APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Christina Lemek Blackwell (“Petitioner”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

James Anthony Andrews, Petitioner, pleaded guilty in this case to two counts of aggravated assault. At the same hearing, Petitioner pleaded guilty to additional charges in another case. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to concurrent eight-year sentences for the aggravated assault charges to run consecutively to a two-year sentence for the charges in the other case—for a total effective sentence of ten years—with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas, and Petitioner applied for probation, which the State opposed. The trial court denied Petitioner’s request for probation, requiring him to serve his ten-year sentence in incarceration. Petitioner subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the case and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s amended petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A man sought to intervene as of right in a family member’s action for partition of real property. The trial court determined that the proposed intervenor did not have an interest in the subject property. So it denied his request to intervene and his other requests for relief. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jason Steven Molthan, appeals from the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence related to his misdemeanor convictions for stalking and harassment, for which he received consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion without the appointment of counsel and a hearing; that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing by finding that his history of criminal activity was extensive; and that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of certain property. Because the trial court’s order contains conflicting findings, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, Bath Fitter Tennessee, Inc. (“Bath Fitter”), appeals the denial of its motion to submit its contract dispute with the homeowner to arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The parties executed a written contract for the installation of a new shower for the homeowner, the parts for which were manufactured in Canada. Both parties signed the contract on the front page of the two-page agreement where the signature lines were provided; however, neither party signed or initialed the arbitration provision that appeared on the back of the contract. Although not explicitly stated in its order, it appears that the trial court denied arbitration based upon the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”), which, at the time of contracting, required that arbitration clauses in residential construction contracts be separately signed or initialed. It is undisputed that the materials installed by Bath Fitter were manufactured in Canada; thus, the transaction involves interstate commerce. For that reason, the FAA applies. Because the FAA does not require signatures or initials to indicate approval of arbitration clauses and preempts conflicting state laws that invalidate otherwise valid arbitration agreements, we reverse and remand with instructions to submit the contract dispute to arbitration pursuant to the FAA and stay proceedings until arbitration is complete.

Petitioner, Christopher David Hodge, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was filed approximately twenty years after his conviction for second degree murder. Because the evidence that Petitioner claims is newly discovered does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime for which he was convicted, he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Vana Mustafa, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his amended petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that, although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was litigated in his motion for new trial and on direct appeal, he is nonetheless entitled to post-conviction relief based on new grounds of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. In addition, he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include these new grounds on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Larry E. McKee, appeals his Bradley County conviction for theft of property valued at more than $1,000, but less than $2,500.  He contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by (1) prohibiting Defendant's trial counsel from cross-examining two witnesses as to the manner in which the landlord of the burglarized property received rent payments from the tenants, (2) refusing to allow trial counsel to explain the relevancy of said line of questioning, and (3) threatening to hold the trial counsel in contempt for continuing to ask the witnesses about such payment methods after the trial court ruled them irrelevant.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Brock Hill, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), brought an action for defamation against the State regarding statements made in connection with a sexual harassment investigation that resulted in the termination of his employment. The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Claims Commission analyzed the potentially defamatory statements and concluded that each statement was time-barred and/or failed as to an essential element of a defamation claim. Regarding statements contained in an “Investigation Summary Memorandum,” the Claims Commission also concluded that Mr. Hill’s defamation claim failed because the document was prepared by a Deputy Commissioner and was, accordingly, protected by absolute executive privilege. We conclude that Mr. Hill adequately alleged defamation such that dismissal of his claim was error and that the existent record and filings do not support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, absolute executive privilege protects the statements contained in the Investigation Summary Memorandum. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

After discovering that her neighbors had built a home on rural property that she owned, the property owner brought an ejectment action to remove them. The neighbors asserted an affirmative defense based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103, which protects against ejectment if the defendant can show adverse possession for seven years. Following a trial, the trial court found that the neighbors had proven adverse possession and set a boundary line of the possessed area, drawing upon an exhibit produced by a surveyor. The property owner asserts that the boundary determined by the trial court was too expansive and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. The neighbors assert that the trial court drew the boundary line in a manner too restrictive, failing to encapsulate the entirety of the area they actually possessed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darrel Hochhalter, who is serving a twenty-two-year sentence for convictions of six counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of rape, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Anthony T. Braden, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court committed plain error in finding that the victim had properly authenticated the video-recorded forensic interview under Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123(b)(1). Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. Richmond S. and Lisa S. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Fentress County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Cory S. (“Father”) to his minor children Dawson S. and Bentley S. (“the Children,” collectively).1 The Children were removed from Father’s custody following an incident in which Bentley was severely injured. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on five grounds, including severe child abuse. Father appeals, arguing among other things that he did not intentionally or knowingly harm Bentley. We vacate the Trial Court’s waiver of a home study of Bentley in Petitioners’ home because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116 requires that such a study be conducted when the child, like Bentley, is unrelated to the prospective adoptive parents.2 Otherwise, we find that each of the grounds for termination found by the Trial Court were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We remand to the Trial Court for a home study to be conducted in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116.

Defendant, Natasha Lynn Bryant Fults, was indicted by a Warren County Grand Jury on two counts of tampering with evidence. See T.C.A. § 39-16-503. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to both counts with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I offender to serve five years incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by not sentencing her to split confinement or alternative sentencing. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ashley Bianca Ruth Kroese, appeals the denial of her motion to correct clerical errors in her judgments. On appeal, she claims the trial court erred by summarily denying her motion and failing to enter corrected judgments to include jail credit for the time she was on home confinement pending trial. Because the record is inadequate for meaningful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in his brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Daniel Joe Otten II, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order to serve the remainder of his five-year sentence in confinement.  Defendant argues that he was denied the right to confront witnesses at the violation hearing and that the trial court improperly based its finding on hearsay evidence without a showing of reliability; that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated the conditions of his release and the trial court applied an incorrect standard by failing to distinguish between failure to report and absconsion; and that the trial court erred by ordering full revocation.  After review, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony without a finding of good cause or reliability.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 

In this post-divorce action, the parents filed cross-petitions to modify the agreed permanent parenting plan concerning their minor child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order determining that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The trial court changed the designation of primary residential parent from mother to father and adopted a new permanent parenting plan, which granted 237 days with the child to the father and 128 days to the mother annually. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

Pro se Petitioner, Shavone D. Page, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. After review, we agree with the trial court that Petitioner has not raised a colorable claim under Rule 36.1, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Benton County jury convicted the Defendant, Jayson Keith Johnson, of reckless homicide and introduction of contraband into a penal institution. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant was a Range III, persistent offender. It also found that consecutive sentences were appropriate and sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. He also asserts that the State did not provide adequate pretrial notice that he would be subject to Range III sentencing. Upon our review, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. However, we respectfully remand the case for the trial court to resentence the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender.

Petitions involving child custody and support were filed in juvenile court. After a juvenile court magistrate ruled on the custody issues, Father filed a request for rehearing before the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E). The juvenile court judge affirmed the decision of the magistrate without explanation or addition. Because neither the juvenile court magistrate nor the juvenile court judge adjudicated the pending child support matter, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Pro se Petitioner, James Allen Gooch, Jr., appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his third motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence is illegal because the State failed to procure a valid arrest warrant. Upon our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has waived this claim for failure to raise it in his trial court motion and that, regardless, this court has already considered and rejected the Petitioner’s argument in a previous appeal. See State v. Gooch, No. M2017-01885-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3414293 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2018), no perm. app. filed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sean Austin Miller, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and received a sentence of ten years in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the Defendant touched the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. We affirm.