APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Paul Michael Cheairs, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and or deliver, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventeen years. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in admitting a rap video made after the arrest, by allowing expert testimony from a lieutenant, and in sentencing. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce.  The former husband challenges the classification and division of the marital estate.  Because the husband failed to comply with our procedural rules, we deem his issues waived and dismiss the appeal. 

This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a petition for civil contempt for failure to comply with orders regarding the division of marital assets and awards of spousal and child support against the husband and his relatives, who held an interest in the properties at issue. We affirm the trial court’s grant of orders of civil contempt against all parties. We also conclude that this appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages.

A husband and wife commenced this health care liability action by filing a complaint against a medical doctor and his practice. Along with their complaint, the couple filed a “Certificate of Good Faith” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which requires certification that an expert has reviewed the available medical records “for the incident or incidents at issue” and that the expert believed there was “a good faith basis to maintain the action consistent with the requirements of § 29-26-115.” The original complaint alleged that the defendants caused severe permanent and physical injuries when they failed to properly diagnose and treat the husband’s cancer. After the husband died, the wife filed an amended complaint that alleged that the defendants’ negligence also caused the husband’s death. But the wife did not file a new certificate of good faith. For this reason, the defendants sought dismissal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(c). The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. The issue is whether § 29-26-122(a) requires plaintiffs to file a new certificate of good faith with an amended complaint that alleges a new injury based on already-alleged negligent acts by existing defendants. In Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, 469 S.W.3d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) we held that a new certificate is required when adding new defendants to existing claims. And in Estate of Vickers v. Diversicare Leasing Corp., No. M2021-00894-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 2111850 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022), we held that a new certificate is required when adding new allegations of negligence against existing defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that a new certificate is required when adding an injury based on existing claims against existing defendants. For this and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

In considering this appeal, the majority thoughtfully moves through the labyrinthian requirements of Tennessee health care liability actions. While the majority’s analysis presents a well-considered direction to go, I cannot follow their route for its full course. Holding onto statutory language that hopefully serves the role of the thread used by Theseus in navigating out of the labyrinth, 1 I believe that the proper way back through the maze follows that statutory thread along a different path. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.

The trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition on a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal.

Ina Grace Jacobi sued VendEngine, Inc. (“VendEngine”), alleging that she was wrongfully arrested due to VendEngine’s negligent design and operation of an inmate messaging system. The trial court determined that the gravamen of Ms. Jacobi’s claim was for malicious prosecution and granted summary judgment to VendEngine after concluding she failed to prove the elements of that claim. Ms. Jacobi appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert David Morse, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court committed two evidentiary errors: (1) admitting multiple autopsy photographs depicting the victim's body; and (2) limiting his cross-examination of Agent Davenport about the Defendant's statement to the police. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 

The Defendant, David Kaiser, appeals from his guilty pleaded convictions for two counts
of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony;
burglary, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000,
a Class D felony; and misdemeanor drug possession, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A.
§§ 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading of theft); 39-13-1002
(Supp. 2021) (burglary); 39-17-418 (2018) (misdemeanor drug possession). The
Defendant agreed to an effective ten-year sentence as a Range II offender, with the manner
of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the
court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding a decision of the Knox County Commission to amend zoning for the subject property. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

After being convicted by a jury of multiple drug charges, possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and three alternative counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Torsaunt Lamont Shanklin, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-five years in incarceration.  His direct appeal challenging the denial of a motion to suppress was unsuccessful.  State v. Shanklin, No. M2019-01896-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1082043, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2021).  Petitioner sought post-conviction relief primarily based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Tony Stafford, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant claims that the State’s pre-indictment delay constituted a due process violation and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant filed a motion requesting waiver of his untimely notice of appeal; however, he failed to file a timely motion for new trial before the trial court. We elect to waive the untimely notice of appeal in the interest of justice. However, because Defendant’s motion for new trial was not timely filed, we address only Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of the record, legal authority, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Richard Penley, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s probation revocation of the effective six-year sentence he received for his guiltypleaded
convictions for misdemeanor theft, two counts of evading arrest, reckless
endangerment, driving while in possession of methamphetamine, attempted possession
with the intent to sell methamphetamine, and reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and
ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edwin Reeves, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of
criminally negligent homicide and possession with the intent to sell or to deliver a schedule
II controlled substance in a drug-free zone. He later pleaded guilty to a second count of
possession with the intent to sell or to deliver a schedule II controlled substance in a drugfree
zone. The trial court imposed an effective nine-year sentence. The Defendant filed a
motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed for the failure to state a colorable claim.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action the husband appeals the classification of two substantial assets as marital property, each of which he contends are separate property because they were gifted to him by his father. The husband also challenges the trial court’s determination of his income for purposes of child support and alimony. On different grounds, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for child support purposes. The wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido based upon its finding that her fees had been paid out of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 and that an award of alimony in solido would constitute “double dipping.” She further seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for purposes of child support and alimony. Moreover, we affirm the classification of the 7.6-acre parcel with the cabin as marital property but reverse the classification of the husband’s partnership interest in Berry’s Chapel Ventures, LLC, as marital property and remand with instructions to classify it as Husband’s separate property. We further find that the appreciation in the value of the husband’s interest during the marriage is his separate property. Resultingly, on remand, the trial court is to reconsider the equitable division of the marital estate and enter judgment accordingly. Because of significant changes in the marital estate, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand with instructions to reconsider this award upon settling the marital estate and to enter judgment accordingly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, albeit on different grounds. Each party shall be responsible for their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal. 

Petitioner, Donald K. Moore, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions seeking post-conviction relief from his 1996 convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery in case number 96-C-1428 and second degree murder in case number 96-C-1423, for which he was sentenced to life, twenty years, and twenty-one years’ incarceration, respectively. The post-conviction court concluded that, even if Petitioner’s allegations were taken as true, he would not be entitled to relief and summarily dismissed the petitions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner’s ex-wife became romantically involved with the Respondent. The Petitioner sought an order of protection for himself and his children against the Respondent, asserting that the Respondent stalked him and his children. The Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he had only ever been near the Petitioner for the legitimate purpose of protecting Petitioner’s ex-wife and children from Petitioner, who has a troubling history of violence and who allegedly continued to emotionally harm the children during their online visitation. The General Sessions Court concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove stalking and declined to grant an order of protection. Petitioner advanced the petition to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court also refused to grant an order of protection and found that the Petitioner made knowingly false allegations at the time of filing his order of protection petition. Accordingly, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Respondent. The Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm.

The Defendant, Grover Beverly, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of two counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Pro se Appellant, Michael Adams, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on November 1, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The Defendant, James R. Holley, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing after his guilty pleas to eight counts involving drugs, weapons, and traffic offenses. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to provide this court with an adequate appellate record. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rickius Grant, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempting to traffic a person for a commercial sex act and resulting concurrent six-year sentences. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Roger Bridges, 1 was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; sexual battery, a Class E felony; rape, a Class B felony; and rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of fifty-one years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The four victims involved were three sisters and their female first cousin, and the offenses occurred over a two-month period that culminated on June 12, 2018, when one of the three sisters divulged the abuse to her father, who called the police. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1973), “by failing to produce information concerning the pending investigation of a male family member for sexual abuse crimes against some of the same family group.”2 Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection in general sessions court. The respondent counter-petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). After a hearing, the general sessions court denied the respondent’s petition, but it also declined to extend the temporary protective order and dismissed the underlying petition for lack of proof. The respondent appealed the decision on “attorney’s fees” to circuit court. After a de novo review, the circuit court determined that the respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under either the order of protection statute or the TPPA. In this appeal, the respondent challenges denial of his request for attorney’s fees under the TPPA. Because the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the general sessions court’s order denying the petition to dismiss under the TPPA, we vacate in part and remand.

In 1996, the Petitioner, Alvin Dean Shaver, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole. In 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the charges because the statute pursuant to which he was convicted did not have the constitutionally required style, “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application for the writ, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.