APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se Appellant, Michael Adams, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on November 1, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The Defendant, James R. Holley, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing after his guilty pleas to eight counts involving drugs, weapons, and traffic offenses. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to provide this court with an adequate appellate record. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rickius Grant, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempting to traffic a person for a commercial sex act and resulting concurrent six-year sentences. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Roger Bridges, 1 was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; sexual battery, a Class E felony; rape, a Class B felony; and rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of fifty-one years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The four victims involved were three sisters and their female first cousin, and the offenses occurred over a two-month period that culminated on June 12, 2018, when one of the three sisters divulged the abuse to her father, who called the police. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1973), “by failing to produce information concerning the pending investigation of a male family member for sexual abuse crimes against some of the same family group.”2 Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection in general sessions court. The respondent counter-petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). After a hearing, the general sessions court denied the respondent’s petition, but it also declined to extend the temporary protective order and dismissed the underlying petition for lack of proof. The respondent appealed the decision on “attorney’s fees” to circuit court. After a de novo review, the circuit court determined that the respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under either the order of protection statute or the TPPA. In this appeal, the respondent challenges denial of his request for attorney’s fees under the TPPA. Because the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the general sessions court’s order denying the petition to dismiss under the TPPA, we vacate in part and remand.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Detarus Brown, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s order partially denying his motion to correct his sentence, and Defendant contends that the trial court should have treated his motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kurt Franklin Luna, was convicted after a jury trial of driving without a license, driving an unregistered vehicle, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced him to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant raises a variety of claims. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant has waived his issues for failure to create an adequate record and failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A Dyer County jury found the Defendant, Daniel McCaig, guilty of unlawfully possessing methamphetamine and a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his right to represent himself and imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns whether a railroad employee’s negligence claim brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (“FELA”) is precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq. (“FRSA”). Troy L. Rouzer (“Plaintiff”), a locomotive engineer, sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) under FELA for injuries he sustained in a collision. Plaintiff alleged insufficient training. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that FRSA precludes Plaintiff’s FELA claim. Defendant argued that national uniformity in safety rules requires this result. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeals. We hold, inter alia, that in view of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014), exemplified in its statement that “[w]hen two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation of the other[,]” id. at 115, Plaintiff’s FELA claim is not precluded by FRSA as both federal statutes complement one another toward the goal of rail safety. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, D’tearius Carvell Southern, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, tampering with evidence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-three years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that Defendant had no duty to retreat before using deadly force as part of the self-defense instruction. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marlos LeKeith Tipton, appeals from his convictions for vehicular homicide and speeding following a bench trial. Specifically, the Defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial based on the trial court’s denial of funding for a defense expert in vehicle collisions. He further argues that the proof was insufficient to support his conviction of vehicular homicide based upon reckless conduct predicated on excessive speed alone. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Damon Cordell Parson, of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted audio recordings of the drug transactions and that, without the recordings, the evidence is insufficient to convict him. He further contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence within his applicable sentencing range and did not make proper considerations with regard to alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on September 20, 2024. The envelope within which the notice of appeal was mailed reflects that it was mailed from the prison mailroom of the facility where the appellant was incarcerated on November 9, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a health care liability action. The plaintiff’s husband passed away after a complication that occurred during a medical procedure. The plaintiff provided pre-suit notice of her claim to five health care providers but ultimately filed suit against only three of the providers. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her initial action, but then she re-filed it within a year. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed suit, alleging that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) due to limiting language included in HIPAA authorizations she had provided to the defendants. The trial court also found that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4), which requires plaintiffs to file certain documentation with their complaint. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4) but did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

In accordance with the reasoning set forth in this court’s recent opinion in Jarrett v. State, I would dismiss Petitioner’s appeal due to his failure to file a timely notice of appeal and his failure to acknowledge that his notice of appeal is untimely or otherwise request that this court accept his late-filed notice of appeal.

A minor Plaintiff, acting through his grandmother, sued several healthcare providers for injuries stemming from his birth. The Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit. The Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice to each defendant within a year of dismissal but did not refile the suit for over a year after dismissal. The Plaintiff asserted this was permissible in accordance with the 120-day extension available under Tennessee’s Healthcare Liability Act. The trial court rejected this contention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, much of the parties’ respective briefing tracked the arguments before the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, __ S.W.3d __, No. M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 259059 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025). While the suit was pending on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that the 120- day extension does not apply to the one-year deadline for refiling suit after a voluntary dismissal. This case is controlled by the Richards decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this action filed pursuant to 42 United States Code § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law enforcement officers had violated one plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using excessive force when the officers shot and injured him at the scene of a “road rage” incident that did not involve the injured plaintiff. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances because the injured plaintiff had appeared at the scene of the road rage investigation suddenly and without warning, had approached the officers rapidly, and had been armed with a rifle. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice, determining, inter alia, that the officers’ use of deadly force had been objectively reasonable. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Knox County Jury convicted the Petitioner, James Theodore Menard, of one count of rape of a child, one count of exhibition of pictures depicting sexual conduct harmful to a minor, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court, and our supreme court denied review.  State v. Menard, No.  E2021-00164-CCA-R3-CD,  2022 WL 1498767, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2022).  The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective for failing to disclose a plea offer and failing to review discovery.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The Defendants, Jeffrey Pete Fautt and Robin Leanne Osborne, appeal their convictions for selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine. They argue the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts because officers’ testimony was inconsistent, unreliable, and uncorroborated. Specifically, they assert that the controlled purchases were not captured by audio and video recordings, the searches of the confidential informant’s vehicle were not recorded, and officers did not deploy a canine unit during the searches of the informant’s vehicle. The Defendants additionally contend that Defendant Osborne’s testimony should have been accredited over the confidential informant’s testimony. The State avers that the testimony, video evidence, and laboratory results introduced at trial were sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Eugene Beard, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun.  After the plea, but before the sentencing hearing, the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment offering exhibits showing that the Defendant qualified as a Range II offender and asking the court to impose consecutive sentences and the maximum sentence.  After the hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to eighteen years for each of the assault convictions to be served concurrently at 85% and to ten years for the handgun conviction to be served at 35% and consecutively to the assault sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing and when it considered the State's notice to seek enhanced punishment, which the State filed after he pleaded guilty.  After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. 

The defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, appeals the twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court upon resentencing for his second-degree murder conviction arguing the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, our review has revealed a possible issue as to the sentences imposed in Counts 5 and 6, and we remand for the trial court to make further findings. 

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Cordaro Dywon Black, of four counts of rape of a child and one count of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-four years and six months in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Zion Houston, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely because it was filed more than one year after the Petitioner’s judgments were entered. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it determined the petition was untimely because the judgments in question did not become final until thirty days after they were entered, and the petition was filed one year after the judgments became final. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for preliminary consideration of the post-conviction petition consistent with this opinion and pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106.