APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Deshawn Mitchell, entered guilty pleas in Case No. 12-CR-136 to sale of a counterfeit substance, which he represented to be cocaine (count 1) and delivery of a counterfeit substance (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-137 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-138 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); and in Case No. 12-CR-139 to possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 1), possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 2), resisting arrest (count 3), and evading arrest (count 4).  The plea agreement stated that the length and manner of sentencing in these cases would be determined by the trial court, and the trial court sentenced Mitchell as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in confinement.  On appeal, Mitchell argues that his sentence is excessive.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jimi L. Greene (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked licence, and violating the financial responsibility law. He was sentenced as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement, with the remainder of his sentence to be suspended to community corrections with several specific conditions. Subsequently, a community corrections violation warrant was filed. The Defendant admitted to the violations alleged in the warrant, and a hearing was held as to disposition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rokisha Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2008 convictions for two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted first degree murder and her effective sentence of life plus fifteen years.  The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding her petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing her petition.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Rutherford, was convicted by a jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence, with 160 days’ confinement as “shock incarceration” and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the denial of judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl P.E. Munsey, challenges his sentences for three 1978 convictions for armed robbery. The petitioner’s claim is primarily based on an assertion that the sentencing provisions of the statute he was sentenced under had been repealed by the legislature and his sentences are therefore illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without a hearing. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, James Michael Flinn, was convicted by an Anderson County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his backyard and car, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his warrantless detention, (4) he was denied the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, (5) he was denied preliminary hearings after his arrests on two dates, (6) the trial court erred in revoking his bond, (7) he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him by the trial court’s admission of the victim’s death certificate, (8) he was denied his right to testify by the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony regarding the reason he made statements to a witness, (9) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his purchase of a shotgun, (10) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of vandalism of the victim’s house and truck, (11) the trial court erred in receiving as exhibits the no true bills returned by the grand jury regarding a prior incident in which the victim hit the Defendant, (12) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on the Defendant’s silence when he was detained by the police, (13) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence, (14) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding admissions against interest, and (15) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to due process by entering judgment and sentencing him on the same day. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Daniel Adam Barnes, appeals from his Cheatham County Circuit Court bench conviction of Class A misdemeanor assault.  On appeal, the defendant claims that his 11-month, 29-day sentence, all but 10 days of which was suspended, was erroneously imposed because he was not given the opportunity to be heard before the sentence was imposed.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Terrell B. Johnson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone and possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1) (possession with the intent to sell Schedule II narcotics) (2010). The convictions were merged, and the Defendant, a Range I, standard offender, was sentenced to twelve years, with a minimum of eight years to be served. See id. § 39-17-432 (2010) (enhanced penalties for offenses committed in drug-free zones). The sentence was imposed consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in other cases. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to lost and destroyed evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Arturo Rivera, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner attacked his conviction for aggravated robbery. Petitioner had pled guilty to the charge and received a 7.2-year sentence as a mitigated offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel which directly prevented Petitioner from entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. After a review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Torriano Floyd, was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery. The trial court imposed two six-year sentences for robbery, to be served consecutively to each other, and one four-year sentence for attempted robbery, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, he challenges the credibility of one of the witnesses as it pertains to sufficiency of the evidence and the imposition of partial consecutive sentence alignment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, George Joseph Raudenbush, III, was found guilty by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest with risk of death, a Class D felony; evading arrest, a Class A misdmeanor; two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest), 39-13-101 (2010) (assault), 39-13-103 (2010) (amended 2012, 2013) (reckless endangerment), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a suspended license), 55-12-139 (2012) (amended 2013) (violation of the financial responsibility law), 55-8-152 (2012) (speeding). The trial court merged the evading arrest convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years as a Range I, standard offender for evading arrest. For the misdemeanor convictions, he was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and the two assault convictions, six months for the driving on a suspended license conviction, and thirty days for the speeding conviction. Pursuant to statute, he was not sentenced for violating the financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences. On appeal, he contends that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by determining he waived the right and by requiring him to proceed pro se at the trial, during sentencing, and on appeal. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, acting pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of habeas corpus relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The appellant, William Jamal Harris, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probationary sentences, contending that the State failed to adduce sufficient proof that the appellant committed new offenses. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danny Howard, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by permitting a juror to remain on the jury after learning that the juror worked with one of the State’s witnesses, and (2) by denying Howard’s motion for a mistrial based on an alleged Jencks violation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Elton Brent Stanfill, pleaded guilty to one count of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of unlawfully using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years for the methamphetamine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the unlawful drug paraphernalia conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve ninety days in custody and placed him on Community Corrections for the remainder of his sentence. In July 2012, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence. The trial court issued a warrant, and, after a hearing, revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State failed to show that he had violated the conditions of his sentence and because he should have been given an opportunity for rehabilitation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiffs sought the return of property that had been donated to the Karns Volunteer Fire Department (“Fire Department”). Plaintiffs alleged that a reversionary clause in the warranty deed had been triggered when Fire Department began paying firefighters and charging subscription fees for its services. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the reversionary clause had not been triggered and granted Fire Department’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce on fault-based grounds against Husband and awarded $1,500.00 monthly in transitional alimony to Wife for a period of thirty-six months. Husband appeals. Determining the amount of alimony to be beyond Husband’s ability to pay, we modify the transitional alimony award to $1,000.00 monthly to Wife for thirty-six months. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The petitioner, Anita Kay Broughton, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, she contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue a defense of diminished capacity despite ample proof that the petitioner suffered from a mental condition. She also challenges the accuracy of the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lewis, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a fifteen-year prison sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sequester the jury; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the body of the deceased; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing certain witness testimony.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court’s holding that termination of his parental rights to two children was in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After his previous guilty-pleaded convictions were vacated, petitioner, Bruce Reliford, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery charges and was found guilty by a jury of felony murder. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and denial of discretionary review by our supreme court, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows, in which petitioner alleges the following: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly communicate with him; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty to the aggravated robbery charges; and (3) the post-conviction court’s error in denying his motion to recuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holdings that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder.
 

This appeal involves removal from general sessions court to circuit court. The defendant tenants rented residential property from the plaintiff property owner. The owner filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the tenants for unpaid rent. The tenants filed an application in the general sessions court to remove the case to circuit court; they asserted that the counterclaim they anticipated filing would exceed the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court. The general sessions court granted the application for removal, the tenants filed their counterclaim in the circuit court, and the case proceeded in the circuit court for over two years. The circuit court then issued a sua sponte order directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to the general sessions court, because the removal statute does not apply in that county and because the tenants did not file a cost bond when the case was removed. The tenants objected to the remand on several grounds and alternatively asked the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim even if it remanded the original claim to general sessions court. The circuit court remanded the original claim to general sessions court holding, inter alia, that the tenants failed to file a proper cost bond in connection with the removal. It then held that the counterclaim and all other pleadings filed in the case were “null and void” and dismissed the counterclaim on that basis. The tenants now appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s decision that the tenants failed to file a proper bond, vacate that portion of the circuit court’s order declaring that all proceedings other than the original claim were a nullity, and remand for reconsideration in light of Rules 13.09 and Rule 42.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

A jury convicted the defendant, Keith Bates, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The defendant testified that he had been in jail around the time of the crime, and the State then questioned him about the timing of his imprisonment and release. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to allow the State to question him about the timing of his release from jail. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.