APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Lavon Mario Davis, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County from his convictions for second degree murder and attempted first degree murder, both Class A felonies. He was sentenced to twenty years for the second degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. He contends that: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court lacked authority to accept the guilty plea to second degree murder; and the trial court lacked a sufficient factual basis to accept his guilty plea to attempted first degree murder. We affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Because the state, as the appellant, failed to meet its burden of proving that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by suppressing the evidence, I must respectfully dissent from the majority.

The petitioner, Bryan Lee Cable, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Father, C.E.S., and Mother, L.L.S., were not married at the time of the birth of their minor child, A.C.S., on September 27, 2006. The birth certificate was initially caused to reflect the child’s surname as that of Mother. On November 17, 2006, the Father filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, to establish parentage for joint custody. An Order of Parentage, reserving the issue of changing the child’s surname, was entered by the Juvenile Court, through Special Referee, on February 27, 2007. The Juvenile Court Referee subsequently ordered that the child’s surname be changed to that of Father by Order entered December 13, 2007. Following an appeal of the Referee’s decision, the Juvenile Court, by Special Judge, affirmed the Referee’s decision and ordered that the surname of the child be changed to that of Father. Mother appealed, claiming that Father failed in meeting his burden of proof of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that changing the minor child’s surname was in the best interest of the child. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Re’Licka Dejuan Allen, was indicted on two counts of aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. The State refused to comply with Defendant’s requests for discovery by withholding the contents of Defendant’s computer hard drive and other computer materials alleged to contain incriminating evidence. The State refused to disclose the requested discovery despite the trial court’s issuance of two protective orders, the ruling of the appellate court on interlocutory appeal, and a third protective order by the trial court requiring disclosure. After a final hearing, the trial court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the indictment against Defendant. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based upon the perceived threat of federal prosecution to defense counsel. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment and remand for trial.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained a compensable injury to both of his shoulders in March 2005. The treating physician assigned 6% permanent anatomical impairment to the body as a whole. Employee suffered a second injury to his shoulders in February 2006. The same physician assigned an impairment of  7% to the body as a whole, which he described as a “cumulative” impairment for both injuries. Employee returned to work for Employer at wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage. The trial court awarded 9% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the first injury, and 10.5% permanent partial disability for the second injury. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the medical testimony. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly. Employee contends that the trial court erred by denying, on the basis of sovereign immunity, his motion for discretionary costs. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

The petitioner, Omowale A. Shabazz, filed in the Morgan County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Raymond Writer, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was void because the trial court did not follow the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner did not allege a ground upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. In response, the State filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, George Allen King, pled guilty to one count of robbery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to eight years as a Range II multiple offender. He was placed on enhanced probation. After the revocation of his probation within a year of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argued that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not entered into voluntarily. At the conclusion of a hearing on the matter, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred because Petitioner was under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the plea and that he believed he was to receive a six-year sentence as opposed to an eight-year sentence. Because we find no credible evidence in the record to support Petitioner’s claims, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kevin B. Thompson, appeals from the Hardin County Circuit Court’s probation revocation for his two-year effective sentence for his guilty pleas to violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony, and violation of the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor. He claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in incarceration. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.

Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy appealed the termination of his employment for violation of SOR-104–Personal Conduct to the Civil Service Merit Board. The Board modified the punishment to suspension without pay. The Sheriff’s Department appealed the Board’s modification to the Shelby County Chancery Court, which upheld the Board’s decision. The Sheriff’s Department appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated
robbery and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the
Department of Correction. Defendant raised several issues in his original direct appeal, including
whether the trial court erred in finding that he had implicitly waived his right to the assistance of
counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial. Without addressing the other issues, this court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the implicit waiver or forfeiture of counsel issue. See State v. Michael Small, No. W2003-02014-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3327845, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 15, 2006). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney. Defendant now appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in finding that his actions warranted the forfeiture of counsel, and (2) the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial after Jimmy Calloway testified in rebuttal that the defendant said he did not want to “go back to prison for six more years.” A criminal defendant is entitled to impartial and unbiased jurors who are not influenced by inadmissible and prejudicial information such as the defendant’s being convicted of another crime. See State v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tenn. 1987).

The defendant, Jerome Emmett Huntley, was convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years, six months and thirty days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Brian Knight, was convicted of one count of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (3) he was deprived of a fair trial before an impartial judge; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (5) he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to confirm that he had personally decided to waive his right to testify; and (6) the trial court improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence. We conclude that all of these contentions lack merit. We accordingly affirm.

The Petitioner pled guilty in Sullivan County, Tennessee, to one count of robbery and one count of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to five years for his robbery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his evading arrest conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his judgments were void because neither judgment ordered his sentences to be served consecutively to his unserved sentence in Maryland. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

In 1996, a Hamilton County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Delivetrick D. Blocker, for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. In 1997, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years for especially aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2008, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) the indictment charging him with murder was fatally defective because it did not allege an overt act; (2) the indictment charging him with especially aggravated robbery was fatally defective because it varied from the judgment convicting him of attempted especially aggravated robbery, which requires proof of an overt act; and (3) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order his sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

Appellant hospital filed suit against Appellee insurance company for damages arising from Appellee’s alleged impairment of the Appellant’s hospital lien. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant hospital, finding that Appellant had perfected its lien under Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-101, and that the Appellee had impaired that lien pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-104. The trial court, however, limited Appellant’s recovery to the amount of coverage under the insurance policy. We affirm as modified herein.

The petitioner, Jason Crawford, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the appeal as untimely filed or, in the alternative, affirm the circuit court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to timely file his notice of appeal and his claims do not warrant consideration in the “interest of justice.” Therefore, his appeal is dismissed.

The defendant appeals as of right from his Hamilton County jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting unduly prejudicial autopsy photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to show that he premeditated the killing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a nuisance case. The plaintiff landowner filed a complaint alleging a continuous nuisance caused by grading completed on adjacent property. The plaintiff alleged that the grading had altered the natural drainage pattern, causing damage to her house. The complaint sought damages and injunctive relief. The defendants sought summary judgment, raising the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court agreed and granted defendants’ motion. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute, we reverse. 

This is an wrongful death action arising under a theory of premises liability. Plaintiff’s husband died as a result of injuries he sustained after tripping over a piece of concrete embedded in a dirt path. Plaintiff alleged that two of the defendants, who were under a separate maintenance contract with the owner of the property, failed to exercise the required due care in the maintance, inspection, and repairs of the path. The trial court granted directed verdicts for both defendants after finding that neither owed a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. We agree that defendant Brooks Shaw did not have a duty to maintain the path. However, we have determined that defendant Town and Country did owe a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact for the jury to decide. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Virgil Samuels, pled guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated rape. The defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to be served as a violent offender. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this interpleader action, plaintiff held an IRA account established by decedent. When decedent died dispute arose between his companion and his blood relatives, because he had designated his companion as the sole beneficiary of his IRA account, but in his Will he gave the IRA account to his relatives. The contending parties raised this dispute in their pleadings and after an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court ruled that the designee on the IRA account was entitled to the proceeds because the relatives did not carry the burden of proof to establish undue influence was exercised on the decedent when he established the IRA account. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand with the cost of the cause taxed to appellants.