APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the validity of a covenant not to compete. The employee, William C. Kitchens (“Kitchens”), became a certified orthotist after entering into the covenant with his employer Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics East, Inc. (“Hanger”). After the employee quit his job and began providing orthotic services for a competitor, Hanger filed suit. Following a trial, the Trial Court determined that the covenant not to compete was enforceable and that Kitchens had breached the covenant. The Trial Court also determined that Kitchens’ new employer, defendant Choice Medical, Inc. (“Choice Medical”), had induced Kitchens to breach the contract in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. §47-50-109, and that an award of treble damages was appropriate. Judgment was entered against Kitchens and Choice Medical jointly for $240,182.00, and against Choice Medical for an additional $480,364.00. Defendants appeal raising numerous issues. We affirm.

The defendant, Sean Thomas Corlew, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, in the Tipton County Circuit Court. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based upon his allegation that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to support the stop leading to his eventual arrest. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action for workers’ compensation benefits has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The claimant seeks workers’ compensation benefits for the death of his wife, a long distance truck driver, who died after leaping from the cabin of her tractor trailer on a mountainous stretch of highway. Her employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier is in liquidation. As part of the liquidation process, the chancery court assigned the claim to a referee for a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The referee concluded that the wife’s death did not arise out of her employment. The chancery court affirmed the denial of benefits, but on the grounds that the Liquidator had established that the wife’s death was due to willful misconduct. The claimant appeals. This appeal presents two issues: 1) whether the claimant’s tardiness in filing objections to the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law was due to excusable neglect, and 2) whether the chancery court erred in holding that the Liquidator met its burden of proof for establishing the willful misconduct defense. Upon review, we hold that the claimant’s late filing was due to excusable neglect. In addition, we hold that the Liquidator failed to establish that the wife’s death was due to willful misconduct. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s holding on both issues and remand for a new hearing.

The Appellant, Anthony E. Perry, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Perry was convicted of first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of kidnapping and especially aggravated kidnapping and is currently serving an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this court. In July, 2002, Perry filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other issues, multiple grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, and, following the appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed seeking a delayed appeal of his convictions upon the ground that Perry had been deprived of his right to seek second-tier appellate review. At the post-conviction level, the State conceded Perry’s entitlement to a delayed appeal. Nonetheless, on September 17, 2002, the post-conviction court denied Perry’s post-conviction petition based upon its perceived lack of jurisdiction to grant a delayed appeal, without addressing the merits of Perry’s remaining post-conviction issues or reserving them for a later determination. The Appellant then appealed the dismissal of his petition to this court. While the appeal was pending in this court, the post-conviction court entered a second order, on January 2, 2003, reversing its prior dismissal of the petition and granting Perry a delayed appeal. No action was ever taken by Perry in furtherance of the delayed appeal. Perry later moved to voluntarily dismiss his appeal, which was still pending before this court. Within one year from the voluntary dismissal of the appeal, the post-conviction court appointed substitute counsel to represent Perry for the purpose of pursuing the ineffective assistance claims alleged in the petition. Following the filing of three amended post-conviction petitions, a post-conviction hearing was held on December 21, 2005, at which Perry asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s (1) failure to seek suppression of his warrantless arrest within his home, in violation of Payton v. New York, and (2) failure to request lesser-included instructions at trial. After hearing the evidence presented, the post-conviction court denied the petition upon the merits. Perry now appeals that denial. On appeal, the State initially argues that the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to review Perry’s alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of this argument, the State asserts that the post-conviction court lost jurisdiction of the case when Perry filed a timely notice of appeal to this court from the post-conviction court’s order entered on September 17, 2002, denying post-conviction relief. We agree. As the September 2002 order specifically denied the post-conviction petition, without reservation of any issues, Perry’s only relief was through the appeal to this court. By voluntarily dismissing that appeal, the Appellant has defaulted those issues which collaterally challenged his conviction. The subsequent order entered by the post-conviction court granting the delayed appeal had no force and effect, and any actions, including the filing of amended post-conviction petitions, were not validly before the post-conviction court. Thus, the post-conviction court’s order of September 5, 2006, denying relief must be reversed and vacated.

A Lincoln County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Tony E. Cannon, Jr., of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the conviction of attempted second degree murder and imposed an effective sentence of 12 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the 12-year sentence imposed for attempted second degree murder is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in staying a disciplinary proceeding pending before a hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to stay the disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the stay order  issued by the trial court, and we dismiss the respondent’s motion for a stay.

The petitioner, Yasin Hawkins, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is defective because it does not include a copy of the judgment which is the basis for the petitioner’s being restrained, and it fails to present a claim which is cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Lovard D. Horton, pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell seventy pounds or more of marijuana, and possession with intent to sell or deliver 300 pounds or more of marijuana within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant pursuant to the plea agreement to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years in prison. The Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gerry Lynn Hensley, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humboldt Law Court of Gibson County. Hensley pled guilty to two counts of Class B vehicular homicide by reason of intoxication and was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to concurrent eight-year sentences as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Hensley raises the following challenges to the imposed sentences: (1) whether the trial court erred in considering an enhancement factor when no notice was provided by the State of its intent to rely upon such factor as required by local rules; (2) whether the court erred in considering dismissed charges in applying the enhancement factor of a prior criminal history; (3) whether the court erred in failing to specifically identify the mitigating and enhancing factors found and in failing to apply other certain mitigating factors which Hensley argues are applicable; (4) whether the court erred in not sentencing Hensley as an especially mitigated offender; and (5) whether the court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The petitioner, Dallas R. Myers, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record, we are persuaded that the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s post-conviction petition. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Therefore, we grant the state’s motion, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This action charged the defendant with engaging in unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to establish that he suffered a loss of money or property. On appeal, we affirm the summary judgment.

In this claim for workers’ compensation, the defendant/employer filed a motion seeking permission to have an ex parte interview with the treating physician regarding the medical condition of the plaintiff/employee. The employer also sought an order requiring the employee to submit to an independent medical evaluation. The trial court denied each motion, and we granted the employer’s application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon review of the record and consideration of the applicable law, we hold that (1) the employer may not communicate ex parte with the employee’s treating physician without first obtaining a waiver of the implied covenant of confidentiality from the employee; and (2) the employer’s request for the worker to undergo a medical evaluation should be granted unless the trial court determines that the request is unreasonable.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that, in the context of litigation regarding a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the employer and the employer’s lawyer are not entitled to have ex parte communications with the physician treating the employee. However, I base my conclusion on legal principles that differ from the “contract implied in law” theory relied upon by the Court.

Appellant, Michael Dewayne Mann, was found guilty by a Dyer County Jury of driving under the influence and for violation of the implied consent law. In a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of third offense driving under the influence. As a result, Appellant received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was to be suspended after the service of 150 days of incarceration. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, the following issues are raised for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court improperly allowed a police officer and the prosecutor to refer to Appellant’s prior record. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Furthermore, we decline to address the evidentiary issues as plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Anthony Harris, has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that he was ineffectively represented and that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Heath Brent Clark, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for multiple offenses including burglaries, thefts, vandalism and evading arrest. He pled guilty to all the charges. At a sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court improperly denied an alternative sentence and that consecutive sentencing was excessive given the fact that the offenses all occurred during a twenty-four hour period of time. We conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing and that despite Appellant’s waiver of the issue regarding consecutive sentencing, the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This case involves a non-custodial parent’s attempt to give consent for her fourteen-year-old daughter to get married. After the parties divorced, the father was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ daughter, and the mother had regular visitation. When the daughter was fourteen years old, the father took her to the mother’s home for visitation. Without telling the father, the mother took the daughter and her eighteen-year-old boyfriend to the juvenile court below to seek permission to get married. At the juvenile court, the mother signed an affidavit consenting to the marriage. Based on the mother’s affidavit, the juvenile court judge signed an order granting the daughter and her boyfriend permission to marry. They immediately obtained a marriage license and got married. After learning of the marriage, the father filed a motion in the juvenile court asking it to set aside its order giving the daughter permission to marry. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion to set aside. It also held that setting aside the prior order rendered the daughter’s marriage void. The mother now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its order giving the daughter permission to marry. Additionally, we note that the marriage is merely voidable, not void.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the purchaser of real property at a delinquent tax sale is entitled to recover delinquent property taxes paid on the property during the redemption period. We hold that funds expended to pay delinquent property taxes during the redemption period are lawful charges to preserve the value of the property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2704, and therefore, the purchaser is entitled to recover these charges. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This appeal arises out of a petition for civil contempt based on the failure to pay child support. The state, on behalf of the obligee mother, filed this petition for contempt against the obligor father for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the juvenile court determined that the father was willfully underemployed and in contempt of court. The father filed a petition for a rehearing under the local rules of the juvenile court, seeking to introduce additional evidence on the issue of willful underemployment. The juvenile court treated the father’s petition as a motion to alter or amend under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the father was not entitled to such relief. The father appeals, arguing that he should have been permitted to introduce additional evidence under the applicable juvenile court local rules, and that the juvenile court erred in finding him in contempt. We conclude that the trial court appropriately considered the father’s petition as a motion to alter or amend under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of the father’s petition, and therefore affirm.

This is an appeal from a post-judgment collection proceeding in which the judgment creditor sought to subject the assets of three trusts, of which the judgment debtor was a beneficiary and trustee, to satisfy a default judgment. The trial court found that the trusts were passive or dry and that the legal and equitable estates had merged, resulting in the judgment debtor’s holding fee simple title to the trust property. Debtor asserted that he had dissipated the assets of two trusts, but one trust still held income-generating farm land. The trial court ordered the farm land sold and also ordered further discovery to locate the assets of the other two trusts. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The Defendant, Larry Carter, was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and sentenced to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at his jury trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

The Defendant, Quincy DeAngelo Gardner, was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the single issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. He argues that the proof was insufficient to overcome his claims of self-defense and intoxication at the time of the murder. After a review of the evidence in the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jesse Raymond Proctor and Janie Kay Proctor (“Plaintiffs”), husband and wife, sued Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C. and Center for Sports Medicine & Orthopaedics, LLC (“Defendants”) alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq., concerning certain business practices of Defendants related to surgery performed on Mr. Proctor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim sounded in alleged deceptive business practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977; that the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; that defendants’ affirmative defenses contending that Plaintiffs’ claims sound in medical malpractice should be denied; and that Plaintiffs were barred from amending their pleadings to raise medical malpractice claims. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We reverse and hold that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 can apply to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspects of a medical practice, and since Plaintiffs’ complaint sounds in alleged deceptive business practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The defendant, Nathan Jack Childress, was convicted of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, after taking a dump truck from a construction site during his escape from police custody. He was sentenced to twelve years as a Range III, career offender for this offense. Additionally, he pled guilty to a charge of escape and was sentenced to six years for that offense, with the sentences to run consecutively to one another and to his unfulfilled sentences for a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.