APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Javon Webster, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition filed approximately twelve years after expiration of the one year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. Petitioner alleged facts in his petition which he claims justify tolling of the statute of limitations based upon due process grounds. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Homeowner brought a lawsuit asserting multiple challenges to the bank’s administration of her mortgage and initiation of foreclosure proceedings. The bank filed a motion to dismiss, which was ultimately granted by the trial court, despite several post-judgment motions filed by the homeowner. On appeal, the bank argues that the homeowner’s notice of appeal was not timely. Although we find that the homeowner’s notice of appeal was timely, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the bank’s motion to dismiss the homeowner’s complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Defendant, Joel Wayne Allen, appeals his convictions from a jury trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This case originated when the plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Correction facility at Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), alleging that medical professionals at the correctional facility had provided him with untimely and inadequate medical care for a serious heart condition. Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations concerned individuals who were not employed by the State, the Claims Commission (“Commission”) initially dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to file a proposed amendment naming State employees as defendants and then a second claim, resulting in the instant action. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of res judicata. Finding that the plaintiff had misnumbered his proposed amendment to the original claim, the Commission treated the proposed amendment and second claim together as an amended claim. Ultimately determining that the plaintiff had alleged a health care liability action but failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for such a suit and that he had failed to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over intentional or criminal acts allegedly committed by State employees, the Commission entered a final order dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.

Defendant, Mattie Florence Sweeney, was found guilty of gross neglect of an impaired adult as charged in Count One and guilty of neglect of an impaired adult in Count Two. The trial court merged the two convictions into a single conviction for gross neglect of an impaired adult, and sentenced Defendant to a term of five years “to serve.” After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court committed plain error by constructively amending the indictment during the jury charge; (2) the trial court erred by admitting testimony about the victim’s driver’s license record; (3) the trial court erred by admitting lay testimony about the victim’s cough and the condition of his skin; (4) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim’s buttocks into evidence; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dwight Gossett, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced by the trial court to twelve years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Deandre Bonds, aka Israel El-Elyon, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and one count of evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors, for which he received a total effective sentence of six months. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the judgments of conviction incorrectly note the convictions are Class B misdemeanors; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court only for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the offenses are Class A misdemeanors. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Gary E. Floyd, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the lesserincluded offense of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-210. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (2) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; (4) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense; and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Reggie Horton, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, and simple assault, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated kidnapping. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, David Von Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by one having a prior felony conviction, Class D felonies; and felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the two drug convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years on that conviction; the court merged the four various possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions and imposed a sentence of five years on that conviction; and the court imposed a sentence of five years on the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The court ordered that the sentence for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for a total effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in not considering any mitigating factors in determining his sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a statutory writ of certiorari. The petitioner filed an application with the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission (“the Commission”) to obtain a permit to renovate a 1935 industrial building in the Broadway Historic Preservation District in downtown Nashville. The Commission partially approved the application but required modifications before a permit would be issued. In pertinent part, the Commission denied the request to install vertically operable windows (similar to “roll up” garage doors) because they were not consistent with the style of the original 1935 windows. The Commission also required the construction of a parapet wall around the fifth story rooftop deck, rather than a railing proposed by the petitioner, to hide the building’s rooftop additions because the additions were not compliant with the design guidelines for the district. Following an evidentiary hearing, the chancery court affirmed the Commission’s decision. We affirm the chancery court.

The Appellant, Raymond Ross, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Harold Allen Vaughn, appealed his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated robbery, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that his co-defendant was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for entry of a separate judgment form in Count 2 reflecting that the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was merged with his attempted first degree murder conviction in Count 1. State v. Harold Allen Vaughn, No. W2016-00131-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7102748, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), perm. app. granted and case remanded, No. W2016-00131-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017) (order). On November 17, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Defendant’s pro se application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Henderson, 531 S.W.3d 687 (Tenn. 2017). State v. Harold Allen Vaughn, No. W2016-00131-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017) (order). Upon further review, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery, modify this conviction to aggravated robbery, and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing and for entry of an amended judgment form in Count 4 reflecting this modified conviction and sentence. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal arises from a juvenile proceeding wherein the mother, Heather P. (“Mother”) filed a petition to modify her visitation with her two children, Haley S. and Leila P. (“the Children”), who were eleven and four years old, respectively, at the time of trial. Haley’s father, Michael S. (“Father”), remained incarcerated during the entire action. Leila’s father was deceased prior to the commencement of this proceeding. The paternal grandparents of Leila, Leroy W. and Tammie W. (“Grandparents”), who had legal custody of both children, subsequently filed a counter-petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Haley. The magistrate of the juvenile court entered a pre-trial order, stating, inter alia, that if Grandparents were successful in terminating the parents’ rights, Mother’s petition to modify visitation would be dismissed but that if Grandparents were not successful, Mother’s petition would be scheduled for hearing. The magistrate’s order further allowed Mother to amend her original petition to modify visitation. Following a bench trial regarding the termination action, the trial court granted Grandparents’ petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights to the Children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the children from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court further found that grounds existed regarding Father because he had abandoned Haley by failing to visit her and because he had failed to establish parentage. Mother appealed the trial court’s decision. Because no adjudicatory hearing order exists in the record finding the Children to be dependent, neglected, or abused, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions as to Mother. We further determine that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its determination that statutory grounds for termination existed regarding Father. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights and remand to the trial court for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017).

The Defendant, Jason Levi Butts, fired a shot from a rifle toward a home, and the bullet penetrated the wall and hit the sleeping victim in the hip. The trial court ruled that all three statements which the Defendant made to law enforcement during the investigation of the shooting were admissible. The Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment, a Class C felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of three and two years, respectively. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s initial statement to police, which he made without being advised of his rights and after law enforcement twice told him he could not leave the police station. However, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm the convictions.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over a fatal cycling accident. Carolyn Crisp (“Plaintiff”), surviving spouse of William Andrew Crisp (“Decedent”), sued Michael Nelms (“Nelms”) and George Long (“Long”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for negligence. Decedent and four others, including Nelms and Long, were riding as part of a “paceline” group when a crash occurred. Nelms asserted comparative fault, stating that Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line. Long denied he slowed down suddenly. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court held, among other things, that paceline cycling inherently is dangerous and that Decedent was at least 50% at fault for his accident. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line and whether a reasonable jury could find Decedent less than 50% at fault in his accident. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the case to proceed.

Over twelve years ago, Petitioner, Ronnie Henry, was convicted at a jury trial of several counts of robbery involving multiple victims in Shelby County. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2006-00344-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 450459, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). After resentencing, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s effective seventy-year sentence. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2009-00089- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2009), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Ronnie Henry v. State, No. W2014-01786-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1402951, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Now, Petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Individual members of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly and the 110th Tennessee General Assembly appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) denying their motion to intervene in this suit involving the divorce of a same-sex couple and specifically involving the issue of whether the spouse who has no biological or other recognized legal relationship to the parties’ minor child may be considered a parent under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306 (2013). We find and hold that because all of the issues in the divorce now are final the case has been rendered moot as it has lost its justicability and no longer involves a present, ongoing controversy. We further find and hold that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. As the case is moot, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Quanya Revell Prewitt, appeals the denial of her petition for postconviction relief from her conviction for possession of dihydrocodeinone in a school zone with intent to sell. She argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Jeffery A. Jones, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to DUI .08 % or greater, reserving as a certified question of law whether the results of his forced blood draw should have been suppressed because the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained reckless falsities and the form nature of the search warrant and affidavit prevented the magistrate from making an informed judgment as to probable cause. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Unmarried father filed a petition to establish parentage and a residential parenting schedule. After father’s parentage was established, the juvenile court set a residential parenting schedule that awarded equal parenting time and ordered the child’s surname changed to a hyphenated version of both parents’ surnames. Mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in fashioning the parenting schedule and in ordering a change of the child’s surname. Upon review, we affirm the residential parenting schedule but vacate that portion of the order directing a change in the child’s surname.

The Defendant, Derek Cullen Lee, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court “did not sufficiently weigh all the [required] factors . . . in deciding suitability for diversion”; and (2) that the trial court’s decision to deny his request for judicial diversion was based on the offense that he was convicted of rather than the applicable factors. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Brandon Lacy Franklin, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and imposition of an increased sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Adam Davis, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent term of eight years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher James Kirkland, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Blount County Circuit Court conviction of the delivery of a controlled substance. Discerning no error, we affirm.