APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action for defamation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). The plaintiffs operated a teledentistry platform dedicated to providing remote treatment for mild-to-moderate malocclusion of the teeth. The defendants published an online article and broadcast an “investigative report” that alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ customers were experiencing “painful problems” such as nerve damage, joint damage, and loss of teeth. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued these and other statements—as well as the implications derived from those statements—injured the plaintiffs’ reputation and disparaged the plaintiffs’ products, services, and business. The trial court dismissed the action under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“the TPPA”), holding that the TCPA did not apply and that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case for their defamation claims. This appeal followed. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and disregarding all countervailing evidence, we have determined that the plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence of falsity to support some of their claims but failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Defendants ask for an award of their appellate attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107, which requires an award of costs and fees “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under [the TPPA].” Because we have affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the TPPA, Defendants are entitled to an award to be determined by the trial court on remand.

Defendant, Lacorious Tyquez Fuller, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court conviction for conspiracy to deliver more than 150 grams of heroin, for which he received a sentence of 17 years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s admission of a video recording of a controlled purchase between Defendant and two confidential informants. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jimmy Smith, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Taeshaun K. Patterson, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, facilitation of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class D felony, facilitation to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and robbery in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation), 39-12-103 (2018) (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-13- 401 (2018) (robbery), 39-12-302 (2018) (sentencing classification for acting in concert). The Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court should have held a sentencing hearing for the first degree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, in light of State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), we remand for the entry of an amended first degree felony murder judgment form to reflect in the special conditions section that the Defendant is entitled to an individualized parole hearing after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six years of his life sentence.

Plaintiff insurance company is the insurance carrier for an insurance agency that was sued for negligence in five Tennessee lawsuits. After the underlying lawsuits were settled, the plaintiff, in its own name and on behalf of its insured, sued the law firm that represented the insured in the lawsuits. The plaintiff asserted a direct legal malpractice claim, a legal malpractice claim as subrogee of the insured, and a negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court dismissed all claims. In particular, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain a direct legal malpractice claim against the law firm due to the lack of attorney-client relationship and that the assignment of legal malpractice claims is prohibited in Tennessee. In the alternative, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not establish the damages element of its legal malpractice claims. The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a misrepresentation of existing or past fact. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct legal malpractice action. As to the remainder of the trial court’s rulings, however, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Radames Antonio Rivera, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to strike two jurors who had prior connections with the parties and by failing to effectively cross-examine a principal State witness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Plaintiff was injured as a result of stepping into a hole in the grass on the Defendant’s property and brought a premises liability action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendant, finding that the Plaintiff’s responses to the Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts established that the Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. On appeal, the Plaintiff asserts there is evidence from which notice could be inferred. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. The judgment is affirmed.

At issue in this appeal is the petitioner’s attempt to recover for breach of contract of a marital dissolution agreement entered into between his parents prior to their divorce. Although the parents’ agreement had called for the petitioner’s father to create an irrevocable life insurance trust for the petitioner’s benefit, the trial court concluded that there was not an enforceable obligation regarding that subject matter and entered summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Lee McClain, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for aggravated assault and witness coercion. The Petitioner argues he received the ineffective assistance of both pretrial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he contends both attorneys who represented him during the pretrial stage were ineffective by failing to discuss discovery materials and case strategy with him, failing to adequately prepare for trial, and failing to file “critical” motions, resulting in the Petitioner’s having to represent himself at trial. Additionally, he argues appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to include sufficiency of the evidence and severance issues in his direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns whether witness testimony in the course of a parole hearing is absolutely privileged. Fred Auston Wortman, III (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner, filed a defamation lawsuit against Eric Shirkey (“Defendant”), a detective who testified at Plaintiff’s parole hearing, in the Circuit Court for Morgan County (“the Trial Court”).1 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s statements about him at the parole hearing, such as calling Plaintiff a “narcissist,” damaged his reputation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court concluded that Defendant’s statements were absolutely privileged. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that his parole hearing was administrative rather than judicial in nature, so Defendant’s statements were not protected by absolute privilege. We hold that the parole board, in considering whether to grant Plaintiff parole, was exercising a judicial function such that absolute privilege extended to testimony at the parole hearing. We hold further that Defendant’s statements were relevant and pertinent to the issues involved. Therefore, Defendant’s statements at Plaintiff’s parole hearing were absolutely privileged. We affirm.

The Defendant, John Michael Storey, pled guilty as a Range III, persistent offender to reckless homicide and the sale and delivery of fentanyl. As part of the plea, the parties agreed to have the trial court decide the length of the sentences and the manner of their service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted an alternative sentence or, alternatively, should have modified his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to provide for probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely as to the trial court’s original sentencing decision, and we dismiss that part of the appeal. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

In response to a petition alleging the violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19- 116, a statute that prescribes a criminal penalty and that this Court has held does not provide for a private right of action, the trial court entered an injunction. The trial court thereafter found that the appellant was in criminal contempt of the injunction and sentenced him to ten days in the county jail. The appellant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the order that he was held in contempt of was not lawful. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the contempt judgment should be reversed.

This post-divorce action concerns the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence as specified in their marital dissolution agreement. The husband claimed a right under the MDA to, inter alia, one-half of the net proceeds, but the wife asserted that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. The parties also disputed who was liable for income taxes, including interest and penalties, incurred and accruing after 2019, when the parties entered the MDA. Each party also asserted claims and entitlements to various credits and/or offsets resulting from the delay in the sale of the marital residence. The trial court held that the MDA limited the husband’s interest to $40,000. The court assessed $29,368.52 in post-divorce income taxes, including penalties and interest, against the husband. The court also ordered him to pay $20,543.10 for the wife’s attorney’s fees per the MDA’s fee-shifting provision. But the court granted the husband’s request for reimbursement for the cost of repairs to the property and awarded the husband credit for one-half of the utilities that he paid pending the sale of the property. The husband appeals, raising several issues. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s finding that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. We also conclude that the MDA obligated Husband to pay for all utilities and other expenses pending the sale of the property. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Husband was entitled to a credit of one–half of those payments. Thus, we vacate the monetary awards that were based, in part, on these decisions, and remand with instructions to recalculate the parties’ respective entitlements to “the net proceeds.” We affirm the trial court in all other respects. We also find that the wife has a right to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under § 15 of the MDA and remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

Petitioner, David Anthony Avery, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 claiming that his sentences were illegal because his criminal case was a civil matter, that the United States District Court had original jurisdiction over all civil cases, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentences. We determine that the motion failed to state a colorable claim and affirm summary dismissal of the motion by the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a partnership and its limited partners concerning the payment of attorney’s fees under the parties’ limited liability agreement. The trial court held that the attorney’s fees were payable from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership’s property, and the limited partners appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Anthony Tucker, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Francis, pled guilty to the offenses of aggravated assault and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years to be served in custody. On appeal, the Defendant challenges both the length of the sentence and the manner of its service. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal follows the dismissal of a proceeding brought in probate court. Because we cannot discern the basis for the trial court’s decision in the two orders that are at issue, we vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In 2012, the Defendant, Reginald D. Bond, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of attempted rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and ordered him to community supervision for life and to register as a sex offender. After his release, the Defendant was convicted of violating the sex offender registry, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended to probation. He violated his probation by being charged with new offenses, so the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence, contending that his sentence was illegal because the community supervision and sex offender registry requirements violated double jeopardy. The trial court summarily denied Rule 36.1 relief. On review, having determined that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate, failure to develop a reasonable trial strategy, and failure to object to the use of Petitioner’s nicknames and to testimony regarding statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Curtis Bradley, was indicted on one count of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury and one count of false imprisonment. He entered a negotiated plea agreement to the lesser-included charge of reckless aggravated assault with the trial court to determine the length of sentence and whether Defendant would receive judicial diversion. The false imprisonment charge was dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and ordered Defendant to serve three years, suspended to probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for judicial diversion and by imposing more than the minimum sentence. Based on our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, Shelby County juries convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Keller, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of evading arrest (No. 10-02756); and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” (No. 10-07532). The Petitioner received effective sentences of 300 years (No. 10-02756) and 210 years (No. 10- 07532). The Petitioner appealed his convictions in both cases. See State v. Keller, No. W2012-01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6021332 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2013), perm. app. granted, cause remanded (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014) and State v. Keller, No. W2012- 01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4922627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). The Petitioner then filed a series of motions and petitions, which this court has addressed on appeal. Keller v. State, No. W2019-01652- CCA-R3- ECN, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2021), perm. app. denied; Keller v. State, No. W2020-00590-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 2886338 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2021). In the consolidated matter herein, the Petitioner filed: a petition “new post-conviction” relief and a “supplemental” petition for writ of error coram nobis in No. 10-02756; a petition for DNA post-conviction analysis in Nos. 10- 07532 and 10-02756; and a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 in No. 10-07532. The trial court denied the petitions, and the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. After this appeal was docketed, counsel filed a motion for a late-filed notice of appeal for all five underlying petitions. On review, having determined that all of the Petitioner’s filings in No. 10-02756 and his petition for DNA analysis in No. 10-07532 were untimely, we deny his motion for a late-filed notice of appeal and dismiss the appeal with respect to those filings. The remaining motion, the Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in No. 10-07532, was timely filed and, 09/12/2024 2 upon review, we conclude the Petitioner has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the petition.

This appeal stems from a contract to purchase real property in Knox County, Tennessee, which ultimately fell through. The intended purchaser filed suit against the property owner seeking to enforce the contract. The property owner brought a counterclaim against the intended purchaser and a third-party claim against the intended purchaser’s principal averring that they fraudulently induced him to enter into the contract. After contentious litigation, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the property owner as a sanction for ongoing discovery abuses by the intended purchaser and its principal. The intended purchaser and its principal sought relief from the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, which the trial court denied. Discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm

Pro se Appellant, Willie Gordon, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on December 15, 2023. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petitions filed by each of the named defendants in the underlying defamation lawsuit. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to each defendant.