APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a long-running divorce case on appeal to this Court for the third time. The husband
raises several issues concerning the trial court’s classification of the parties’ interests and
award of attorney’s fees to the wife. We affirm.

Petitioner/Mother seeks accelerated review of the trial court’s denial of her 12^th motion to recuse. A final judgment has been entered in the underlying termination of parental rights case, and Mother has appealed that judgment.  Issues related to the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion to recuse may be raised in Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s final judgment.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Petitioner/Mother seeks accelerated review of the trial court’s denial of her 13^th motion to recuse. Because a final judgment has been entered in the underlying termination of parental rights case, and Mother has appealed that judgment, issues related to the trial court’s denial of Mother’s recusal motion may be raised in her appeal of the final judgment.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

The Appellant, Howard Jefferson Atkins, acting pro se, appeals from the Tipton County
Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error
in a juvenile transfer order entered in 2000. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the
briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jacquet Moore, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his underlying conviction for aggravated rape. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) perform adequate investigation in preparation for trial, including seeking funds for investigative services, and (2) effectively impeach the victim on cross-examination. As a preliminary matter, we remanded the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of an amended order to include sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on these two issues. After our review of the amended order, as well as the issues presented by the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights, the trial court determined
that clear and convincing evidence supported termination as to two statutory grounds:
abandonment by failure to visit and persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s
removal. The trial court did not find clear and convincing evidence to support the alleged
ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical
custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined that
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed,
contesting the termination of her parental rights and additionally arguing that the adoptive
father lacked standing to file the petition due to his criminal history and the fact that he is
not legally related to the child. Upon review, we determine that the adoptive father had
standing to file the termination petition because he had maintained physical custody of the
child for nearly a year before filing the termination petition. As to termination of the
mother’s parental rights, we reverse the trial court’s determination that the petitioners had
failed to establish the statutory ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to
assume legal and physical custody of the child. Accordingly, we find that statutory ground
also supports termination of the mother’s parental rights. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant, James Andrew Paige, appeals from his convictions for three counts of rape, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by(1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2)admitting the victim’s hearsay statements; and (3) failing to inquire into defense counsel’s unintentional contact with a juror or declare a mistrial. Defendant also avers that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal concerning the scope of a commercial property insurance policy and whether the insured has stated sufficient facts to invoke coverage. The insurer filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the policy at issue did not provide coverage for the insured’s claimed losses. The insured filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy provided coverage and asserting a breach of contract claim. The insurer filed a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied. We granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. After interpreting the policy, we determine that the insured failed to invoke coverage, and we reverse the trial court’s contrary finding. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, finding that the counterclaim sufficiently stated a claim for a declaratory judgment. Because the pleadings had not closed when the trial court ruled on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises out of a health care liability claim. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury entered a verdict in favor of the appellee-defendant. The appellant-plaintiff appeals the trial court’s acceptance of two of defendant’s expert witnesses. Upon diligent review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant’s causation expert witness to testify about his interpretation of a diagnostic image when his opinion about that image had not been properly disclosed as required by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also conclude that this error more probably than not affected the judgment. We further conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant’s standard-of-care expert witness to testify despite not satisfying the locality rule contained in the Health Care Liability Act. However, we conclude that this error did not more probably than not affect the judgment. We vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for a new trial.

Following a bench trial, Deviest Patton (“Appellant”) was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court ordered Appellant to be diagnosed and evaluated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a)(1). Upon completion of the evaluation, the State filed a complaint for judicial commitment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered Appellant to be judicially committed. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by ordering judicial hospitalization. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The father of the minor child appeals the termination of his parental rights. The paternal aunt and uncle, who sought custody of the minor child, appeal the denial of their motion to intervene. We affirm both decisions.

The circuit court determined that two grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but concluded that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The petitioners appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.

Defendant, Todd Allen Burrows, Jr., appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michele Lee Ridgeway, pled guilty to two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years suspended to supervised probation. Thereafter, the Defendant allegedly violated the terms of her probation by possessing drug paraphernalia in her residence. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the State proved that she violated the conditions of her suspended sentences; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking her probation as a consequence of the alleged violation. Upon our review, we conclude that the State did not prove that the Defendant violated the terms of her probation. Because we resolve the appeal on that basis, we do not reach the second issue. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the revocation order and remand the case for dismissal of the revocation proceedings.

Defendant, Joshua Daniel Gibbons, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of disorderly conduct, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erredin its instructions to the jury. We find that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on a mode of disorderly conduct not included in the charging instrument and that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictionunder either mode of liability charged to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

This action involves the trial court’s denial of a petition for termination of a biological
father’s parental rights to his minor child. We now affirm.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Cordero Klein Blake, of driving while
under the influence (“DUI”) of marijuana, first offense, possession of a handgun while
under the influence, driving on a suspended license, speeding, violation of registration law,
and violation of financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed a total effective
sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to community corrections
supervision following service of seven days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI and possession
of a handgun while under the influence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a Rule 10B interlocutory appeal of the denial of a second recusal motion. We find, as the trial court did, that the second motion is repetitive of the first and should be denied. We further grant attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal.

The trial court determined Defendants/Appellants were liable for damages arising from
negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. We reverse.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bradley Michael Lesniewski, was convicted of possession of a handgun by a felon; possession of a firearm by a felon-prior felony drug conviction; false imprisonment; evading arrest; possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Heroin); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (0.5 grams or more of Methamphetamine); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Fentanyl); possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving while license is suspended, cancelled, or revoked. For these offenses, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand for the merger of two counts and the entry of corrected judgment forms.

This appeal involves a long-running custody dispute between unmarried parents. In this
latest chapter of the litigation, the father filed a petition to modify, seeking to be named
primary residential parent and/or increase his parenting time. The mother filed a counterpetition,
seeking only a change in decision-making authority. The trial court denied the
father’s petition but did make several changes to the parenting schedule. The trial court
also granted the mother’s request to be named sole decision-maker for educational and
extracurricular decisions and allowed her to obtain passports for the children. Finally, the
trial court ordered the father to pay the mother’s attorney fees. The father appeals. We
vacate in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Bernard Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrianne Smith, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated domestic assault following a bench trial. The Defendant represented himself at these proceedings, although he was appointed an attorney as “counsel to assist,” also known as “standby counsel.” On appeal, the Defendant contends, inter alia, that he did not ask to represent himself, even with the aid of standby counsel, and that the trial court improperly required him to do so against his expressed wishes. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the Defendant that he was denied his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction petitioned for a writ of mandamus. On its own motion, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We affirm.

Seventeen-year-old Antonio Demetrius Adkisson (a.k.a. Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr.) (“the Defendant”) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the fatal shooting of two victims. The Gibson County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) held a transfer hearing and found it appropriate to transfer the Defendant to the Gibson County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to be prosecuted as an adult. After a jury trial, during which the Defendant’s videotaped statements were admitted into evidence, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. See State v. Adkisson, No. W2022-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1252173 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2024). The Defendant requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging (1) the juvenile court lacked probable cause to believe he committed the charged offenses, as required for transfer by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(A), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting his confession at trial because he did not validly waive his right to remain silent and his confession was involuntary. We hold that the Defendant was properly transferred to the trial court. We further hold that the Defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but his confession was unlawfully coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause and thus inadmissible at trial. Having found reversible error on that basis, we vacate the Defendant’s convictions of second-degree murder and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kenneth C. Davis, was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation and received a twelve-year sentence. The Defendant died while his motion for new trial was still pending, which prompted the Defendant’s counsel to file a motion to dismiss on the Defendant’s behalf, arguing that the common law doctrine of abatement ab initio should act to abate the Defendant’s entire case from the inception of the prosecution. The trial court denied the motion, relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Al Mutory, 581 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2019). The Defendant’s counsel filed an appeal from that decision pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the Defendant’s counsel contends that the trial court erred by relying on Al Mutory and declining to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio under these circumstances. Following supplemental briefing, we conclude that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3 to review the issue as presented. Further, we decline to extend the extraordinary judicial remedy of a writ of certiorari. The appeal is dismissed.