APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for injunctive relief and damages
stemming from a boundary line dispute. The defendant, a farming corporation, executed a
deed containing a written description that included an 11.28-acre area of land which lies
along the southern border of its property. The plaintiffs became aware of the deed and
filed this action, alleging that they owned the 11.28 acres at issue. Both parties claimed to
have paid taxes on the disputed area for many years. The plaintiffs had their property
surveyed, and the surveyor determined that they owned the disputed area. The farm had
its property surveyed twice. Those surveyors agreed the farm owned the disputed area.
The chancery court found that both parties had paid taxes on the disputed area for at least
the preceding 20 years. The chancery court also determined that the surveys provided by
the defendant farm accurately reflected the boundary line at issue and found it owned the
disputed area. The court also made an alternative holding that the farm had acquired the
disputed property by adverse possession. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

In May 2024, the Petitioner, Laura Naomi Clifton, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor via electronic means, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence
of concurrent two-year sentences, to be served at 30%. The plea agreement specified that
the Petitioner would not be placed on the sex offender registry. After serving her sentence,
the Petitioner was placed on the sex offender registry and forced to comply with its
requirements. Accordingly, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief. During the
hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court offered her time to consider her options.
She went to the parking lot to consider the matter and, while she was outside, the postconviction
court dismissed her petition for failure to prosecute. The Petitioner asked the
post-conviction court to reconsider, and it denied her request. After a review of the record,
we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we remand the case for a hearing
during which the Petitioner should be given the opportunity to pursue her petition for postconviction
relief.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary
dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable
claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his life sentence for first degree
murder is illegal and his judgment of conviction is void because (1) the trial court’s
comments regarding parole eligibility were in direct contravention of the relevant statute
and (2) the statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder
rendered his sentence unfairly disparate and in direct contravention to the purposes and
principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing
Act”). He further claims that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him
counsel despite the Petitioner’s indigent status. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason White, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that the
indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the
intent to sell and deliver within a drug-free school zone, was fatally defective, which
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and rendered the judgments void. Based upon our
review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found multiple
grounds for termination and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. We affirm.

Parents, on behalf of their deceased child, filed a health care liability action against an obstetrician, alleging that the infant’s death was the result of negligent medical treatment during delivery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the parents argue that the trial court erred in: (1) limiting the testimony of their causation expert and excluding his exhibits and demonstrative aids; (2) denying a motion in limine to prohibit a line of questioning and argument by the defense; (3) excluding evidence of the suspension of the defendant’s medical license; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction on informed consent; and (5) declining to grant a new trial based on misconduct of defense counsel during closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Billy Joe Baggett, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Alfonvo Montell Johnson, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, evidence tampering, abuse of a corpse, and attempted abuse of a corpse, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support certain of his convictions and that the absence of an election with regard to the charge of evidence tampering entitles him to a new trial on that offense. Because the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of abuse of a corpse and attempted abuse of a corpse, we reverse those convictions and dismiss the charges. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant, Keith Richardson, appeals his Perry County Circuit Court convictions of five counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest, four counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count each of continuous sexual abuse of a child, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated rape, (2) he did not properly waive his right to a jury trial pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 23, and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we remand the Defendant’s judgments of conviction for rape in count 21and statutory rape in count 22for the entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant and Appellee agreed ona permanent parenting planthat provided for equal parenting timeof their minorchildafter their divorce.Appellee later sought to relocate with the childto pursue an employment opportunityin Georgia.One hundred four days after Appellee filed a relocation petition, Appellant filedan answer opposing the relocation. Thetrialcourt permitted the relocationand struck Appellant’s opposition because it was filedafter the expiration of the thirty-day period set forth inTennesseeCode Annotated section 36-6-108.The courtamended the parties’ parenting accordingly.Onappeal, Appellantargues the trial court erred in striking his response as untimely.We affirm thejudgment of the trial court.

The appellant filed the instant action seeking a copy of the property management contract between her condominium association and its property management company. The trial court determined that “a contract between a condominium association and its management company would not be included in those records that a condominium association would be required to provide to a unit owner.” The court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The appellant appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner, Roy Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
asserting his case should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing or, alternatively, that
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,
we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the husband is
a business owner and that his business, known as Choice Pool Care, LLC, constituted a
marital asset. It then awarded the wife “a 20% share of the business.” However, the trial
court did not value the marital asset. The husband appeals, insisting that the trial court
erred in finding the existence of a marital asset and in its equitable division of the asset.
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the husband’s
ownership interest in the LLC as marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s ruling
regarding equitable division of the asset and remand for the trial court to value the asset
prior to equitably dividing the marital estate. The trial court’s rulings regarding child
support and alimony are likewise vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the
further proceedings that are necessary as to the division of the marital estate.

This extraordinary appeal involves whether a non-attorney individual may file a notice of
appeal in the Shelby County General Sessions Court on behalf of a limited liability
corporation. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the appeal
on this basis. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for
dismissal.

A property owner brought suit against the owner of a neighboring property, seeking either an order awarding her land encompassing a driveway or an easement to use the driveway. The trial court referred the issues to a special master, who made detailed findings regarding the boundary between the properties and as to the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. Following a hearing on objections to the special master’s report, the trial court accepted the special master’s findings and recommendations. The neighbor appealed, raising issues regarding the court’s weighing of the evidence in finding the boundary line and granting of a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. We affirm.

Mortgage companies maintain that the Tennessee Housing Development Agency(“THDA”), which services mortgages through the trade name of Volunteer Mortgage Loan Servicing(“VMLS”), is liable for monetary losses following the use of an improper bank account number. THDA and VMLS contend that they are protected by sovereign immunity and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion because it found THDA was engaged in commercial activities. THDA and VMLS appealed. We reverse.

Defendant, Bruce Allen Watts, appeals the trial court’s decision revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his effective fourteen-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jereme Walker Amis, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of a firearm after having been convicted ofa felony crime of violence, a Class B felony, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of felony drug offense, a Class C felony, and violating the conditions of his community supervision, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions ofpossessing a firearm and sentenced himto an effective sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendantcontends thatthe trial court committed plain errorby refusing to accept his offer to stipulate tohis prior felony convictions,that the trial court abused its discretionby denying his request to bifurcatethe chargeofviolating the conditions of his community supervision, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Thomas Koontz, appeals the judgment of the Criminal Court for Hamblen County revoking his probation and ordering execution of his original eight‑year,
six‑month sentence. He argues that the trial court (1) imposed an illegal sentence by altering his release eligibility from thirty percent to one hundred percent, and (2) failed to make the requisite findings on the record to justify ordering him to serve the entire sentence in confinement. Following our review of the record, the arguments and briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated his probation and the revocation of probation; however, the trial court failed to articulate sufficient findings regarding the consequences imposed, as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Because the record is insufficiently developed for meaningful de novo review, we remand for entry of findings on the record consistent with Dagnan.

The Defendant, Scott A. Stiner, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-529(soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor)1(2018)(subsequently amended), 39-13-504 (aggravated sexual battery) (2018)(subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective fifty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1)he did not receive a fair trial because the allegations and acts that constitute the basis of the convictions were different than the allegations in the indictment and the bill of particulars;(2) the court erred by failing to sever the offenses during the trial; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age conviction in Count 6;(4) he did not receive a unanimous verdict for aggravated sexual battery in Count 3; (5) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) the court erred in admitting evidence in contravention of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) the court erred in admitting a diagram that was not properly authenticated; (8)the court erred by allowing expert testimony that went beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise; and (9) the court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing on all counts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s judgments and legal conclusions, save for one issue. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion regarding the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of an uncharged sexual assault of a baby pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I would find that the introduction of this evidence was in error; however, I would further find that the error was harmless in these circumstances and would affirm the convictions despite the error.

The pro se Petitioner, Verchaunt Joshua Williams, has filed an application for permission to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, Sec. 10(B). For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby denies the Petitioner’s application.

The Defendant, Mawule Tepe, has filed a pro se petition seeking the recusal of
Bradley County General Sessions Court Judge Clayton Collins and Bradley County
Criminal Court Judge Andrew M. Freiberg from presiding over any of the Defendant’s
pending proceedings in those courts. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. We have
determined that an answer from the State is not necessary. Id. §2.05 (“[i]f the appellate
court, based upon its review of the petition and supporting documents, determines that no
answer from the other parties is needed, the court may act summarily on the appeal”).
Following our review, the Defendant’s petition is summarily DISMISSED.