APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns an employee who made preparations to start a competing business while still employed by his old company. Todd Heins (“Heins”) was a manager working for Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. (“Leslie’s”), a nationwide pool supply business, at its Bartlett Hills location in the Memphis, Tennessee area. Jay Karcher (“Karcher”), while a customer in Leslie’s Bartlett Hills store, approached Heins one day while he was working with an idea about starting a new pool supply business. Heins was intrigued and followed up with Karcher to found Blue Wave Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC (“Blue Wave”). Heins resigned from Leslie’s before Blue Wave opened for business. Heins’ friend and Leslie’s employee Chad Pitcock (“Pitcock”) also resigned and went to work for Blue Wave. Leslie’s sued Blue Wave, Heins, Pitcock, and Karcher (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and inducement to breach contract. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed Leslie’s complaint with prejudice. Leslie’s appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a detainer action. Brewers Rentals (“Brewers”) obtained a detainer warrant against tenant Otto Karl Appelt (“Appelt”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Appelt thereafter appealed to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). Appelt paid a $500 appeal bond. However, Appelt did not post bond equal to one year’s rent as required by statute in order to retain possession during the appeal. Brewers filed a motion to dismiss and/or for possession in the Trial Court, which was granted. The Trial Court held that, as Appelt had neither surrendered possession nor posted the requisite bond, dismissal was required. Appelt appeals. We hold that Appelt’s failure to post bond equal to one year’s rent enables Brewers to regain possession immediately but does not deprive the Trial Court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Appelt’s appeal. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for this case to proceed.

The Defendant, Christopher Russell, appeals his convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (4) his sentences are excessive. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Claude Delanore Maney, Jr., was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault by strangulation and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teddy Lynn Sams, pleaded guilty to three counts of violating a condition of community supervision in exchange for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it did not order an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant filed a Rule 60 motion with the trial court while the matter was pending on appeal. The trial court denied the motion finding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter. Appellant appeals the denial of his Rule 60 motion. We affirm the trial court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion at that time.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The child’s guardians, who had been granted custody of the child, filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court granted the guardians’ petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that four grounds for termination were proven—willful failure to visit, willful failure to provide child support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions—and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We vacate the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the order terminating the father’s parental rights. 

On April 28, 2017, the Defendant, Jamie L. Woods, entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued at more than $10,000.00 and received a three-year sentence of probation with the amount of restitution to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $19,442.36 in restitution at $540 per month. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of restitution and the Defendant’s ability to pay the restitution. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Monica Leigh-Ann Briggs, was convicted by a Campbell County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and second degree murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39- 13-202 (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (second degree murder). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her pretrial statement, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (3) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of the offenses, (4) the trial court erred in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, (5) the trial court erred in admitting an exhibit depicting a Facebook page, (6) the trial court erred in admitting a “ledger” found in the victim’s wallet, (7) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (8) due process requires relief due to the existence of cumulative error. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Appellant, Daniel H. Jones, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion for declaratory relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 102(a). The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court.

This case involves the last will and testament of the deceased, Joe Marce Abbott. Upon the death of the deceased, his daughter, Marce Harvey, filed a petition in the trial court seeking to probate the deceased’s will. The validity of the will is not contested by any beneficiary or other person. The court, however, apparently acting sua sponte, held that the will failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 32-1-103 (2015), 32-1-104 (Supp. 2017), and 32-2-110 (Supp. 2017). As a consequence of this determination, the court rescinded its previously-entered order to probate because, as the court stated, the will “does not meet the requirement of the Laws of the State of Tennessee.” The petitioner appeals. We reverse.

Zoran Andric (“Employee”) alleged he was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc. (“Employer”). After a hearing, the trial court found Employee suffered a compensable injury to his right foot and awarded 64 percent permanent partial disability. Employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s finding Employee suffered a compensable injury to his right foot, but we modify the award to 26 percent permanent partial disability to the right foot.

According to the allegations in the pro se post-conviction petition, the Petitioner, Robert Simons, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse and six counts of child neglect and received an effective eighteenyear sentence. He alleged that the date of the judgment was April 13, 2012, and that no appeal was filed. He filed a post-conviction petition on February 16, 2016, alleging that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should not bar his petition because he was tried pursuant to an invalid indictment, he was asserting actual innocence, and his severe mental disability prevented him from “understanding the laws and rules to present and articulate the violations occurring in the trial court proceedings.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred after considering the statutory factors that allow for tolling the statute of limitations. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1)-(3) (2012). On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of the statute of limitations. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for consideration of whether due process requires tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001), and to consider whether the appointment of counsel is appropriate.

The Defendant, James T. Hutchins, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his criminal exposure of another to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Angela Denise Brewer, appeals her jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder, for which she was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, specifically challenging the evidence establishing premeditation and that she acted “intentionally.” Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action arises out of an incident in which an instructor with the Eagleville High School’s Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps pulled a stool from beneath a student participant in a JROTC competition while the student was sitting on it, causing injury to the student. The student’s parents brought suit against the Rutherford County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for her injuries. Following a trial, the court dismissed the suit, holding that the instructor’s actions were not within the scope of his employment, and therefore, the Board’s immunity from suit was not removed. Plaintiffs appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s holding that the instructor acted outside the scope of his employment, and as a consequence, the Board retained immunity from suit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, the defendant, Roger Reed, appeals. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by permitting certain testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an Amended Final Decree of Divorce entered on November 15, 2017. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the decree as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Quartez Gary, of attempted first degree premeditated murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient as to the element of premeditation and that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were unclear. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, William Darryn Busby, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Lewis County Circuit Court, asserting that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of the petition must be reversed and the case remanded to the coram nobis court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process principles require tolling the statute of limitations.

Tyler James Reed, the Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. After this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review, the Petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from lead trial counsel and appellate counsel. He asserts that lead trial counsel convinced him to offer a false proffer to the State, which foreclosed him from testifying at trial, and failed to investigate his mental health and voluntary intoxication at the time of the offenses. He additionally asserts that appellate counsel failed to file a petition to rehear after this court did not specifically discuss several issues raised in his direct appeal. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

James P. Jones, Defendant, was convicted of several counts of theft and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a twelve-year probationary sentence. A violation of probation warrant was later issued against Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation. Defendant now timely appeals the trial court’s decision and argues that he was denied the right to counsel during the revocation hearing. Because we conclude that Defendant did not effectively waive or forfeit his right to counsel, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for appointment of counsel and a new probation revocation hearing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Amanda C. Andrews (“Defendant”) pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary and was sentenced to fifteen years as a persistent offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant claims the trial court erred by sentencing her to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jason Clark (“Defendant”) filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion seeking relief from two judgments of conviction. Defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Because we have no subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

Petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals after he failed to receive relief from his third petition for writ of error coram nobis. For a multitude of reasons, including the failure to file a timely petition, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.