APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Gayle Thomas Crawford, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and possession of drug  paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he raises essentially five issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the rule of sequestration was violated; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer his opinion on the street value of the drugs; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify that an unknown black male listed in the warrant was the defendant; and (5) whether the search warrant was invalid. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana, the rule of sequestration was not violated, the trial court did not err in allowing the officer’s testimony with respect to the street value of drugs and the identity of the unknown black male, and that the defendant has waived the issues with respect to the validity of the search warrant. We further conclude, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and reverse and dismiss the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.

The Petitioner, Gregory Allen Cathey, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the nonclaim statutes in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-2-
307(a)(1), -310(a) (2007) do not prevent the Bureau of TennCare from recovering correctly paid
medical benefits from the late Martha M. Tanner’s estate. My two-fold purpose in preparing this
separate opinion is to explain my understanding of the basis for the estate’s liability and to address the application of the statutory recovery procedures when a TennCare recipient’s family decides against probating the deceased recipient’s estate.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. The Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder during the construction of the Defendant’s auto wash. The trial court held that the Plaintiff was a casual employee of the Defendant, and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. It further held that the Defendant was not subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because it did not have the required number of employees and because it was not in the construction business. On appeal, the Plaintiff contends that these findings were erroneous. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee complied with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a) (Supp. 2003). It further found that she had sustained a compensable injury to her lower back and awarded 30% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to provide timely notice and that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Terrence Gardner, was convicted of first degree (felony) murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder, to ten years for the Class B felony, and to four years for the Class C felony. The convictions for the murder and aggravated robbery were set to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the aggravated assault, for a total effective sentence of life plus four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in not permitting him to present a witness to be impeached. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The Defendant, Travis Tierney, was charged with one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -102(d)(1), -16-503(b). He was found guilty as charged following a jury trial and sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder, six years for each aggravated assault, and six years for tampering with evidence, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of second degree murder; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a suit between siblings over their mother's Estate. Plaintiff sued his brother, defendant, alleging the defendant had a confidential relationship with the parties' mother and sought a judgment declaring that certain transactions made by the defendant on behalf of the mother were void. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Court held the evidence established a presumption of undue influence and the defendant did not rebut the presumption. The Court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the annuity contracts and bank contracts, that the defendant had caused the plaintiff's name to be deleted as a beneficiary of those contracts, and the Court entered Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $211,830.86 against defendant and placed a lien upon the defendants' real property until the Judgment is paid. Defendant has appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Brandon Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is presently serving an effective sentence of forty years after being found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially  aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we conclude that the petitioner’s sentencing claim was previously determined and that he failed in carrying his burden of proving that trial counsel was ineffective. The judgment from the post-conviction court denying relief is affirmed.

In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had entered an Agreed Order for disbursement of the funds which stated the parties had determined that the purpose of the constructive trust would best be shared out by transferring the funds to a newly created non-profit corporation known as the Lafollette Medical Foundation (the funds had been held by the Clerk of the Court). The Court directed that the trust fund would be placed in the foundation with the monies retained for potential liabilities, and the charter of the LaFollette Medical Foundation, Inc., was filed with the Court, as well as its by-laws. The City of LaFollette filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., along with affidavits. The Court conducted a hearing and filed a Memorandum Opinion finding that its order was not void because the City had been found to have no interest in the fund and the City had actual knowledge of the Foundation and its rules, and transferring the money to the Foundation best served the interest of the public rather than the money being held by the Court. The City of LaFollette appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Dennis J. Rountree, Jr., appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because it found the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for a hearing on the merits of the petition.

The defendant, William J. Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentences for violation of habitual motor vehicle offender status, driving under the influence fifth offense, and driving while license revoked fourth offense. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support hisconvictions and that his effective twelve-year sentence was excessive. We affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court.

Commercial real estate broker brought action against seller of property seeking commission following the sale of the property to buyers allegedly introduced to the seller by the broker during the term of the listing agreement. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the seller finding the listing agreement was unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds and a lack of mutual assent to the terms of the agreement. Broker appeals and finding error, we reverse and remand.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without parole plus twenty years. The Petitioner then timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Calvin R. Cannon, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his four petitions for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee, who suffered a neck, arm and shoulder injury in the course and scope of her employment, made a meaningful return to work after her injury. The trial court ruled that the Employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that, therefore, the cap on benefits of one and one-half times the impairment rating provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply. The trial court applied a multiplier of four times the impairment rating. The Employer appealed. We agree with the trial court that the Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, and thus the benefits cap does not apply. Moreover, the multiplier of four times the impairment rating was not excessive. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Shelby County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition on the basis that the petitioner was at fault for timely failing to discover the evidence. The petitioner appeals, maintaining that the newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also argues that the coram nobis court applied the incorrect standard in denying his petition for coram nobis relief, that the court did not address all of the evidence in denying his petition, and that a review of all the evidence shows he should receive a new trial. The State argues that the coram nobis court should have dismissed the petition because it was untimely filed and that, in any event, the court properly denied the petition. Based upon our review, we conclude that due process required tolling the statute of limitations in this case and agree with the petitioner that the coram nobis court denied the petition based upon the incorrect standard. Therefore, the court’s denial of the petition is reversed, and the case is remanded to the coram nobis court for reconsideration of the petition.

Petitioner, Gerald Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief in which he argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also argues on appeal that the post-conviction court improperly excluded evidence at the post-conviction hearing related to his diminished mental capacity. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a summary judgment case, arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs/Appellants, the two injured parties, filed suit and served a copy of the summons on their insurance provider, the Appellee herein. In interpreting the policy, the trial court concluded that the policy limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence limited Plaintiffs/Appellants’ coverage to $200,000 (or $100,000 per person). Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to recover the policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence. We affirm the decision  of the trial court.

Appellant, Lois Brasfield, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of felony reckless endangerment and misdemeanor assault. As a result, she was sentenced to eighteen months in incarceration. The trial court ordered her to spend 90 days in jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction to the jury at trial. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to show that the instruction was warranted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted Nancy Randolph Deakins (“Wife”) a divorce from Lynn Lampton Deakins (“Husband”) thereby ending the parties’ 24-year marriage. Upon dissolving the marriage, the court valued and divided the marital estate, declined Husband’s request for alimony, and awarded Wife discretionary costs, her attorney’s fees and court costs. Husband challenges each of these determinations as well as an evidentiary ruling and the court’s finding that Husband dissipated assets. We reverse the awards to Wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Gary E. Aldridge, was convicted in 1997 of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault, all perpetrated upon his estranged wife. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years, with a sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days to be served consecutively. The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. Gary Eugene Aldridge, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00075, 1999 WL 632299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 1999), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2000). Subsequently, the petitioner began a series of post-conviction filings. This appeal resulted from the dismissal of his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. We agree and dismiss the appeal.