APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jacob Lee Carney, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arising from his guilty-pleaded convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Leigh Ann Champion Thweatt, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking her probation in full rather than allowing her to address her substance abuse issues on probation, contending that full revocation did not serve the ends of justice for the public or the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a recusal appeal filed by the pro se petitioner relative to the underlying delinquent
taxpayer action. Because the petitioner has not demonstrated a factual basis warranting
recusal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to recuse.

The Defendant, Jacob Franks, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of sexual exploitation of a minor involving fifty or more images, a Class C felony, and fifteen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1003(a), (d)(2025). The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the Defendant’s roommate’s notarized written statement after the roommate invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the trial. We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. We affirm the judgments in Counts 5, 6,7, 8, 9,10, 11, 13, 14, and 15. We reverse the judgments in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, and 16 and remand for a new trial on these counts.

A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Gabriel Seth Box, of first degree premeditated murder, theft of a firearm, and two counts of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus six years. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial date so that he could present an expert witness; and (2) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s motion to continue should have been granted, though the error was harmless in light of the expected testimony of the defense expert. We also conclude that the case should be remanded for reconsideration of consecutive sentencing under the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Accordingly, we respectfully affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for reconsideration of the issues related to consecutive sentencing.

An Anderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Sean Kirk Wagner, of sexual battery
by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years,
364 days of which were to be served at 100% in the county jail and the balance to be
suspended and served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that:
(1) when the trial court instructed the jury on sexual battery by an authority figure as a
lesser-included offense to Count 1, rape, it constructively amended the indictment; (2) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the State improperly failed to elect
specific facts to support his conviction; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the State
to elicit testimony that the Defendant had referred to the victim and her friends as “sluts”;
and (5) the trial court erred when it did not allow the results of his polygraph test to be
admitted into evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Shannon Leigh Smith, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying her claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 1) failing to uncover evidence of a detective’s sexual relationship with a State’s witness and the same detective’s termination from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission for misconduct; 2) failing to file a motion to suppress searches of Petitioner’s cell phone and Facebook account; 3) inadequately cross-examining the victim’s sister-in-law; 4) failing to put forth evidence to support self-defense; 5) failing to call defense witnesses including an expert on battered woman syndrome; 6) and withdrawing motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. She further argues that she is entitled to relief based on the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s alleged errors. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant, William Lavell Nelson, pled guilty
to one count of aggravated assault and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years’
incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to
correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which
the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court
erred by summarily dismissing his motion and by considering it as a request for relief
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Discerning no reversible error, we
affirm.

The Defendant, Keith Andrew Baggett, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s
probation revocation of his six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his
sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, pro se, was convicted of two counts of rape of a
child. In this consolidated appeal, he challenges the orders of the Hardeman County Circuit
Court summarily dismissing his petitions seeking habeas corpus relief. Upon review, we
affirm.

Frank Delmar Raines, Jr., the Petitioner, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted rape and
attempted aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective thirty-year sentence.
On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s investigation of a
State’s witness and counsel’s decision not to call character witnesses at the sentencing
hearing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s division of marital debt and award of alimony in a divorce action. After the trial, the court assigned most of the marital assets and debts to the husband and awarded the wife alimony in futuro based on an affidavit that included her “anticipated” expenses. The court also awarded the wife alimony in solido to pay for her attorney’s fees. The husband then filed a motion to alter or amend. While the motion was pending, the net proceeds from the sale of marital real estate were distributed to the parties. In its order on the husband’s motion, the trial court reallocated responsibility for the balance on a credit card account in the husband’s name, and it ordered the balance be paid out of the net proceeds from the real estate sale. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court erred by relying on the wife’s “speculative future needs” rather than her actual expenses at the time of trial when awarding alimony. The husband also argues that the court should have awarded rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro because the wife has several vocational certificates that she could use to obtain a better paying job. And both the husband and the wife contend that the division of marital debt was inequitable. We conclude that the parties have waived their objections to the division of marital debt and the award of alimony in solido by failing to comply with the briefing requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As for the award of alimony in futuro, we find no error in the trial court’s reliance on evidence of the wife’s “anticipated expenses,” and we find no support in the record for the husband’s assertion that the wife could obtain a better paying job with her vocational certificates. Nonetheless, we find it necessary to modify the portion of the trial court’s order requiring the parties to pay off the credit card with funds from the real estate proceeds because they were previously disbursed.

The Defendant, Kyle Golden, entered a guiltyplea to one count of aggravated assaultand three counts of child abuse. The Shelby County Criminal Court accepted the Defendant’s guilty plea and, following a sentencing hearing, denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of five years’ supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Petitioner, Terrance B. Smith, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding. Because the notice of appeal in this case fails to satisfy the requirements for an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c), we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Thomas Lymn, appeals his Moore County Circuit Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established abandonment by failure to visit and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We reverse, holding that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence in support of the alleged statutory ground of termination.

Jeffrey Roach, Petitioner, pled guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted
felon in January of 2025. In exchange for the plea, he received a three-year sentence to be
served at 100%. In February of 2025, he filed a series of pro se motions which referenced
post-conviction relief and ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court
treated the motions as a petition for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel, and set a
hearing. Petitioner continued to file motions with the court despite being represented by
counsel. After a hearing, at which Petitioner did not testify, the post-conviction court
denied relief. Petitioner appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds for termination and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, the trial court made specific findings for twelve of the twenty statutory best interest factors but declined to consider eight of the factors based upon a purported pleading deficiency. Mother appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the minor child: abandonment, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and severe child abuse. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Sheppard Washington, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court found that Petitioner’s request for relief, which was based upon a claim that his sentence had expired, was premature. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a breach of contract action for specific performance of a commercial real estate purchase and sale agreement. The plaintiff buyer brought suit after the defendant sellers refused to convey the property due to a dispute over a mandatory tax withholding. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the buyer specific performance and attorney’s fees. The trial court found that the sellers were bound by the agreement because, even though their real estate agent had appended their electronic signatures without contemporaneous authorization, they later ratified the transaction. The trial court further concluded that the sellers’ total refusal to close constituted an anticipatory repudiation, thereby excusing the buyer’s lack of formal tender of the purchase price. The sellers appealed. We affirm.

Appellant filed a petition for accelerated interlocutory appeal seeking recusal of the trial judge under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because it appears that a written motion to recuse was only lodged with the trial court and because the trial court never entered an order on the written motion, we dismiss the appeal.

A mother petitioned to extend child support for her severely disabled child into adulthood. The court granted the petition. In doing so, the court used the child support guidelines to calculate the amount of support. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court should have included the child’s social security income in the calculations, but he did not file a transcript or a statement of the evidence. Because the lack of a transcript or statement of evidence prevents us from reaching the substance of the issue raised by the father, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.