APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A member of a limited-liability company withdrew from the company with a deficit in his capital account. The company filed suit against the withdrawing member on the ground that he had an obligation to repay the deficit amount. The withdrawing member filed a counter-complaint arguing that the company was estopped from collecting the debt because the debt had been forgiven. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the withdrawing member’s motion and granted the company’s motion, finding that the withdrawing member failed to prove that the company forgave the debt. The withdrawing member appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of a zoning variance. Earl Scott Moore and Joetta Moore (“the Moores,” collectively) applied for a variance in order to build a carport at their home. The Moores’ neighbors, Michael Cobble and Lora Cobble (“the Cobbles,” collectively) opposed the requested variance. The Greene County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) rejected the Moores’ application. The Moores submitted a second application, this time reducing their request by seven feet so as not to protrude into a public right-of-way. The BZA granted the Moores’ application for a variance. The Cobbles filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that material evidence supported the BZA’s decision to grant the variance and dismissed the Cobbles’ petition. The Cobbles appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to hold that res judicata barred the Moores’ second application for a variance. We hold further that, because the Moore property is not distinguishable in any meaningful way, the BZA’s decision to grant a variance was not supported by material evidence. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, J.W. Causey, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An advanced practice nurse worked at three different testosterone clinics in the Memphis area and was charged with violating portions of the Nursing Practice Act and the rules and regulations governing nurses. The Tennessee Board of Nursing (the “Board”) held a hearing and determined that the evidence supported many of the alleged offenses. The Board revoked the nurse’s certificate to practice as an advanced practice nurse, revoked the nurse’s license to practice as a registered nurse in Tennessee and the multistate privilege to practice in any other party state, and assessed civil penalties against her that totaled $7,200. The nurse sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The nurse then appealed the Board’s decision to this court. Concluding that substantial and material facts support the Board’s findings, we affirm the Board’s decision.

This appeal involves an unnecessarily lengthy and convoluted divorce proceeding. The appellant-wife argues that the trial court failed to properly classify and divide the parties’ marital property. Due to the lack of factual findings regarding the basis for the trial court’s marital property distribution, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand the issue to the trial court for entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Appellant filed a complaint after he was terminated from his employment with the Bradley County, Tennessee Sheriff’s Department. The complaint alleges a violation of procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, breach of contract, and violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 38-8-304. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on various grounds and a second motion to dismiss on the basis that Appellant’s claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment and by separate order granted the County’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the one year statute of limitations applied. We affirm.

Defendant, Michael Nelson Hurt, pled guilty to official misconduct and theft of property valued over $1000 and accepted an out-of-range sentence of six years’ probation. Defendant applied to the trial court for judicial diversion, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider all of the common law factors in determining Defendant’s suitability for diversion, resulting in a sentence that is disproportionately punitive. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for the entry of judgment forms on each charge that was disposed of by way of the plea agreement.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 allows a trial court to set aside a final judgment under certain circumstances, including when the judgment is void or “for any other reason justifying relief.” Here, a decedent’s mother, in her capacity as her unmarried son’s next of kin, filed a lawsuit seeking damages for his wrongful death. The case was settled and dismissed. Nearly twenty months later, the decedent’s alleged minor child filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal and to be substituted as the plaintiff. The motion asserted that the child was the decedent’s next of kin and the proper party to pursue the wrongful death claim, based on the decedent’s execution of an acknowledgment of paternity and a Mississippi trial court order for support. The trial court denied the motion, finding it was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling, holding that the Rule 60.02 motion was not ripe for adjudication until the trial court conclusively established the child’s paternity. We find the Court of Appeals erred by focusing on issues surrounding the child’s paternity rather than reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 60.02 motion. We hold that the trial court properly denied relief under Rule 60.02. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

Anthony D. Herron, Jr., a disabled army veteran, applied and was approved for vocational rehabilitation services through the Tennessee Department of Human Services, Division of Rehabilitation Services. During the course of developing a self-employment plan, the Division of Rehabilitation Services determined it had received insufficient information from Mr. Herron to merit further consideration of his self-employment plan. Mr. Herron administratively appealed, but after a hearing, the Department affirmed the decision of the Division of Rehabilitation Services. Mr. Herron then petitioned for judicial review in chancery court, which also affirmed the decision of the Division of Rehabilitation Services. Mr. Herron appeals. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment.

The Appellant, Steven David Catalano, entered a plea of nolo contendere to driving under the influence (DUI), reserving a certified question of law challenging whether a be-on-the-lookout report (BOLO) issued by a Brentwood police officer provided sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a Franklin police officer’s traffic stop of the Appellant’s vehicle. The State contends that the question presented is not dispositive; therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and conclude that the appeal must be dismissed.

This appeal involves parties with interests in neighboring properties who competed for the issuance of a billboard permit. Rather than waiting for the resolution of the administrative process that would determine which of the two applicants was entitled to a billboard permit, one party illegally constructed his billboard without a permit in the midst of the proceedings. Because of his action, the opposing party was unable to construct a billboard when the litigation ultimately ended in its favor. The party who prevailed in the administrative process and its landlord both obtained default judgments against the party who constructed the billboard based on claims of intentional interference with business relations and inducement to breach a contract. The trial court appointed a special master to calculate damages and adopted the master’s report in its entirety, awarding the landlord approximately $1.1 million and awarding the party who planned to construct the billboard $3.9 million, which included treble damages. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s orders suppressing evidence and dismissing the indictment, which charged the Defendant with driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, violating the implied consent law, failure to maintain a motor vehicle within a lane of traffic, and violating the open container law. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) evidence and by dismissing the indictment. We conclude that the trial court did not err by suppressing the evidence but that the court erred by dismissing the indictment in its entirety. Although we affirm the dismissal of the indictment count charging DUI per se, we remand the case to the trial court for reinstatement of the remaining charges in the indictment and for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The father is currently serving an eleven-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to vehicular homicide, with the victim being the child’s mother. The child’s maternal aunt and uncle, who had been granted custody of the child, filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights upon finding by clear-and-convincing evidence that four grounds for termination were proven, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court as to three of the grounds for termination. However, we affirm the trial court’s decision as to one ground, and that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

This is a post-foreclosure unlawful detainer action in which Orion Federal Credit Union, after purchasing the property at foreclosure, was awarded a judgment for possession of the property by the general sessions court. The prior owner refused to surrender the property and appealed the judgment for possession to the circuit court. Orion filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was granted. The trial court also issued Orion a writ of immediate possession, and Orion took possession of the property. The prior owner appeals the trial court’s grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because we have determined the case is moot, we dismiss.

The Defendant, Jerry Dixon, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in jail, 180 days to be served on house arrest, and the balance to be served on probation. See T.C.A. § 39-13-103 (2014). On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an alleged intentional or negligent misrepresentation made in connection with the sale of a residence. Shortly after purchasing their home from sellers Edward M. Forester and Alisa S. Forester, buyers Josh Holland and Angie Holland discovered that the subfloor of the house was saturated and ruined by pet urine. The buyers sued the sellers in general sessions court. That court found that the sellers intentionally misrepresented the condition of the subfloor on the property disclosure form. The sellers appealed to the trial court. The buyers alleged that the sellers violated the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (TRPDA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5- 201, et seq. (2015). They sought damages for intentional or negligent misrepresentation; promissory fraud; fraudulent inducement to contract; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 Mr. Forester passed away prior to the second trial. The buyers continued this litigation but only against Ms. Forester in her individual capacity. The trial court held that the buyers failed to prove that Ms. Forester had knowledge of the alleged defect in the subfloor. Specifically crediting her trial testimony, the court held that Ms. Forester did not violate the TRPDA or make an intentional or negligent misrepresentation. The buyers appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in determining that Ms. Forester did not know about the condition of the subfloor and in admitting Ms. Forester’s testimony regarding Mr. Forester’s mental capacity around the time of the general sessions court trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant, Milvern Hoss, Jr., guilty of violating the requirements of the sexual offender registry due to his failure to report monthly, for which he received a sentence of four years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant asserts the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 is unconstitutional in its application to him, and the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Department of Children’s Services initiated a proceeding to have four children declared dependent and neglected; the children were so determined, and in a separate proceeding, the Department sought to terminate the rights of the parents of the children. The rights of the father of three of the children were terminated on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse; the court also determined that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions and affirm the remaining grounds and the holding that termination of Father’s rights is in the best interest of the children.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Andrew Bernard Beverly, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for premeditated murder, felony murder, and attempted murder, arguing the State failed to prove the appropriate mens rea for the offenses. The defendant also claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress three statements made after his arrest claiming his Miranda waiver prior to the initial interview did not pass constitutional muster. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit; (2) abandonment by willful failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; and (4) persistence of conditions. We reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and persistence of conditions. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

In this premises liability action, following the filing of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking to amend her complaint to add a claim of negligence per se based on alleged building code violations attributed to the defendant’s maintenance of the premises at issue. The trial court failed to rule upon the pending motion to amend before granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff timely appealed. Due to the trial court’s lack of proper consideration of the motion to amend, we conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remand this matter to the trial court for consideration of the motion to amend and entry of an order presenting a reasoned explanation for the grant or denial of the sought amendment. Following such action regarding the motion to amend, the trial court may consider the motion for summary judgment.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Antonio Durham, of attempted rape, a Class C felony, and sexual battery, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Appellant to ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted rape. The State claims that the trial court erred by merging the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by merging the Appellant’s convictions and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

Defendant, Sandra Darlene Wood, was convicted following a jury trial in Marshall County Circuit Court of one count of cruelty to animals. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 11 months, 29 days suspended on probation after 45 days’ incarceration and ordered Defendant to pay $4,134 in restitution to Volunteer Equine Advocates. Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her conviction for cruelty to animals; (2) whether the sentence imposed is excessive and contrary to the law; and (3) whether the trial court properly admitted testimony regarding a prior visit by a Sheriff’s Department Detective to her farm in June, 2014. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee in this case worked for the employer as a truck driver. In 2003, the employee sustained compensable work-related injuries to his hand and neck. After neck surgery, the employee returned to work. In October 2008, the employee claimed that he sustained compensable work-related injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. The employer paid temporary benefits but disputed whether the claimed injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. The employer filed a petition in the trial court seeking a determination of its obligations to pay further benefits. The parties submitted the deposition testimony of several physicians, who gave conflicting opinions about the cause of the employee’s October 2008 shoulder and neck injuries. The trial court held that both injuries were compensable. The employer’s appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After a thorough review of the evidence, we hold that the employee did not sustain a compensable work-related injury in October 2008. Accordingly, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Michael Barnes, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Johnson County Criminal Court conviction of possession of contraband in a penal institution, for which he received a sentence of fifteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to: (1) “object with regard to the chain of custody”; (2) “object with regard to the entry of exhibits into evidence”; (3) explain to the Petitioner the maximum sentence that he faced; and (4) address the issue of “selective prosecution.” Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.