APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce matter, the parties dispute the interpretation of a provision of their marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) concerning one of Husband’s retirement plans. On the parties’ cross petitions to enforce the MDA, the trial court found the MDA to be unambiguous and agreed with Wife’s interpretation of the disputed provision. Discerning no error, we affirm. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is granted pursuant to the terms of the MDA; her request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.

In a joint trial, a Davidson County jury convicted Phillip Jerome Gardner, III, and Latonia Maria Gardner of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and three counts of aggravated child neglect. Additionally, Latonia Gardner was convicted of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child abuse. Each was sentenced to life plus seventeen years. On appeal, the Defendants raise separate issues. Ms. Gardner argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. She also alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to sever offenses; improperly admitted expert testimony and video evidence; gave a misleading supplemental jury instruction; and imposed consecutive sentencing. Mr. Gardner similarly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred when it took under advisement his motion for a judgment of acquittal; failed to sever the Defendants; failed to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior injuries; failed to instruct the jury on his alibi defense; and gave the same misleading supplemental jury instruction. Upon review, the court affirms Ms. Gardner’s conviction and life sentence for felony murder in perpetration of aggravated child abuse. However, the court agrees with the parties that the jury was improperly instructed on one aggravated child neglect count, and we remand that count and its associated felony murder count for a new trial as to both Defendants. With the parties’ agreement, we also reverse the order for consecutive sentences in Ms. Gardner’s cases and remand for the trial court to consider the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Finally, we remand both cases for entry of corrected judgments of conviction. In all other respects, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The assignee of a contract for the sale of real property appeals the dismissal of its claims against a third party for civil conspiracy to commit breach of contract, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and statutory inducement of breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant third party based on its conclusion that the third party had no notice of the contract at issue and did not act maliciously. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Gary Lee Bragg, Jr., claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to request that the jury be instructed on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated
burglary. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel “was deficient for not
requesting applicable lesser-included jury instructions” but found that “Petitioner was not
prejudiced as a result” and denied relief. We determine that trial counsel’s decision not to
request an instruction on lesser-included offenses was an “informed choice based upon
adequate preparation,” Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Tenn. 2016), and that
Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance
and used reasonable professional judgment to make the strategic decision to employ an
“all-or-nothing” defense strategy. We agree with the post-conviction court’s ruling that
Petitioner failed to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After declaring the parties divorced, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for their minor child. The plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent and gave the father 80 days of parenting time each year. The father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting a parenting plan that failed to maximize his parenting time. We affirm.

The Defendant, Marquis Rashum McReynolds, was convicted by a Roane County Criminal
Court jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; aggravated
robbery, a Class B felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; reckless
endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and employing a firearm during the
commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-
102(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-402
(2018) (aggravated robbery); 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery); 39-13-
103 (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment); 39-17-1324(b) (2018)
(subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
felony). The trial court dismissed the firearm charge and imposed an effective sentence of
twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1)
denying his request to admit the video recording of the victims’ interviews with police; (2)
denying his request to sever his trial from his codefendant’s trial; and (3) failing to grant a
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the chancery court’s decision to affirm the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s determination that he was overpaid unemployment benefits. Because we have determined that the appellant failed to comply with the applicable rules regarding appellate briefing, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Amy Upton, pleaded guilty to four counts of drug-related offenses after
the trial court denied her motion to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, to suppress
evidence seized on the day of her arrest. The motion pertained to the circumstances of her
arrest, which occurred in Claiborne County but was effectuated by Union County deputies.
As part of her plea agreement, she sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging
the trial court’s decision to deny the motion. Following our review, we conclude that the
certified question does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved
as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we are
without jurisdiction to consider the question. The appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rodzell Lamont Mason, appeals the summary dismissal as time-barred of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to his case that would allow his claim, filed more than thirteen years after his judgment became final, to be considered. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The present appeal originates out of a Juvenile Court dependency and neglect proceeding. During the pendency of the case in the Juvenile Court, the Nenana Native Association filed a notice of intervention and averred that the two children at issue in this appeal are “Indian Children” under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Nenana Native Association requested that the Juvenile Court enter an order acknowledging its status as these children’s tribe, and the Juvenile Court subsequently did so. Although the Nenana Native Association was allowed to intervene as a party in the case, the Juvenile Court later entered an order denying a request that the case be transferred to a tribal court. An appeal was thereafter pursued in the Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court, considering the matter de novo under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(a), also entered an order denying transfer. Although the Nenana Native Association now pursues an appeal of the Circuit Court’s order in this Court, we conclude that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal from the Juvenile Court. Accordingly, we vacate the Circuit Court’s judgment and remand the case back to the Circuit Court with instructions that it remand the matter back to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s and father’s parental rights to their minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and two statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Both the mother and father have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three children. The trial court found that two grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. The father appeals. We affirm.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Petitioner, Aaron Ostine, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence, and this court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Ostine, No. M2013-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2442988 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 28, 2014), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2014). The Petitioner filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our supreme court granted the application and remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of its holding in State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 (Tenn. 2014). After considering the facts and circumstances of the case as compared to those in Jackson, this court again affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Ostine, No. M2013-00467- CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 7009058, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2016). The Petitioner timely filed for post-conviction relief based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and asserts that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors entitle him to relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

A homeowner appeals from a jury verdict in a breach of contract action. The homeowner complains of errors in the conduct of the trial, including the exclusion of key evidence. Because the homeowner did not present these issues to the trial court in a motion for a new trial, the issues are waived. And we affirm the judgment.

A property owner filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of metropolitan government ordinances that prevented him from obtaining a permit for a short-term rental property with more than four bedrooms. We have concluded that the property owner’s claims are barred by res judicata.

Defendant, Dustin William Russell, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation, and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty years.  On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court gave an improper instruction for second degree murder, the evidence was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction, and the trial court abused its discretion in its application of an enhancement factor and in its failure to make findings to support partial consecutive sentencing on the dangerous offender factor.  Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Petitioner, Jonathan W. Stephenson, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his fifth petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner challenges his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and the legality of his death plus sixty-years effective sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Before taking his own life, the Defendant’s husband shot and killed another individual, resulting in a civil suit brought by the victim’s family.  An insurance company with whom the husband had a policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Defendant’s husband’s actions were not covered by the insurance he had obtained.  A sheriff’s deputy tried to serve process.  The Defendant, however, was not home, and the deputy left a contact card.  The Defendant called the deputy, and, after discussion, she instructed the deputy to leave the documents with a particular individual at her home.  The deputy followed these instructions.  The Defendant did not respond to the suit and a default was entered.  Months later, the Defendant, alleging the deputy failed to effectuate valid service of process, sought to have the default set aside.  The trial court disagreed and declined to set aside the default.  The Defendant then asked the trial court to alter its order, asserting for the first time that she was not a proper party to the Company’s suit.  The trial court declined.  The Defendant appealed.  We affirm.

A driver was injured in a car accident with an uninsured motorist and filed a negligence suit against the uninsured motorist. The driver served her uninsured motorist insurance carrier with notice of the lawsuit. After the driver could not obtain service of process on the uninsured motorist, the case proceeded against the insurance carrier. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the driver. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, awarding damages to the driver. The trial court denied the driver’s post-trial motion for prejudgment interest based upon its determination that the suit was a personal injury action and that, therefore, the court could not award prejudgment interest. We have concluded that the trial court erred in classifying the claim against the insurance carrier as a personal injury action. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order denying prejudgment interest and remand for a determination of the proper amount of prejudgment interest.

Danny Royce Murphy, Defendant, was convicted of driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license and driving without evidence of financial responsibility after representing himself at trial. The trial court ordered a six-month sentence, with 30 days to serve and the remainder on Community Corrections. Defendant filed several post-trial motions, including a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motions and this appeal ensued. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Andrew Dunnivant, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of domestic assault. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that the Defendant would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years but that the trial court would determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and imposed a sentence of full confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted an alternative sentence. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract to enforce a purchase and sale agreement, which was allegedly entered by and between Appellants and Appellees. In their answer, Appellees asserted, as an affirmative defense, that Appellants had no standing to enforce the contract because they were not parties to it. On Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Appellants were not parties to the contract and had no standing to bring an action to enforce it. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A putative father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a child. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of several statutory grounds for termination. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Following thorough review, we conclude that not all grounds for termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Still, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until July 16, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 motion to dismiss Appellant’s lawsuit for unjust enrichment because Appellant did not exhaust its remedies in contract. We affirm.