APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, John Mark Hall, appeals his Knox County jury conviction of domestic assault, for which he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days on unsupervised probation after service of 192 hours in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence was lacking, and that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a long-standing conservatorship, which was created in 1981. The primary issues pertain to the fees the conservator is entitled to receive for the various services she renders in administering the estate of the conservatorship and services the conservator renders as one of the caretakers for the ward, Patricia L. Capelli (hereinafter “Ms. Capelli”). Following an evidentiary hearing on the conservator’s fee applications for services rendered, the trial court bifurcated the conservator’s rate of compensation for caregiving as distinguished from management of the conservatorship. The court reduced the hourly rate of compensation for caregiving services to $25 per hour while allowing the conservator to be compensated at the rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship, the rate the court had previously authorized for all services. The court also reduced the total hours claimed for both types of services. The court then ruled that, going forward, the conservator’s rate of compensation for any services would be $25 per hour. This appeal followed. We affirm the bifurcation of the rate of compensation for service previously rendered. However, finding this to be a complex conservatorship case, we modify the fee schedule going forward and hold that the conservator shall be paid the previously authorized rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship but affirm the rate of compensation of $25 per hour for caregiving services rendered by the conservator. We also modify the trial court’s decision to disallow blocks of time for the caregiving services billed by the conservator. Further, we find that the conservatorship shall pay the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the conservator in this appeal but not the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Joseph Capelli. We also remand for the court to consider the applicable law and relevant facts regarding the construction of a pool on Ms. Capelli’s property. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Defendant, Michael Malik Tashaw Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of filing a false police report, possession of marijuana, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about a shotgun found in his vehicle, and that the State failed to establish that he possessed illegal marijuana rather than legal hemp. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Mother’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In 2020, a Hardeman County jury convicted the Petitioner, Lavonte Douglas, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Douglas, No. W2020-01012-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 4480904, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 28, 2023). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, amended by counsel, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to: object to hearsay statements; request in writing a curative jury instruction; and give a closing argument. He further contended that the cumulative effect of these errors entitled him to post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jerrico Lamont Hawthorne, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief and argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness who would have testified that
Defendant was not present for the shooting. Following our review of the entire record, the
briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

This is a dispute between two brothers concerning the current ownership of real property their father owned at the time of his death. The plaintiff, contending the brothers are tenants in common because their father died intestate and they are his only heirs, seeks to partition the real property formerly owned by their father. The defendant contends he is the sole owner because he had an oral agreement with his father pursuant to which he would be bequeathed the property upon his father’s death in exchange for moving to his father’s property to work the farm and care for his father, which he claims to have done in reliance on the agreement. Thus, the defendant asserted a counterclaim by which he seeks specific performance of the oral agreement, a declaration that he is the sole owner of the property, and dismissal of the partition petition. Relying on the theories of equitable estoppel/estoppel in pais, the defendant also contends that the plaintiff may not assert a defense based on the statute of frauds, Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-2-101(a)(4). The trial court found that the defendant failed to establish a contract to make a will or devise property, and it also held that the alleged oral agreement was too vague to be enforced, that the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations under the agreement, and the agreement was unenforceable based on the statute of frauds. Thus, the court ruled that the parties jointly own the property as tenants in common, dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim and designated the order as a final judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Petitioner, Victor Trezevant, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a life sentence. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.  The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest.  After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

In 2012, a Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dwight Randall Walton, of four
counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of
aggravated sexual battery. For these convictions, he received an effective sentence of fifty
years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. State v. Walton, No. E2014-02319-
CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5554573, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2015), no perm. app.
filed. On direct appeal, this court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
each conviction, except the aggravated sexual battery conviction. Id. Concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated sexual battery conviction, we reversed
and dismissed that conviction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction
court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction
court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Gregory Bonds, entered a guilty plea to seven offenses, for which he received a concurrent twelve-year term of imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro-se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter an agreement with the State for an illegal sentence. The Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal because the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony offense was ordered to be served concurrently with other offenses in direct contravention of the law. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim for relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter the plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, William Dejesus Fernandez, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment for count two consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jeffrey W. Dean, was convicted in the Robertson County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a prior violent felony and received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, through counsel, seeks an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 from (1) the post-conviction court’s preliminary order entered on April 21, 2025; (2) the order denying a motion to strike or vacate that order entered on May 13, 2025; and (3) the order denying an interlocutory appeal entered on August 1, 2025. 1 The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim as being previously determined, and its subsequent denials of requests for rehearing and review, “so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). The Petitioner also requests a stay of the post-conviction proceedings. Upon review of the application and its supporting documents, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated grounds for extraordinary relief under Rule 10. Accordingly, a response from the State is not required, and the application is DENIED. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d).

This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment.

This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment.

Six years after his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, the Petitioner, Craig Rickard, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. In that petition, he asserted that the two convictions should have merged under principles of double jeopardy. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of the petition. Accordingly, we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

This appeal stems from a boundary line dispute. Mr. Jones sold the Smiths two lots within a subdivision in Hardin County. It is undisputed that the Smiths bought Lots 87 and 88 on September 11, 2012. Several years later, Mr. Jones claimed that the Smiths had encroached on “Lot 89.” The Smiths insisted they occupied only the 80 linear feet purchased from Mr. Jones. When the parties were unable to come to a resolution, the Smiths filed suit in chancery court to quiet title to Lots 87 and 88, declare the lot numbers on the survey misnumbered, and prayed for damages for slander of title and attorney’s fees. Mr. Jones filed a counter-complaint to quiet title to “Lot 89,” for ejectment, conversion and/or civil theft, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, defamation, and punitive damages. After a bench trial, the trial court held that “Lot 89” did not exist, granted damages to the Smiths for slander of title, and dismissed Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We affirm the trial court’s holding that “Lot 89” does not exist and the dismissal of Mr. Jones’s counter-complaint. We vacate the court’s decision as to slander of title, reverse the grant of attorney’s fees as to damages, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The defendant, Jeremiah Nance, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury for which he was sentenced to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing testimony that the police were responding to a domestic call; (2) the trial court erred in not allowing the victim to assert her Fifth Amendment right not to testify; and (3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the prosecutor to misstate the evidence during closing argument. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the minor child: abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that the Department of Children’s Services failed to meet its burden of proof as to any of the statutory grounds set out in its petition to terminate appellee/mother’s parental rights to the minor child. Although unnecessary in view of its determination that there were no grounds for termination, the trial court undertook a best interest analysis and found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate mother’s rights. Because the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings as to either grounds or best interest, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order terminating appellee/mother’s parental rights

The Defendant, Kelly Ray Turnbow, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of his three-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding he violated the terms of his probation based on conduct not alleged in the probation violation warrant and (2) failing to articulate its reasoning to support the full revocation of his probation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for additional findings consistent with this opinion.

A buyer signed an agreement with a contractor for the construction of a custom home. After disagreements arose over the construction and its pace, the buyer sued the contractor and its owner seeking damages and to quiet title to the property. The trial court awarded the buyer damages, title to the property, and attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm.

In this dispute between neighboring property owners, the trial court determined that a concrete fence built by one neighbor violated a setback ordinance and entered an injunction requiring the neighbor to remove the fence. We have determined that the trial court erred in so ruling and reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision.

Appellant sued appellees alleging breach of contract, fraud, and property damage. The trial court granted separate default judgments against the two appellees. Appellees moved the trial court to set aside the default judgments due to a lack of personal jurisdiction and due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The trial court set aside the default judgments over the objections of appellant, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court involuntarily dismissed appellant’s complaint at the conclusion of his case-in-chief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.