APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim for adverse possession of the property in dispute. I also concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s ruling that Defendants may construct the fence where proposed as that fence is constructed entirely on Defendants’ property and does not, as found by the majority, interfere with Plaintiff’s use of the easement in any way.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise during her work from 1944 to 1989 as a telephone operator for her employer, and awarded 50% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on the issue of causation. Alternatively, it argues that the award is excessive. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint.

The Petitioner, Marco Butler, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and his concurrent sentences of life and twenty-five years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to communicate his release eligibility date. He also contends that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, George Cecil Resh, alleged that he sustained
hearing loss due to exposure to a harmful level of noise in his workplace. The employer, Building
Materials Corporation, denied that the employee’s hearing loss was work-related. The trial court
found in favor of the employee and awarded 50% permanent partial disability of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Because we find that the expert medical evidence failed to establish that Mr. Resh’s hearing loss was work-related, we agree and reverse the judgment.1

The petitioner, Johnny Menifee, was convicted in 2004 of Class D felony evading arrest with risk of injury, misdemeanor theft, Class E felony reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and resisting arrest. He received an effective sentence of eighteen years as a persistent offender. After his convictions and sentences were affirmed by this court in 2006, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition; and, after our review, we affirm that denial.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order overruling a pro se petition for writ of mandamus by the appellant. In the petition, the appellant sought access to the grand jury for Bradley County to present evidence of purported wrongdoing by the investigating officer of his case. The trial court denied the petition. On a different basis, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging false light invasion of privacy and defamation after her physician sent a letter she considered defamatory. After finding that plaintiff consented to the disclosure by signing a consent form, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.

The defendant, Suzanne D. Burkhart, appeals certified questions of law from the Sevier County Circuit Court, where she pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and violation of the implied consent law. The reserved certified question challenges on constitutional grounds a Sevierville police officer’s basis for stopping her vehicle and also his authority for doing so outside the City of Sevierville. We affirm the action of the trial court.

The petitioner, Liberty Bonding Company, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of its request to return the $5000 paid as a final forfeiture on the bond for the defendant, Jose E. Bejar. The defendant violated his bond agreement in 1996, and the petitioner paid the final forfeiture in 1997. Some ten years later, the State dismissed the pending charges against the defendant. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial because: (1) there was no written final order of forfeiture entered; and (2) the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-133(c) (2006) prohibits the State from dismissing the underlying charges. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by Judge Farmer. However, because I reach the result by different reasoning, I write separately.

In 1995, a Hickman County jury convicted the Petitioner of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of false imprisonment, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to a total effective sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming the trial court did not have statutory authority to sentence him as a Range II multiple offender. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing, finding that “[h]abeas corpus relief is not appropriate.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

I must respectfully dissent in this case. Unfortunately, I find that I disagree with both the majority opinion and the concurrence.

The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody of his three minor children, who are in the custody of their maternal grandparents. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nicholas Allen Montieth, was found guilty of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years as a Range One offender. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to impeach the victim with testimony of a prior inconsistent statement. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, was convicted by a Tipton County Jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to deliver and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to a fourteen-year sentence. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Robert Lee Adams, Jr., No. W2007-00880-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2152497 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 22, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition.  Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner brought this action in Juvenile Court to establish paternity and set co-parenting time with the child. The mother answered and, as an affirmative defense, averred that the father had signed a waiver of his parental right and cited the statutes stating that a waiver of parental rights could not be revoked. The Trial Court appointed a guardian ad litem, and the sole issue tried by the Trial Court was whether the waiver should be voided on the grounds that the father had signed the waiver under duress and undue pressure. The Trial Judge found that the father failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed the waiver of interest and notice due to fraud, duress or intentional misrepresentation. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiff, formerly an at-will employee of Baptist Hospital, filed this action asserting that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. She asserted twelve claims, inter alia, retaliatory discharge, age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, violation of wage and hour laws, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The trial court summarily dismissed all of the claims. We affirm.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq.

This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties.