APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an unemployment compensation case. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Department") denied the claim of Becky Elliott for unemployment benefits, finding that the plaintiff quit her job without good cause connected to her employment. After exhausting her administrative remedies to no avail, the plaintiff sued James G. Neeley, the Commissioner of the Department, seeking judicial review in the trial court, which court affirmed the Department's denial of benefits. The plaintiff appeals, essentially arguing that the Department's decision is not supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm.

This appeal involves enforcement of a divorce decree incorporating a marital dissolution agreement and the obligation of a parent to support a child beyond the child's majority in certain circumstances. The trial court determined that the former husband's alimony obligation had terminated upon the payment of the entire amount of alimony in solido created in the order and MDA. The court also held that the father had a continuing obligation to support his adult son because the son was disabled. We affirm both holdings.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following two questions from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, at Greeneville: (1) In an action instituted against an employer for workers' compensation benefits and in which the employer files an answer or amended answer naming a third party as having caused all or a part of the plaintiff's injuries, does Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 extend the limitation period and allow the filing of an amended complaint against the third party named by the employer and/or other persons named as tortfeasors(s) by the third party in its answer? In the event the first question is answered in the affirmative, then the second question is posed: (2) In Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a), does the term "applicable statute of limitations" appearing in the phrase "or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations" refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury only or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day "window" provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a)? As to the first question, we answer in the negative. We hold that because Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 applies only to cases in which comparative fault is or becomes an issue, and because workers' compensation benefits are awarded without regard to fault, section 20-1-119 may not be invoked as authority to amend a complaint in a workers' compensation action to include a claim against a third party tortfeasor that would otherwise be time-barred. Because our answer to this first question renders the second question moot, we do not address it at this time.

The Defendant, Karen Renee Howell, pled guilty to three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murders, a consecutive term of twenty-five years for the attempted murder, and a concurrent effective term of twenty-five years for the remaining convictions. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that her guilty pleas and sentencing were marred by the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This direct appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andre Mayfield, filed for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to invalidate several convictions he obtained in 1989. The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the State's motion and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Marquez Winters, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of attempted first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals that ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal questions the apportionment of attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff suffered a compensable on-the-job injury and by the negligence of a third party. He recovered workers' compensation benefits, and settled his tort action thereafter. The employer's subrogation rights were stipulated, but the parties could not agree upon a proportional allocation of fees.

The petitioner, Randall Edwin Cobb, appeals pro se from the order of the Obion County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief for failure to state a claim. The petitioner pled guilty in June 2000 to one count for possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, a Class B felony, and on two counts for sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, each a Class B felony. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed his habeas corpus petition; (2) whether the petition stated a claim for relief; (3) whether the judgments are void; and (4) whether the indictments were defective. After reviewing the matter, we affirm the decision of the trial court, but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, John Allan Lezotte, entered pleas of guilt to driving under the influence and child endangerment, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress. The judgments are affirmed.

The Petitioner Steven L. Anderson appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.  12.02 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Under the Tennessee long-arm statute and the relevant case law, we find that the criteria for personal jurisdiction over Appellant are met. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

The petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of a delayed appeal by which to present his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner’s due process right to appeal was not violated simply because he failed to take action to secure representation. The record reflects that the petitioner was not declared indigent and that the onus in obtaining representation rested with him. His coram nobis petition was outside the applicable statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. We affirm.

This case involves a surviving spouse’s attempt to set aside a financial transaction made by the decedent approximately one year prior to the decedent’s death. The trial court voided the transfer and awarded the proceeds to the surviving spouse, determining that the transfer was fraudulent and intended to defeat the interest of the surviving spouse. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.

In post-divorce proceedings, Husband/Appellant sought modification of his support obligation to Wife/Appellee. Divorce Referee found no change in circumstances on which to base a modification. The trial court affirmed the Referee’s findings. Husband/Appellant appeals. We affirm.

The juvenile court and custodial party in a dependency and neglect proceeding were granted a Rule 10 application for extraordinary appeal from the chancery court’s order staying and restraining proceedings of dependency and neglect in the juvenile court. We reverse the order of the chancery court.

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition for a reduction or termination of alimony. Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered petitioner to continue paying $1,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife and granted Wife's request for her attorney's fees and court costs. Wife's counter-petition for an increase in alimony was denied. Both parties appeal. We affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. On appeal, Woods raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to use Woods’ prior criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment when the convictions were more than ten years old; (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Woods to present proof that two other co-defendants had been convicted of the crime; and (4) whether the sentence is excessive. After review of the record, we find that because Woods’ motion for new trial was not timely filed, issues 2 and 3 are waived. After review of issues 1 and 4, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The trial court found the employee failed to prove his chronic lung problems were related to his occupational exposure. We affirm.

Two cases that pertain to the same child are consolidated on appeal. The child was placed in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the age of two and one-half years due to filthy conditions at home, lack of supervision, exposure to pornography and drug paraphernalia and parents drug use when both parents were arrested at the family’s home. The Juvenile Court found the child to be dependent and neglected and a victim of aggravated sexual battery. Parents appealed and received de novo trial in Circuit Court which separately concluded the child was dependent, neglected and a victim of severe child abuse and sexual battery. In a separate action, DCS petitioned the Juvenile Court to terminate both parents’ parental rights. DCS investigator interviewed the mother while she was in custody on unrelated charge and after the mother had been appointed counsel. The DCS investigator had not consulted with nor been encouraged by DCS attorneys about questioning the mother. After being released from custody the mother was interviewed by detective. After being advised of her Miranda rights she signed a statement waiving the rights and admitted that she and the father sexually abused the child. The mother had been apprised of her rights against selfincrimination, yet she made a voluntary statement. Thus, she waived her rights against selfincrimination.  Juvenile Court terminated the rights of both parents based on abandonment, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. Both parents appeal. We affirm.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I disagree, though, with the conclusion that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not affect the sentencing. However, I believe the defendant’s history of criminal of convictions justifies the sentence he received.

Helen Broyles ("Plaintiff") sued Emma Woodson and the Estate of H.Y. Woodson, Emma Woodson, Executrix ("Defendants") claiming that her husband and H.Y. Woodson entered into an agreement in 1990 for Plaintiff's husband to purchase a house located in LaFollette, Tennessee for $21,000. Both Plaintiff's husband and H.Y. Woodson had passed away when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff claimed Emma Woodson was not calculating interest properly and had not given Plaintiff proper credit for the house payments that had been made. Plaintiff requested the Trial Court examine the relevant documentation and establish the amount of Plaintiff's equity and the amount still owing. It was admitted by the parties that there was an agreement of some sort between their deceased husbands. However, that agreement was either an oral agreement or, if it had been reduced to writing, the written instrument appeared to be lost or destroyed. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendants after concluding: (1) the Statute of Frauds rendered the agreement unenforceable; (2) the Dead Man's Statute precluded admission into evidence of any proof regarding the terms of the agreement; and (3) Defendants had negated an essential element of Plaintiff's contract claim which required her to establish the essential elements of the alleged contract with reasonable definiteness. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm as modified.

The defendant, Michael Paul Mondell, was convicted of facilitation of the second degree murder of his father, Francis Mondell. The trial court imposed a 12-year Department of Correction sentence. The defendant appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. We affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to eight years.

Defendant, Richard Simon, filed a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and/or Equitable Relief" and a pro se "Petition Seeking Nunc Pro Tunc Order" requesting the trial court to modify or correct his sentence to grant him retroactive sentence reduction credits. The trial court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence, and dismissed his petitions. Because there is no right of appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's motions, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and second degree murder, raising two claims: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Fernando Deandra Vaughn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by not waiting for the disposition of the drug charges against him before revoking his probation on the basis of those charges. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.