APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The issues presented on appeal relate to the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. We affirm.

The Shelby County Assessor and Shelby County moved to intervene in a probate case in order to amend a prior order previously entered adjudicating a claim made against the decedent’s estate by the City of Memphis for delinquent personal property taxes. The would-be intervenors claimed as their interest in the case the possibility that the probate court’s decision might be deemed preclusive in a tangentially related chancery proceeding. The probate court denied the motion to intervene and ordered that the movants pay the estate’s attorney’s fees. We conclude that the movants did not possess a substantial legal interest in the litigation warranting their intervention under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01, and we further conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion to be untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the probate court’s denial of the motion to intervene as well as its denial of a companion motion made under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We, however, vacate its decision awarding the estate attorney’s fees.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of his closely held stock and the classification of its appreciation as marital property; the $75,000 award of alimony in solido to Wife to account for her interest in the appreciation of that stock; the award of $1,500 per month in transitional alimony for 60 months; and the award to Wife of $25,000 in attorney’s fees incurred through trial and of $1,500 in attorney’s fees incurred in defending against husband’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Jim Sanders, retired from his employment with the United Parcel Service in September 2003. In February 2004, he gave notice to his employer of a workers’ compensation claim. He alleged that he had sustained gradual injuries or aggravation of his pre-existing conditions as a result of his work activities. The claim was denied, and the Mr. Sanders filed suit. At trial, the court sustained objections by both parties to medical records attached to medical depositions. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the employee had failed to carry his burden of proof and also that the claim was barred by failure to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in sustaining the employer’s objection to medical records, in finding that he had not carried his burden of proof, and in finding that he had not complied with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

A Davidson County Criminal Court grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas Jefferson Teague, Jr., on one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court accepted a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to only felony possession of a weapon in exchange for a Range I sentence of two years’ confinement in a regional workhouse. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion seeking placement in a community corrections program. Adopting the State’s view that the incarcerative sentence was embraced in a binding plea agreement and was not subject to modification, the trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. Although the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying relief, we affirm its order because the record demonstrated no factual basis for relief.

The Defendant, Sanford Lee Parker, was convicted of felony driving under the influence (fourth offense or greater), child endangerment, violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked license. For these convictions, the Defendant received consecutive terms of four years, eleven months and twenty-nine days, eleven months and twenty-nine days, and six months respectively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for driving under the influence and child endangerment and contends that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Adrienne Hollowell, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony. The Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to one year in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. At the time of her guilty plea, the defendant filed a petition to suspend her sentence; following an August 2006 hearing, the trial court denied the petition and ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in incarceration. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of full incarceration. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ray Charles Nelson, of theft and criminal trespass, and the defendant, now on appeal, challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we hold that the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Sullivan County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Thornton Shayne Snapp, for theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft, and instead only supported a conviction for joyriding. After a thorough review of the record, we have found the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Craig Robert Nunn, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated sexual battery convictions. The petitioner first argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that due process considerations did not toll the statute of limitations. He further argues that the post-conviction court, which also considered his claims on the merits, erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial on its merits of the petition.

Bobby E. White and Ann H. White sought judgment granting them title to a small portion of property that they claim to own by deed, adverse possession and by payment of taxes. The trial court granted Pulaski Electric System, a public electric company, summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryan Dale Farmer, of one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison, suspended after the service of sixty days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he did not use his supervisory power over the victim to accomplish a sexual act; and (2) the trial court erred by not granting him full probation. After a thorough review of the applicable record and law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join in the results reached by the majority but write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations. The majority opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding that the post-conviction petition filed more than five years after the entry of judgment in this case is time-barred. This conclusion is based upon the belief that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing showed that the petitioner was misled by trial counsel regarding his right to pursue post-conviction relief under the terms of his guilty plea agreement.

The defendant, Tony Draine, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically with regard to the requisite mental state. After review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of conviction.

These consolidated appeals arise out of two forcible entry and detainer suits filed in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court. For the following reasons, we have determined that one appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final order, and one appeal must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

A Loudon County grand jury indicted the defendant, Ariel Ben Sherman, and co-defendant, Jacqueline Crank, for child neglect. The trial court dismissed the indictment against Sherman. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted Sherman’s application for permission to appeal to consider the issues presented for review, and hold as follows: (1) When deciding a motion to dismiss an indictment, a trial court may consider undisputed facts that are clearly and unequivocally agreed upon by the parties; (2) a person standing in loco parentis to a child may have a legal duty of care, the breach of which may result in criminal culpability; and (3) the State is not bound at the outset of a trial by the legal theories espoused in its bill of particulars. Because the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate the indictment against Sherman, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of an appeal from a general sessions judgment. The appellant purchaser defaulted on a loan from the appellee finance company for the purchase of a vehicle. The finance company then filed an action to recover possession of the vehicle. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the finance company. The purchaser appealed the judgment to the circuit court. The finance company moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to file the required bond. The circuit court found that the purchaser was not indigent and granted the motion to dismiss. The purchaser appeals, challenging the circuit court’s finding that he was not indigent. We find that an appeal bond was not required under Tennessee caselaw. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Harrison Melvin X. Pearison, was denied habeas corpus relief by the Johnson County Criminal Court from his 1997 conviction for aggravated arson and twenty-year sentence at 100 percent service. On appeal, he contends that the amended judgment with 100 percent service is void and that he is entitled to serve the sentence at thirty percent as originally imposed. Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

The petitioner, Rodney L. Tipton, was denied habeas corpus relief by the Johnson County Criminal Court from his 1992 judgments for jury convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and effective thirty-three-year sentence as a Range I offender. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court constructively amended the indictment for aggravated rape by including in its jury instructions modes of the offense which were not charged in the indictment and because the trial court erroneously amended the aggravated robbery indictment by allowing an amendment to include a car as an additional item taken in the course of the robbery. Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

This action was filed on October 3, 1996 in the Chancery Court. The Final Judgment was entered in the Trial Court on September 13, 2007. On appeal, we vacate and remand for a new trial inter alia due to the unreasonable delay by the Trial Court in rendering judgment.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of J.C. (“Father”) and B.C. (“Mother”) to the minor children S.A.C., K.O.C., and J.S.C. (“the Children”). After trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and that termination was in the best interests of the Children. Father and Mother appeal to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress made by two family members of a child who was seriously injured in an automobile accident. In their complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the injured child’s mother and brother alleged that they had sustained severe emotional injuries after they observed him lying on the pavement in a pool of blood.  The injured child’s parents served a copy of the complaint on their automobile insurance company because the driver of the automobile that struck their son lacked adequate insurance. The insurance company moved for a partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because neither the injured child’s mother nor his brother had seen or heard the injury-producing accident. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion, and the injured child’s mother and brother appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted the insurance company’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly permitted these negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to proceed. We have determined that persons who observe an injured family member shortly after an injury-producing accident may pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The Petitioner, Ricky Thomas Hughes, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. On appeal, he alleges that his sentence is void because the trial court failed to comply with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and cases interpreting that provision. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Deonta Baskin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for shooting a man in the hip following an altercation. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted murder conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his attempted murder conviction, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient proof that the shooting was premeditated. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this premises liability action for personal injuries sustained by the elderly husband who was injured when automatic doors at the entrance to a medical office building struck him causing him to fall. In the premises liability action that followed, Plaintiffs alleged that the major tenant of the office building and the property management company failed to exercise the required due care in the maintenance, inspection, and repair of the doors and/or to properly warn Plaintiffs of the dangers existing at the office building. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against both defendants. We have determined the major tenant owed no duty to Plaintiffs and thus was entitled to summary judgment. We have also determined that the property management company did not create the alleged dangerous or defective condition, and it did not have actual or constructive knowledge that a dangerous or defective condition existed. Accordingly, we affirm.