APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq.

This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties.

The defendant, Antionette Horton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense or defense of others. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The heirs of the woman who conveyed Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association filed suit claiming, among other things, that due to the Association’s failure to pay the heirs as required in the deed of conveyance, the property reverted to the heirs. We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Association holding that the Association did not fail to comply with the obligations relevant to the reversion, so no reversion was triggered.
 

Property owners sued, alleging that the Metropolitan Government was using or taking their property without their permission and without compensation. The Metropolitan Government took an easement over the property by eminent domain and the State built the Victory Memorial Bridge over part of it. The Metropolitan Government later transferred its interest in the property to the State. Much later, the Metropolitan Government built the Gay Street Connector over part of the easement and maintained exclusive control over the part of the easement not used for the bridge. The trial court found for the government. The property owners appealed. We affirm.

In a divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate, its determination of her income for child support purposes, and its division of the parties’ income tax liabilities. We affirm.

Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. He alleged that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of chronic pain. His employer contended that the chronic pa in and any menta l conditions a rising f rom it we re the re sult of seve ra l previous injurie s and surge rie s. The tria l court awa rded bene fits for the menta l injury. The employe r contends tha t the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises out of an action to refund tangible personal property taxes. The
administrator of a decedent’s estate filed suit against the Shelby County Assessor of Property
and the Shelby County Trustee following the payment of delinquent taxes. The administrator
alleged that prior forced assessments of the decedent’s property were illegal, arbitrary, and
unduly excessive. The chancery court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the case. We affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded workers’ compensation benefits for gradual injuries to the employee’s hands, arms, shoulders and left knee. On appeal, her employer asserts that the trial court erred by finding that she had complied with the notice statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201(b), and also by finding that she had sustained her burden of proof on the issue of causation. We conclude that sufficient notice was given. In addition, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a causal relationship between the employee’s work and her left knee injury. We affirm the findings of causation concerning her other injuries.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Reid, appeals the revocation of his intensive probation by the Circuit Court of Madison County, for which his original four-year term of probation was re-instated after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. Reid originally pled guilty to attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony, possession of a
deadly weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of a felony, a Class E felony, and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. For the attempted aggravated assault, Reid was sentenced to four years intensive probation, after thirty days confinement, and assessed a $150 fine. For the possession of a deadly weapon and reckless endangerment convictions,
Reid was sentenced to concurrent two year terms of intensive probation, to be served concurrently with the attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, Reid claims the trial court erred by revoking his intensive probation and ordering that he serve 11 months and 29 days in jail. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nigel Kavic Watkins, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-215(b), -15-402(b). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for reckless homicide and, as a violent offender, to twenty-five years for aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered him to serve these sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of aggravated child abuse; and (4) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and in ordering consecutive service. We notice as plain error that the Defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s double jeopardy clause were violated by his dual convictions. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child abuse. We merge the Defendant’s reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated child abuse conviction and remand for resentencing.

The Defendant-Appellant, Landon McConaughy, was arrested 1 after a valid traffic stop, and various contraband was seized from his person and his vehicle. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop, which was denied by the Madison County Circuit Court. McConaughy subsequently pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a prohibited weapon, both Class A misdemeanors. He received an effective sentence of five years. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, McConaughy properly reserved three certified questions of law alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution: (1) “whether the scope of his detention following the traffic stop was exceeded by [the arresting officer], without reasonable suspicion or probable cause;” (2) “whether [the arresting officer] had sufficient reasonable suspicion that McConaughy was armed in order to justify a Terry style pat-down;” and (3) “whether [the arresting officer] exceeded the scope of a Terry pat-down.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Johnny Bernosa Young, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Young to serve his felony sentences consecutively. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cedric Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of confinement at the county workhouse, with six months of the sentence to be suspended. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in failing to set a minimum service percentage for his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Stewart, was convicted of destruction or interference with utility lines, a Class E felony, following a bench trial in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to three years and three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, Stewart claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not rebut his defenses of duress and necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Christopher M. Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. For each aggravated rape conviction, Black received a twenty-year sentence to be served consecutively to one another. For each aggravated robbery conviction, Black received a ten-year sentence to be served concurrently with one another. The trial court ordered the aggravated rape sentences to be served consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentences, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Black argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the prosecution failed to establish a legitimate chain of custody for the evidence swabs collected from the crime scene; (3) it was constitutionally improper to allow a witness, Dwight Brewer, to identify Black at trial; (4) it was improper to admit proof of the original “CODIS hit” without establishing a chain of custody; and (5) the imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. We affirm Black’s convictions but remand for a resentencing hearing regarding Black’s sentencing status with respect the 2005 sentencing act and regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing.

This dispute involves the administration of a decedent’s estate. The chancery court removed
the decedent’s children as co-administrators of her estate because they were unable to
peaceably complete their duties. The court appointed a successor administrator whose job
was made difficult by continued infighting between the interested parties. Nevertheless, the
successor administrator proceeded with his duties and proposed a final accounting five years
after the estate was opened. The appellants responded to the proposed accounting with an
objection and a motion for continuance. The chancery court denied the motion for
continuance and approved the final accounting. The court later denied the appellants’ motion
to alter or amend or for new trial and closed the estate. We affirm.

The Defendant, J. Steven Brasfield, pled guilty to three counts of violating trapping regulations. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty days of probation and ordered him to pay $5500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that restitution is not proper in this case and that the trial court erred when it set the amount of restitution. After a thorough review of the evidence and the applicable authorities, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court, in determining the appropriate restitution in this case, to consider the Defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay.

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s sound conclusion that Williamson County was required to collect the new development tax at the time of the application for the building permit, I disagree with the ruling that ultimate tax liability must be based on the projected – rather than the actual – square footage of construction. I would, therefore, hold that when the developer has paid a sum based on projected square footage and later built a larger structure than initially anticipated, the County would be entitled to recover the deficiency in payment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-6-108(6) (2005), 9-3-202 (1999).

The Defendant, Gary Lynn Morgan, pleaded guilty, just prior to trial and in front of the jury, to two counts of evading arrest, one a felony and the other a misdemeanor. He proceeded to trial on the remaining counts of the indictment, and the jury found the Defendant guilty. On appeal, the Defendant argues that, because the trial court failed to question him in accordance with constitutional and supervisory authority mandates, the trial court erred by denying his request to set aside his guilty pleas. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. We remand solely for the purpose of entry of corrected judgments.

The petitioner, Terrance D. Nichols, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life with parole following his conviction for first degree murder. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. The State argues that the petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and, despite being heard and ruled upon by the post-conviction court, asserts this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain review. We agree that the record supports this argument; therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.

This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of the Williamson County Adequate Facilities Tax Act, which imposes a privilege tax based upon the gross square footage of new construction in Williamson County. In 2005, the County notified certain builders of new residential construction that a review for the period from January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2003, indicated that the builders owed an additional amount of privilege tax because the actual square footage of the completed construction was greater than the projected square footage at the time the privilege tax was paid. The builders objected to payment of the additional privilege tax and filed an action for declaratory judgment, contending that the County’s belated collection attempts were in derogation of the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We accepted this case for review to determine whether, after the privilege tax is paid based upon the projected square footage of new development before construction, the County is authorized to collect an additional privilege tax after construction based upon the actual completed square footage. We hold that after the County collects the privilege tax
based upon the projected square footage, the language of the Act prohibits the County from later collecting additional privilege taxes based upon the actual square footage of the completed project. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County, grant summary judgment in favor of the builders, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings as necessary.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of Candis D. (“Mother”) with respect to her minor daughter, Dravyn L.D.
(“the Child”). The petition alleged multiple incidences of abandonment, substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The juvenile court
terminated Mother’s parental rights upon finding that each of the grounds alleged was
established by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. She contends that DCS’s
handling of the case effectively denied her the right to due process. She further challenges
the juvenile court’s finding that she was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency
plan. We affirm.

The Appellant, Richard E. Brown, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence, second offense. Because the Appellant failed to prepare an adequate record on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment creditor sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. In a prior appeal, this court instructed the parties to focus on whether certain transactions were or were not loans. If they were loans, then the plaintiff could not prove her case to make the defendants responsible for the judgment against the defunct corporation. The trial court found that the transactions were loans. We affirm.