APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A self-represented defendant in a divorce case moved to recuse the trial judge. After the trial judge denied the motion, this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. Because the motion for recusal failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the denial of the motion.

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, Harlan V. Ferguson, alias Harley T. Martin, of two counts of vehicular homicide, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, and failure to drive within a single lane of traffic. The trial court merged the vehicular homicide and DUI convictions into one vehicular homicide conviction and imposed an effective ten-year sentence with one year to be served in confinement followed by probation. While Defendant’s direct appeal was pending in this court, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged that newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment. The trial court denied the petition, and this court consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal of his convictions and his appeal from the denial of coram nobis relief. On appeal, Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; (2) the State’s failure to establish the chain of custody of Defendant’s blood samples; (3) the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss due to the destruction of evidence; (4) the trial court’s admission of lay testimony regarding the cause of the victim’s injuries; (5) the trial court’s admission of Defendant’s medical records; (6) the trial court’s exclusion of defense evidence; (7) the trial court’s failure to issue a missing witness instruction; (8) the State’s comments during closing arguments; (9) the State’s failure to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (10) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Tra’Shawn Glass, entered guilty pleas to three counts of vehicular homicide, four counts of drag racing resulting in serious bodily injury, and two counts of reckless aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged various convictions and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve a sentence of full confinement and in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Juwan Jaheim Gaines, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder wherein the victim suffered serious bodily injury, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. He asserts that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense constitutes reversible error, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Reggie Horton, was found guilty in an October 2016 trial of the offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, and simple assault related to conduct occurring on April 27, 2015. State v. Horton, No. W2017-00676-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1598895 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2018), no perm. app. filed. On April 27, 2023, while post-conviction proceedings were pending, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis petition challenging only his conviction of aggravated kidnapping, claiming newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial on this offense. The Petitioner appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing he is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations and the merits of his claim warrant relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

In October 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner, Kenneth Brown, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, twelve counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, twelve counts of aggravated assault, one count of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 308 years. In August 2023, Petitioner filed pro se petitions for post-conviction DNA and fingerprint analysis and a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petitions. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition for post-conviction fingerprint analysis and the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Father and Mother divorced. In ruling upon various matters contested by the parties, the trial court evenly divided Father’s pension without determining whether a portion was separate property, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony, and named Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appeals, asserting error as to all three determinations. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to treat the pre-marriage portion of the pension as separate property. As for the trial court’s alimony award and primary residential parent decision, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the trial court’s order regarding the classification and division of assets, alimony, and primary residential status and remand.

In this post-divorce action, the father sought a reduction of his child support obligation because he had recently lost his employment and two of the parties’ three minor children had become emancipated. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court removed the parties’ two emancipated children from the child support worksheet but increased the father’s child support payment upon finding that the father was willfully unemployed and imputing to him a salary commensurate with his previous wages. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation, the trial court considered the father’s recent tax information, his frequent job changes, his residential arrangements, his long-term failure to exercise his full weekend parenting time with the children, and the cost of his leisure travel. The trial court also imputed the proscribed statutory salary amount to the mother, who was not employed at the time of trial. Although both parties appeared pro se at the trial, the trial court entered an order granting the mother’s request for attorney’s fees without including an explanation of how the court determined the reasonableness of the fees. The father has appealed. Despite his pro se status before this Court, the father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal, claiming that an out-of-state attorney prepared his appellate briefs. Upon thorough review, we deny the father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal because the attorney who allegedly prepared the father’s briefs did not sign the briefs or otherwise file an appearance with this Court as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for a written order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Flamini, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of possession with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell one-half gram or more
of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; and possession with the intent to manufacture,
deliver, or sell less than fifteen grams of fentanyl, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-
17-434 (2018) (possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell methamphetamine);
39-17-417 (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (possession with the intent to
manufacture, deliver, or sell fentanyl). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a
Range II offender and imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years and ten years,
respectively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) erred by denying
his motion to suppress, (2) erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, and (3) violated his
right to remain silent by admitting evidence related to a civil asset forfeiture proceeding.
We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of an asset forfeiture order.
However, we, likewise, conclude that the error was harmless and affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

I join the court’s judgment affirming the convictions and agree with much of the reasoning in the lead opinion. I write separately, however, to express my respectful disagreement with how the lead opinion treats the trial court’s error in admitting evidence that the Defendant did not contest the asset forfeiture order.

The lead opinion considers the Defendant to have preserved for appeal his constitutional issue concerning the admission of the civil forfeiture order, although it ultimately subjects the issue to a relevancy analysis. I respectfully disagree that the constitutional claim on appeal was preserved in the trial court. The Defendant’s non-contemporaneous reference to his right to remain silent arguably preserved a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim. The problem for the Defendant, however, is that he raises a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim on appeal that was never presented to or ruled upon by the trial court. As such, the issue concerning the admission of the civil forfeiture order is waived, and the Defendant is not otherwise entitled to relief. For this reason, I concur only in the result of the lead opinion as to this issue. I fully join the lead opinion as to the other issues raised by the Defendant.

The Defendant, Jonnella Risharra Hambrick, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault and received an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her the right to counsel at the trial and by imposing a sentence without her being present. Because we agree that the Defendant was denied her right to counsel and that she had a constitutional right to be present for sentencing, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of her proffered expert for failure to comply with the locality rule. Plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary of judgment based on the exclusion of that expert. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, we affirm that ruling. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment as the excluded testimony was the only evidence offered regarding the applicable standard of care.

Following a bench trial in this divorce action, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court entered a permanent parenting plan order, designating the wife as the primary residential parent to the parties’ four minor children and granting the husband 144 days of annual residential co-parenting time. In what the court found to be an equitable division of the marital estate, it awarded to the wife $303,260.00 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of the marital residence and her marital share of the husband’s military retirement. The husband received $274,097.10 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of an unimproved parcel of real property. The court directed that the wife would be responsible for the mortgage owed on the marital residence but also directed that the wife would not be required to refinance the mortgage debt until the youngest child had reached the age of eighteen years. Finding the wife to be the economically disadvantaged spouse and expressly finding that she was not voluntarily underemployed, the court awarded to her $5,000.00 monthly in transitional alimony for a period of six years, to be offset by her share of the husband’s military retirement benefits upon his retirement. However, the court specified that “[t]he amount of $5,000.00 is a global amount which shall include the child support obligation owed by [the husband].” Based on the child support guidelines, the court ordered the husband to pay $1,992.00 monthly in child support. The court further awarded to the wife $10,127.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment with the minor modification of an added provision stating that the wife will indemnify and hold the husband harmless for the mortgage debt on the marital residence until it is paid in full or refinanced. We also award to the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Petitioner, Randall L. Pruitt, entered open guilty pleas to three counts of rape, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight and one-half years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentences on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him of his potential sentences by pleading guilty without a sentencing agreement with the State. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff after a bench trial in an auto accident case. The trial court declined to award the plaintiff all of the damages she sought because it concluded that her most significant injury, a torn rotator cuff, was not caused by the auto accident at issue. The plaintiff then filed a motion to recuse and to set aside the judgment due to a friendship between the trial judge’s son and counsel for the defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The main issues in this post-divorce appeal concern the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. In addition to the post-divorce proceedings, the husband filed a declaratory judgment petition to determine the amount he owed the wife under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The husband and the wife then engaged in protracted litigation to determine the amount owed. The husband later amended the declaratory judgment petition to include a request to modify alimony. The parties resolved the declaratory judgment petition by providing the trial court with an amount upon which they agreed. The husband then voluntarily nonsuited the petition to modify alimony. Both parties sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA. The trial court determined that the husband was the successful party in the declaratory judgment action and that there was no successful party in the request to modify alimony. The court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, asserting that she was the successful party in both actions and that the court should have awarded her attorney’s fees to her. The wife also challenged discovery sanctions entered against her. First, we determine that the declaratory judgment action did not fall under the fee provision of the parties’ MDA. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the husband to be the successful party in that action; we affirm the portion of the order declining to award either party attorney’s fees. Next, based upon a recent decision of our Supreme Court, we determine that the wife was the successful party in the petition to modify alimony and reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary. We affirm the imposition of discovery sanctions.

The Defendant, Jacorey Tyvon Forte, was found guilty by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated robbery, and he received a sentence of eleven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of this offense. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

The Petitioner, David Sands, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his sentence has expired due to “missing” pretrial jail credit and improper calculation of behavioral and work credits. After review, we affirm.

A hospital system filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking invalidation of two TennCare State Plan Amendments on the basis that they violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-108. The two State Plan Amendments set forth reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court declared that the TennCare State Plan Amendments were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

In June 2021, the Shelby County Grand Jury issued a three-count indictment charging Roy Frazier II (“Defendant Frazier”) with two counts of aggravated rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and Bionka McGaughy (“Defendant McGaughy”) with child abuse or neglect of a child eight years of age or less (Count 3). Following a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Frazier of aggravated rape of a child in Count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count 2, for which he received a sentence of life without parole plus twenty years. The jury convicted Defendant McGaughy of child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of two years to be served in the workhouse. On appeal, Defendant Frazier contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting multiple hearsay statements; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; (4) the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors in sentencing; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing. For her part, Defendant McGaughy argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for child neglect of a child eight years of age or less. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction in all respects.

Defendant, Valerie Garrett, was convicted following a bench trial of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and failure to maintain lane of travel. Defendant claims that the deputy who arrested her lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A hospital system that was the aggrieved party in this contested case before The Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration sought judicial review of the agency’s decision upholding the validity of two TennCare rules. The two rules regulate reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court reversed the agency’s decision and held that the two rules were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order.