APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Damien Clark, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County for second degree murder, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years’ confinement as a violent offender. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction as character evidence, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction when the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and notice of impeachment was “inadequate and inaccurate,” and (4) the jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit the defendant of second degree murder before examining voluntary manslaughter as a conviction offense deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and to trial by jury. Although the required procedure was not used to admit the defendant’s prior conviction, we conclude the errors were harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the granting of a summary judgment to Gtech Corporation and Specialized Communications Companies, Inc., relating to the installation of a satellite antenna on the roof of A&S Market located in Davidson County, Tennessee. The market burned and the owners brought suit alleging that the negligent installation of the satellite antenna caused the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground the negligence alleged by the market owners was not the legal cause of the fire. We reverse.

The eleven Plaintiffs, investors in a real estate development in Tunica, Mississippi, suffered losses when the financing for hotels on the tracts of land they had leased failed to materialize. Five of the Plaintiffs first learned of the investment opportunity in 1993 while attending a presentation by real estate agents Lloyd and Betty Link in Gatlinburg. After suit was filed against several Defendants based upon breach of oral and written contracts, the trial court entered an order of dismissal as to the Links and other of the Defendants and, later, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of D.C. Parker and Richard Flowers, the owners of the land. When judgments had been entered as to all of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs appealed, but only as to Parker and Flowers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that whether an agency relationship existed between Parker and Flowers, as principals, and the Links, and whether the Links had been guilty of misrepresentation were disputed questions of fact. Upon remand, a jury found that the Links were the agents of Parker and Flowers, who were vicariously liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made by the Links. Damages were awarded to the Plaintiffs. In a second appeal, this time by Parker and Flowers, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to those five Plaintiffs who had attended the presentation in Gatlinburg, but remanded for a new trial as to those who did not. We granted an application for permission to appeal to consider whether the order of dismissal in favor of the agents precluded any adjudication of vicarious liability as to the principals.

The Appellant, Carlos Bonding, LLC, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $20,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $6,000 of the bond. On appeal, Carlos Bonding argues that the trial court, by referencing the concept of treble damages, abused its discretion in its method of calculating the amount to be forfeited. Because the trial court must be afforded broad discretion in a bail forfeiture proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this divorce case the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. The husband appealed on the grounds that a house awarded to the wife was not a marital asset, and otherwise questioned the property and division of the indebtedness of the marital estate. On appeal we affirm, as modified, the modification being that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Judge finding that the father had awarded his son a collection of firearms.

The defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, which were merged into two counts, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to ten years for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with all sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the record supported that the sentences be served consecutively. However, the matter was remanded to the trial court for the defendant to be sentenced under the pre-2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. Subsequently, the defendant was resentenced to eight years for each of the aggravated robberyconvictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping, with all sentences to be served consecutively. He again appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. The State asks that this matter be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and, following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20.

The petitioner, Brandon Biggerstaff, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father of an eleven year old boy on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay child support. The father admitted that he did not pay the child support ordered by the court, but claimed that his failure was not willful. He argued that his record as a convicted felon prevented him from finding and holding steady employment, thus rendering him unable to pay any support at all. However, the record shows that Father was able-bodied and did in fact work at a number of jobs after his felony conviction. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court found that the employee, Lisa Holt, had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer, Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., has appealed,  contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a  compensable injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.1

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his lower back on May 1, 2002. The trial court ruled that the employee had failed to carry his burden of proving that he had sustained a compensable injury. The employee appealed,  contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Kelly Hill, by means of a Rule 10 interlocutory appeal, seeks review of the Maury County Circuit Court’s ruling that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying her application for pretrial diversion. Following review of the record, we conclude that the relevant factors were properly considered by the assistant district attorney general and that no abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s application for diversion.

Husband appeals two convictions of contempt of court and sentence of two days incarceration for each finding of contempt. Finding no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm the convictions.

This appeal involves an action to terminate the father’s parental rights filed jointly by the prospective adoptive parents and the temporary guardians of the child. The Juvenile Court found that the father did not abandon his child because the child’s temporary guardian interfered with the father’s attempts to visit the child. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the father abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) by willfully failing to visit the child for over four months. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the juvenile court to determine whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child.

In this wrongful death action, Edwina Montgomery (“the Plaintiff”), individually and as the surviving spouse of Thomas M. Montgomery (“the Deceased”), brought suit under the Tennessee Dram Shop Act (“the Dram Shop Act” or “the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002). The Plaintiff also sued for negligence and negligence per se.¹ The Plaintiff sued Kali Orexi, LLC, which operates under the trade name of Gondolier Italian Restaurant and Pizza (“Gondolier”). Gondolier moved for summary judgment, which was granted as to all theories of recovery. We affirm the summary judgment on what appears to be an issue of first impression. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002) apply to third parties and do not authorize an action against a seller of an “alcoholic beverage or beer” by or on behalf of the supplied, or “first” party. Since the Dram Shop Act does not address first parties, its enactment leaves the law as to first parties as it existed before the Act’s enactment. In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly held that the injuries to the Deceased were not foreseeable; thus, Gondolier owed the Deceased no duty. Furthermore, even if a duty were owed, it was not breached. The question whether the actions of the Deceased and a taxi driver, who was paid by Gondolier to take the intoxicated Deceased home, were intervening and superseding causes that relieve Gondolier of liability are not addressed since we hold that the Plaintiff had no cause of action under the Dram Shop Act or for common law negligence. Accordingly, we affirm.²

This appeal involves a petition filed by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services, to terminate the parental rights of a biological father to his now ten-year-old daughter. The Juvenile Court granted the petition and the father has appealed. After carefully reviewing the record and relevant legal authority, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding of abandonment and the judgment terminating the father’s parental rights.

The Defendant-Appellant, Gregory A. Frye (“Frye”), pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twentynine days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court  ordering Frye to serve his sentence consecutively to unrelated convictions for which he was currently serving a sentence. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Lora Ashley, appeals the Moore County Circuit Court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Appellant pled guilty to one count of facilitation of a violation of the sex offender registry and agreed to an open plea, where the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the basis that Appellant’s criminal history supported a denial of alternative sentencing and that measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessfully applied to Appellant. As a result, the trial court ordered her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. Appellant appeals this decision. We determine that the record supports the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves authority to accept service of process. The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the defendant corporation and its employee, the defendant physician. The plaintiffs attempted to serve process in person on both the corporation and the physician at the corporation’s business address. Service was accepted on behalf of the physician by a co-worker, who was not specifically authorized to accept service for him. Service was accepted on behalf of the corporation by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent, and who was not specifically authorized to accept service for the corporation. Both defendants received a copy of the summons and complaint. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint and attempted to serve both defendants via certified mail. The return receipts for both defendants were signed by an employee of the corporation who was not an officer, managing agent, or chief agent of the corporation, and was not specifically authorized to accept service of process on behalf of either the physician or the corporation. The employee who signed the return receipts was, however, authorized to sign for certified mail. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based in part on insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, relying on this Court’s decision in Boles v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., No. M1999-00727-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1030837 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2000). The defendants were granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the defendant physician argues that service on him was not effective because he was not personally served and because the persons who accepted service on his behalf were not authorized to do so. The defendant corporation argues that service on it was not effective because neither the corporation’s registered agent nor its administrator were served and the persons who accepted service on the corporation’s behalf were not authorized to do so. After reconsidering the analysis in Boles, we reverse the trial court’s decision, finding that service was not effective on either defendant and the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I concur in the result reached by the majority and agree that the trial court correctly denied alternative sentencing in this case based upon the defendant’s criminal history and past failed efforts at rehabilitation. However, I write separately to note that the trial court revoked the defendant’s bond and denied her bond in a misdemeanor case pending appeal in contravention to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-104 and Rule 32(d)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which grant a defendant in a misdemeanor case “a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.”

Appellant, Gale Marleen Krizka, was indicted for first degree murder for the death of her husband. At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court dismissed the first degree murder charge. The case proceeded to the jury on several lesser included offenses. After deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder. As a result, the trial court sentenced her to twenty-two years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of her conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on criminal responsibility for the acts of another. We determine that the evidence presented at trial supports a jury instruction on criminal responsibility for the acts of another and that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Ron Henry and Linda Henry (“Plaintiffs”) sued Cherokee Construction and Supply Company, Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging damages sustained when a wall in the home that Defendant constructed for Plaintiffs collapsed. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the four year statute of repose contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-201, et seq., and granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin enforcement of a detainer judgment and to nullify a foreclosure on their home on the basis that defendant failed to offer the property for sale at the courthouse door, in accordance with the notice of foreclosure. The Trial Court held plaintiffs failed to prove their allegations and found the foreclosure sale was properly held. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This is a lawsuit filed by eight county officials to resolve a budget dispute. The officials filed an application in Chancery Court seeking judicial authorization to hire additional staff and to increase the salaries and benefits paid to a separate group of county employees. One day after the petition was filed, the officials, along with the defendant County Mayor, entered a consent order approving each petitioner’s requests. One month later, the County Commission attempted to intervene and have the order set aside. The trial court denied the County Commission’s motions, and the County Commission appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to intervene. However, several procedural and substantive defects require this Court to vacate the Consent Order and remand
this matter to the trial court.

The defendant, Algie Lavell McClure, appeals as of right his jury convictions in the Hamilton County Criminal Court for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, reckless endangerment, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of two years and three years for the reckless endangerment and aggravated burglary counts, respectively. The two year sentence is to be served consecutively to the life sentence for the merged first degree murder conviction, with all other sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant contends on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of numerous prior bad acts of the defendant through multiple witnesses, that the trial court erred in admission of impeachment evidence, and that the trial court erred by not giving a credibility instruction relative to expectations of favorable treatment certain witnesses may have had in exchange for their testimony.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason Calvert, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.