's attempt to recover assets from her daughter and former son-in-law, who allegedly exercised undue influence over her financial decision-making for a period of years following the death of her husband. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate two transfers of substantial assets to the defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of a claim between the parties, we vacate the entry of final judgment and remand.

The appellants, Aaron Bonding Company, T Bonding Company, and Around the Clock Bonding Company, LLC, appeal the order of a final forfeiture against them, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order. Following our review of the record, we dismiss this appeal as being premature and remand the case to the trial court to issue an order of final disposition  appellants may then appeal.

The Defendant, Timothy Mark Agee, II, appeals his conviction upon a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-three years. The Defendant appeals, contending that the sentence imposed is too lengthy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.

The Defendants, Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, were convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine. Additionally, the Defendant Miller was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine. All convictions are Class A felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(j)(5). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant Miller to an effective sentence of one hundred and twenty years as a Range II, multiple offender; the trial court ordered all three of his forty-year sentences to be served consecutively to one another. As for the Defendant Turner, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years as a career offender, running both of his sixty-year sentences concurrently with one another. On appeal, the Defendant Miller presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence gathered via wiretaps; (2) whether it was error to allow a State's witness to "field-test" a substance found on an exhibit; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support verdicts for conspiracy and delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine; and (4) whether the trial court committed sentencing errors. The Defendant Turner, in addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions, argues that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain "drug ledgers" found in his apartment; and (2) the telephone calls intercepted during the wiretap investigation, purported to contain the Defendant's voice, were, in fact, inadmissible hearsay. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants’ home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant’s attorney alerted the plaintiff’s attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this appeal should be
dismissed. The record on appeal includes the court’s minutes for April 30, 2008. The minutes reflect that on October 4, 2007, judgment nisi was taken against the defendant and that a scire facias was issued and served. According to the minutes, a final judgment was entered against the defendant and his sureties in the amount of $75, 000 “the penalty of the defendant’s appearance bond, for which execution will issue, together with the costs of this prosecution.”

The petitioner, Jermaine Hughey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Matthew I. Tart, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of alternative sentencing following his pleas of guilty to charges of violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law, speeding, and leaving the scene of an accident. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for the trial court to consider amendments to the judgments.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, for these convictions. Under the same indictment, the Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for this conviction, to be served consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of twentyone years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that consecutive sentencing was improper. Because the record on appeal does not include the necessary transcripts of what transpired in the trial court, we conclude that the Defendant has waived the issues argued on appeal. We must presume that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and that the sentencing ruling of the trial court was correct; therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, George Ward, appeals his resentencing following the revocation of his eight-year community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum twelve-year sentence for his Class B felony drug offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. Following our review, we affirm the twelve-year sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Tommy Lee Clark, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper cross-examination and for not investigating the petitioner's mental competency. The State argues that the petitioner has waived appellate review of these issues by not including them in his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.