APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Lamar Lanair Denson, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of the sale of fentanyl, a Class C felony; possession of heroin with intent to sell or
deliver, a Class B felony; possession of fentanyl with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C
felony; possession of a firearm by one with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense, a
Class C felony; maintaining a dwelling for the unlawful selling of controlled substances, a
Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration followed by five years
on supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss Count 5 of the indictment, a charge related
to the sale of fentanyl, due to the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (2) reopening
the proof to allow the State to enter into evidence a stipulation regarding the defendant’s
status as having a prior conviction that would disqualify him from possessing a firearm .
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,
we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County grand jury convicted the defendant, Todd Lee White, of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and resisting arrest, for which he received an
effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress and in sentencing him as a Range III persistent
offender. After reviewing the record, hearing oral argument, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss Appellant’s healthcare liability action based on its finding that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Appellant appeals. We affirm.

Defendants appeal from a final judgment in a dispute over a construction contract. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This is an action to enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of stock in a corporation formed to purchase a parcel of commercial real estate. The plaintiff alleged that he helped obtain financing for the purchase in exchange for 50% of the company. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff had only an option to buy a 50% interest within one year of closing. The trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony and awarded him a judgment for his share of the company’s profits. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This appeal arises from post-divorce petitions and counterpetitions for enforcement and modification of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”), and permanent parenting plan (the “PPP”). The dispositive issue on appeal is whether either party is the prevailing party for the purpose of recovering his or her attorney’s fees. Because the final decree of divorce incorporated a mandatory dispute resolution provision, we must first determine whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party concerning claims “to procure enforcement” of the MDA or PPP. We then consider whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), (the “Statute”), which has a broader application but is discretionary. During the pendency of the action, the defendant/father delivered two checks to the plaintiff/mother, one in satisfaction of the mother’s claim for past due child support and a second check in satisfaction of her claim for past due alimony. Thereafter, the remaining claims went to mediation, after which the parties approved an agreed order resolving all remaining claims except attorney’s fees, reserving the fee issue for the trial court. Each party, claiming to be the prevailing party, sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that “[s]ince both parties were awarded their beneficial, judicial relief that materially altered the other party’s behavior, the court cannot consider either party the sole ‘prevailing party.’” Thus, neither was awarded any attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Because the father paid the child support and alimony arrearages after the mother filed her petition and motion to enforce the MDA and PPP, we find that the mother is the prevailing party on the enforcement claims, for which she is contractually entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the MDA. As for the respective claims and defenses related to modification of the MDA and PPP, for which the Statute applies, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees based on the finding that neither party can be considered the prevailing party. Thus, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to award the mother a judgment for the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs she incurred to enforce the father’s obligations to pay child support and alimony pursuant to the MDA 03/13/2026 - 2 - and PPP. Because neither party can be considered the sole prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests to recover their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Dewaine Love, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he is entitled to relief because his multiple convictions
violate due process and double jeopardy protections and that his sentence is unlawful
because it was imposed without the preparation of a presentence report. Upon our review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner’s notice of appeal was
untimely and that the interest of justice does not mandate waiver of the requirement. The
appeal is dismissed.

This is a dispute between a neighborhood homeowners’ association (“HOA”) and a homeowner in the HOA’s neighborhood. On remand after a prior appeal, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner appealed the declaratory judgment and then filed multiple motions in the trial court seeking inherent authority sanctions and costs against certain attorneys who had been involved in the case. The trial court denied the motions, and the homeowner appealed those determinations. We affirm the trial court’s decisions in all respects.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Jomo Kenyatta Berry, of one count of
attempted first-degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission
of a dangerous felony, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
one count of aggravated stalking, two counts of vandalism, three counts of reckless
endangerment, one count of theft, one count of burglary of a vehicle, one count of
attempted second-degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he
received an effective sentence of forty-one years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant
contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for
aggravated assault. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion
to sever, the trial court failed to give complete and accurate jury instructions, and improper
argument by the State affected the verdict. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms
in counts five, eight, eleven, and fourteen. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Justin Lloyd, for review of the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to revoke his pretrial bond. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

Defendant, Demontrey Monquisze Logsdon, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with two co-defendants, for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, along with several other charges. Defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts as charged, and Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to plain error relief based on the admission of testimony by a detective who did not conduct the cell phone data extraction about which he testified. Defendant asserts he was denied his right to confront the witness who conducted the extraction. Because Defendant did not establish plain error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, George Harris Patterson, III, who was described at oral argument as a First Amendment Auditor, was indicted for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assault on a first responder after an incident at a Davidson County Post Office. A jury found Defendant not guilty of resisting arrest but guilty of disorderly conduct and assault. Defendant appeals, raising several issues. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute under the First Amendment as applied to him, the trial court’s failure to give a special jury instruction, the trial court’s admission of a piece of evidence and testimony from a postal employee, and the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial. He also insists he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tommy Lynn Hollingsworth, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the revocation of the defendant’s probation. As to the disposition of the defendant’s probation, while we affirm the judgment of the trial court to order confinement in case number 96-195, the trial court erred in imposing that disposition in case number 96-193, which had expired.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial in probation revocation proceedings attached on December 26, 2024, which is when the July 8, 2002 violation of probation warrant was served and the Defendant was arrested. In Allen, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “a probation revocation proceeding is a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and as such, the defendant . . . has a constitutional right to a speedy trial on ‘the offense of violation of the terms of probation.’” Allen v. State, 505 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1974). The Allen court then concluded that the “two year, eight month delay” between the issuance of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing violated the defendant’s right to a trial. Id. at 716-19.

The Carroll County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Dale Maurice Teague, with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 1), possession of marijuana (Count 2), possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia (Count 3), and possession of a prohibited weapon, to wit, knuckles (Count 4). After the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the marijuana count, the jury convicted the Defendant of the remaining offenses, and the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a prohibited weapon, knuckles; (2) the State violated two pretrial orders that resulted in the improper admission of hearsay and prior bad act evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his initial motion to suppress and in denying his motion to reconsider the motion to suppress. After review, we affirm.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two minor children after finding that the mother abandoned the children through failure to support and subjected the children to severe abuse. The mother appeals to this Court, and, discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant was charged with first degree premeditated murder after shooting and
killing the victim during an argument. The Defendant was tried before a jury, and the trial
court instructed the jury on the defense of self-defense. The jury convicted the Defendant
of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to five years of incarceration, suspended after the service of eleven months,
twenty-nine days. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
allowing an eyewitness to offer opinion testimony, simultaneously infringing on the
Defendant’s constitutional right to not testify, and that the trial court erred in ordering the
Defendant to serve a portion of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth George Arnold, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape,
aggravated sexual battery, and sexual battery by an authority figure, for which he is serving
an effective thirteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court
erred in denying relief on his claims that he received the ineffective assistance of pretrial,
trial, and appellate counsel and that relief was required due to the cumulative effect of
multiple instances of deficient performance by his attorneys in the conviction proceedings.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Michael Sneed, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of the sale of methamphetamine in an amount over 0.5 gram, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a), (c)(1) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a sixteen-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant, a Range II offender, contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Justin Johnson-a/k/a Straight Drop, appeals his convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the admission of photographs of the victim’s body at the crime scene and during the autopsy, the trial court’s denial of his request to sit at counsel table during trial, and the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments. Defendant also contends that he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of multiple errors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendants Pauline Virginia Spalding and Charles Martin Johnson were jointly indicted for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and impersonating a police officer. The Defendants were tried together by a jury, and the jury convicted both Defendants as charged. The trial court sentenced Ms. Spalding to fifteen years for the kidnapping conviction, three years for the assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the impersonation conviction. The trial court ordered Ms. Spalding’s sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective term of incarceration of fifteen years. The trial court sentenced Mr. Johnson to seventeen years for the kidnapping conviction, four years for the assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the impersonation conviction. The trial court ordered Mr. Johnson’s sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective term of incarceration of seventeen years. In this consolidated direct appeal, Mr. Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and also contends that his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Ms. Spalding contends that the trial court erred in denying the admission of certain evidence; that purported dishonesty from one of the jurors during voir dire entitles her to a new trial; and that the trial court erred in sentencing her. We affirm.

A father filed several documents in the Juvenile Court for Madison County (the “trial court”) seeking, inter alia, parenting time with his minor child. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, and the father filed a timely appeal to this Court. Because the father’s brief fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure addressing briefing, father waives any issues purportedly raised. This appeal is dismissed.

A music publisher sued a musician for breach of contract. The musician, saddled with legal fees related to this litigation, eventually filed for bankruptcy and claimed certain musical works as his own intellectual property during the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties settled by agreeing that ownership rights to a subset of the musician’s songs would be transferred to the publisher. Subsequently, the publisher contacted a licensing agency in pursuit of royalties, claiming ownership of more songs than were actually provided for under the settlement. The musician objected to the licensing agency, asserting that the publisher misrepresented the breadth of works it obtained in the settlement. This led to a second lawsuit with the music publisher asserting breach of contract against the musician. The musician filed a counterclaim against the publisher in this second lawsuit, asserting that the publisher’s communications with the licensing agency amounted to tortious interference with the musician’s existing and prospective business relationships. The publisher sought to dismiss the musician’s counterclaim under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The trial court dismissed the publisher’s TPPA petition. The publisher appeals the denial of its TPPA petition. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order denying relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.