APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A circuit court found four children dependent and neglected because they were suffering from abuse or neglect. It also determined that the children’s father committed severe child abuse. Upon review, we conclude that the court’s severe child abuse finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. So we reverse that finding and affirm the lower court’s decision as modified.

This is a premises liability case brought by a sales representative for a product vendor who was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision based upon the conclusion that Tractor Supply was the statutory employer of the sales representative under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and was, therefore, shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, concluded that Tractor Supply was not the sales representative’s statutory employer, and remanded the case to this Court to consider the pretermitted issues. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the issue of whether Tractor Supply owed a duty of care to the sales representative. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

In this interlocutory recusal appeal, Appellant argues that in addition to the grounds for recusal relied upon in the trial court, the trial judge’s failure to promptly rule on his motion constitutes an additional basis for recusal. Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Marty Allison Hobdy, Jr., was convicted of aggravated assault and placed on probation for seven years. While on probation, he was charged with a second assault but was acquitted by a jury. After the acquittal, the State sought to revoke the Defendant’s suspended sentence based on the same alleged conduct. At the revocation hearing, the State presented no proof and instead urged the trial court to rely on its memory of testimony and credibility assessments from the prior trial. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation on that basis. On appeal, the Defendant contends, among other things, that the State’s procedure caused the trial court to cease functioning as a neutral and detached decisionmaker. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the order revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentence and remand the case for a new hearing.

The Plaintiff brought a claim of intentional interference with business relationships against the Defendant, and the Defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The Defendant attached to the motion a declaration to establish that the suit was in response to his exercise of the right to free speech and right to petition. The Plaintiff did not attempt to establish a prima facie case but instead sought to amend the complaint to allege a different cause of action and sought to exclude the declaration. The trial court dismissed under the TPPA. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for a determination of attorney’s fees under the statute.

Petitioner, Brandon Michael Schklar, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his petition was timely filed and stated a colorable claim; (2) Tennessee case law allows for exceptions to the statutory post-conviction verification requirement; and therefore, (3) he should have been offered an opportunity to verify his petition under oath in an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Devaunte Louis Hill, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Defendant’s proffered expert; (2) the trial court improperly limited Defendant’s cross-examination of a witness; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Defendant opened the door to cross-examination about delinquent behavior he committed as a juvenile; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of Defendant’s gang membership in its case-in-chief; (5) the trial court improperly admitted part of a recorded jail conversation between Defendant and other parties; (6) the State engaged in improper argument during closing; (7) he is entitled to relief via cumulative error; and (8) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ed Henry Loyde, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking DNA analysis of evidence related to his 2014 conviction for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and we conclude Petitioner is not entitled to waiver of the filing deadline. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

This is a dispute over a child support obligation for a severely disabled adult child that would have terminated on the child’s 25th birthday under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). Prior to the expiration of Father’s agreed upon support obligation, the child’s mother petitioned for child support to continue due to the adult child’s ongoing disability and needs. Finding that the adult child was severely disabled and living with her mother prior to attaining eighteen years of age and she remains severely disabled, the trial court granted the mother’s petition and ordered that the father’s child support obligation be extended indefinitely. The trial court also awarded the mother a judgment of $21,700 in retroactive child support. The father appealed. We affirm.

Adonis Donnell Holbrooks, Petitioner, was convicted of attempted rape of a child, solicitation of a minor, especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor via electronic means. State v. Holbrooks, No. M2019-02099-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6060440, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2021). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to establish prejudice.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Michael Dale Rimmer, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Charles Rice, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital intellectual disability proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Defendant, Lerico Sullivan, challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that because the only evidence supporting the revocation was improperly admitted testimonial hearsay, this court should reverse and dismiss the revocation proceeding. Defendant also challenges the trial court’s holding him in contempt twenty times during the hearing and ordering the ten-day sentences imposed for each contempt finding to be served consecutively. The State concedes that the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay but asks this court to remand the case for a new revocation hearing. The State contends that the trial court did not err by holding Defendant in contempt or by aligning the sentences consecutively. Because the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay without making the appropriate findings and because no other evidence supported the allegations that Defendant violated his probation, we reverse the revocation of his probation and dismiss the case. Regarding the twenty findings of contempt and related consecutive sentencing decision, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against three of the findings of contempt and reverse and dismiss those findings. We also conclude that the effective sentence on the contempt convictions should be modified to sixty days to be served in confinement. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified in part and reversed and dismissed in part.

This action arises from the parties’ repeated petitions to modify a permanent parenting plan set forth by the trial court in 2016 regarding co-parenting of the parties’ two minor children. Shortly after the children were born, the mother moved to Virginia with the children, and the father remained in Tennessee. The parenting plan designated the mother as primary residential parent and set forth a schedule wherein the children would reside with the mother and attend school in Virginia during the school year, and reside primarily with the father in Tennessee during the summers. The parenting plan further provided that each parent would enjoy co-parenting time with the children while the children were living with the other parent. Since moving to Virginia in 2016, the mother had filed several motions to change venue to the trial court in Virginia. The mother argued that a change of venue was proper, pursuant to Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the trial court in Tennessee had lost continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and because Tennessee was an inconvenient forum. At the beginning of trial, after considering Mother’s renewed motion to change venue, the trial court determined that it retained subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. The trial court then conducted a three-day hearing on the substantive arguments presented in the parties’ competing motions to modify and motions for contempt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that a material change in circumstance had occurred warranting modification of the parenting plan. Additionally, the trial court found the mother guilty of two counts of civil contempt for violating the parenting plan by failing to allow the father his weekend co-parenting time in October 2023 and by failing to timely return the children to the father for the beginning of his summer co-parenting time in 2024. The trial court fined the mother $100.00 for the civil contempt charges. The trial court also ordered the mother to pay the father’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,000.00 for her actions in prolonging the lawsuit and other violations of court orders. Upon careful review, we vacate the two civil contempt charges and resultant fine of $100.00. In all other respects, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, David Keith Gunn, of one count of possessing fifteen grams or more of fentanyl for resale, one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of possessing drug paraphernalia. The Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of incarceration of seventeen years for these offenses. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress the evidence upon which his trial convictions are based. We find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.

A municipal court determined that property owners repeatedly violated a city zoning ordinance restricting vacation rentals in residential areas. The property owners appealed to circuit court, where the matter was consolidated with another action filed by the City against the property owners in which the City was seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The circuit court found the property owners in violation of the zoning ordinance and granted a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, and affirmed the municipal court’s rulings as to the violations. The property owners appeal. In doing so, they advance numerous issues challenging the circuit court’s rulings. While significant briefing deficiencies result in the waiver of the majority of these issues, in considering the issues that are properly before this court, we conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the ordinance. However, because our decision does not fully resolve whether the property owner violated the ordinance, we remand for further proceedings.

The Testator asked her great-niece, a licensed Attorney, to make changes to her will that were to the Attorney’s financial benefit. The Attorney returned to the Testator a revised version of the will, which included the changes requested by the Testator and additional changes. Several months later, the Testator executed the revised will. The Testator’s Nephew, acting as a personal representative, claimed that the Testator lacked capacity and that the new will was a product of undue influence. While the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide which party bore the burden of proof regarding undue influence, the trial court gave the jury a verdict form that definitively indicated that Nephew retained the burden of proof. The jury found in the Attorney’s favor. On appeal, the Nephew presents challenges to several evidentiary rulings as well as a jury instruction concerning the Testator’s capacity, which we affirm. However, Nephew also asserts that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury with respect to his undue influence claim. We conclude that the trial court’s inconsistent instructions regarding the Nephew’s undue influence claim warrant a retrial as to this claim.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court denied Appellant’s 11th motion to recuse, and Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child. By consent of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to twenty-five years’ incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the denial of his pro se “Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus[,] Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence[,] Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Lee Potts, claims the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner claims (1) that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f), which requires that petitioners prove “allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence,” is inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “erects an unconstitutional barrier to relief” and (2) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain and call a use-of-force expert witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Randall Lee Neece, of first degree premeditated murder. On the first day of trial, the Defendant moved for a change of venue, asserting that a newly installed “Victims of Violent Crime” monument outside the courthouse prejudiced prospective jurors. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the denial of a venue change or the adequacy of voir dire but instead contends that the sworn jurors were exposed to extraneous prejudicial information through the monument. Upon our review, we conclude that this claim was not preserved for plenary review and does not warrant plain error relief. We therefore respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This election contest action is before this Court for the second time on appeal. The plaintiff, Robin M. McNabb, initially sought a judgment declaring the August 2022 election for Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge void because the defendant, Gregory H. Harrison, who had received the greatest number of votes, did not meet the one-year “district” residency requirement set forth in Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. After the trial court dismissed Ms. McNabb’s complaint and this Court affirmed the dismissal, our Supreme Court reversed those decisions upon holding that Article VI, Section 4 required a candidate to have been a resident of the municipality for at least one year prior to the election. McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2025) (“McNabb I”). On remand, the trial court declared the election void. Mr. Harrison subsequently filed a motion to set aside that order predicated on a newly enacted statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 16- 18-206, which provides that the McNabb I decision “shall apply prospectively and shall be enforced beginning with the next regularly scheduled election for any affected municipal judgeship after May 21, 2025.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-206(c). Ms. McNabb filed a response opposing Mr. Harrison’s motion, and she filed a motion to amend her complaint wherein she requested that she be declared the “winner” of the August 2022 election. The trial court granted Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside the order and denied Ms. McNabb’s motion to amend her complaint. The trial court found, inter alia, that Ms. McNabb had failed to properly raise a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. Ms. McNabb has appealed. Upon thorough review, we determine that Ms. McNabb sufficiently raised a constitutional challenge to § 16-18-206. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding that Ms. McNabb did not raise a constitutional challenge, vacate the trial court’s grant of Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside, and remand for the trial court to consider the constitutionality of § 16-18-206 and to reconsider Mr. Harrison’s motion to set aside. However, we affirm the trial court’s finding that under the precepts of § 16-18-206, Mr. Harrison was the de facto Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie Richard Martinez, of first degree
felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective
sentence of life imprisonment plus four years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting three different writings attributed to the Defendant as autobiographical rap lyrics;
(3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to amend the especially
aggravated robbery count the morning of trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Kendra
Ivey to testify to double hearsay; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Specific Discovery Request No. 1, which requested materials necessary for his state-funded
expert; and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a final judgment in a divorce action without children. The wife appeals contending the trial judge was biased against her, the judge erred by denying her petition for divorce while granting the husband’s counterpetition for divorce, and the judge erred in allocating marital assets and debts. Finding no error, we affirm.