APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Father appeals order finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to a total of 180 days incarceration. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Court today invalidates the Unauthorized Substances Tax on the ground that it exceeds the General Assembly’s taxing power under Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Court reaches this conclusion despite the precedents requiring us to interpret statutes in a manner that sustains, rather than defeats, their constitutionality. Even though I concur with the Court’s conclusions that the Unauthorized Substances Tax does not run afoul of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination and that it is consistent with the requirements of due process, I cannot concur with its decision that this tax cannot be imposed in a constitutional manner on persons who possess significant quantities of illegal drugs for the purpose of resale.

In this divorce dispute, Wife argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her the divorce, by characterizing her condominium as marital property, and in the division of marital assets, including funds that the court found Husband had dissipated from the marital estate. Finding that the Husband did not dissipate marital funds, we reverse. On all other issues, we affirm.

The defendant, Sam Avery Wilhoite, was indicted on ten counts of forgery involving five forged checks. A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted him of eight counts of forgery and lesserincluded charges on two of the counts. The trial court merged five of the counts, including the lesser-included convictions, with the five other counts and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Sellers of truck appeal award of damages and attorneys fees awarded to purchaser based on finding that sellers violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Effective January 1, 2005, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a tax on the possession of unauthorized substances for the purpose of generating revenues to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drug crimes. Subsequently, Steven Waters was assessed with taxes, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $55,316.84 by the Tennessee Department of Revenue after purchasing nearly a kilogram of cocaine from a confidential informant. In a declaratory judgment suit in the Chancery Court of Loudon County, Waters challenged the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of self-incrimination, double jeopardy and due process. The chancellor declared the statute unconstitutional and set aside the assessment. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the enactment exceeded the General Assembly’s taxing power under article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Initially, we hold that the statute imposing the tax on unauthorized substances does not violate the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy or abridge the guarantee of procedural due process. Because, however, the tax cannot be classified as either a tax on merchants, a tax on peddlers or a tax on privileges, as authorized by our state constitution, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant, Christopher Anderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury on one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The defendant received sentences of three years for aggravated burglary and eight years for each count of aggravated robbery to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to sever his cases from the cases of his co-defendant; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count III, charging aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding defense counsel’s inquiry on cross-examination of the co-defendant regarding bias. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. He was
subsequently sentenced to 18 years for rape of a child and 10 years for aggravated sexual battery. His sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of 28 years. On appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions, and (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve his sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcie Lynn Pursell, aka Marcie Pursell Frazier, was indicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court for three counts of aggravated child abuse. Thereafter, the Davidson County Juvenile Court concluded that the State had not proved allegations, in a dependent and neglect petition, that the defendant had injured her child or allowed the child to be injured. The defendant sought to dismiss the felony child abuse charges in criminal court on collateral estoppel grounds. The trial court denied her motion. The trial court and this Court granted her Rule 9 application for an interlocutory appeal. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court finding that the State was not collaterally estopped from pursuing criminal prosecution against the defendant is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Bryant D. Millen, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview and investigate witnesses. He further asserts that trial counsel failed to impeach the testimony of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of a minor automobile accident. The plaintiff filed suit individually and on behalf of his son, claiming that his son suffered whiplash in the accident. The defendant admitted fault for the accident but denied that she caused any damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff presented testimony from a physician who opined that the son was injured in the car accident. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Jecory J. Leonard, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to facilitation of second degree murder and facilitation of attempted first degree murder, Class B felonies. The plea agreement provided that the length and manner of service of the sentences would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the

This appeal involves a medical malpractice action. In a motion for summary judgment, defendant physician asserted that plaintiff’s expert witness failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule. The trial court granted the motion finding that plaintiff’s expert failed to demonstrate a familiarity with the standard of care in defendant’s community or a similar community. In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, plaintiff attached a supplemental affidavit of the same expert in order to cure the deficiency. The trial court considered the expert’s supplemental affidavit and denied the motion because the new affidavit still failed to satisfy the locality rule. Plaintiff appeals. Reviewing the record, we find that the expert’s supplemental affidavit cured the initial deficiency by relating facts which showed the similarity of the two communities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is a dispute over lease agreements. The plaintiff outdoor advertising company leased two parcels of property from the defendant real estate development company for the purpose of erecting billboard signs. The defendant then cancelled the leases. The defendant had contracted to sell the property to another outdoor advertising company, and cancelled the leases with the plaintiff in reliance on a lease provision allowing cancellation in the event that the plaintiff’s signs interfered with the defendant’s sale or development of the property. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s cancellation was ineffective because this was not the type of interference that was contemplated in the agreement. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages allegedly suffered as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to remove its billboards. Meanwhile, the third-party outdoor advertising company that was supposed to purchase the property filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that the plaintiff was interfering with its contractual relations with the defendant real estate development company. A trial was held, and no proof of damages was submitted. The defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company that sought to intervene asked for a hearing on damages in their post-trial brief. The trial court issued a letter ruling finding that the defendant’s termination of the leases was effective. Years later, an order was entered reiterating the finding that the defendant effectively terminated the leases; the order set the matter for a special hearing on damages owed to the defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company. The third-party’s motion to intervene was never explicitly granted. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge assigned to the case died. A substitute judge was assigned to hear the remainder of the case. In response to a series of motions, the trial court determined that the trial was properly bifurcated, that the third-party advertising company did not transfer its right to damages in a sale of its assets, and that its motion to intervene was never granted by the previous trial judge, and it therefore could not recover damages. The thirdparty advertising company now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision that the motion to intervene was never granted, finding that the motion to intervene was implicitly granted in the order following the trial. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the bifurcation was proper, that the defendant real estate development company effectively terminated the leases, and that the third-party advertising company that sought to purchase the property retained the right to damages after the sale of its assets. The case is remanded for a hearing on the damages owed to the third-party advertising company, if any.

The defendant, Cris R. Woods, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Union County for reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the trial court improperly denied his motion for acquittal. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we vacate the conviction.

Plaintiff filed this action as a “qui tam claim” pursuant to the Tennessee False Claims Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101 et seq. The Trial Court awarded plaintiff proceeds from the settlement under the Act and both parties have appealed. On appeal we hold that plaintiff did qualify under the statute as an original source, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to award a recovery. However, we hold there is not sufficient evidence to affirm the award. We vacate the award and remand pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3-128.

The defendant, John Brunner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and domestic assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent terms of twenty-three years, six months and eleven months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s eviction letter to the defendant into evidence; (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the domestic assault conviction with the second degree murder conviction; and (5) cumulative error entitles him to relief. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Talmadge Wayne Bradley, pled guilty in Lawrence County to one count of possession of a Schedule III substance with intent to sell. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that enhancement factor (14), abuse of a position of public trust applied to appellant. Appellant was sentenced to four years, one year to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals arguing

The defendant, Raymond Carlton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, premeditated first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing questions concerning his prior convictions and arrests, and he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Glenn Eugene Armes, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to arson and simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years for arson and eleven months and twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served consecutively. As a condition of his guilty plea, defendant properly reserved a certified question of law as to whether he was subjected to an unconstitutional traffic stop. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bert Newby, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life for the first degree murder charge and three years for the aggravated assault. The defendant raises three issues for appeal: 1) whether the late-filed notice of appeal should be waived in the interest of justice and judicial economy; 2) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his murder conviction. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for shooting a man to death during an attempted robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for a sequestered jury; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Owners of an insured vehicle that was damaged by fire filed suit against their insurance company for breach of contract, failure to pay insurance claim in good faith, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Insurer filed a counter-complaint alleging that one of the insureds had no right of recovery under the policy because she had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that the other insured was barred from seeking recovery under the policy because the insured failed to answer questions under oath when asked by the insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Donald Mays, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner has previously been granted a remand to the post-conviction court for consideration of the issues that he now appeals: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allege in his motion for new trial that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery; and (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post conviction court.

This case involves competing adoption petitions filed by a child’s maternal and paternal grandparents after the child’s father was sentenced to death for killing the child’s mother. The trial court simply compared the relative fitness of the two sets of grandparents and granted the adoption petition of the paternal grandparents. We conclude that the trial court erred in giving equal weight to both petitions because the paternal grandparents did not meet the requirements set forth in Tennessee’s adoption statutes. We also conclude that the maternal grandparents were fit persons to have the care and custody of the child, that they are financially able to provide for the child, and that adoption is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order granting the adoption petition filed by the maternal grandparents.