APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On appeal, the petitioner avers that the post-conviction court erred in: (1) failing to rule on post-conviction counsel's motion to withdraw prior to ruling on the post-conviction petition; (2) dismissing the petition summarily; and (3) dismissing the post-conviction petition in an untimely manner. Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and that the delay in the disposition of the petition did not prejudice the petitioner. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Ronald Joseph Reece pleaded guilty to statutory rape for which he received a two-year probationary sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to grant judicial diversion, he now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence imposed by the lower court.

Convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, the defendant, Jeremy Sheron Hall, a/k/a Rodney Lee Jones, appeals and challenges the trial court's failure to suppress evidence, the admission of hearsay evidence, the imposition of a $100,000 fine, and the length of the sentence imposed. We affirm the criminal court's judgment.

A grandmother, who lost custody of her grandchildren in Juvenile Court proceedings, sued the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") and its employee in Circuit Court alleging defamation. The trial court dismissed the suit based upon immunity. We affirm the dismissal of DCS and affirm the employee's dismissal on alternative grounds.

The appellant, Robbie O. Allen, entered Alford pleas in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to two counts of felony failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant on each count to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Glenda Emmit ("the plaintiff") brought a petition seeking to annul her marriage to Richard Emmit. She alleged that, unbeknownst to her, her prior marriage to James Randall Medley had not been dissolved at the time of her attempted marriage to Mr. Emmit. She claims that this prior marriage prevented her from contracting a valid marriage with Mr. Emmit. The trial court held that the co-administrators of Mr. Medley's estate (collectively "the co-administrators") were indispensable parties and ordered the plaintiff to amend her complaint to add them. Following a bench trial, the court below entered a judgment denying the plaintiff's petition for annulment on the ground that she had "unclean hands" and was therefore estopped from averring either that her marriage to Mr. Emmit was invalid or that her marriage to Mr. Medley was not dissolved. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Edward Overby, was convicted by a jury in the Bradley County Criminal Court of second degree murder, theft over $1,000, theft under $500, aggravated assault, and possession of marijuana. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the petitioner challenges this ruling and additionally contends that he should have been evaluated for competency prior to the commencement of the post-conviction hearing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Denise Wassom ("Plaintiff") loaned her car to her ex-boyfriend who then had a single-car accident while making a beer run. Plaintiff's vehicle was a total loss. Fearing that her ex-boyfriend might be arrested for DUI, Plaintiff reported to the police that her car had been stolen. Plaintiff's vehicle was insured through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Plaintiff also reported to State Farm that her car had been stolen. Approximately two weeks into State Farm's investigation, an adjustor for State Farm interviewed the witnesses whom Plaintiff claimed to have been with at the time her vehicle was stolen. Immediately after these interviews, Plaintiff "came clean" and told State Farm the truth. State Farm denied Plaintiff's claim and Plaintiff filed suit claiming State Farm was in breach of contract. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Plaintiff had made material misrepresentations with the intent to deceive. The Trial Court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Kendrick Naylor, was convicted by a jury of criminal attempt to commit assault, felony evading arrest, and theft of property over $10,000. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four (4) years as a Range II multiple offender for the evading arrest conviction and six (6) months for the attempt to commit assault conviction, to run concurrently to the sentence for evading arrest.  The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight (8) years for the theft of property conviction, to be served consecutively to the four-year sentence for evading arrest, for a total effective sentence of twelve (12) years. After a motion for new trial was denied by the trial court, a timely notice of appeal was filed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and the appellant’s sentence because we determine that the appellant’s history of criminal convictions more than justifies the sentence imposed.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Hopkins Plemons, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to nineteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he acted in self-defense when he killed the victim; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner, Paul Tobias Davis, has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his "Petition for Pretrial Jail Credit And/or Petition for a Writ of Certiorari." In that petition, the petitioner challenges the calculation of his sentencing credits during his incarceration in the Davidson County Jail from July 8, 2001, until April 17, 2002. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, James Robert Davis, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced by the jury to life without the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and by the trial court to a twenty-year sentence on the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The appellant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting statements of the victim as excited utterances; (2) the trial court erred by admitting tape recordings of the appellant’s telephone calls from the jail; (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the convictions; and (4) the evidence at trial did not clearly establish the cause of the victim’s death. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Greg Harris, of criminal conspiracy to sell or deliver more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony; possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine for resale within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for each felony conviction, and concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of fifty years. The jury fined him a total of $1,005,000. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence and allowing prosecutorial misconduct without declaring a mistrial; (4) the jury verdict lacked unanimity because the state failed to elect either sale or delivery in count one of the indictment; (5) his right to a fair trial was violated by the fact he lacked certain materials necessary to prepare for trial, i.e., a map depicting the area surrounding the location of his arrest, a transcript of the suppression hearing, and a list of potential jurors; and (6) the trial court erred by imposing excessive and consecutive sentences. We affirm the defendant's convictions. However, we hold the record is insufficient to justify the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences and, in light of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the defendant's sentences to twenty-four years for each felony conviction.

The Defendant, Melissa Simmons, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. As part of the plea agreement, she intended to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). Because the judgment form failed to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 37(b)(2), defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review. As a result, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of defendant's claim, and accordingly dismiss her appeal.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues of this case are as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding medical causation; and (2) whether the trial improperly denied employer's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of George Barnard and Dr. David Bradley Seitzinger. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review in this workers’ compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer where the employee was first injured and missed work while employed by a previous employer. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer because the preponderance of the evidence is that the employee’s gradually-occurring injury became compensable while working for the prior employer and did not progress while working for the defendant employer. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Kevin Troy Greer, appeals the dismissal by the Davidson County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. After review of the record, we affirm.

A jury convicted the defendant, Edward E. Keathley, of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and of possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was fined a total of $900.00 and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in concurrent split confinement with ninety days in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This action for specific performance was filed following a foreclosure sale of real property. The foreclosure was prompted by a prior purchaser's default. Rena Mae Blair ("the plaintiff"), the holder of the first deed of trust in default, acting through her daughter and substitute trustee, Linda Caraway, advertised and conducted the foreclosure sale with the assistance of an attorney. At the sale, the property was sold to Rollin C. Brownson and his wife, Mary Ann Brownson ("the defendants") for $77,642.05. There was no writing at the time of the sale memorializing its terms, but Mr. Brownson did provide Ms. Caraway with an earnest money check. Subsequent to the sale, the attorney conducting the sale drafted a deed which purports to set forth the terms of the sale. The defendants refused to go through with the sale when they learned that the property was reputed to be worth only $50,000. In response to the plaintiff's complaint for specific performance, the defendants raised the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, contending that there was no written memorandum reflecting the terms of the parties' oral agreement. Following a bench trial, the court below granted the plaintiff's request for specific performance. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

This is a child custody dispute. The parties were married and had one child. When the child
was approximately three years old, the father filed a petition for divorce and was granted temporary
custody. A year and a half later, the trial court granted the parties a divorce by stipulation, but
reserved the issue of permanent custody. After a hearing, the trial court granted the father primary
residential custody, with the child to reside with the mother three weekends out of the month plus
additional time. The mother now appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to engage in a
comparative fitness analysis and failed to consider evidence that the father had abused the mother during their marriage. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Thomas M. Tucker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm its dismissal of the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Kenneth I. Campbell, was convicted of first degree murder and theft of property and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He later sought both direct and post-conviction appeals, both of which were denied by this court. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, which was dismissed.  He appeals that dismissal, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without ordering DNA testing on a bullet introduced at the petitioner’s trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

he Defendant, Richard P. Holt, pled guilty to various drug related felonies in four separate cases, and he was placed on community corrections, and then transferred to supervised probation for a period of eight years. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued because the defendant left the state without permission, and the defendant was indicted and arrested for theft of property valued over $500.00. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentences in prison. The defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke the defendant's probation; and (2) the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Robert Moody, filed a "Motion to Correct Errors in Judgment" in which he claimed that the two sentences requiring him to register as a sexual offender are illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Moody's request for discretionary review through the common law writ of certiorari. We conclude that the writ of certiorari is not available to review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence and that a habeas corpus action, not a motion, is the proper procedure for collaterally attacking an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Wilbert Rogers, appeals the denial of post conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney. The petitioner was originally convicted by jury of second degree murder. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.