APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” with respect to the claim of David Stone seeking damages arising out of the death of his wife, Rhonda Stone,1 who was killed by the alleged negligent driving of an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, the Stones had a personal liability “umbrella” insurance policy with State Farm, which provided $1 million in personal liability coverage above and beyond the Stones’ underlying insurance policies, including their automobile liability insurance policy. Their umbrella policy does not, by its language, include uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. However, Mr. Stone argues that UM coverage should be read into their umbrella policy because the Stones did not reject such coverage in writing, which Mr. Stone says is required by the applicable statute. State Farm argues that the statute in question, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a) (2000), applies only to automobile insurance policies and does not impose the rejection-in-writing requirement on umbrella policies. Based upon the parties’ “Agreed Stipulations,” the lower court, at a bench trial, agreed with Mr. Stone’s interpretation of the statute. We disagree with the interpretation placed upon the statute by Mr. Stone and the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse.

This appeal involves a negligence action filed after the plaintiff was charged with child rape. The plaintiff sued the sheriff’s deputy and Department of Children’s Services employee who interviewed the alleged victim; the sheriff; the county mayor; the county itself; a Department of Children’s Services supervisor; and the District Attorney General. The plaintiff contended that if a “child protective team” had interviewed the victim, he would not have been arrested and charged with child rape. The trial court dismissed the claims against the state employees for lack of jurisdiction, and it dismissed the claims against the county employees pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq. The sheriff’s deputy was also named as a defendant in his individual capacity, and the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Richard Lynn Dixon, appeals the revocation of his probation by the trial court. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Robert Kimbrel, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This appeal involves concurrent findings of a special master and a trial court. The bank foreclosed on property and the owner filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure. The chancellor referred the matter to a special master for the determination of two factual issues. The special master found that the account in question was in arrears at the time of the foreclosure, and that no payments were made that were not properly credited to the account. The chancellor adopted the findings of the special master and granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The owner appeals, and we affirm.

The Appellant, Gregory Derrick Maness, appeals the sentencing decision of the Chester County Circuit Court ordering that his sentences be served in confinement. Following Maness’ guilty pleas to the filing of a false report, a Class D felony, and to the misdemeanor crimes of domestic assault and theft, Maness received an effective four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Maness raises the sole issue of whether the trial court erred “by sentencing [him] to the Tennessee Department of Corrections [sic], rather than an available alternative to incarceration?”  After review, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jeffrey A. Simmons, was denied the writ of habeas corpus by the Hardeman County Circuit Court based upon his claims that (1) the indictments were void because they listed “Jane Doe” as the victim, (2) the indictments were void because they failed to allege a mens rea, and (3) the trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence him because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(a) by not sentencing him within forty-five days of conviction.  Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

This appeal involves a dispute between two attorneys over a contingency fee generated from a client’s case. The younger attorney worked as an associate at the senior attorney’s law firm, and both parties worked on the client’s case. When the case concluded, the associate sued the senior attorney, claiming that the parties had agreed to equally share the fee. The senior attorney testified that the associate had volunteered to work on the case for free. He further testified that pursuant to the parties’ arrangement, if he chose to pay the associate, he could unilaterally decide how much the associate’s services were worth. The trial court found that the parties had agreed to equally share the attorney’s fee generated in the case, and it awarded the associate one-half of the fee. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft in excess of $60,000 after embezzling over $630,000 from her employer. The trial court imposed a sentence requiring a term of confinement and probation. As a condition of her probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to make monthly restitution payments of approximately $1,500 to her former employer upon her release from confinement. After her release, the defendant petitioned the trial court to modify the conditions of her probation by reducing her monthly restitution payments to $500 per month. The trial court denied her motion to modify, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant could not appeal as of right the trial court’s decision to deny her motion to modify under Tennessee’s rules of appellate procedure. Nevertheless, a majority of the intermediate appellate court reviewed the defendant’s challenge as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and concluded that the trial court’s decision constituted a “plain and palpable abuse of discretion.” The State appealed. Upon review, we hold that the defendant does not have an appeal as of right to challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify. Furthermore, we conclude that the intermediate appellate court erred in granting the defendant a common-law writ of certiorari and in finding that the trial court’s decision was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand with instructions that the trial court’s order be reinstated.

The defendant, Alvin Green, was convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of forty-six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State did not adequately rebut his defense of duress. Further, he argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce his statements soliciting the murder of the State’s witnesses; by allowing a lay witness to testify regarding the operation of the weapon used during the offenses; and in applying an enhancement factor and imposing consecutive sentences.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to reflect that the defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, rather than attempted robbery.

The defendant, Bobby Dior McMillian, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court sentenced him improperly. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Plaintiff homeowners sued defendant residential building contractors for breach of a home construction contract upon allegations of defective workmanship and abandonment of contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded actual damages in an amount based upon the finding that the house was of no value. The trial court also awarded damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act upon a finding that the defendants violated the Act by willfully and knowingly misrepresenting that they were bonded. Upon appeal, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court, and accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in all respects.

This appeal involves a jury’s award of punitive damages. The construction company entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to widen a portion of a highway. The homeowners entered into a contract with the construction company allowing the construction company to place excess materials generated from the highway project on the homeowners’ property. In exchange, the
homeowners would receive compensation based on the cubic fill area, and the company would fill and grade that portion of the homeowners’ property. The project required that the construction
company conduct extensive blasting near the homeowners’ house and vehicles. One of the homeowners became concerned when he witnessed the construction company placing various garbage items and tires on his property near the fill area. After three years, the construction company finished the project. The homeowners brought suit, alleging that the company failed to pay the amount due under the contract and caused damage to their house due to the blasting. The complaint also alleged that the company buried certain items, including tires, on the property which constituted an environmental tort. The homeowners’ amended complaint stated a cause of action in nuisance and also sought an award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million dollars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the homeowners for the nuisance claim in the amount of $3,305.00 and found that punitive damages should be imposed on the construction company. The jury found in favor of the construction company for the environmental tort claim. After the second phase of the trial, the jury returned an award of $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court remitted the award to $1 million, the amount of the homeowners’ ad damnum. The construction company appeals, and we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.

The Petitioner, Timothy Earl Waters, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1989, Waters was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and assault with intent to commit first degree murder. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following review, we conclude that the petition fails to allege any ground which would render the challenged judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s modification of a child’s custody due to a material change in circumstances. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s change of custody of her minor child to Father/Appellee. Specifically, Mother/Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the finding of a material change in circumstances and also raises issues concerning trial court’s reliance on certain evidence. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.

The petitioner, William Anthony Hayworth, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of twenty years for the Class B felony and ten years for the Class C felony as a Range III, persistent offender, with the sentences to be served concurrently. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Appellant, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the prison disciplinary board’s findings.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Appellant’s alleged failure to execute his petition in compliance with the statutory requirements found at T.C.A §§ 27-8-104 and 27-8-106. Finding that Appellant had failed to have his petition notarized, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Linkous’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that summary judgment was correctly granted in this case because I believe Ms. Linkous has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her husband’s suicide was foreseeable under the circumstances, and whether the Defendants’ conduct was reasonable.

Plaintiff brought this action to void two deeds executed by the deceased shortly before he died. Plaintiff sought to void the deeds on the grounds that the grantees of the deed exerted undue influence on deceased in obtaining the deeds and that deceased was not competent to make the deeds. In a bench trial, the chancellor held that plaintiff did not prove undue influence and that the deceased was fully competent to contract and execute the deeds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John E. Carter, appeals from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the State of Tennessee moves this court, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, to summarily affirm the circuit court’s order. We agree that such motion is well taken, and we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Vincent Tracy Morton, entered guilty pleas to three counts of delivery of more than .5 gram of cocaine for resale, Class B felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive eleven year Range I sentences for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. The defendant did not appeal the sentencing determination. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and the court, by agreement of the parties, granted a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court imposed sentences that are excessive in both length and manner of service. The state contends that the trial court imposed appropriate sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Felton, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Felton seeks habeas corpus relief from his two 1997 Shelby County convictions for aggravated rape, which were entered as a result of his pleas of guilt to these crimes. On appeal, Felton contends that he was sentenced as a multiple rapist on each of the aggravated rape convictions with a release eligibility of thirty percent, and, because “the statute mandates service of such sentence at 100%,” his sentences are illegal and, therefore, void. Review of the face of the judgments of conviction establishes that Felton was sentenced as a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender and as a “Multiple Rapist.” However, review of the record of the proceedings before us clearly demonstrates that a release eligibility of thirty percent was simply a gratuitous and unwarranted entry which, although approved by the trial judge, was not a “bargained-for element” of Felton’s pleas. See Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tenn. 2006). Consistent with this holding, we remand the case to the original court of conviction for entry of corrected judgments of conviction for aggravated rape to reflect service of the two sentences as a multiple rapist. Dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Darron Price, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. Price was convicted in 2003 for attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. State v. Darren Price,¹ No. W2003-01447-CCA-MR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Feb. 9, 2005). The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied Price’s application for permission to appeal on June 20, 2005. Id. Subsequently, Price filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied Price an evidentiary hearing based upon its determination that the petition was untimely pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, Price argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition as untimely. After review, we conclude that the record supports a threshold showing of Price’s compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, § 2(G). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order dismissing Price’s petition, and we remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Price can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he complied with Rule 28 § 2(G) in filing his post-conviction petition.

This wrongful death action was brought by the widow of deceased, who committed suicide in the county jail. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant County on the grounds that the undisputed evidence established that the defendant’s suicide was not foreseeable. On appeal, we affirm.