APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Thomas Dequan Solomon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in
confinement. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by basing its
decision merely on proof of alleged criminal conduct prior to the filing of formal charges
and without considering his history of supervision while on probation. After review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andrew Martin Robbs, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence per
se, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2020). The trial
court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to
probation after 120 days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified
question of law challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit of complaint in support of the
arrest warrant. Because the certified question fails to identify the scope and limits of the
legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua James Smith, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his conviction and sentence, but the State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because his notice of appeal was untimely. Upon our review, we agree that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing requirement. We respectfully dismiss the appeal.

I ultimately concur in the majority’s judgment dismissing this appeal. I write
separately simply to address the majority’s Part B consideration of why waiver of the
timeliness requirement is not in the interest of justice. Candidly, Defendant did not ask for
such consideration, let alone attempt to bear the burden of demonstrating that the interest
of justice merits waiving the timely filing requirement.

This case involves dueling declaratory judgment actions arising out of a deed of conservation easement dated December 31, 2007, encumbering property located within the Town of Farragut in Knox County. The trial court found in favor of Foothills Land Conservancy and awarded the nonprofit its damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to a minor child based on severe abuse. The trial court also concluded that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Aaron Malone, Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder for his role in a murder that took place during an attempted robbery and sentenced to life in prison. State v. Malone, No. W2009-02047-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1005487, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 13, 2011). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Malone v. State, No. W2016-00666-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 1404374, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2017). Petitioner then filed a “Petition to Reopen for Requesting DNA Post-conviction.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and Petitioner timely appealed, arguing that: (1) the postconviction court erred by failing to address and make findings of fact regarding all four requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304 in its order denying the petition; (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding the evidence was previously subjected to DNA analysis; (3) the post-conviction court erred in finding there was not a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results were obtained from DNA analysis; (4) the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing; and (5) the post-conviction court erred by failing to appoint new counsel after counsel informed the court he was leaving the jurisdiction. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the estate of Dr. Hillery W. Key (“Dr. Key”), who died testate in 1912. These proceedings began in 1998 in the Chancery Court for Tipton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties are descendants of Dr. Key. Odessa Rose and Marilyn Locke (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) advocate a per capita distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. Carolyn Fields Hayes and Frederick Fields (“Hayes Defendants,” collectively) and Larry Murrell, Jr., Joyce A. Carter, Dorethea McIntyre, and Lynnie Higgs (“Murrell Defendants,” collectively) (“Defendants,” all defendants together) assert that this Court, in a 2005 opinion, already decided upon a per stirpes distribution. The parties reached an agreement on the record in open court ostensibly ending this long-running matter, but Plaintiffs have appealed anyway. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. We hold, inter alia, that Plaintiffs are bound by the agreement announced in court whereby the parties waived their right to appeal. We hold further that the law of the case doctrine prevents Plaintiffs from relitigating the distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. We affirm. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied as moot. We find this appeal frivolous, and remand for the Trial Court to award Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, to be paid by Plaintiffs rather than from the common fund in this case.

The Defendant, Christopher L. Dowlen, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve his original four-year sentence for his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by finding sufficient evidence that the Defendant possessed a firearm in violation of his probation, and (2) by failing to consider whether full revocation of his sentence would serve the “ends of justice” and “best interest” of the Defendant. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of a final divorce decree brought by a husband acting pro se. Because the husband’s brief is deficient, we determine that he has waived consideration of any issues. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. According to the appellant, the notice of appeal was mailed to this Court on July 3, 2024, but the notice never arrived at the Appellate Court Clerk’s Office. The appellant provided a tracking number that was allegedly used to mail the notice of appeal, but the tracking information does not demonstrate that the notice was sent via certified mail pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 20 during the thirty-day appeal period. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Billy D. Woodard, Jr., appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original five-year sentence for his theft conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by relying on grounds not included in the probation violation warrant; and (2) by failing to consider any other punishment or alternative to incarceration. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Gene A. Hoskins, Jr., appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original three-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by failing to consider the consequence of the revocation as a separate discretionary decision, and (2) by failing to consider the interests of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the children by willful failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the children and ruled that it was in the children’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of abandonment by failure to support and that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, William Tony Burrell, was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a handgun while under the influence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of the implied consent law. After Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained against him during a traffic stop that led to his arrest was denied by the trial court, Defendant entered into negotiated guilty pleas to one count of DUI and one count of possession of a handgun while under the influence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties reserved a certified question of law for appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). After review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Cornelius Williams IV, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second-degree murder and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in providing the jury with an erroneous instruction; (3) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce a pro se pleading purportedly filed by the defendant; (4) the defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) the defendant’s sentence for convicted felon in possession of a handgun is illegal. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two indicating the statutorily authorized release eligibility of eighty-five percent on the handgun conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues reasoning and judgment as it relates to Parts I through IV of the majority opinion. As it relates to Part V, however, I must depart from the majority regarding the remedy for the trial court’s imposition of an illegal sentence. I believe the Defendant has the right to a sentencing hearing upon remand. On this point alone, I dissent.

Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, filed a pro se “Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Petition in Conjunction with Writ of Error Coram Nobis” (“the Petition”).1 The trial court found that the Coram Nobis Petition, on its face, failed “to establish that there is newly discovered evidence that would give rise to coram nobis relief” and summarily dismissed the Coram Nobis Petition. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Coram Nobis Petition. Because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking appellate review of the denial of the Motion to Re-open, we lack jurisdiction to consider the Motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c).

The Defendant, John Houston-Polk, III, was convicted in a Rutherford County Circuit Court bench trial of simple possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail with the first 30 days to be served at 100% and the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in two general sessions court cases. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle parked in the driveway of his parents’ home. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jarmie Alonzo Hill, whose first trial with a codefendant before a Davidson County Criminal Court jury ended in a mistrial, was convicted in a second Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte recusing itself based on a prejudicial finding it made against the Defendant in the codefendant’s unrelated drug case; (2) whether the State committed a Brady violation by not providing the Defendant with the transcript of an unavailable witness’s jury trial testimony until the first day of the retrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his fourth untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. He argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because he presented newly discovered evidence in support of actual innocence; therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. Alternatively, he argues that the lower court improperly denied his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the coram nobis petition and conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the denial of the motion to reopen and dismiss the appeal in that respect.

Petitioner, Danielle Wright, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal
of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review of the entire record, briefs
of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner filed an untimely notice
of appeal and the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement
because Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was not timely filed, there is no basis for
tolling the statute of limitations, and the petition fails to state a colorable claim for relief.
Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher R. Smith, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to consecutive fifteen-year sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in Count 1 for aggravated assault, modify Count 2 to a conviction for assault, and remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentencing on Count 2.