APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of the chancery court’s affirmance of the decision of the administrative law judge granting a Line of Duty Disability (“LODD”) pension to a Memphis Firefighter. The appeal hinges on a question of law concerning the meaning of Memphis Code of Ordinances § 25-1(27), which states that an employee is eligible for a LODD pension if:

[A] physical . . . condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, . . . while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place . . . which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city. The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians.

City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27) (emphasis added).

Three qualified physicians testified, but only one of them found that both factors were established. In ruling in favor of the firefighter, the administrative law judge and the chancellor both held that it was not necessary that each qualified physician state that the injuries were caused while in the actual performance of duties for the City at a definite place and time and that he was permanently disabled from continuing in his chosen role as a consequence of that injury. The City of Memphis insists that this was error, contending that “the ordinance clearly requires at least two physicians to opine that the employee sustained a work-related injury which caused his/her disability.” Based on the plain language of the ordinance, we agree with the City’s interpretation of the evidentiary requirements for a LODD pension; we therefore reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the decision of the Pension Board of the City of Memphis, which denied the application for a LODD pension.

The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for diminution of real property value,
alleging that the defendant’s steam pipe exploded, causing toxic debris, including asbestos,
to fall on the plaintiff’s real property. The plaintiff’s claims included strict liability for
ultra-hazardous activity, ordinary negligence, negligence per se, public nuisance, trespass,
continuing private nuisance, and medical monitoring. The trial court dismissed the entire
amended complaint without prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(6) after finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the Tennessee Asbestos
Claims Priorities Act. The trial court also dismissed the claims for strict liability,
negligence per se, trespass, and medical monitoring with prejudice. Upon review, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the entire complaint without prejudice, as well as the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence per se, trespass, and medical monitoring claims with
prejudice. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim with prejudice.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights, arguing that the trial court erroneously found that grounds
existed for termination and that such termination was in the child’s best interest. Having
carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

A Jefferson County jury convicted the defendant, William David Phillips, of four counts
of reckless homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of felony reckless
endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of fourteen years, eleven
months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial
court erred in imposing an excessive sentence, denying probation, and imposing
consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for a corrected
judgment form in count three.

The defendant, Luther Ray Mabe, Jr., appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court jury
convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, for
which he received an effective sentence of 10 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery
conviction and argues that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the correct grade of theft for
which the defendant was convicted and merging the theft conviction into the aggravated
robbery conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues’ reasoning and judgment as it relates to
the Defendant’s sentencing issue. Regarding the Defendant’s sufficiency challenge,
however, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that the facts at trial do not
support the State’s theory on appeal regarding when the shotgun was taken. Specifically,
I believe that the facts at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
demonstrate that the Defendant had not completed the taking of the shotgun at the time that
the Defendant and the victim struggled over control of the rifle.

The Defendant, Danny Lynn Collier, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s
ordering him to serve a four-year sentence in confinement after revoking his probation,
arguing that the trial court should have elected to place him back on supervised probation.
Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A surviving spouse brought this action against the estate of her deceased husband and his ex-wife and children. The surviving spouse sought to set aside the decedent’s inter vivos transfer of three properties to the ex-wife and children and/or to have the value of the transferred property included in the decedent’s net estate under Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-1-105, which applies when a decedent transferred property “with an intent to defeat the surviving spouse’s elective or distributive share.” The decedent conveyed the properties within three days of his death by quitclaim deed for no consideration other than love and affection. One of the deeds was executed by the decedent, and the other two deeds were executed by the decedent’s attorney-in-fact, his daughter. The chancellor referred all issues in dispute to a special master who found that the properties conveyed by the attorney-in-fact were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share but that the third tract, which was conveyed by the decedent, was not. The chancellor adopted the report and recommendations of the special master. This appeal followed. After considering the factors identified in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) and the totality of the circumstances, we hold that all three properties were conveyed with the intent to defeat the plaintiff’s elective share. Thus, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, including a recalculation of the surviving spouse’s elective share based on a net estate that includes all three properties at issue.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamauri Ransom, of aggravated robbery
and first degree felony murder. The Petitioner appealed, claiming insufficient evidence,
and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Jamauri Ransom, No. W2019-
02319-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1310877, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 8, 2021), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. July 12, 2021). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition,
alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed
to move for a mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct. After a hearing, the postconviction
court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

Following a bench trial, Shanynthia Gardner (“Defendant”) was convicted of four counts
each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in perpetration of
aggravated child abuse, first degree felony murder in perpetration of aggravated child
neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect, for which she received an
effective sentence of life. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court
used an incorrect legal standard in determining that she failed to carry her burden of
establishing her insanity at the time of the offenses; (2) the evidence is insufficient to
support her convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s request to
make an offer of proof of the entirety of a witness’s audio recorded statement to police.
Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald Haynes, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on probation. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $42,000 in restitution to the victim in monthly installments of $500. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of pecuniary loss to support an order of restitution. After review, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court to determine the victim’s credibility, the victim’s pecuniary loss, if any, and to make adequate findings of fact, if any, to support the imposition of restitution based upon sufficient credible evidence of pecuniary loss.

This products-liability case is dismissed with prejudice on the parties’ joint stipulation of
dismissal.

Defendant, William Timothy Kirk, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement, to be served at seventy-five percent. The trial court ordered the DUI sentence to be served consecutively to the life sentence for which Defendant was on parole at the time of the offense. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed a complaint for a restraining order against the defendant, the wife of the
plaintiff’s ex-husband. The plaintiff sought a restraining order because the defendant
requested to “add” or “friend” plaintiff’s co-workers and manager on certain social media
applications. The trial court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order and, after
conducting a hearing, extended the temporary restraining order for one year. Following
our review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to
establish that she would suffer immediate and irreparable harm absent a restraining order
against the defendant or any other facts that would otherwise constitute a cause of action.
We therefore reverse and vacate the one-year restraining order.

Petitioner, Roosevelt Morris, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), he did not receive timely pretrial notice of the State’s notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, and because the habeas corpus court did not give him sufficient time to file a written reply to the State’s response to the habeas corpus petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Darren Marion Little, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the Sex Offender Registry and one count of possessing a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred when it classified him as a Range III offender. After review, we agree with the parties. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for resentencing.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Theodore Devon Wells, of sale of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine, and delivery of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to twenty-eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erroneously admitted certain items of evidence. He further contends that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated. Finally, he contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Decedent’s siblings filed a document they alleged to be decedent’s last will and testament. Decedent’s husband, the personal representative of her estate, moved to declare the alleged will invalid for lack of an effective signature. The trial court concluded that the will was ineffective due to the lack of decedent’s signature, and declined to admit it to probate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pro-se petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his “Rule 36 Plain Error Motion for New Trial.” Following our review of the entire record
and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents to two children, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence as to both parents regarding the ground of severe child abuse and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

Heather B. ¹ (“Mother”) and John S., III (“Father”) are the biological parents of Serenity S. Mother and Raymond R. are the biological parents of Harmony R., Mellody O., and Angel O. Tina S. (“Grandmother”) and John S., Jr. (“Grandfather” or, together with Grandmother, “Petitioners”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Mother’s and Raymond R.’s parental rights in April of 2021 and for adoption of the children. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights as to Serenity S. As for the grounds for termination, Petitioners alleged: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Petitioners proved all three statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Mother appeals to this Court. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded. Because Petitioners proved no statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we need not consider whether termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.

The Defendant, Jermaine R. Carpenter, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his
second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Edgar Bailey Jr., appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony
murder, setting fire to personal property, and three counts of aggravated assault. The
Petitioner is serving an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1)
the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief under the Post-Conviction DNA
Analysis Act of 2001 (the DNA Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -
313 (2018), and (2) the Petitioner is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court found Father to be willfully underemployed and imputed income to him for calculation of child support. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination, arguing the trial court erred as to the amount of income imputed to Father for the purposes of setting child support and also as to its determination of the amount of retroactive support. We affirm the trial court’s income imputation. However, we conclude the trial court erred in its calculation of retroactive support owed by Father. Therefore, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in part and reverses in part.

The Defendant, Thakelyn J. Tate, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess more
than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled
substance) (2018), 39-17-432 (2018) (subsequently amended) (drug-free zone), 39-12-
103 (2018) (conspiracy). The jury likewise determined that the Defendant committed a
criminal gang offense, enhancing the felony classification of the conviction. See id. § 40-
35-121 (2019). The court imposed a fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal gang enhancement. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.