APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Thomas Mack Arnold, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecutor
made improper statements during the State’s rebuttal argument such that a mistrial was
necessary. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm.

A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim.

In 2014, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of alternate
counts of selling or delivering one-half gram of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public
elementary school, Class A felonies, in addition to other offenses. The trial court merged
the two drug-free zone convictions and sentenced the Defendant to forty years as a Range
II, multiple offender with mandatory one-hundred percent service of the minimum sentence
in the range. In 2022, following amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, the Defendant
filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-17-432(h), which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The
Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court’s ruling was a plain and palpable abuse of
discretion. Upon our review of the oral arguments, applicable law, and the briefs of the
parties, we deny the Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Defendant, Philip Cavitt, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced as a Range II offender to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm.

In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of conspiracy to
possess with the intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of heroin in a drug-free zone,
a Class A felony. Following amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, the Defendant, in
2022, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h), seeking
resentencing of his Range II sentence of twenty-five years, which included a mandatory
minimum service requirement. The trial court found that it could not resentence the
Defendant to a lower release eligibility because such was not authorized by the statutory
language and denied the motion. We grant certiorari to vacate the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Tommy Gayden, filed a single pro se pleading titled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, Motion for Plain Error Review, and Petition for Extraordinary Writ on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.” The trial court summarily denied the motion to correct illegal sentence portion of the pleading for failure to state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1. Treating the two remaining claims as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, the trial court summarily denied the claims because they did not satisfy any of the criteria to reopen a post-conviction proceeding, they were previously waived, and they were raised outside the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of all claims.

Petitioner, Stanley Jefferson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the taking of Petitioner’s DNA. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Leon Denton, was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, and one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years’ confinement. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals that dismissal. After careful review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, Petitioner offers no reasons why the interest of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Dylan Ray Thompson, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus eight years. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions and that the trial court erred in aligning his sentences consecutively. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part, but ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Nearly twenty-three and a half years ago, Phillip Mullins, Petitioner, was convicted of felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to life without parole. State v. Mullins, No. M2002-02977-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 23021402, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 1, 2004). The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief and habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. See Mullins v. Lindamood, No. M2017-00139-CCA-R3-HC, 2017 WL 3332269, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017); Mullins v. State, No. M2008-00332-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 5272573, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for DNA post-conviction relief, a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and a petition for habeas corpus relief. Following several hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for DNA analysis of the evidence; (2) the post-conviction court improperly denied his request for expert funding; (3) the post-conviction court improperly determined his petition for error coram nobis relief was untimely; and (4) the post-conviction court improperly determined his habeas claims were without merit or previously litigated. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a health care liability case that centers around the statutory requirements for the pre-suit notice to be provided to defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 26-121. The trial court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining the pre-suit notice provided in this matter did not substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Roy Garrens, Jr., of especially aggravated kidnapping of a child under thirteen, aggravated assault by strangulation, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping by the possession or threat of the use of a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support one of his aggravated kidnapping convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) failing to merge convictions representing alternative theories of especially aggravated kidnapping; and (2) sentencing the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. Upon our review, we agree with the parties that the Defendant’s kidnapping convictions in Counts 2 and 3 should be merged, and we respectfully remand these counts for entry of corrected judgments noting the merger. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a disputed easement. Appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that Appellee did not possess an easement over Appellant’s property. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that: (1) Appellee had an express easement appurtenant over Appellant’s property; and (2) an increase in traffic due to the normal development of Appellee’s property did not overburden the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a petition for criminal contempt filed by the petitioner, Nikki Sixx, against the respondent, Vanessa Clark, concerning Ms. Clark’s alleged violations of multiple orders of protection. The trial court found Ms. Clark guilty of 100 counts of contempt, sentencing her to 300 days in jail and imposing $5,000 in fines. Ms. Clark has appealed. As a threshold matter, we determine that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. Clark’s challenges to the validity and scope of the underlying orders of protection from which no appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that Ms. Clark has waived any challenges to her bond conditions by failing to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Regarding the trial court’s contempt findings, upon our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment in part, vacating the contempt finding regarding count 7 and subtracting count 43, which was found not to constitute a violation of the order of protection, from the trial court’s total. We also reduce Ms. Clark’s sentence by one day, awarding her the appropriate pretrial jail credit. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reflect a total of 98 counts of contempt. These modifications also require that the judgment reflect total fines of $4,900 and a sentence of 293 days. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action brought by the appellee against the appellant based upon the appellant’s purported breach of a duty to collect and remit to the appellee annual dues owed to it by the appellant’s members. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between two municipalities and the district attorney general responsible for prosecuting cases in the jurisdiction in which the municipalities lie. The district attorney general threatened to cease the prosecution of cases in the courts of the municipalities and stated that he would only continue to do so if the municipalities provided an additional assistant attorney general position for his office or funding for such a position. The district attorney general justifies his threat by citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1), which he asserts requires municipalities to fund additional prosecutorial personnel in order for his duty to prosecute cases in municipal court to be triggered. The municipalities filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and later amended their claims to include a request for declaratory judgment. The trial court ordered that the municipalities were entitled to a declaratory judgment “that they ha[d] provided ‘sufficient personnel’” to the district attorney general and that he could not avoid the responsibility of prosecuting cases “by invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(6).” The trial court also determined that the district attorney general had a “clear statutory mandate” and issued a “peremptory writ of mandamus” compelling the district attorney general to comply with the statute. The district attorney general appeals. Finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103(1)’s “personnel requirement” does not refer to prosecutorial personnel, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. John W. and Kelli W. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Crystal B. (“Mother”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter, Sawyer B. (“the Child”). The juvenile court previously found that Mother committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the Child’s half-sibling from abuse by John B., a man Mother lived with. Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s finding. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she left John B. as soon as she could, although she remained with him for months after the termination petition was filed and continued to contact him. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph George Schenck, appeals the trial court’s summary denial and dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence is illegal because he did not sign the circuit court judgment forms and it was neither explained to him nor announced on the record that he was required to serve 75% of his sentence before he was eligible for work release, furlough, trusty status, or rehabilitative programs. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert L. Hall, Jr., of one count of
possession of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of
unlawful possession of a weapon, and one count of criminal trespass. The trial court
ordered an effective thirty-two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions for felony possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Jullion Fain Culps, appeals from the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing on his effective nine-year sentence. The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the Defendant to serve his sentence on probation, given his age, employment status, and his desire to care for his child. The State asserts that the trial court acted within its discretion by imposing a sentence of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress relating to her interaction with a transit bus operator. We affirm the dismissal.

A home health nurse was injured in an automobile accident while driving her vehicle in connection with her employment. She later sought uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile liability policy issued to her employer. Arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply to the employee’s accident, the insurance carrier moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion. We conclude that the business policy unambiguously limited uninsured motorist coverage to specifically listed automobiles. Because the nurse’s vehicle was not listed, the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply. We further conclude that this policy limitation does not contravene our uninsured motorist statutes. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The Defendant, Billy Gene Sliger, appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child
and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Specifically, he argues that (1) the evidence
was insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction; (2) the trial court erred
by interrupting jury deliberations to inform the jury of the court’s schedule; (3) the State
committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire, opening statement, and closing
arguments; (4) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect an offense for count
two charging rape of a child and instead giving a modified unanimity instruction; and (5)
the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this condemnation action, the trial court entered an order of possession granting to the petitioner city two greenway easements and two construction easements over two tracts of land owned by the respondent corporation. In the order of possession, the court found that the city’s taking was for the public purpose of the city’s greenway project. The corporation filed two successive motions for summary judgment, claiming that because the taking was partially for a private purpose, it violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. The corporation averred that the order of possession required the city to construct parking spaces on one of the corporation’s tracts to replace parking spaces taken from the other tract and that this would yield only a private benefit. The corporation also asserted that the city had abandoned its taking by failing to construct the replacement parking despite the completion of the greenway. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment, determining that the order of possession had not required the city to build replacement parking and that no abandonment had occurred. Following a jury trial regarding compensation, the trial court entered a judgment approving the jury’s monetary award to the corporation with prejudgment interest. The corporation has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the corporation’s request for an award of costs and attorney’s fees on appeal.