APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the entry of a final decree in a divorce action, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., asserting that the parties made a clerical error in the marital dissolution agreement, as a result of which Wife received a higher percentage of marital assets than intended. The trial court denied relief. We affirm the action of the trial court.

This is a factual dispute about whether defendant signed a lease as a tenant and is liable under the terms of the lease. The Trial Court held defendant liable for damages under the lease. We affirm.

The petitioner, Michael S. Morani, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tommy Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He raised a number of issues in his original direct appeal, including whether the trial court erred in finding that he had forfeited his right to trial counsel. We found no merit in the other claims, but remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the forfeiture of counsel issue. See State v. Tommy L. Holmes, No. W2006-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1651876 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2007), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007). After holding that hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that the defendant had forfeited the right to counsel by physically assaulting his trial counsel. The defendant now appeals from that order, arguing that his behavior was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order finding that the defendant waived his right to counsel. Having previously found no merit to the defendant’s other issues raised on direct appeal, we also affirm his judgment of conviction.

Mother and Father appeal the order of the Juvenile Court for Dickson County, Tennessee terminating their parental rights. Mother’s termination was based on: noncompliance with the permanency plan; failure to visit; failure to establish a suitable home; and the persistence of conditions that prevent return of the children; and the children’s best interests. Father’s termination was based on noncompliance with the permanency plan and the children’s best interests. Finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the children’s best interests, as modified, the judgment is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority affirming the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s conduct in this case warranted the forfeiture of counsel. I acknowledge that the majority opinion correctly recites the applicable case law concerning defendant misconduct and forfeiture of counsel. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s application of the law to the facts presented in this case. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination that the defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial.¹

The defendant-appellant, Tony Lee Crowe (hereinafter “Crowe”), was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) whether the trial court properly exercised its role as the thirteenth juror, and (3) the denial of his amended motion for new trial based on new evidence. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm Crowe’s convictions but remand the case for the sole purpose of considering the third amended motion for new trial.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor finding that, based upon the discovery rule, the one year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim had expired prior to the filing of the Appellants’ complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, our legislature has granted trial courts with broad statutory authority to transfer claims filed in the wrong jurisdiction under the remedial provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008). Moreover, this Court has traditionally encouraged the disposition of colorable claims on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. In consequence, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a transfer of the claim to the court having jurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

This appeal involves the application of the transfer provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008) to habeas corpus petitions challenging a criminal conviction. The petitioner, who was incarcerated in Davidson County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. The trial court promptly denied the petition on its merits. Rather than filing a petition seeking post-conviction relief, the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. For the first time on appeal, the petitioner, invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116, requested the Court of Criminal Appeals to transfer his habeas corpus petition to Maury County, where he had been convicted, for consideration as a post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to transfer the habeas corpus petition to Maury County and affirmed the denial of the petition. Carter v. Bell, No. M2006-01363- CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2744998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Charles Fenn and Dott Fenn owned property in Sevier County. In August 1996, they entered into a contract to sell the property to Benjamin F. Darnell, Sr. The Fenns agreed to finance the sale over a ten-year period. According to the contract, Mr. Darnell was to make monthly payments of $999.11 for ten years, with one final balloon payment of $113,058.43. Mr. Darnell died in February 2004 and his wife, Mary Darnell, continued making the monthly payments. Unbeknownst to Ms. Darnell, on October 14, 2005, the Fenns sold the property to Teddy Jones. Four days later, Ms. Fenn, through her attorney, sent Ms. Darnell a letter terminating the contract based on various alleged breaches. Ms. Darnell filed suit seeking specific performance of the contract. Following a bench trial, the court found that the contract was enforceable; it ordered specific performance. The trial court rejected the claim of the defendant Teddy Jones that he was a bona fide purchaser without knowledge. The Fenns and Mr. Jones appeal. We affirm.

In 2004, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Defendants had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in the State of Tennessee. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss citing two defenses: lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion for failure to state a claim but explicitly declined to rule on the jurisdictional question. Defendants have not
waived their personal jurisdiction defense. On appeal, Defendants ask that we consider the jurisdictional question only if we first find for Plaintiff on the substantive issue. Because we find that jurisdiction is a prerequisite of an adjudication on the merits, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal, and remand to the trial court for consideration of Defendants’ personal jurisdiction
defense.

The defendant, Robert Edward Boling, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006). He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the admission of testimony that he alleges was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Because the defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely, we hold that he has waived our consideration of any issue except for sufficiency of the evidence. Holding that the jury was within its province in convicting the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant Claiborne Builders to recover the rental fees from a contract between plaintiff and Claiborne Builders for earth-moving equipment which Claiborne Builders used to remove soil from Wilder's property. The Trial Judge entered Judgment against Claiborne Builders on its contract and Wilder Construction under an implied contract. Wilder has appealed. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The appellant pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to theft over ten thousand dollars, a class C felony, and official misconduct, a class E felony. Pursuant to her plea agreement, she received a total effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of her application for judicial diversion. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Tipton County jury convicted the defendant, James Roosevelt Fleming, of one count of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of attempted possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his felony conviction, and he also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Johnson (hereinafter “Johnson”), of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. As a Range I, standard offender, Johnson received concurrent sentences of eight years, nine months for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years, three months for the aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed solely for the aggravated robbery conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for specific performance of a land sale contract. Plaintiff made partial payments towards the purchase price for several months after the agreement was reached. In 2005, however, the relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant deteriorated, and the Plaintiff stopped making payments. Defendant then informed the Plaintiff that the agreement was cancelled and began looking for another buyer. After the presentation of Plaintiff’s proof, the trial court found that Plaintiff was unable to perform under the agreement within a reasonable time. The trial court also found that the agreement expressly permitted the Defendant to cancel the agreement in the event of Plaintiff’s non-performance. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is the second time these parties have been before this court on matters relating to their divorce. In the first appeal, we rejected the husband’s argument that he lacked the financial resources to pay the wife in cash for her share of the marital estate. However, we vacated the trial court’s award of alimony requiring the husband to pay the wife’s health insurance premiums because there was insufficient proof presented regarding the issue at trial. On remand, the trial court allowed the husband to sell various properties in order to pay the wife for her share of the marital estate, but the court refused to require the wife to pay half the income taxes associated with the sales or the real estate taxes on the properties. The trial court found that the husband had the ability to pay the wife’s health insurance premiums, and the wife did not, and it ordered the husband to pay such premiums. The trial court also ordered the husband to pay wife post-judgment interest on the original cash award of marital property. In addition, the court found the husband in contempt and ordered him to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees incurred on remand. The husband appeals. We affirm as modified and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves retroactive child support. The parties were divorced in 1996 and submitted a marital dissolution agreement that was approved by the trial court. In 1999, the parties submitted a consent order modifying the marital dissolution agreement to provide that the father would not pay child support, but he would be responsible for providing health insurance coverage and paying for one-half of uncovered medical, dental, orthodontic, and optical expenses. The consent order was approved by the trial court. In 2006, the mother sought to have the consent order set aside on the basis that it was void as against public policy, and she sought an award of retroactive child support to the date of the 1999 consent order. The trial court granted retroactive child support only to the date of the mother’s petition seeking such support. Mother appeals, claiming that retroactive child support should be awarded to the date of the 1999 consent order. We affirm.

Petitioner, Bobby Lee, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gene Booker, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to properly preserve the petitioner’s severance issue on direct appeal. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, charged with two counts of aggravated child abuse, was convicted only upon thesecond count. While upholding the propriety of the jury instructions, the Court of Criminal Appealsreversed, ruling that the state had failed to establish that the defendant had knowingly inflicted theinjuries. We granted review in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establishthat the defendant acted knowingly and by non-accidental means. Because the trial court providedadequate instructions and because the circumstantial evidence, as accredited by the jury, establishedthe essential elements of the offense, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed andthe conviction and sentence is reinstated.

The defendant, Travis Lester, was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.