APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this interpleader action, plaintiff held an IRA account established by decedent. When decedent died dispute arose between his companion and his blood relatives, because he had designated his companion as the sole beneficiary of his IRA account, but in his Will he gave the IRA account to his relatives. The contending parties raised this dispute in their pleadings and after an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court ruled that the designee on the IRA account was entitled to the proceeds because the relatives did not carry the burden of proof to establish undue influence was exercised on the decedent when he established the IRA account. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand with the cost of the cause taxed to appellants.

This is a wrongful death action brought under a theory of medical malpractice. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs filed their complaint after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. After careful review, we find that Plaintiffs had notice of their claim no later than February 27, 2003, and their lawsuit was not timely filed. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jimmy Stuart Mynatt, appeals his convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life plus twenty-five years.  On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress statements made to the police; and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Earice Roberts, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence that a police officer and witness for the State had committed crimes in her official capacity as manager of the evidence and property room. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

The petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and unknowing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A former inmate in the Davidson County jail filed a Petition for Permanent Injunction against the Davidson County Sheriff and the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in which he alleged he had been mistreated while incarcerated. The defendants moved to dismiss the former inmate’s petition for injunctive relief on the ground that he was no longer incarcerated, and thus his action for injunctive relief was moot. The plaintiff failed to respond to the motion and did not attend the hearing on the motion. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss from which the plaintiff appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The appellant filed this action against the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Lottery Commission alleging that the defendants breached a contract with him by failing to pay him the $171,000,000 grand prize for the December 8, 2004 Powerball drawing.2 The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s expert’s standard of care and causation opinions and in granting summary judgment to the Appellees as to Appellant’s medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims. We affirm.

I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”) owed a duty to its tenants to take reasonable steps to prevent them from suffering harm, and I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. I write separately to reaffirm my view that “any discussion of foreseeability in the context of duty encroaches upon the role of the finder of fact.” Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 375 (Tenn. 2008) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting).

The plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant shot and killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against the defendant housing authority, alleging negligence and breach of contract for failure to provide a safe premises. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review to determine whether the housing authority owed a duty of care, an essential component of the claim, under the theory of negligence. Because the potential for violence in the housing project was reasonably foreseeable and the gravity of the harm outweighed the burden on the housing authority to have taken reasonable protective measures, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record of the Chancery Court of Greene County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. This Court is of the opinion that the judgment of the Chancery Court should be vacated and this case remanded.

The defendant, Brian A. Lowman, was denied pretrial diversion by the district attorney general for Hamilton County and requested review of the denial by the trial court. After review, the trial court reversed the denial of pretrial diversion by the district attorney general. The State then appealed the decision of the trial court to this court for review. After careful review, we conclude that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and reverse the decision of the trial court granting pretrial diversion.

The plaintiff filed interrogatories and requests for production seeking information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage. When the defendants objected to providing this information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court ruled that the information was subject to discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage was not discoverable under Rule 26.02. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The plaintiff filed interrogatories and requests for production seeking information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage. When the defendants objected to providing this information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court ruled that the information was subject to discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage was not discoverable under Rule 26.02. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Appellants, Edward Earl Allen, Jr. and Carlos A. Branch, entered best interest guilty pleas in Davidson County to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a weapon on school property after an incident at Vanderbilt University. The plea agreement did not specify the length or manner of service of the sentences but specified that the sentences would run concurrently to each other. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellants to six years for aggravated assault and two years for possession of a weapon on school property, as Range I Standard Offenders. Appellants seek a review of their sentence on appeal. Because the record supports the sentences and the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing as to Appellant Branch, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Carmi Binkins, was convicted of two counts of attempted second
degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with one of the attempted murder convictions and sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for each of the attempted second degree murder convictions and to twenty-four years at 100 percent for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The court ordered that the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions be served concurrently with the attempted murder convictions but consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of fortyeight years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) his right to confrontation was violated when a crying victim was allowed to display his injuries to the jury despite being found incompetent to testify; and (2) the trial court provided erroneous instructions on the elements of especially aggravated kidnapping when answering a question from the jury. The State argues that the defendant has waived the issues by failing to include an adequate record on appeal and that the trial court’s jury instructions were proper. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that count four is to be served concurrently with count two and that Defendant’s especially aggravated kidnapping sentences are to be served at 100 percent release eligibility.

Plaintiff, son and next-of-kin of decedent, appeals grant of summary judgment to hospital in negligence and wrongful death action. Finding no error in the action of the trial court, we affirm the decision.

A home seller appeals a jury verdict finding that she intentionally misrepresented water conditions in the basement in connection with the sale of her home. According to the seller, the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the trial court erroneously allowed opinion testimony from the contractor who repaired the water damage. We affirm, finding that material evidence supports that the jury verdict and that the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony.

Wife sued the insurance company for failure to pay on Husband’s life insurance policy and the insurance brokers for failure to procure an enforceable life insurance policy, various torts and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Wife settled with the insurance company before trial and won judgments against the brokers based on failure to procure an enforceable life insurance policy ($1,000,000.00); negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty ($300,000.00); and violation of the TCPA (an additional $300,000.00). Defendants appeal, claiming that they should receive a credit for the amount of the settlement with the insurance company and that the other awards were improper for various reasons. We affirm the $1,000,000.00 judgment but find that a credit for the settlement is appropriate. We affirm the tort award. We also affirm the finding of a violation of the TCPA and affirm the award of the additional $300,000.00.

The issue presented in this case is whether the commencement of foreclosure proceedings constitutes an increase in hazard for notice purposes under a standard mortgage clause in an insurance policy. The parties to this dispute are the bank that loaned funds to a homeowner for the purchase of a house and the insurance company that issued a personal fire and extended coverage insurance policy on the premises. After the homeowner became delinquent on her payments, the bank began foreclosure proceedings by notifying the homeowner of its intent to foreclose on the house. No notification of the foreclosure was given to the insurance company which insured the house against fire loss. Before the foreclosure process was complete, the homeowner filed for bankruptcy, which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the house was destroyed by fire. The insurance company refused to pay the insurance proceeds to the bank on the theory that the commencement of foreclosure proceedings constituted an increase in hazard of which the bank was required to notify the insurance company under the policy. The bank filed suit against the insurance company for breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act  The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the bank, concluding that the bank’s failure to give the insurer notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the bank’s initiation of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After careful review, we conclude that commencement of foreclosure proceedings does not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, no notice was required to be given to the insurance company. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, based on the trial court’s holding that the judgment rendered in Massachusetts was enforceable in Tennessee. Since Massachusetts had personal jurisdiction over defendants and the alleged fraud upon the court was not sustainable, we find no ground under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 that constitutes a defense to domestication of the judgment rendered in Massachusetts. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiffs brought this action against Bradley County, alleging the county was negligent in failing to properly maintain a defective, unsafe and dangerous condition at the intersection of two county roads, which caused an accident wherein plaintiffs were injured. The county filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the trial court granted on the grounds the county was immune. On appeal, we hold the record before us does not support the judgment granted by the trial court as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The employee worked as a long-haul truck driver for the employer, a carrier of motor freight. While operating a truck, the employee was struck in the rear of his trailer by another vehicle. Medical treatment was not deemed necessary at the time of the collision. Shortly thereafter, the employee reported pain in his neck and lower back. The trial court awarded 90% permanent partial disability.
On appeal, the employer raises the following issues: (1) whether the employee’s medical condition is causally connected to the vehicular accident; (2) whether the employee has sustained permanent impairment; (3) whether the employee is 90% disabled; and (4) whether the trial court’s award for the payment of medical expenses to Dr. Curlee, an unauthorized medical provider, is proper. The employee also appeals arguing that he is totally and permanently disabled. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.1

This is a companion case to Filson v. Seton Corp. d/b/a Baptist Hospital, No. M2006-02301-COA-R9-CV. Both cases were brought by mothers of newborns against the hospital where the babies were born, and both arose from the same incident. Employees of the hospital mistakenly brought the wrong infant to a mother for feeding. In the case before us, Ms. Hobbs, the mother of the child who was mistakenly taken to the wrong mother, claimed emotional distress on her own behalf and negligence and battery on behalf of her child. The hospital admitted a breach of the standard of care, but argued that the plaintiffs did not suffer any actual damages because the mistake was corrected within a very short time after it was made. The trial court dismissed all the claims on summary judgment. Ms. Hobbs argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims for negligence and battery that she filed on behalf of her infant child. We affirm the trial court.