APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted by a Warren County jury of facilitation of first degree felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and criminally negligent homicide, which the trial court merged into the facilitation of felony murder conviction. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years on the facilitation of felony murder conviction and twelve years on the facilitation of especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain her convictions and whether the court erred by not instructing the jury as to accessory after the fact and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the correct offense date.

In this appeal, a roofing contractor seeks to reverse the trial court's finding that it breached express and implied warranties and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The contractor argues that its agreement was simply to perform insurance repair work and that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to expand the parties' agreement. There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant violated its warranty. We affirm that finding, but reverse the trial court's finding that the contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.

The plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action filed their complaint approximately three weeks after the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980), had expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their action should not be time-barred because the primary plaintiff was mentally incompetent during most of the repose period. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that due process requires tolling of the statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs relied on Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and other precedents which provide for tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003), on the basis of a petitioner’s mental incompetency. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. We hold that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. The legislature has the constitutional power to place reasonable temporal limitations on rights of action in tort. By contrast, a post-conviction petition, despite its procedurally civil nature, is available only to a person who is in custody following a criminal conviction and sentence; such a petition thus implicates life and liberty interests in a way that materially differentiates it from civil actions. Therefore, the precedents which require tolling for mental incompetence in the context of post-conviction petitions are inapposite to questions of tolling statutes of repose in civil tort actions.

The petitioner appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her first degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of trial counsel. She also contends she was denied the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

Defendant, James C. Leveye, entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of more than 0.5 grams of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence of four years as a Range III persistent offender. As a part of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing the marijuana and drug paraphernalia discovered during a search of Defendant's person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of an action for divorce. The trial court awarded the wife a divorce from the husband on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and denied the husband’s counterclaim for divorce. After classifying and valuing various items of property in the marital estate, the trial court divided the marital property between the husband and wife. Further, the trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony in the amount of $6,000.00 per month for three years and then $3,000.00 per month for the next three years. Finally, the lower court ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Aaron T. James, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and the trial court imposed a sentence of sixty years. In this appeal, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by limiting the questioning of a witness; (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction on the defense of necessity; (4) that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the state to make improper commentary on the law during closing argument; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering that the defendant serve the sentence he received in this case consecutively to the sentence for a previous conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a dog bite case against an absent landlord. The plaintiff argues that owing to the pervasive publicity about the viciousness of the tenants' dog, the landlord had constructive notice of its propensity to violence and should therefore be held liable. Summary judgment was granted to the landlord . We affirm.

Appellant, James Thomas Jefferson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his petition for post-conviction relief because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction as to lost or destroyed evidence, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of custody. Because we find these issues to be without merit, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This consolidated appeal involves an intra-family dispute over ancestral property. Three brothers filed two separate suits in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County to sell and partition real property that had been owned by their deceased uncle and grandfather. They challenged the right of three of their cousins to inherit because they were non-marital children and their paternity had not been judicially established before their father's death. The trial court rejected the brothers' arguments and granted summary judgments in favor of the cousins in both cases. The brothers appealed both judgments, and this court consolidated the appeals. We affirm the summary judgments in favor of the cousins in both cases and deny the cousins' request for frivolous appeal damages.

The Petitioner, Cecil Moss, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and that it erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm its dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Michael Blackburn, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus twenty years. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2003) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff-employee suffered a 60% vocational disability to her right upper extremity and a 30% vocational disability to her left. From these determinations, the trial court awarded a 45% disability to both hands. The defendant-employer asserts that the trial court award was excessive under the facts and applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

This appeal involves a husband's obligation to provide rehabilitative support to his former wife following the dissolution of their twenty-one year marriage. The wife filed a divorce complaint in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. After an attempted reconciliation failed, the husband filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. The trial court conducted a bench trial and granted the wife a divorce on the ground of adultery. The trial court also ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,000 per month in rehabilitative spousal support for seven years. The husband appealed. We agree with the trial court's decision to award the wife spousal support for seven years; however we modify the judgment to clarify the support as transitional support rather than rehabilitative.

The plaintiff claims that a balance is owed on a contract for the production of catalogues. For the reasons hereafter recited, we affirm the dismissal of the case.

The Defendant, Kevin M. Radley, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post- conviction relief. The trial court determined that the petition was time-barred and dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Sanders, was convicted of possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when, during jury selection at trial, his trial counsel failed to object to a racially motivated peremptory challenge by the State. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Derrick McClure, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that his petition was untimely filed without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process considerations tolled the statute of limitations. On appeal, we reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Rodney Welch, pled guilty to unlawful possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight (8) years, as a Range I standard offender, with six (6) months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served in the Community Corrections Program. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence and re-sentenced the defendant to eleven (11) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and re-sentence of eleven (11) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Lewis Carpenter, Jr., filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court dismissed the Defendant’s petition as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Kelsey Darwin Treece, was convicted of one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (hydromorphone) and was sentenced to serve fifty months as a Range I offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Kenneth Carroll, was convicted in the Roane County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), child endangerment, and a violation of the implied consent law. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Roane County Jail for the DUI and child endangerment convictions. For his violation of the implied consent law, the appellant's license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the employee retained a 28% permanent disability to both arms. The employer asserts that the evidence presented at trial shows that the employee suffered no injury to his left arm in 2001. Additionally, the employee asserts that the amount of vocational disability awarded is inadequate. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Earl David Crawford, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this post-divorce action, the father appeals from the Trial Court's Order requiring the father to reimburse one-half of the college expenses paid by the mother, pursuant to an agreement in MDA signed by the parties. The Trial Court also ordered the father to pay the mother's attorney's fees, and held the father in contempt. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment against the father for one-half of the college expenses, but reverse the finding of contempt and the Order for attorney's fees.