APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Lessees/Appellants filed suit against Lessors/Appellees for breach of a commercial lease after Lessors/Appellees refused to approve Lessees/Appellants’ proposed subtenants. The trial court found that Lessors/Appellees had failed to fully mitigate damages, and granted Lessor/Appellees only 50% of rents as damages, along with damages for taxes and insurance. Lessees/Appellants appeal the trial court’s award of rents, and the judgment for taxes and insurance.  Lessors/Appellees raise additional issues concerning the trial court’s award of only a portion of its claimed attorneys fees, and the judgment based upon damage to the demised Building by Lessees/Appellants.  Finding no error, we affirm.

The plaintiffs filed this products liability case against Daimler-Chrysler seeking damages for the wrongful death of their son and for emotional distress suffered by the mother. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. We granted review to determine: 1) whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought simultaneously with a wrongful death claim is a “stand-alone” claim that requires expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury; 2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; 3) whether the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were excessive; and 4) whether the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim. We hold that the simultaneous filing of a wrongful death suit does not prevent a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim from being a “stand-alone” claim. Therefore, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought under these circumstances must be supported by expert medical or scientific proof of a severe emotional injury. In addition, we conclude that the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were adequately supported by the evidence and were not excessive. Finally, we hold that the trial court erred by recognizing the plaintiffs’ second failure to warn claim but conclude that the error did not prejudice the judicial process or more probably than not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the compensatory and punitive damage awards based on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the punitive damage award related to the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim.

The Appellant, Trumaine Winters, appeals his convictions and the resulting sentencing decisions of the Shelby County Criminal Court. After a jury trial, Winters was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated robbery. Winters was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twelve years for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Winters argues: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court “erred in failing to suppress the identification and subsequent identification testimony of State’s witnesses”; (3) that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors at sentencing for the conviction of aggravated robbery; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (4) are without merit. However, with regard to issue (3), we conclude, following plain error review, that Winters’ sentence for aggravated robbery must be reversed in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the case remanded for resentencing.

The heart-wrenching facts of this wrongful death/emotional distress case, which are adequately set forth in the majority opinion, need not be restated here. The tragedy visited upon this family is indeed great. The record, like the trial itself, is lengthy. The trial testimony is extensive and, at times, contradictory. The fact that the members of this Court disagree as to how to resolve some of the difficult legal issues–which are hotly contested–is no surprise. The case is complex on multiple levels and resolving the issues presented while attempting to achieve a just result has proven to be no easy task.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of rape and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an eight year sentence for the rape conviction and three year sentences on each sexual battery conviction. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant complained that his counsel forced him to plead guilty, after which counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and it ordered the Defendant to serve the sexual battery convictions concurrently to each other but consecutively to the rape conviction. The court also denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to allow Counsel to withdraw during the sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing for the sexual battery and rape convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Court has decided to uphold a judgment for $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the death of an eight-month-old child in a collision between a minivan and a truck. While the parents’ loss of their child is heart-wrenching and tragic, I cannot concur in affirming the awards of either compensatory or punitive damages against the manufacturer of the minivan in which the child was a passenger. The child’s parents are not entitled to $13,367,345 in punitive damages because they have failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer acted recklessly in the design, construction, or marketing of the minivan. They are likewise not entitled to recover $5,000,000 in compensatory damages because of the erroneous admission of evidence regarding twenty-five “similar incidents” occurring after the date that the minivan was sold. Accordingly, rather than approving the award of $18,367,345 in compensatory and punitive damages, I would remand the case for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only.

Following a trial de novo on writ of certiorari, the trial court reversed the City of Memphis Alcohol Commission’s denial of a beer permit, ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the sale of beer from the applicant’s market would interfere with the public health, safety, and morals. It ordered the City of Memphis to issue a beer license to the applicant. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Eric Shane Heller, was convicted of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, both Class B felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search warrant which led to his arrest, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on the flight of the defendant. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the defendant’s convictions.

I concur with Justice Holder and Chief Justice Barker as to the propriety of the award of $5 million for the wrongful death of Jeremy Flax, apportioned one-half to the fault of the DaimlerChrysler Corporation [the “Defendant”] and the other one-half to Lewis Stockell. I further concur in their affirmance of the trial court’s reduction of punitive damages against the Defendant regarding the wrongful death action from $65,500,000 to $13,367,345. Finally, I agree that the $2.5 million in compensatory damages awarded Rachel Sparkman for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, one-half of which was adjudged against the Defendant, and the punitive damages of $6,632,655, all of which was assessed against the Defendant, should be set aside.

The appellant, William Earl Starks, was found guilty by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State adduced insufficient proof of venue.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pro se Appellant filed suit against Appellee Landlord for damages following a forcible entry and detainer. Appellant appealed the decision of the general sessions court to the Circuit Court at Fayette County. The circuit court found that Appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof and dismissed the appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Wiled McMillIan, pleaded guilty in the Dyer County Criminal Court to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. He received a sentence of ten years, to be served in the Department of Correction (TDOC), although the court noted that the petitioner would be allowed to go to long-term drug rehabilitation after he had served six months in the Dyer County jail. Prior to the petitioner’s serving six months in the Dyer County jail, he was transferred to TDOC to serve the remainder of his sentence. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his separate motion to set aside the guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Father and Mother are parents of a minor child born out of wedlock. After Mother regained custody of child, she petitioned the trial court for prospective and retroactive child support and medical insurance. Father also petitioned for retroactive child support. The juvenile referee set prospective child support and ordered Father to provide medical insurance for the child, but reserved the issue of retroactive child support pending the parties’ submission of their past years’ financial records. After multiple continuances and Father’s apparent unwillingness to comply with trial court’s discovery order, the Referee dismissed both parties petitions. A special judge affirmed. Father appealed and Mother cross-appealed. We remand the cause to the trial court to issue a ruling that contains a basis for the dismissal and for a determination of whether the trial court intended for its dismissal to serve as a denial of the parties’ petition for retroactive child support.

This is a termination of parental rights case. On June 19, 2007, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Madison County to terminate the parental rights of Nikia Kiwan Long (“Mother”) and Terry Lowvall Woods (“Father”) to their minor children, JQW, born March 2000, and LKW, born January 2005. In its petition, DCS asserted the statutory grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions leading to the children’s removal from the home. Following a hearing on December 11, 2007, the trial court entered separate orders terminating Father’s rights and terminating Mother’s rights based on abandonment for failure to support, persistence of conditions that prevented the children’s return to Mother, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Only Mother appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Maurice Tyrone Hendrix, seeks habeas corpus relief from 1988 Davidson County convictions for four counts of second degree burglary and one count of grand larceny and his resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years. The petitioner contends that his sentences have expired and that the judgments of conviction are void. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order to produce two witnesses for deposition within forty-five days, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion where there was no evidence of willful or dilatory conduct by Plaintiff. We vacate and remand.

The petitioner, Lamar Fletcher, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric Jason Tolley, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing to consider his claims.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Shamarcus Antwan Hunt, was convicted of the sale of cocaine under .5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession of cocaine over .5 grams with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class B felony. He was sentenced, respectively, to eight years and twelve years in the Department of Correction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial following allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The mother of five children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court terminated mother’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse due to her failure to protect the children from sexual abuse by her husband. The court also found that terminating her parental rights was in all five children’s best interests. We affirm.

Appellant, Brian Charles LaDue, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to six years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant seeks review of his sentence on appeal. We determine that Appellant has failed to show that plain error review of his sentence is warranted or that the trial court erred by denying probation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shundell L. Dickerson, was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder (Class A felony) and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years in prison. He appeals his conviction and sentence. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) precluding him from entering into evidence an anonymous letter mailed to the police in which other persons were named as responsible for the crime; (2) limiting the questioning of a witness regarding his expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument. Finally, the defendant argues enhancement factors were improperly applied to increase his sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

A state maintenance worker was injured while cleaning water out of an elevator pit in the Legislative Plaza. The worker sued the contractor that provided elevator maintenance and repair services to the state. He claimed that the contractor was responsible for his injuries because the contractor violated its contract with the state by refusing to remove the water from the elevator pit and because it was negligent in not locking down the elevator when its employee knew people would be working in the pit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor. The worker appealed. We affirm.

The court hereby grants the petition for rehearing filed by the State of Tennessee in this matter and withdraws the opinion and vacates the judgment previously filed on March 20, 2008. A new opinion and judgment are being filed contemporaneously with this order.

The defendant, George Garner, Jr., appeals his Rutherford County Criminal Court conviction of one count of attempted second degree murder. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.