APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Bert Newby, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts his trial counsel at the trial where Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated assault rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to affirm the Trial Court. I believe the Trial Court did commit reversible error when it limited Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in this health care liability informed consent action. Specifically, I do not believe that the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on what risks should have been disclosed to the Plaintiff to meet the acceptable standard of care for informed consent should have been limited to disclosure of only those risks that actually came to pass.

This appeal involves the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found the agreement was not unconscionable, but that the defendant had waived its right to enforce the agreement. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and we remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Charles Pennington, charging him with first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was found not guilty of employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, and by agreement with the State, to a concurrent sentence of twelve years for attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee was injured when she fell from a stack of soft drinks while attempting to climb a wall to rescue and remove a feral cat from her employer’s premises. Her employer denied the claim, contending that she was on a private mission at the time of her injury and also that she had violated a safety rule by failing to use a ladder. The employee filed this action seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial was bifurcated. After the initial hearing, the trial court found that the employee’s action was related in part to her employment and, therefore, compensable. After a subsequent hearing, the court awarded benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on compensability and, in the alternative, that the claim is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a) (2008). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Everett Russ, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to consecutive terms of nine years for each conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the State’s failure to respond properly to his request for a bill of particulars should have resulted in a mistrial and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but because of inappropriate sentencing, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting concurrent sentences.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further address the causation aspect of the trial court’s rationale in excluding portions of Dr. Law’s testimony.

The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brandy Lea Birdwell, contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, citing the following bases:  (1) failure to provide a copy of discovery; (2) failure to adequately prepare and advise the Petitioner prior to her testimony; (3) failure to request a jury out hearing before the State impeached the Petitioner with a pending criminal charge; (4) failure to conduct a proper investigation with a private detective; and (5) failure to subpoena a material witness at the Petitioner’s request.  After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 

The parents of six children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on two grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions, and the determination that termination of both parents rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, No. M2011-01210-SC-R3-CD, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013).   See State v. Glenn Lydell McCray, No. M2011-02411-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).  Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that although the jury was not properly instructed pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  Upon further review, we conclude that the omission of the White instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.  The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I respectfully dissent. Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment for two counts of aggravated assault against the victim. One of the convictions for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a rifle, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

The other conviction for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

Justin B. Conrad (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property of $1,000 or more.  The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions.  See State v. Justin Brian Conrad, No. M2008-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103776, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Petitioner, Jonathan Tears, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the petition because the State violated his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory information, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  More specifically, Petitioner contends that the State (1) failed to disclose a statement made by the victim; (2) failed to disclose the statement of Ashton Davis; (3) failed to disclose the statement of Felice O’Neal; (4) failed to disclose the statement of Tangelia Alexander; and (5) failed to disclose payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to “investigate, interview, subpoena, and call to the stand” Shelby Harris, Darron Little, Alexander Harris, Jarrod Robinson, Zeldra Swaggerty, and Adriana Cross; (2) failing to request Jenck’s material and cross-examine the victim concerning his statement to Detective Oliver; (3) failing to request a ballistics expert to testify at trial; and (4) failing to investigate and assert the defense of self-defense.  Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise Brady issues.  Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief and remand this cause for a new trial.
 

The Defendants, Barry Smith, Barron Smith, and Julian Kneeland, were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of eight counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; one count of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; eight counts of reckless endangerment, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-103, 39-14-406 (2010). The trial court merged the eight counts of reckless endangerment with the eight counts of aggravated assault. Defendant Barry Smith was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective ten-year sentence. Defendant Barron Smith was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years for each aggravated assault conviction, three years for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective fourteen-year sentence. Defendant Julian Kneeland was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendants contend that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a 9-1-1 recording, and (3) the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the Defendants’ convictions except the aggravated assault convictions in Count 21, which we reverse and dismiss. We vacate the judgments for the remaining aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions and remand the case for entry of a single judgment for each aggravated assault conviction, noting merger of the reckless endangerment convictions.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. Affirmed and remanded.

Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing, based upon a finding that the petition was filed in violation of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Haley, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Grandparents were awarded custody of Child after a dependency and neglect finding. Grandparents later filed petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to adopt Child. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights after concluding Mother abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Child by failing to visit her in the four months leading up to Grandparents’ petition, but the evidence is not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated.

The Petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the habeas corpus court committed a “misdemeanor in office” by denying his petition for relief, that he was illegally sentenced as a repeat violent offender, and that he did not have the requisite prior convictions to be sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction (DOC). After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Brandon Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Darryl Thomas Harmon, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge suit against his former employer, Defendant. According to his complaint, Defendant’s owner engaged in illegal activity. Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s owner of the illegal activity and was subsequently terminated. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff did not report the illegal activity to any person or entity other than the Defendant’s owner, who was a participant in the illegal activity. Plaintiff contends that where a company’s owner is a participant in illegal activity, reporting the illegal activity solely to the owner should not preclude a retaliatory discharge claim premised on refusal to remain silent. We do not agree and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

The Defendant, Teresa Ann Kingsmill, pled guilty to eight charges, all of which stemmed from her possessing or manufacturing methamphetamine.  The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of twenty-one years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced her because it failed to adequately state its reasoning for the Defendant’s sentence in the record.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant.  We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.