APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant Donald Lockhart was indicted by a Loudon County Grand Jury for driving under the influence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401. The trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence derived from the stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Thereafter, Appellant pled guilty to the charge, but under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b) preserved the following issue for appeal: “Whether the trial judge erred by failing to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the [Appellant] that was conducted by the Lenoir City Police Department and which the [Appellant] alleged was conducted in the absence of a valid warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion, all in violation of [Appellant’s] constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures?” On appeal, he argues that the citizen informant’s tip, combined with an officer’s determination that Appellant was impaired during a welfare check minutes before the stop, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Upon review, we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court is free to set any sentence
within the appropriate sentencing range “regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors.” I write separately, however, to emphasize that the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act, when read in conjunction with those provisions not affected by the amendments and the Sentencing Commission Comments, are in and of themselves open to two interpretations: (1) that, although the enhancement and mitigating factors were rendered advisory, a trial court still has no discretion to enhance a defendant’s
sentence without finding applicable one of the enhancement factors enumerated in Code section 40-35-114 and (2) that a trial court is free to choose any sentence within the appropriate range so long as the imposition of the sentence complies with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. The latter was first alluded to by our supreme court in State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 355 (2008). For the reasons set forth below, it is my view that latter interpretation is constitutionally required.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Amos Oyeleye, of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case following a long-term marriage. Following a trial, the Trial Court classified the property as separate or marital, divided the marital property, awarded Wife $30,000 as her share of farm income that was earned after the parties separated, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $800 per month and alimony in solido of $20,000 for partial payment of her attorney fees. Both parties appeal raising various issues. We modify the award of $30,000 in farm income to an award of $2,184. We also modify the award of alimony in futuro to be $400 per month, with this modification to become effective sixty days from the date our judgment is entered. In all other respects, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed this claim for negligent deprivation of a statutory right upon finding that the statute relied upon contained no private right of action. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Lance Murray, of facilitation of robbery. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

During the course of an investigation for a robbery and homicide, officers provided Miranda warnings to the defendant, who sought clarification regarding his right to the presence of counsel. Ultimately, the defendant executed a waiver and made a statement to police. Indicted later for first degree murder and other offenses, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his entire statement, arguing that the investigating officers had failed to honor an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. The trial court granted the motion, the State received permission to take an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We accepted the application for review to determine whether the defendant was equivocal in his request for counsel and, if so, whether the police properly limited further questions to the clarification of his right to counsel until the right was either clearly invoked or waived. Because the defendant did not clearly assert his right and the police officers limited the scope of their questions until the defendant chose to execute the waiver of rights form, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioners filed an administrative petition with the defendant commission challenging a newly promulgated rule. Before the commission took action on the administrative petition,
the petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the trial court, making essentially the same allegations. The commission filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, because the petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing the declaratory judgment lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioners now appeal. We reverse, finding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

A Madison County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Carlous Leon Clark, for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and assault. The Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that a trial would not comply with the speedy trial provisions of the United States and Tennessee constitutions. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and a Madison County jury convicted the Defendant of attempted first degree murder, assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “Motion for Correction of Void Judgment.” The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the petitioner’s motion should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and that he failed to state a cognizable claim because he is not “imprisoned or restrained of liberty.” We agree, grant the State’s motion, and affirm the judgment from the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Curtis Daniel Hart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He was initially convicted of second degree murder, simple possession of marijuana, and simple possession of Alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, and sentenced to thirty-five years in confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, the petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective in a variety of areas but failed to prove any of the allegations. Therefore, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Terry Cary, was convicted by a Madison County jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Tywan Garcia Armstrong, was convicted by a jury in Marshall County of (Count 1) sale of a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B Felony; (Count 2) delivery of a Scheduled II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; (Count 3) possession with the intent to sell a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; (Count 4) possession with the intent to deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; and (Count 5) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, a Class E felony. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his car; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for Counts 1, 2, and 5; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to apply the mitigating factors submitted by the Defendant at the sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Joseph Grant, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner claims the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing and allowed evidence of witness statements that would have impacted the outcome of the proceedings. We conclude the writ of error coram nobis upon this record is not available to the petitioner because he pled guilty. The summary dismissal is affirmed.

This is an appeal of a discovery matter. The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle
accident with the defendants. One year and one day after the accident, the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit asserting negligence. The complaint sought money damages for damage to property
and personal injury. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations. The plaintiff sought extensive discovery of the defendants’ personal records.
The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff now appeals. We find that the order from which the
plaintiff appeals is not a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Herman Sowell, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his motion requesting the trial court to modify his sentence of confinement to a suspended sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no change in circumstances which would justify the requested modification. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Eugene Scoville, of two
counts of harassment. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Collins Reed, appeals his sentence following the revocation of his probation. He originally pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This sentence was suspended to ten years of supervised probation. Because this was Reed’s third probation violation, the trial court placed his eight-year sentence for attempted aggravated robbery into effect. On appeal, Reed concedes the probation violation, but argues the trial court should have reinstated his probation or imposed a rehabilitative sentence that addressed his drug addiction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joe Marvin Ellison, pled guilty to aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and rape for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to reopen his post-conviction petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Thomas Christopher Hayes, appeals as of right his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction for sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in the Department of Correction. His sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-
Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete
truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus
manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor. Following trial, the jury found that the
Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees
were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants
appeal. We find that Appellants’ claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side
windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §30101 et seq. Further, we find
that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus
caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting
Appellees’ motions for directed verdict on the Appellants’ claims based on the use of
perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.

This is divorce case, ending a fifteen year marriage. Appellant-Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification and division of marital property. Appellee-Wife appeals from the trial court’s decision to impute income to her. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Frankie E. Casteel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of first degree murder. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee Hospital
after Appellant’s decedent suffered several falls and a broken hip while a patient at Appellee
Hospital. The trial court granted Appellee Hospital’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion,
thereby dismissing Appellant’s amended complaint. Specifically, the trial court held: (1) that
the amended complaint was ineffective to give notice to Appellee Hospital because it did not
reference the date(s) of decedent’s falls, (2) that the medical malpractice claim and hedonic
damages of the widow arising therefrom were dismissed by previous orders of the court, and
(3) that the proof did not support the averments made in the amended complaint. After
review, we conclude: (1) that the amended complaint is sufficiently specific to satisfy Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 8, and to state a claim for medical malpractice against the Appellee Hospital, (2)
that the previous orders of the trial court only dismissed the wrongful death claims and
widow’s loss of consortium claims arising therefrom, and not the medical malpractice claims,
and (3) that the trial court reviewed matters outside the pleadings so as to trigger summary
judgment analysis under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, and (4) that there are disputes of material
fact in this case so as to necessitate a full evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice
claim. Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim
against Appellee Hospital and on the widow’s loss of consortium claims arising from the
alleged medical malpractice.