APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Tammy Kay Scott, alias, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to five years of probation after service of thirty days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress her statement as it was obtained in violation of her right to counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Heather McMurray, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions based on the same incidents and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for each conviction, with a mandatory eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction due to the fact that the offenses were committed in a drug-free school zone. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial after the State played a redacted version of her statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Allan Pope, of one count of using public equipment for private purposes, one count of official misconduct, and one count of theft of services over $10,000 but less than $60,000. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for theft of services and reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property. State v. Pope, No. E2011-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4760724, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 5, 2013). On remand, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court reconsider its previous denial of the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

This appeal arises from a condemnation action. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) acquired real property owned by E. G. Meek (“Meek”) and Shirley T. Meek. The acquisition of the property is not at issue. Rather, the dispute is over the amount of money Meek is entitled to receive from the State. This case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Meek and the State’s expert witness testified. The jury reached, and the Trial Court approved, a verdict for $15,250. Meek had sought considerably more money at trial for his property than the $15,250 awarded by the jury. On appeal, Meek alleges numerous errors, such as that the Trial Court erroneously allowed certain evidence to be admitted and that the Trial Judge failed to properly exercise his responsibility as thirteenth juror. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

Court in post-divorce modification of custody action dismissed Mother’s motion to alter or amend the order adopting parenting plan proposed by Father, holding that the motion was unsigned and not promptly corrected as allowed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. Having determined that the motion was properly signed, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case for consideration of the motion.

The defendant, Tommie Phillips, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of first degree felony  murder, one count of reckless homicide, two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, one  count of aggravated sexual battery, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the four counts of felony murder and one count of reckless homicide into one felony murder conviction and merged the aggravated sexual battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction. The trial court also merged the six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping into three convictions – one per victim – and merged the two especially aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment  plus sixty years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement to police and the photographic and subsequent identifications of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on especially aggravated kidnapping deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty years, which was omitted, and we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in Count 16 and remand for resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary in that count. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Client sued her former attorney for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the attorney’s failure to include in the marital dissolution agreement, prepared for the client and incorporated into Final Divorce Decree, provisions that would permit the client to receive one-half of her husband’s military pension and to be listed as the beneficiary of his Survivor Benefit Plan following their divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney on the grounds that the statute of limitations had passed on the malpractice and the breach of contract claims and that the evidence did not support a finding of serious mental injurysufficient to support the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim; client appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christopher W.C. (“Father”) to the minor child Rebecca J.R.M. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(2) and (g)(9)(A), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Lloyd, of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiff filed his initial health care liability action against the defendant prior to the enactment of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. More than one year later, the plaintiff refiled his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. The defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff’s second action was barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff countered that his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for  summary judgment but granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the application for permission to appeal and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment. We hold that the plaintiff’s action was commenced by the filing of a second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice. We further hold that a plaintiff who files his initialaction prior to the effective date of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of the statute, is entitled to the 120-day extension. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal takes issue with an award of permanent partial disability benefits in a workers’ compensation case. After sustaining a compensable knee injury, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Circuit Court for Wilson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee the maximum disability award permitted by the circumstances. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of an evaluating physician on the ground that he had not personally examined the employee and with the amount of the disability award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We find that the trial court erred by excluding the physician’s testimony but that this error was harmless. We also find that the evidence supports the trial court’s disability award. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Michael D. Green, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree felony murder, and received a sentence of life plus twenty-four years. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to request sequestration of the jury; (2) failing to utilize all available preemptory challenges or to challenge potential jurors for cause; and (3) failing to limit testimony concerning the prior federal trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner/Appellant was terminated from her position with the Shelby County Division of Corrections for violating the Division’s Standards of Conduct and for untruthfulness. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed. On appeal, the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed the Board’s decision. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Raymond Denton, was convicted of aggravated rape, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502; aggravated burglary, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-403; and physical abuse of an impaired person, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-6-119. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender for each conviction to sixty (60) years for aggravated rape, fifteen (15) years for aggravated burglary, and fifteen (15) years for physical abuse of an impaired person. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of ninety (90) years. In this appeal, Defendant does not challenge any of the sentences imposed, and does not challenge the convictions for aggravated burglary and physical abuse of an impaired person. Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of aggravate rape, limited to the argument that there was insufficient proof establishing the element of penetration. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tavaria Merritt, pleaded guilty to nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010).  He was sentenced to nine consecutive terms of twenty-five years for an effective 225-year sentence to be served at 100%.  The Defendant was seventeen years old when the offenses were committed and nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and is cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  Although Graham does not apply to the Defendant’s effective 225-year sentence, we conclude that the sentence is excessive, reverse the judgments of the trial court, and remand for entry of judgments reflecting an effective fifty-year sentence.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Keeanna Luellan, guilty of forgery over $500 and fraudulent use of a credit card over $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other bad acts or crimes and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I join the majority in all respects with the exception of sentencing.  While I agree that the effective 225-year sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, I disagree that an effective fifty-year sentence complies with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.    
 

Petitioner, Frederick Parks, appeals from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Wilson Wentzel, of six counts of prescription fraud and two counts of identity theft.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed concurrent eleven-year sentences for each of the Defendant’s eight felony convictions.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied her request for alternative sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing.

The Petitioner, Robert Lee Polk, appeals the Circuit Court for Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee worked as a skidder operator for the employer’s logging company. The employee’s face and eyelid were lacerated when the chainsaw that he was operating “kicked back.” The employee briefly returned to work within a few weeks after his accident, but he was unable to continue working due to eye pain. The employee subsequently underwent eight surgeries on his face and eye. Although the employer admitted that the employee’s injury was compensable, it argued that his award should be capped at one and one-half times his impairment rating and that the medical testimony concerning his impairment was not credible. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The employer appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The employee, however, contends that the employer’s appeal is frivolous and seeks liquidated damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(h). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dearaysun Wright, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further address the causation aspect of the trial court’s rationale in excluding portions of Dr. Law’s testimony.

The petitioner, Ira Ishmael Muhammad, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 11-year-old Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Reba Nell Woods, of three counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony, and two counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park, a Class B felony.  The trial court sentenced her as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of ninety years.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court committed numerous reversible errors regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the appellant’s convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5.  Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for new trials on those charges.  We also conclude that although the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant sold twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, the evidence is insufficient to show that she did so within 1,000 feet of a park.  Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of those judgments.  Finding no errors that warrant reversal of the appellant’s convictions for selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, those convictions are affirmed.  However, upon remand, the trial court is to consider whether the appellant’s mandatory thirty-year sentences should be served consecutively.