APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only to elaborate on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, versus how it may be used. 

The extrinsic evidence at issue in this case is Mr. Smith’s deposition testimony. During the deposition, the State’s counsel asked Mr. Smith whether it was his “understanding that it was within Pharma’s ability and Pharma’s sole determination to decide what conferences were feasible to produce?” Mr. Smith responded, “Yes.” Discussing this evidence, the majority opinion says that evidence of “a party’s subjective views on the contract’s meaning . . . should not be considered.”

A husband filed for divorce from his wife in 2022. Just before they were set to go to trial in July of 2023, the parties settled their divorce and announced their agreement to the trial court. Before the written consent judgment could be entered, however, the wife filed a notice revoking her consent to the agreement. The trial court entered the judgment regardless, and the wife later filed a motion to set that judgment aside. The trial court denied the wife’s motion, and she appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to forty years in incarceration after stabbing his neighbor, the victim, several times. Defendant represented himself at trial and now represents himself on appeal. He raises a variety of issues including: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (4) whether the trial court should have granted a continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding a statement; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed a witness to use a “script”; (7) whether the State violated Brady, Napue, or Giglio; (8) whether the State improperly used Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment; (9) whether Defendant was denied access to court; (10) whether the trial court properly limited Defendant’s use of an intake video; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury; (12) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (13) whether Defendant was denied compulsory process; (14) whether the trial court should have recused itself; (15) whether the appellate record was transmitted in error; (16) whether the sentence is excessive; and (17) whether cumulative error requires reversal of the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a judgment upholding a decision by the Administrative Procedures Division of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services denying the appellant an award of reasonable expenses after a contested case hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-301, et. seq. Upon the appellant seeking judicial review, the trial court affirmed the decision by the Department. We affirm.

A father and mother appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their two minor children. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of each parent’s rights based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions which led to removal, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Pharma Conference Education, Inc., entered into an agreement with the University of Tennessee Health Science Center to produce as many pharmaceutical continuing education programs “as is feasible.” The Health Science Center terminated the agreement before any programs were held. When Pharma sued to enforce the agreement, the State argued that the agreement lacked consideration and therefore was not a valid contract. The question in this appeal is whether a promise to produce as many programs “as is feasible” constitutes consideration or instead is an illusory promise. We hold that this promise constitutes adequate consideration. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the Claims Commission for further proceedings.

After a hearing before the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission, the appellant homeowner was ordered to remove a covered porch addition that was constructed without a preservation permit, as the Commission determined that the addition did not comply with the applicable design guidelines. The homeowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the chancery court held a de novo hearing on the matter. After the evidentiary hearing, the chancery court likewise determined that the unpermitted covered porch did not meet the applicable design guidelines, and the court ordered its removal. The homeowner appeals, arguing that her due process rights were violated due to untimely notice of the hearing before the Commission and that the chancery court erred in finding that her covered porch was not in compliance with the guidelines. We affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Nancy Abbie Tallent, was convicted by an Anderson County
Circuit Court jury of third offense driving under the influence (DUI) of an intoxicant and
third offense DUI per se. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401. The trial court merged the
convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in
confinement, with seventy-five percent service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that
(1) the trial court judge did not have authority to preside over her case; (2) no probable
cause existed for her arrest; (3) the State violated her right to a speedy trial; (4) she was
denied due process in numerous ways; (5) the State failed to meet its burden of proof; (6)
the jury verdict was not supported by the evidence; and (7) the trial court failed to act as a
thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the change of custody and the relocation of a parent, as well as an evidentiary issue concerning the denial of the admission of certain psychiatric records. Because the mother failed to provide an offer of proof in connection with the juvenile court’s ruling concerning the inadmissibility of the psychiatric records, we conclude that this evidentiary issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. Regarding the remaining issues, the juvenile court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred and modified the parenting plan by designating the father as the primary residential parent and providing the father with the majority of the parenting time. Because we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting plan, we affirm the juvenile court’s modification. Furthermore, as discussed herein, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision permitting the father to relocate.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant class action certification. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to certify the class at issue, we affirm.

This case arises from a car wreck. Following the accident, the at-fault driver was issued several citations for various violations of the City of Memphis traffic laws. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellee’s lawsuit was not time barred. In so ruling, the trial court held that the citations given to the at-fault driver were criminal in nature and, thus, triggered the filing extension contemplated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(2)(A). We granted this interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Because the citations in this case were civil in nature, we conclude that the two-year statute of limitations is not applicable, and Appellee’s lawsuit is time-barred. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order granting Appellant’s motion for summary judgment.

This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured schoolteacher. The trial court determined that the termination constituted an impermissible second punishment for conduct for which the schoolteacher had previously been suspended and ordered his reinstatement. Finding that the termination letter charged the schoolteacher with conduct which was not contemplated in the suspension letter, and with conduct which had not occurred at the time of the suspension, we reverse.

The Defendant, Jimmy Richard Burrow II, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule V controlled substance, a Class E felony; and possession of a firearm after a felony drug conviction, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-1003 (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (aggravated burglary), 39-17-434(a)(4) (2018) (possession of methamphetamine), 39-17-417(a)(4) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (possession of a Schedule V controlled substance), 39-17-1307(c)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm). He received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement but was subsequently released to a residential drug recovery program. The Defendant violated the terms and conditions of the recovery program, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternative sentencing and the Defendant’s amenability to future rehabilitation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee filed a petition to modify parenting time and child support, and Appellant filed a countermotion and a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B motion for recusal of the trial judge. The trial court did not enter an order on Appellant’s motion for recusal, and there was no order transferring the case to another judge by interchange. The new judge made substantive rulings, and Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend asserting that the judge lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rules 11 and 10B were not met. We agree. Vacated and remanded.

Mother appeals the trial court’s ruling approving her request to relocate with the parties’ older daughter but denying her request with regard to the parties’ younger son. We affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryan Anthony Capps, of two counts of sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count of violating the Sexual Offender Registry. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to show that the Defendant qualified as an authority figure or that he conducted an overnight visit at a residence with minors present; (2) the trial court’s oath as administered to the minor witnesses, which included a “pinky promise,” amounted to an improper comment on their credibility; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to question a defense witness about felony convictions more than ten years old; and (4) the trial court erred by denying split confinement and by imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Lynell Sims, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, in exchange for a Range II sentence of eight years, with the manner of service left to the trial court’s determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the entire eight-year sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sentence of total confinement.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sergio Rangel, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to four years, suspended to three years of supervised probation following twelve months of confinement. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the correct conviction offense. 

This appeal arises from an action to recover excess proceeds from the tax sale of a parcel of real property. After the redemption period had ended, the appellants, heirs to the decedent whose property was sold at the tax sale, moved to claim the excess proceeds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2702. The appellee, a company that had held a valid judgment lien against the real property at the time of the tax sale, also moved to claim the excess proceeds, arguing that its lien held priority over the heirs’ claim pursuant to § 67-5-2702(c)(2). The heirs objected, asserting that because the company had allowed its judgment lien to lapse after the tax sale, the company no longer maintained priority to claim the excess proceeds from that sale. The trial court granted the company’s motion, determining that because its judgment lien had been valid and enforceable at the time of the tax sale, the company maintained priority over the heirs to receive the excess proceeds pursuant to § 67-5-2702(c)(2). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

After the denial of a motion to suppress, Charles Ivie Porter, Defendant, pled guilty to two counts of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell in exchange for the dismissal of seven additional drug charges in two separate cases.  He received an effective sentence of twelve years in incarceration.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties reserved a certified question of law for appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).  After a review, we determine that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed because the petition for recusal appeal was untimely and the time for filing a petition for recusal appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by this court. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.08. We also find that the petition would have to be dismissed due to numerous and substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B § 2.02, including the failure to file a copy of the affidavit in support of the motion for recusal as well as the trial court’s order denying recusal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Laverick Clark, of one count of attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of stalking. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial and when it sentenced him. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This case involves an unlawful detainer action filed by a community development center against a tenant for failure to pay rent and for unruly conduct.  The detainer action ultimately resulted in the tenant’s eviction and a monetary judgment against the tenant for delinquent rent payments.  The tenant now appeals the judgment of the trial court.  Because the tenant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Travis Andrew Harris, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon convicted of a violent crime. The trial court imposed an
effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the
evidence at trial as to his premeditation and identity was insufficient to support his murder
conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and affirm Defendant’s
conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) persistence of conditions which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision.