APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her eldest child on a number of grounds. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother engaged in only token visitation with the child during the relevant time period. We vacate the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to parent because the trial court failed to make findings as to whether the return of the child would pose a risk of substantial harm. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

This case involves competing claims for breach of a commercial lease agreement. The tenant commenced this action seeking to recover the security deposit and pre-paid rent, contending that the landlord breached the lease by failing to comply with the notice-and-cure provision in the lease before leasing the premises to another tenant. The landlord denied any breach and filed a counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees contending that the tenant breached the lease by not paying rent. Each party moved for summary judgment, seeking affirmative relief as well as dismissal of the other party’s claims. After ruling that the tenant was the first to materially breach the lease by failing to pay rent and holding that the landlord failed to comply with the notice-and-cure provision in the lease, the court summarily dismissed the tenant’s complaint and the landlord’s counterclaims. Both parties appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the tenant’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of the landlord’s counterclaims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

After pleading guilty to burglary and theft of property valued at over $10,000, Jeffrey Glenn McCoy, Petitioner, was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of 12 years as a Range III offender to be served consecutively to a sentence from South Carolina. His sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Jeffrey Glynn1 McCoy, No. W2016-01619-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 6507232, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2018) (“McCoy I”). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief that was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the State conceded error and this Court remanded for appointment of counsel and further proceedings. See Jeffrey McCoy v. State, No. W2019-00574-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 1227304, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2020) (“McCoy II”). On remand, the post-conviction court appointed counsel and an amended petition was filed. Petitioner alleged that trial counsel failed to inform him of his potential sentence, failed to litigate a motion to suppress, failed to present evidence that Petitioner was under the influence of methamphetamine, and failed to present evidence that Petitioner was not the leader in the commission of the offense. The postconviction court denied relief after a hearing, finding that there was no proof Petitioner’s plea was coerced or that any of trial counsel’s actions were deficient. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The mother of a minor filed suit against a county and county employees, alleging that the minor was sexually assaulted by a county employee while in custody at a county-run juvenile detention center. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment on several grounds, including that the county retained immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the claims against the county arose out of civil rights claims. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric Williams, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions
of aggravated assault and assault, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the trial court erred by classifying him as a Range II, multiple offender.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kenneth Benard Hudspeth, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and two counts of aggravated rape. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(2) (Supp. 1998) (subsequently amended) (felony murder in perpetration of rape); 39-13-210 (1997) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder); and 39-13-205 (1997) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his police statement, and (3) the court erred by ordering consecutive service of his sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the filing of a detainer warrant in general sessions court. The
plaintiff sought to remove the defendant and her mobile home from his real property. The
general sessions court granted possession of the real property to the plaintiff but ordered
him to pay for the removal of the mobile home. The defendant appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief requested and
awarded him possession of his real property. However, contrary to the general sessions
court, the circuit court ordered the defendant to remove her mobile home from the
plaintiff’s real property at her expense. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

In this appeal, the circuit court determined that the plaintiff had failed to timely perfect her
appeal from an order of the juvenile court. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the
ruling of the circuit court.

Lonell Montez Hartshaw, Defendant, appeals the manner of service of his sentences and
fines imposed by the trial court after he entered guilty pleas to felony evading arrest, driving
under the influence (“DUI”) (second offense), simple possession of a controlled substance,
driving on a revoked license (second offense), speeding, violation of the registration law,
and violation of the window tint law. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demetrice Livingston, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury
of second degree murder and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to
twenty years at 100% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his
sentence in a drug case for which he had been sentenced to probation. The Defendant
raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his
conviction; (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (3) whether the
State made an improper closing argument by referencing facts not in evidence and making
a comment that impermissibly bolstered the testimony of a State’s witness. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for the trial court to enter an
amended judgment imposing a concurrent sentence.

In this lawsuit between former law partners, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees.
The instant appeal involves Appellees’ attempt to collect their judgment. The trial court
held that Appellant’s qualified rollover IRA is not exempt from garnishment, attachment
and execution under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 26-2-105, 26-2-111(1)(D), 26-2-
26, and 56-7-203. The trial court also determined that a recreational vehicle was not held
as a tenancy by the entirety and was subject to attachment and execution as Appellant’s
individually-owned property. We reverse.

The Defendant, Jarrett Michael Tolley, pleaded guilty to multiple theft- and fraud-related
charges in the Washington County Criminal Court, for which she received a sentence of
seven years' incarceration suspended to fifteen years on community corrections. The
sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a sentence of two years' incarceration
imposed in an unrelated case in Carter County, which resulted in a sentence of six years on
community corrections, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years to be served on
community corrections. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court denied. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 5, 2023. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This is the second appeal in this matter involving a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 23, 2019, in Nashville. Upon remand, following dismissal of the first appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a final judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual tortfeasor and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against his underinsured motorist insurance carrier. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his negligence claim, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the tortfeasor. We further vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim against his automobile insurer. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a personal injury action arising out of a car accident in a state parking lot. The original defendants raised the defense of comparative fault by the State of Tennessee, and the plaintiff filed a notice of claim in the Division of Claims and Risk Management and, later, filed a complaint in the Claims Commission. After the Claims Commission transferred the matter to circuit court, the State moved to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the court granted the motion. We affirm the trial court’s ruling because, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the complaint initiating a suit against the State was filed in the Claims Commission after the expiration of the 90-day grace period provided by the statute. Furthermore, we find the plaintiff’s argument that the State waived the statute of limitations defense unpersuasive.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Jerome Hardison, of first degree
premeditated murder. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court erred by
denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge; (2) the trial court erred by denying
the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the execution of a search
warrant on his residence; (3) the trial court unconstitutionally limited the Defendant’s
ability to cross-examine a witness; (4) the trial court erred by admitting expert ballistics
testimony at trial; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to prove the Defendant’s identity
as the perpetrator. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffrey George Tulley, Defendant, pleaded guilty to three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, three counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At sentencing, the trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of eleven years on the drug counts and a consecutive four-year sentence for the firearm counts, as a Range I offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action filed in 2018. The wife appeals from the trial
court’s order finding her guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. Because one count of
criminal contempt was alleged as civil contempt, we vacate the trial court’s finding of
criminal contempt on that count. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt on the second
count. We vacate the punishment of community service and remand for determination of
an appropriate punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-103.

The Defendant, Donnie Marquis Tharpe, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the five-year, split-confinement sentence he received for his guiltypleaded
convictions for aggravated assault and evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance
and by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in
confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eula Beasley, entered a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery (count one) and possession of a firearm with a prior conviction for a crime of violence (count two), for which he received an eight-year sentence for each count with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff made a claim for the return of bond money he paid to a private bonding company to secure his release from jail for charges that were pending and then nolled nearly 22 years before the filing of the present cause of action. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court held that the complaint, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, fails to articulate any facts or legal authority showing a right to relief against the defendant. Further, the court determined that if the gravamen of the claim is a tort action for conversion, the claim was also properly dismissed because it would have accrued long ago and is therefore barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a former CEO seeking funds owed to him from his company and two of its subsidiaries. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Darrin Walker, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of
first degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to concurrent life sentences. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.