APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor finding that, based upon the discovery rule, the one year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim had expired prior to the filing of the Appellants’ complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant Claiborne Builders to recover the rental fees from a contract between plaintiff and Claiborne Builders for earth-moving equipment which Claiborne Builders used to remove soil from Wilder's property. The Trial Judge entered Judgment against Claiborne Builders on its contract and Wilder Construction under an implied contract. Wilder has appealed. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Robert Edward Boling, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006). He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the admission of testimony that he alleges was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Because the defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely, we hold that he has waived our consideration of any issue except for sufficiency of the evidence. Holding that the jury was within its province in convicting the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Tipton County jury convicted the defendant, James Roosevelt Fleming, of one count of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of attempted possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his felony conviction, and he also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Johnson (hereinafter “Johnson”), of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. As a Range I, standard offender, Johnson received concurrent sentences of eight years, nine months for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years, three months for the aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed solely for the aggravated robbery conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for specific performance of a land sale contract. Plaintiff made partial payments towards the purchase price for several months after the agreement was reached. In 2005, however, the relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant deteriorated, and the Plaintiff stopped making payments. Defendant then informed the Plaintiff that the agreement was cancelled and began looking for another buyer. After the presentation of Plaintiff’s proof, the trial court found that Plaintiff was unable to perform under the agreement within a reasonable time. The trial court also found that the agreement expressly permitted the Defendant to cancel the agreement in the event of Plaintiff’s non-performance. Finding no error, we affirm.

The appellant pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to theft over ten thousand dollars, a class C felony, and official misconduct, a class E felony. Pursuant to her plea agreement, she received a total effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of her application for judicial diversion. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal involves retroactive child support. The parties were divorced in 1996 and submitted a marital dissolution agreement that was approved by the trial court. In 1999, the parties submitted a consent order modifying the marital dissolution agreement to provide that the father would not pay child support, but he would be responsible for providing health insurance coverage and paying for one-half of uncovered medical, dental, orthodontic, and optical expenses. The consent order was approved by the trial court. In 2006, the mother sought to have the consent order set aside on the basis that it was void as against public policy, and she sought an award of retroactive child support to the date of the 1999 consent order. The trial court granted retroactive child support only to the date of the mother’s petition seeking such support. Mother appeals, claiming that retroactive child support should be awarded to the date of the 1999 consent order. We affirm.

Petitioner, Bobby Lee, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gene Booker, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to properly preserve the petitioner’s severance issue on direct appeal. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is the second time these parties have been before this court on matters relating to their divorce. In the first appeal, we rejected the husband’s argument that he lacked the financial resources to pay the wife in cash for her share of the marital estate. However, we vacated the trial court’s award of alimony requiring the husband to pay the wife’s health insurance premiums because there was insufficient proof presented regarding the issue at trial. On remand, the trial court allowed the husband to sell various properties in order to pay the wife for her share of the marital estate, but the court refused to require the wife to pay half the income taxes associated with the sales or the real estate taxes on the properties. The trial court found that the husband had the ability to pay the wife’s health insurance premiums, and the wife did not, and it ordered the husband to pay such premiums. The trial court also ordered the husband to pay wife post-judgment interest on the original cash award of marital property. In addition, the court found the husband in contempt and ordered him to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees incurred on remand. The husband appeals. We affirm as modified and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Tiwon Anton Harvell, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. He was sentenced as a Range I, Standard offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that (1) the State produced evidence insufficient to convict him of either charge beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas Michael Kesterson, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lake County Circuit Court alleging that his conviction for incest is void because it includes an illegal sentence. The habeas court denied the petition finding that the petitioner was properly sentenced. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Jamie Tenerio Rice, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. Following his guilty plea to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, charged with two counts of aggravated child abuse, was convicted only upon thesecond count. While upholding the propriety of the jury instructions, the Court of Criminal Appealsreversed, ruling that the state had failed to establish that the defendant had knowingly inflicted theinjuries. We granted review in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establishthat the defendant acted knowingly and by non-accidental means. Because the trial court providedadequate instructions and because the circumstantial evidence, as accredited by the jury, establishedthe essential elements of the offense, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed andthe conviction and sentence is reinstated.

The defendant, Travis Lester, was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Johnny Benard Temple, was convicted of eight counts of delivery of .5 ounces or more of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, and two counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. He was sentenced as a career offender to an effective sentence of 102 years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied his two requests for a continuance; and (2) the trial court ordered consecutive sentencing in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 We conclude that these arguments lack merit and accordingly affirm. Because of certain inconsistencies between the Defendant’s sentences as announced at his sentencing hearing and his sentences as recorded on his judgment forms, however, we remand for clarification and entry of corrected judgments.

The petitioner, Calvin Scott, appeals as of right the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board had cause to terminate Derek Davis’ employment for violating the Department’s drug-free workplace program. Upon review, we find that: (1) the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review in reviewing the Board’s decision; (2) the positive urine specimen test result was admissible evidence for the Board to consider; and (3) the Board’s decision to terminate Mr. Davis’ employment was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence that is both substantial and material. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of both the mother and father as to their minor daughter. After a trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed and that termination would be in the child’s best interest. The father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not ordering that he undergo a psychological evaluation. After review of the record, we find that counsel for father did not ask the trial court to have the father undergo a psychological evaluation, and that the issue is therefore waived on appeal. The father does not dispute that grounds for termination and the best interest of the child were established by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Vicki Hogan, of driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as ten days in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that both of her convictions should be reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce into evidence the result of her breathalyzer test, which the Memphis Police Department administered more than three hours after her arrest, in direct contravention to the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant’s DUI per se conviction should be reversed. However, the appellant has waived her claim regarding the DUI conviction because she failed to comply with Rule 24(c), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires that an appellant’s statement of the evidence convey a “complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.”

This is a shareholder class action which was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim. The case alleges breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing against members of the Board of Directors who procured and approved a merger. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to allow the case to go forward, and, therefore, dismissal was in error. The decision below is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

On appeal, Regions Financial Corporation (“Regions”) asserts numerous reasons why the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel should not bar its claim against the Defendants National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. (“National Union”) St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (“St. Paul”), and Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin City”) (collectively “Defendant Excess Insurers”). Regions originally sued Defendants in federal court seeking indemnification pursuant to its insurance contract, and the District Court granted Defendants summary judgment because Regions failed to give simultaneous notice. Regions has now sued Defendant Excess Insurers in circuit court for breach of the same insurance contract. Regions claims that during the federal court appeal it discovered new evidence that it had given simultaneous notice to Defendant Excess Insurers through their agent. Regions claims, however, that it could not have discovered this evidence earlier because Defendant Excess Insurers concealed the agency relationship. The trial court granted Defendant Excess Insurers’ motions for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We affirm.

In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in allowing the executor of the plaintiff’s estate to be substituted as the party plaintiff where the party plaintiff died before suit was filed in his individual capacity. We are also asked to determine whether the defendant waived the issue of plaintiff’s capacity by first raising the issue in a post-answer motion to dismiss. We find that a suit brought in the name of a deceased person amounts to a nullity, and thus, is not amenable to substitution. We further find that an objection based on the fact that the plaintiff was deceased when the complaint was filed can be made at any time during the proceedings, in any appropriate manner, and such objection stops the cause at whatever stage it may be, whenever made known to the court.