APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Gerald Sanford, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction on one count of first degree murder. In this appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the trial court’s classification and division of marital assets upon the parties’ divorce. The wife contends that the trial court incorrectly classified improvements made to the husband’s home with monies taken from the parties’ joint account as the husband’s separate property. Only the wife filed a brief, and we do not have a transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Plaintiff’s employment contract as a probationary teacher was not renewed. He filed a grievance under the agreement existing between the local board of education and the local professional employees’ association. As the last step in the grievance procedure, the teacher sought binding arbitration. The board filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to arbitrate the former employee’s grievance. The trial court dismissed that action, and on appeal this court reversed and remanded for further consideration by the trial court. The trial court then ruled that the issues raised by the teacher were subject to arbitration, and the board again appealed to this court. We hold that a locally negotiated agreement cannot be interpreted to delegate to an arbitrator the decision of whether to renew a probationary teacher’s contract because state statutes clearly give that decision to local school officials. Consequently, we reverse the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth J. Cradic, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child (Class A felony), and three counts of incest (Class C felony). He was sentenced to twenty years for each Class A felony and four years for each Class C felony. The trial court ordered that two of the Class A felony convictions be served consecutive to each other but concurrent to the third conviction and that the three Class C felony convictions be served consecutive to each other and concurrent to the Class A felonies, for a total effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the sentence is improper, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever his offenses and to suppress his statement. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This case arises from an election for Gatlinburg City Commission in May 2007. Six candidates were on the ballot; the top three finishers were elected. Bobby C. (Clark) King received 210 votes and finished fifth, 304 votes behind the third-place finisher. Mr. King now seeks to have the election declared void, and a new election ordered, on the basis of several alleged procedural errors that he says render the election results invalid. After a bench trial, the court rejected Mr. King’s arguments, declaring some of his accusations factually lacking and holding that others, even if true, were not sufficiently serious to justify voiding the election. Mr. King appeals. We affirm.

Employer appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Employee. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on Employee’s workers’ compensation claim. The agreement included language that Employee would not seek further employment with Employer. In granting partial summary judgment to Employee, the trial court found that the disputed language of the agreement did not create a contractual obligation on the part of Employee. We reverse and grant summary judgment in favor of Employer.

The appellant urges this court to reverse the post-conviction court’s decision denying him post-conviction relief based upon his allegation that trial counsel’s failure to explain to him, prior to his plea of guilty, the extent of his obligations under the community supervision provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to undermine the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, he complains that had counsel informed him adequately regarding the requirements of lifetime community supervision, including the possible associated monthly cost of forty-five dollars, he would not have entered his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and automobile burglary. The appellant claims and counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this omission rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent and unknowing.

In this appeal, a mother and father challenge an order terminating their parental rights. We affirm the order as it pertains to the mother, and we reverse as to the father.

The Petitioner, Chad Alan Parker, pled nolo contendre to one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of burglary of an automobile. The trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and community supervision for life for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, and to two years for the burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the issues and applicable authorities, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for the Petitioner to withdraw his best interest plea.

We reverse the trial court’s finding that the immunity granted in the second sentence of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-53-110 applied only where there was proof that actual malice was absent. With regard to the statute of limitations governing claims related to diminution in value to a business, where the gravamen of the complaint is for breach of contract, the six-year period of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109 governs, but where the gravamen of the complaint is for injury to property, the three-year period of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 governs.

The Appellant, Devin James, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court after a jury found him guilty of the reckless homicide of Rodney Steward. After a sentencing hearing, James received a thirty-month sentence in the “workhouse,” with all but ninety days suspended, followed by five years of probation. On appeal, James argues: (1) that the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion was error; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation; and (3) that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence six months beyond the presumptive minimum and in imposing a probationary term of five years. After thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

The Appellant, Walter Pablo, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court in ordering that his sentence for DUI, first offense, be served in total confinement. Pablo and the State reached a guilty plea agreement providing that he would plead guilty to DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, and failure to appear, and receive an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with fifteen days to be served in confinement and the balance to served on probation. At a guilty plea hearing, after questioning by the trial court, Pablo provided information to the court that he was a Mexican citizen, and that he did not know whether the federal authorities were aware of his presence in this country. After four days of guilty plea proceedings over a period from August 7, 2007, to August 28, 2007, during which Pablo was in confinement, the trial court rejected the guilty plea agreement insofar as it provided for a probationary sentence. Pablo was allowed the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, which he declined. The trial court then summarily sentenced Pablo to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration in the workhouse for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation based solely upon his perceived status as an illegal alien. After review, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Pablo’s presence in the United States was unlawful and that the trial court’s summary sentencing decision failed to consider relevant principles of sentencing in denying probation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.

The petitioner, Marcellus Hurt, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to exercise his influence and persuade the petitioner to plead guilty. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Larry C. Pittman, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that he is entitled to relief under Blakely because he submits that he was sentenced illegally. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we conclude that the habeas court’s summary dismissal of the petition was appropriate, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner, Morris Neal Davis, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to sentence him outside his statutory sentencing range and, further, that the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him above the statutory minimum sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would render the judgments of conviction void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Hardeman County Circuit Court.

This is an appeal from a damage award. In the underlying litigation, the plaintiff owner of a mobile home sued the defendant owner of the mobile home park in which the mobile home was located, over the defendant’s eviction of the plaintiff and alleged conversion and trespass, resulting in damages to the mobile home. The trial court held in favor of the defendant mobile home park owner, and the plaintiff appealed. The trial court’s decision was reversed on appeal, and the case was remanded for the determination of the damages to the plaintiff mobile home owner. The trial court awarded compensatory damages to the plaintiff mobile home owner, who now appeals again, arguing that she should have received consequential and punitive damages. We affirm.

The petitioner, Geraldrick Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel (1) should have requested dismissal of the indictment or a special jury instruction after the State lost samples of his blood; (2) should have moved to suppress evidence found after the police searched his home; (3) and failed to object to improper closing remarks by the State. The post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove these claims and dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Lana Billings Henry, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court. In October 2007, the Defendant entered guilty pleas to multiple counts of forgery and theft. Under the terms of the agreement, the Defendant received an effective six-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, and the manner of service was submitted to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a sentence of community corrections was appropriate. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

In this medical malpractice action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant doctor because the plaintiff had not personally served the defendant doctor; was put on notice of this insufficiency in the defendant’s answer; and took no action to re-issue the summons and serve the doctor. Following entry of summary judgment, the plaintiff sought relief from this judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 (1), arguing that the statements of the trial court and the actions of the parties implied that service was proper and led his counsel to believe there was no need to reserve the defendant doctor. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, and the plaintiff appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. During the course of the parties’ long-term marriage, the wife retired from her job as a teacher because of multiple health problems. In the divorce decree, the wife was awarded alimony in futuro. The husband filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. The husband appeals the award of alimony in futuro, and the denial of his motion to alter or amend. The wife asserts that this is a frivolous appeal. We affirm and find that this is a frivolous appeal.

Finding that the home purchasers created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant facilitated the home sale for the contractor/seller, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

The Petitioner, Bernard Henry, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the dismissal was erroneous because he did not receive the effective assistance of trial counsel and because the post-conviction court improperly prevented him from presenting evidence that his appellate counsel was ineffective. After a review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in denying the Petitioner an opportunity to be heard on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Calvin Landers, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a 20-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals and claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is excessive. Because the record supports the judgment of the trial court, we affirm both the conviction and the sentence.

Appellant, Timothy Lee Demery, was convicted by a Carter County Jury of second degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated the appeal herein. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied the motion for new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence that exonerated Appellant and was withheld from the defense during trial. We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The circuit court affirmed a final administrative order of the Tennessee Department of Human Services establishing a divorced father’s child support arrearage, directing that support be paid to the Central Child Support Receipting Unit, and issuing tax refund intercept notices. On appeal, the father contends that he did not owe the arrearage assessed against him, making the intercept notices invalid, that there were numerous irregularities in the administrative proceedings, and that
compelling him to make payments in the manner ordered violates his religious rights under the Tennessee Constitution. We affirm.