APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Laquala Malone, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one
count of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s application for judicial diversion and imposed a three-year sentence to be
served on supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by denying her request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this action sought to collaterally attack a child support judgment and raised allegations of constitutional and other violations of law by several named defendants, including Child Support Services, the plaintiff’s former spouse, and the State of Tennessee. The trial court dismissed the complaint, determining, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Nakeavious Milan, entered a guilty plea to one count of voluntary
manslaughter, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211 (Supp. 2022). Pursuant
to his plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to
eight years, with the trial court to determine whether the Defendant would be permitted to
serve his sentence on probation. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Defendant’s request for full probation and ordered him to serve his eight-year sentence in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for full probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Kyle Baptiste, appeals his Hardeman County Circuit Court conviction of
rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Discerning
no error, we affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee for work performed pursuant to an oral contract between the parties. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Keith Douglas Garrett, of one count of unlawful photography and one count of observation without consent. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days and to register as a sexual offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecution was void due to alleged defects in the arrest process and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to investigators under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).He also challenges the admission of digital evidence extracted from his cell phone and alleges that the State failed to disclose an additional forensic extraction report. In addition, he contends that the State engaged in an improper closing argument. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s sentencing determinations, including the denial of judicial diversion and alternative sentencing and the requirement that he register as a sexual offender. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge.
The trial court deemed the motion repetitive. We agree.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jason O. Miller, of aggravated assault
and domestic assault, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years in
confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated assault. The State concedes that the
evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Upon review, we conclude
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault.
However, as there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of assault, we reverse the
judgment for aggravated assault, modify the conviction to assault, and remand for a new
sentencing hearing and entry of an amended judgment.

The appellant, AA/AAA Bonding Company, appeals its suspension from writing bonds in
the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District due to its failure to comply with the applicable statutes.
Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm the decision of the
trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jeremy Brian Poe, of one count of theft of property greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain hisconviction, and the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a Range III offender. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.However, following ourreview of the defendant’s sentence, we conclude the trial court erred in its application ofTennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107(b)and in finding the defendant to be a Range III, persistent offender. Accordingly, the defendant’s Range III sentence requires reversal, and we remand this matter for resentencing.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of Petitioner’s motion for the disqualification of the trial court judge.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a local board of education’s decision to dismiss a tenured teacher.
The teacher sought judicial review of his dismissal in the trial court. The trial court found
no grounds for dismissal and reversed the board’s decision. The board appeals. We
conclude that the teacher was insubordinate in showing his class a video containing
profanity without parental consent. However, this lone act of insubordination did not
warrant the drastic step of dismissal given the teacher’s long record of good service. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Hawn was not shown to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr.
Hawn was shown to have committed an act of insubordination and that the trial court’s
judgment should be modified to reflect that this statutory ground for a tenured teacher’s
dismissal was proven pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. 49-5-
511(a)(2). I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the Board’s
dismissal of Mr. Hawn “over one isolated act of insubordination was excessive.” In
support of this conclusion, the majority refers to the trial court’s findings regarding Mr.
Hawn’s service record and other factors in determining that the consequence of dismissal
was excessive.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Merv Conley Rodgers, of aggravated assault
by strangulation, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, domestic assault, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred when it concluded he lacked standing to challenge the search of his vehicle; (2) that the trial court erred when it prevented the Defendant from introducing evidence from a prior domestic dispute; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault and especially aggravated kidnapping; and ( 4) that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Defendant, Michael J.W. Potter, appeals the summary dismissal of his ex parte communication that the trial court treated as a petition for post-conviction relief and a Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A paramedic sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. He asserted that in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act he was discharged by the Nashville Fire Department because he refused to participate in or remain silent about the department forcing mentally competent inmates to undergo medical treatment without their consent. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court granted the motion. The paramedic appealed. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Anthony Cooke, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probationand order to serve the remainder of his seven-year sentence in confinement. Defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted certified copies of arrest warrants as exhibits to the revocation hearing and that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We affirm.

On or about March 18, 2026, the pro se Petitioner, Christopher Kiger, filed what is purported to be a notice of appeal to this Court. Because it is unclear what the Petitioner is attempting to appeal, the Court filed an order on April 9, 2026, directing the Petitioner to show cause why this appeal shall be allowed to proceed. The Petitioner was ordered to identify any recent trial court judgment and/or order he seeks to appeal and to attach a copy of that judgment and/or order to his response.

A restaurant based in Williamson County sued a restaurant based in Rutherford County in Williamson County Chancery Court over the use of the name Jasmine. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of venue, and the plaintiff amended the complaint, including allegations that the defendant provided services in Williamson County, advertised in Williamson County, and caused customer confusion and economic harm in Williamson County. The chancery court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the fact that the plaintiff alleged economic harm in Williamson County was not sufficient to establish venue. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Michael Anthony Huerta, was indicted for three counts of first degree murder and pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. Defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range IIoffender with the length of the sentence to be determined at a sentencing hearing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve thirty-eight years at 100 percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Because Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we dismiss the appeal.

A plaintiff sued a physician and the physician’s practice, alleging the physician performed a biopsy during a medical office visit without the plaintiff’s consent. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement in the Health Care Liability Act. Because the court also determined that the action was time-barred, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. So we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. But because we conclude that the complaint does not clearly show that it was filed more than one year after the plaintiff discovered the injury, we modify the dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice.

This appeal stems from a trial court judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to recuse. Petitioner filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

This appeal requires us to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports: (1)
at least one statutory ground for termination of Appellant’s parental rights; and (2) that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.