APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Wendolyn Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the remainder of his claims were either waived or previously determined. The State argues that the post-conviction court lacked the authority to consider Petitioner’s claims because a properly verified post-conviction petition was never filed and that Petitioner has otherwise waived consideration of his issues by failing to prepare an adequate brief. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court had authority to consider Petitioner’s claims, but Petitioner has waived consideration of his claims in this court. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a health care liability lawsuit. Pamela Moses (“Moses”) sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”) in the Claims Commission after receiving dental treatment from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center (“UTHSC”). Moses alleged that her root canal was botched, leaving her injured. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss on multiple independent grounds including that Moses failed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. Moses appeals. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Demonte Isom, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case stems from an alleged oral promise by the owner of two companies to pay the chief financial officer of one company a bonus of ten percent of the “profits” of both companies for work performed for the companies, including related to the sale of certain real property by one company. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, the companies and their owner, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were barred by the parties’ written contract and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendant as to their defense under the real estate broker statute. Both parties appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and unjust enrichment but reverse as to the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. We also reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on their defense under the real estate broker statute.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends he is entitled to relief due to a defective indictment for his underlying charge of aggravated rape. However, as pointed out by the State, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed late. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner’s explanation for the late filing is based upon a misunderstanding of the “prison mailbox rule,” see Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g), and the nature of his defective indictment issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Carlos Ortiz, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm.

This appeal focuses on whether a Grundy County Resolution that regulates the location of quarries is, in effect, a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of Tennessee’s County Zoning Act (“the CZA”). The Plaintiffs claim the Resolution is invalid because Grundy County did not comply with the procedural requirements for passing a zoning ordinance as mandated by the CZA. The Plaintiffs further contend that the County could not utilize its police powers to regulate the location of quarries because the Resolution was preempted by state law. Grundy County argues that the Resolution was not a zoning ordinance, but rather a valid exercise of the County’s police powers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Grundy County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Tinsley Props., LLC v. Grundy Cnty., No. M2022-01562-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 495700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 27, 2024). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that Grundy County enacted what amounts to a zoning ordinance without complying with the statutory requirements contained in the CZA. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Grundy County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A husband appeals from a Final Order of Absolute Divorce. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal with the Appellate Court Clerk within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, James Hawkins, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

The Defendant, Chris Green, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of
robbery and facilitation to commit aggravated assault, for which he received an effective
sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial
court also ordered the Defendant to pay $7,500 in fines as part of his sentence. On appeal,
the Defendant argues the trial court erred by classifying him as a Range III, persistent
offender because the State failed to prove he had received five qualifying prior felony
convictions and because the trial court conducted an unconstitutional factual inquiry into
the nature of the underlying offenses. The Defendant also argues the trial court failed to
make sufficient findings to support its imposition of fines. Following our review, we
reverse the Defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing consistent with this
opinion. Because we conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proof regarding
the Defendant’s sentencing range, we do not address the Defendant’s constitutional claim.

Appellant, Adrian Delk, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Robert D. Rollings, pled guilty to second degree murder in 2012 in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment form reflecting the agreement. Nearly thirteen years later, in 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he was falsely imprisoned based on a judgment form that was not file-stamped by the trial court clerk. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion, insisting that the lack of a file-stamp on his judgment form rendered his conviction not final and illegal. Because we find that Defendant has failed to file a timely notice of appeal and that the interest of justice does not support waiver, the appeal is dismissed.

A circuit court found four children dependent and neglected because they were suffering from abuse or neglect. It also determined that the children’s father committed severe child abuse. Upon review, we conclude that the court’s severe child abuse finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. So we reverse that finding and affirm the lower court’s decision as modified.

This is a premises liability case brought by a sales representative for a product vendor who was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision based upon the conclusion that Tractor Supply was the statutory employer of the sales representative under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and was, therefore, shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, concluded that Tractor Supply was not the sales representative’s statutory employer, and remanded the case to this Court to consider the pretermitted issues. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the issue of whether Tractor Supply owed a duty of care to the sales representative. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

In this interlocutory recusal appeal, Appellant argues that in addition to the grounds for recusal relied upon in the trial court, the trial judge’s failure to promptly rule on his motion constitutes an additional basis for recusal. Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Marty Allison Hobdy, Jr., was convicted of aggravated assault and placed on probation for seven years. While on probation, he was charged with a second assault but was acquitted by a jury. After the acquittal, the State sought to revoke the Defendant’s suspended sentence based on the same alleged conduct. At the revocation hearing, the State presented no proof and instead urged the trial court to rely on its memory of testimony and credibility assessments from the prior trial. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation on that basis. On appeal, the Defendant contends, among other things, that the State’s procedure caused the trial court to cease functioning as a neutral and detached decisionmaker. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the order revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentence and remand the case for a new hearing.

Petitioner, Brandon Michael Schklar, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his petition was timely filed and stated a colorable claim; (2) Tennessee case law allows for exceptions to the statutory post-conviction verification requirement; and therefore, (3) he should have been offered an opportunity to verify his petition under oath in an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Devaunte Louis Hill, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Defendant’s proffered expert; (2) the trial court improperly limited Defendant’s cross-examination of a witness; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Defendant opened the door to cross-examination about delinquent behavior he committed as a juvenile; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of Defendant’s gang membership in its case-in-chief; (5) the trial court improperly admitted part of a recorded jail conversation between Defendant and other parties; (6) the State engaged in improper argument during closing; (7) he is entitled to relief via cumulative error; and (8) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ed Henry Loyde, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking DNA analysis of evidence related to his 2014 conviction for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and we conclude Petitioner is not entitled to waiver of the filing deadline. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

This is a dispute over a child support obligation for a severely disabled adult child that would have terminated on the child’s 25th birthday under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). Prior to the expiration of Father’s agreed upon support obligation, the child’s mother petitioned for child support to continue due to the adult child’s ongoing disability and needs. Finding that the adult child was severely disabled and living with her mother prior to attaining eighteen years of age and she remains severely disabled, the trial court granted the mother’s petition and ordered that the father’s child support obligation be extended indefinitely. The trial court also awarded the mother a judgment of $21,700 in retroactive child support. The father appealed. We affirm.

Adonis Donnell Holbrooks, Petitioner, was convicted of attempted rape of a child, solicitation of a minor, especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor via electronic means. State v. Holbrooks, No. M2019-02099-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6060440, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2021). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to establish prejudice.

The Plaintiff brought a claim of intentional interference with business relationships against the Defendant, and the Defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The Defendant attached to the motion a declaration to establish that the suit was in response to his exercise of the right to free speech and right to petition. The Plaintiff did not attempt to establish a prima facie case but instead sought to amend the complaint to allege a different cause of action and sought to exclude the declaration. The trial court dismissed under the TPPA. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for a determination of attorney’s fees under the statute.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Michael Dale Rimmer, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Charles Rice, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital intellectual disability proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.