APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A mother who had recently given birth was given someone else’s child to nurse, but realized the mistake after a short time. The mother and father filed suit against the hospital alleging, among other things, negligent infliction of emotional distress. The hospital admitted a breach of the standard of care, but argued on summary judgment that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the mother’s lack of emotional injuries as required by Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996). The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant hospital by limiting the mother’s claim for damages to those suffered within ten days of the hospital’s error while the couple awaited confirmation that the baby they brought home was their biological child. We affirm the trial court in part and reverse in part.
 

The minor plaintiff and his parents sued for damages for serious bodily injury resulting from an assault, and at the conclusion of the trial the trial judge held the defendants liable for the injuries and awarded damages. The defendants have appealed, insisting the assault was not foreseeable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties to this action were divorced in Bradley County, Tennessee, and the mother then moved to Florida with the children as the custodial parent under the agreed Parenting Plan. The father brought this action, charging the mother with contempt of court and petitioned the Court to modify the existing Parenting Plan by awarding the father custody of the minor children. Among the defenses raised by the mother was the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this State, but the Trial Judge held that courts in Tennessee had subject matter jurisdiction over the issues in dispute. On appeal, we reverse on the basis that the courts of Tennessee do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues, and remand for transfer of the matter to the appropriate Florida court.

In October 2005, a Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jim Gerhardt, on one count of child abuse and neglect, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a July 2006 jury trial, the defendant was acquitted of the offense as charged in the indictment but convicted of attempted child abuse and neglect, a Class B misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant received a six month sentence, with the defendant to serve sixty days in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. As part of the defendant’s probation, the trial court instituted a 8:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. curfew, ordered the defendant to have no contact with the victim, and required that the defendant receive counseling. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the state to elect offenses; (3) the trial court erred by failing to answer a question posed by the jury during its deliberations; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting attorney to ask the defendant and his wife whether a particular witness was lying; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting attorney to make improper statements during the state’s closing argument; (6) the trial court improperly denied the defendant the transcript of the sentencing hearing; (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (8) the defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (9) the cumulative effect of these and other errors prejudiced him. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the defendant’s issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shortly after the parties entered into a contract for the sale of a piece of real estate, the seller refused to transfer possession and informed the buyer that he did not intend to close on the property. The buyer filed suit for breach of contract and demanded specific performance. The seller denied that the contract of sale was valid or enforceable and presented a number of different and inconsistent allegations to support his contention. The trial court granted summary judgment to the buyer. We affirm.

The Appellant, John Whatley, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction and/or habeas corpus relief. The Appellant previously filed a post-conviction petition which was decided on the merits and the claim presented in the instant petition does not warrant reopening the prior petition. Moreover, the Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Fred Zonge, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. On appeal, the petitioner argues that due process tolled the statute of limitations based upon our supreme court’s holding in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”), which the petitioner claims announced a new rule of  constitutional law, and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Danforth v. Minnesota, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), which changed the standard for determining if new rules of law were entitled to retroactive application. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the rule applies, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Kenneth L. Davis, was convicted by a Madison County jury of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell and/or deliver, possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. He received an effective ten-year sentence for these convictions, with said sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his automobile and that the evidence was insufficient at trial to establish that he possessed the contraband. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, James D. Peebles, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of one count of sale of a Schedule II drug, cocaine, under .5 grams (a Class C felony). Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to a term of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner, Ricky Northern, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. This is the petitioner’s second attempt to secure habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would render the judgment of conviction void. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20.

The Petitioner, Curtis Tate, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying hispetition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and, thereafter, sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the denial of post-conviction relief was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. He submits that trial counsel failed to call several crucial witnesses to establish his self-defense claim and that trial counsel was impaired during trial because of alcohol use. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Almeer K. Nance, appeals the judgment of the Knox County Criminal court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery. He subsequently accepted an agreed sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) erroneously advising him not to testify at trial, which he asserts effectively deprived him of his constitutional right; and (2) failing to raise the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and severance on direct appeal. After a thorough review of the record before us, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Plaintiff filed this action after the statute of limitations had run, and defendant moved to dismiss. Plaintiff attempted to invoke the discovery rule, claiming that his injuries had required surgery and he was sedated for a few days following the accident. The Trial Court granted the defendant summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court on the grounds that the discovery rule was not applicable to the circumstances of this case.

After the employee suffered an employment-related injury to his right extremity, for which he was entitled to workers' compensation, the employer filed suit contesting any award of benefits for the employee's claim that the injury aggravated his pre-existing bipolar disorder. The trial court awarded compensation for the injury to the right extremity, capped at 1.5 times the impairment rating, but denied compensation for aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The employee  appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a  hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The cause is remanded with instructions for a determination of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Betty L. Graham (“Plaintiff”) sued the Board of Director Lake Park Condo-Signal View^₁ (“Defendant”) in General Sessions Court for Hamilton County. The General Sessions Court granted summary judgment to Defendant on eight of Plaintiff’s ten claims and later dismissed the remaining two claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. The Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment to Defendant on the same eight claims as the General Sessions Court had but did so on the sole basis that the appeal to the Circuit Court was untimely as to those eight claims and, subsequently granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the remaining two claims. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the eight claims, and affirm the dismissal of the other two claims.

We granted this appeal to decide an issue of first impression: whether a freestanding claim of  actual innocence is cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief under the Tennessee Post- Conviction Procedure Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-101 through -122. We have also chosen to discuss the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the burden of proof for prevailing on such claims. In 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction trial court denied his petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) a freestanding claim of actual innocence is not cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief; (2) the post-conviction trial court applied the correct burden of proof to the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (3) the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. We hold that a claim of actual innocence based on new scientific evidence is cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of relief, however, because the petitioner has not met his burden of proof to support such claim. We also hold that the post-conviction trial court applied the correct burden of proof to the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To provide clarity in the law, however, we concurrently amend Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 8(D)(1). Finally, we hold that the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects.

The Defendant, Phillip Anthony Farris, pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The sentencing court determined that he should serve his aggravated kidnapping sentences concurrently. Those sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence for second degree murder. The Defendant now appeals the decision to order consecutive sentences. After conducting a de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the sentencing court.

On August 13, 2008, James A. Dellinger, the petitioner, filed a Motion for Disclosure of Evidence Favorable to the Appellant Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and the Federal and State Constitutions Regarding State Witness Charles Harlan. The State filed a response to the motion on August 22, 2008. This Court denied Dellinger’s motion in an order dated August 26, 2008.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008)
for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the efforts of a retired employee of an automobile manufacturer to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to his right shoulder that was diagnosed after his retirement and also to obtain reconsideration of an earlier award of workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury to his left shoulder. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Williamson County concluded that the retired employee had sustained a compensable injury to his right shoulder and awarded him benefits based on a thirty-two percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also determined that the employee was ineligible for reconsideration of the award for the injury to his left shoulder. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with the award for the injury to the employee’s right shoulder, and the employee takes issue with the trial court’s refusal to reconsider the award of benefits for the injury to his left shoulder. We have determined that the trial court properly declined to reconsider the award for the injury to the employee’s left shoulder. We have also determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that the injury to the employee’s right shoulder was work-related. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by failing to limit the award of benefits for the injury to the right shoulder to the cap in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008).

The defendant, Salvador Velazquez Alvarez, pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, Class B felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the two possession of cocaine convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of ten years, six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear a suit filed by the City of Chattanooga (“the City”) to enforce a real property tax lien on property acquired by Custom Baking Company through a sale conducted by a bankruptcy court trustee. The previous owner of the real property, which was alleged to have been delinquent in payment of its city property taxes, filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware prior to this action. The City was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy action and was notified of the proposed sale of the debtor’s assets by the bankruptcy trustee and filed no objection. After the sale of the property, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances, and retained jurisdiction “to determine any claims, disputes or causes of action arising out of or relating to the proposed sale.” The City brought this action in state Chancery Court several months after the entry of the Bankruptcy Court’s order. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide this case and that the City is barred by the collateral attack doctrine from bringing this action to circumvent the Bankruptcy Court’s prior valid final order.

This case involves the construction of a holographic will. Decedent died in 2006, and was survived by her four children. Her will states that one of her sons is to “have” the “home place.” Two of the other siblings, the Appellees, contest the trial court’s determination that the Decedent’s will transfers fee simple title in the Decedent’s real property owned at the time of her death to her son. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which both Husband and Wife challenge various findings and rulings of the trial court. Husband appeals claiming the trial court erred in not finding Wife a non-credible witness, finding Wife is unable to work due to a lengthy illness, awarding Wife alimony in futuro, and requiring him to pay Wife’s COBRA insurance. Wife appeals claiming that the trial court erred in its division of marital property and the amount of alimony awarded. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

The defendants, Brenda Faye Brewington and Brian Dewayne Brewington, were convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, and two counts of child neglect, Class E felonies. For their convictions, the defendants each received an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendants raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims, and photographs and a videotape of their home; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions for aggravated child neglect; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights and granting a stepfather’s petition for adoption. Because the final order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying the trial court’s decision, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.