APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A.N.W., Sr., father, alone appeals the termination of his parental rights as to two children, A.Y.M. and A.N.W., Jr., the youngest of which had been removed from parental custody at birth due to the child's addiction to cocaine. A.N.W., Sr., challenges the trial court's findings that DCS exercised reasonable efforts to provide family services, that A.N.W., Sr., failed to substantially comply with permanency plan goals, that A.N.W., Sr., had abandoned these two children, and that the best interest of the children required termination of parental rights. We affirm the trial court's findings in all respects and remand the case for such other proceedings as may be necessary.

The petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a divorce in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate and marital property as well as the division of these assets. The trial court reserved the issue of the wife's request for attorney's fees. Since all issues were not adjudicated by the final decree, the order was not final pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we hold that this appeal is premature and dismiss and remand to the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell, and one count of possession of an altered serial number item. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fourteen years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of cocaine; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Petitioner, Stanley Adams, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, Ginger Jackson, was convicted of solicitation of first degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years and six months. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by the admission of certain testimony; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain audiotape recordings; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the inaudible portions of the audiotape recordings; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the audiotape recording of the defendant's arrest; (5) that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's proof; (6) that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence offered by the defendant; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding lawsuits involving the defendant and various public entities; (7) that the trial court erred by failing to require the state to elect the specific date on which the offense occurred; (8) that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing; and (9) that the sentence is excessive. The defendant has also asked this court to review her sentence under the guidelines of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The sentence is modified and the cause is remanded for consideration of the defendant's suitability for probation.

The petitioner, Earl Jefferson, was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. His conviction was affirmed by this Court on appeal. See State v. Earl T. Jefferson, No. W2000-00608-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 687061, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 12, 2001) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 29, 2001). The petitioner’s Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied on October 29, 2001. Id. The petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed, alleging that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his right to a speedy trial was denied. The post-conviction
court denied the petition after a hearing. Because we determine that the petitioner did receive the effective assistance of counsel and the speedy trial claim has been waived, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Thomas’s conviction should be affirmed. As to the sentence of death, however, I respectfully dissent. As I have previously expressed in a long line of dissents, I believe that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and is proportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1995 Supp.). I have consistently expressed my displeasure with the current protocol since the time of its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 529 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d, 42, 68 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurringand dissenting); State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 632 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 589 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 910-11 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 288-89 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 320-22 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 431-32 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and  dissenting); Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 233-34 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., dissenting). As previously discussed, I believe that the problem with the current proportionality analysis is threefold: (1) the proportionality test is overbroad, (2) the pool of cases used for comparison is inadequate, and (3) review is too subjective. These flaws seriously undermine the reliability of the current proportionality protocol. See State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). In my view, the current comparative proportionality protocol is woefully inadequate to protect defendants from the arbitrary or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the imposition of the penalty of death.

This is a divorce case. In contemplation of a divorce grounded on irreconcilable differences, Husband and Wife entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the complaint, inter alia, disavowed the prior executed Marital Dissolution Agreement. The divorce case proceeded to trial, and the trial court granted the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and enforced the Marital Dissolution Agreement,  dividing the marital property and debt. Husband appeals. Because Husband-Appellant repudiated the Marital Dissolution Agreement prior to the entry of the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce, there was no agreement between the parties, and the Marital Dissolution Agreement should not have been enforced. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner Dale Eugene Walker appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for robbery, (1) contesting the sufficiency of the identification evidence, and (2) contending that his enhanced sentence of fourteen years was imposed errantly in light of Blakely v. Washington. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence was indeed sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the defendant’s prior convictions warrant the enhanced sentence of fourteen years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony D. Aziz, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately explain the consequences of the pleas and for failing to raise the issue of his mental competency at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Cornelius Boales, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with the intent  to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a class E felony. For these crimes,  Boales received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. In addition, the trial court imposed a $100,000 fine as assessed by the jury for the cocaine conviction. On appeal, Boales  argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support either of his  convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence and the maximum fine for his class B felony conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions and the length of the sentence imposed.  However, we modify Boales’ fine of $100,000 to reflect assessment of a fine in the amount of $50,000.

Appellant challenges trial court’s dismissal of his petition, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(4), seeking to rescind his voluntary legitimation of child, modify custody, set aside paternity order and modify child support arrearage, based on results of DNA test that conclusively proves that he is not the father of the child. We reverse.

The petitioner, Christopher Lee Tuttle, appeals as of right the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for drug-related offenses and effective forty-year sentence. The petitioner contends (1) that the state breached his plea agreement which undermined the voluntariness of his guilty plea and (2) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by acting vindictively and violating Rule 8(a), Tenn. R. Crim. P., requiring mandatory joinder. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Appellants seeking to invalidate certain inter vivos
transfers made by Decedent as well as the Wills executed by Decedent while living with Appellees. After a hearing in which a jury received evidence from numerous witnesses and exhibits, Appellants sought a directed verdict on whether, as a matter of law, the burden to prove the validity of the Wills and the inter vivos transfers shifted to Appellees. The trial court denied this motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees, upholding Decedent’s Last Will and Testament and the inter vivos transfers. Review by this Court is sought by Appellants, and, for the following reasons, we reverse.
 

The defendant attempts to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 while a motion is pending in the trial court. The trial court has held the defendant’s remaining motion in abeyance because the defendant has pursued this appeal. We find this appeal premature and remand the case to the trial court to complete the proceedings and issue a final judgment, from which the defendant may then appeal.

The Appellant, Jerry Yates, appeals the denial by the trial court of a motion to suppress all evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence, alleging an illegal warrantless misdemeanor arrest because he left the scene of the accident. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

I concur in most of the reasoning and results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the conclusion that Dr. Goetting was not qualified to testify as an expert in this parent-child homicide case. The trial court excluded her testimony because it was the first time she had testified in such a case, she was a sociologist, and she relied on facts that were not in evidence. It concluded that her testimony would not be a substantial help to the jury.

This appeal arises out of an action by Appellant for a claim of negligence. After the close of
Appellant’s proof, Appellee moved for involuntary dismissal based on the lack of evidence
concerning the actions of the emergency vehicle involved in the automobile accident. The trial court granted the motion on this basis, and Appellant now seeks review by this Court. We affirm.
 

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s rights to his non-marital child. When the child was almost five years old, his mother and her husband filed a petition in the Williamson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the biological father’s parental rights and to adopt the child. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the biological father had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him and that terminating the biological father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated the biological father’s parental rights and approved the adoption. The biological father has appealed.  We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned the child and that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.

The petitioner, Jesse David Teasley, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, request for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The trial court properly denied relief as the pleadings were untimely filed and without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court Grand Jury indicted the defendant, George Lebron Johnson, on two counts of attempt to commit first degree murder. He entered into an agreement with the state to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in exchange for concurrent six-year, Range I sentences. The agreement provided that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the effective six-year sentence. On January 9, 2004, the trial court ordered him to serve the effective sentence in confinement. On February 6, 2004, the defendant moved the court to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas and for a new trial on the issue of the manner of service of his sentences. The trial court denied both motions, and the defendant has appealed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.