APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Bedford County jury convicted the Petitioner of seventeen crimes involving his sexual contact with three minor girls, and this Court affirmed those judgments on appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sunni Adkins, pled guilty to three counts of child abuse, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for each misdemeanor and to four years for the felony to be served as a Range I standard offender. The misdemeanor sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the felony sentence. Additionally, six months of each misdemeanor sentence was ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing her by improperly applying certain statutory enhancement factors and by denying full probation or another alternative sentence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we uphold the sentences ordered by the trial court.

A Warren County jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery in separate cases, and this Court affirmed the judgments on appeal. The Petitioner filed two post-conviction petitions asserting various grounds for relief. The post-conviction court denied the petitions for post-conviction relief after a consolidated hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges: (1) he was denied the right to a fair trial because a case relied upon by the trial court and on direct appeal to exclude expert testimony proffered by the Petitioner has since been overturned; and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s modification of child support. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in setting support based upon eighty days of visitation as set out in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1240-2-4-.04(7)(a) rather than the 182.5 days used for fifty/fifty parenting situations as contemplated in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1240-2-4-.02(12). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Appellant, Billy Clay Browning, was convicted by a Henry County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder and received, as provided by  law, a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Browning has presented two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance because Browning was unable to assist trial counsel with his defense; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over an arbitration agreement, and stems from a nursing home abuse and neglect case. The decedent’s daughter signed all the paperwork associated with the decedent’s admission to the nursing home. An arbitration agreement was included in the admissions agreement. Decedent’s daughter, as next of kin, filed a complaint alleging nursing home abuse and neglect. The nursing home moved to stay the case and compel the matter to arbitration. The trial court held that daughter did not have authority to waive decedent’s constitutional right to a jury trial, and denied the nursing home’s motion. The nursing home appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Petitioner pled guilty to rape and incest and agreed to allow the trial court to sentence him. After a sentencing hearing, the court imposed an effective sentence of ten and one-half years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed the sentence, and this Court affirmed. The Petitioner then filed his petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. The post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff, a songwriter and recording artist, filed this action against his manager and publisher seeking a declaration that the Exclusive Management Agreement and the Exclusive Songwriter Agreement were invalid and unenforceable due to various alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and breaches of contract. The defendants filed Counterclaims seeking a declaration that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid, and that they sought to recover damages and attorney’s fees. The music publisher additionally sought specific performance of the Songwriter Agreement and an injunction to prevent the songwriter from composing any songs for others until the plaintiff fulfilled his obligation to the publisher. The Chancellor summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s Complaint. The Chancellor also summarily ruled that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid and enforceable, that the plaintiff was in material breach of both agreements. As for the Songwriter Agreement, the Chancellor found that the plaintiff was obligated to compose and deliver to the publisher an additional 76 songs of marketable commercial quality, for which the publisher was granted equitable relief in the form of specific performance as well as injunctive relief, whereby the plaintiff was enjoined from composing any songs for others until the songwriter fulfilled his obligation to the publisher. The defendants were also awarded $737,201 in damages, which included an award of attorneys fees of $171,704. The plaintiff appealed presenting numerous issues. We affirm the Chancellor’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s Complaint. We also affirm the Chancellor’s determination that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid and enforceable and that the plaintiff was in material breach of both agreements for which the defendants are entitled to recover damages. We, however, have determined the Chancellor erred by granting the publishing company extraordinary equitable relief in the form of specific performance and injunctive relief under the Songwriter Agreement. Because of our decision concerning specific performance and injunctive relief, each of which are factors to consider when determining the amount of attorney’s fees the defendants may be entitled to recover, we find it necessary to vacate the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $171,704 and remand the issue, along with the issue of damages and other relief, if any, to which the defendants may be entitled.  

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court because of the defendant’s failure to include the guilty plea hearing transcript in the record and the attendant presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’s ruling presumed correct in the absence of an adequate record on appeal).

The Defendant, Jennifer Lynn Stinnett, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court. The Defendant was indicted for over two hundred offenses (Class D and E felonies and Class C misdemeanors) as a consequence of her scheme to unlawfully obtain prescription drugs. She subsequently pled guilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective twelve-year sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve 365 days in jail, followed by probation for the remainder of her sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for full probation. After a review of the record, we find no error in the denial of total probation. We remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The Appellant, Charles Michael Bean, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. A jury found Bean guilty of three counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions for reckless aggravated assault with the three aggravated assault convictions, and a sentencing hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of three years for each of the Class C felonies and ordered that Bean serve nine months in incarceration followed by four years of probation. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, Bean argues that the trial court erred in denying him a sentence of total probation. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

The defendant, Benjamin Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. For the felony murder conviction, he was sentenced as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction, and for the aggravated child abuse conviction he was sentenced to twenty-five years, to be served concurrently. In this direct appeal, he claims (1) that the trial court improperly allowed evidence of the defendant’s bad acts without conducting a hearing as required by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) that the trial court committed plain error in allowing a state’s expert witness to testify about the victim’s cause of death without establishing a proper foundation, (3) that the court erred in failing to replace a juror who indicated she had some knowledge of one of the state’s witnesses, (4) that the trial court failed to give instructions on lesser offenses, and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We hold that although the state made an improper rebuttal argument, the error was harmless, and the remaining issues are without merit. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Sheffa, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective and, that because of the ineffectiveness of counsel, his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Dane Lee Duckett, was convicted by a Cumberland County Jury of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, driving on a revoked license, and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Dane Lee Duckett, No. E2004-02321-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2777378, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 26, 2005). In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We determine that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Johnny Justin Postles, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, he argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the court reporter failed to file verbatim records with the clerk of the court in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-14-307(a).  Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void or his sentence illegal. The judgment of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed.

This cause of action arises out of statements made by Dr. William E. Bennett to PHP Companies, Inc. (“PHP”), a health insurance company, regarding Dr. Francis Roy. Dr. Roy alleges that, in connection with PHP’s review of Dr. Roy’s application to become an approved PHP provider, Dr. Bennett made written statements that reflected poorly on Dr. Roy’s work history and qualifications. Dr. Roy claims that these statements were false and defamatory. In response to Dr. Roy’s complaint, Dr. Bennett filed a motion for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that the document containing the allegedly defamatory statements is privileged and inadmissible under the Tennessee Peer Review Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219 (2004). The court granted Dr. Bennett’s motion. We affirm.

The State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of a father, filed a petition for contempt against the mother of the parties’ three minor children for her failure to pay child support. Following the contempt hearing, the trial court found the mother “might be slightly mentally retarded” but that she had the ability to pay and willfully failed to pay child support on eighteen occasions. Finding her guilty of criminal contempt, the trial court sentenced the mother to 180 days in jail. The mother appeals, contending the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she had the ability to pay child support and failed to present sufficient evidence that her failure to pay was willful. Finding the evidence in the record insufficient to prove that the mother had the ability to pay the amount of support as ordered and that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the mother’s failure to pay child support was willful, we reverse the trial court’s finding of criminal contempt.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, seeking the balance allegedly due under a contract between the defendant and a third party. The plaintiff contended that it was the assignee of the rights, but not the obligations, of this contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the third party manifested its intent to terminate the contract prior to the alleged assignment. In the alternative, the defendant argued that its performance was excused because the third party filed for bankruptcy, which was a ground of default. The defendant also disputed whether there was in fact an assignment between the plaintiff and the third party. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. The parties began living together in 1998, and married in 2004. Some time before the marriage, the parties purchased a residential lot on which they constructed a home, financing the construction with a credit card in the wife’s name. Title to the home was in the wife’s name alone. The husband performed manual labor on the lot and the home during and after the construction. During the marriage, the parties operated a business that proved unsuccessful. The wife eventually left to start her own business in a different field. At approximately the same time, the wife filed for divorce. A trial ensued. The parties introduced evidence on the value of the home, various items of personal property, and a significant amount of credit card debt. After the close of the evidence, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife, and awarded the home and the debt associated with the home to her. It ordered the sale of some property and application of the proceeds to the parties’ debt. The remaining debt was not classified as marital or separate and was not divided. The parties appeal. The husband argues that the trial court erred in not awarding him a share of the parties’ business and the increase in value of the marital home. The wife argues that the trial court erred in failing to designate the assets and debts as marital or separate and to divide them between the parties. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to award the Husband a share of the failed business or a share of the increase in value of the parties’ home. We vacate the remainder of the judgment and remand for allocation of the personal property and the debt.

Defendant, Kenneth Ray Kilpatrick, entered a plea of guilty in case no. 6670 to one count of manufacturing marijuana in an amount not less than twenty plants nor more than ninety-nine plants, a Class C felony; one count of facilitation of possession with intent to manufacture marijuana, a Class D felony; and one count of possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant Kenneth Kilpatrick as a Range II, multiple offender, to concurrent sentences of six years for his Class C felony conviction, four years for his Class D felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant, Carrie Fay Kilpatrick, entered a plea of guilty in case no. 6670 to one count of facilitation of possession with intent to manufacture marijuana, a Class D felony, and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. In case no. 6689, Defendant Carrie Kilpatrick entered a plea of guilty to one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant Carrie Kilpatrick as a Range I, standard offender, to three years for her Class D felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant Carrie Kilpatrick to serve her sentences in case nos. 6670 and 6689 concurrently for an effective sentence of three years. On appeal, both Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their respective requests for alternative sentencing and ordering each Defendant to serve his or her sentence in confinement. Defendant Kenneth Kilpatrick also contends that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors in determining the length of his sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Martin Leon May (“Father”) appeals an order of the trial court directing him to pay interest on a child support obligation. We hold that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the imposition of interest in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court entered May 24, 2007, nunc pro tunc November 14, 2006.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Gregory Yeary, suffered a compensable low back injury in October 2003. He received medical treatment and returned to work. In August 2004, he experienced back pain while lifting his two year old son. Mr. Yeary advised his employer that he had never recovered from the original injury and made a workers’ compensation claim. The claim was denied. Two evaluating physicians testified that Mr. Yeary had sustained a permanent impairment as a result of the October 2003 injury. Neither doctor could state with certainty the effects of the August 2004 child lifting episode. The trial court awarded 42% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer, CMH Manufacturing, Inc., has appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to find that the August 2004 event was the intervening cause of the employee’s disability, that the amount of the award was excessive, that the trial court erred in requiring payment of unauthorized medical expenses, and that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The employer also contends that the trial court placed improper conditions upon granting a stay. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action, asking the Court to declare that building restrictions on platted parcels of property from a common grantor applied to a non-platted parcel purchased by defendants from a subsequent grantor. 

The Trial Court, responding to a summary judgment motion, made detailed findings of facts, and concluded that the “subject to” language in the deeds was ambiguous and construed the language against the inclusion of restrictions on any portion of the property that lay outside the platted subdivisions. Plaintiffs have appealed, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

A mortgage broker filed this breach of contract action against a real estate investor based upon the investor’s failure to pay a loan placement fee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgage broker. Because we find that there are genuine issues of material fact, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.