APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant pled guilty in Williamson County to aggravated vehicular assault and three DUI counts.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in confinement.  Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence is excessive and the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgment forms as detailed in this opinion

A Maury County jury convicted Destiny Diamond Baxter and Anthony Wayne Sheffield of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder, and abuse of a corpse. Defendant Sheffield was also convicted of possessing a firearm with a prior conviction for a crime of violence and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury determined that both Defendants should serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for the homicide offenses. As for the remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Defendant Baxter to an additional twenty-two years and sentenced Defendant Sheffield to a further thirty-five years. On appeal, both Defendants challenge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support their convictions. Defendant Sheffield also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the Defendants’ cases and admitting photographs of the homicide victim into evidence during the jury’s sentencing phase. Further, Defendant Sheffield argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him for the other convictions by failing to consider the risk and needs assessment, miscalculating the range, and imposing consecutive sentences beyond his life term. Upon our review, we conclude that a harmless error exists in failing to issue a limiting instruction as requested by Defendant Sheffield, and we also remand the judgments for correction of clerical errors. However, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

We do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded.

This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Latosha Starks-Twilley, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying her pro se petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing because the petition alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on our review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case to that court for the appointment of counsel and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jarrod Dewayne Moore, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s imposition of an effective ten-year sentence in confinement for his drug and firearm-related convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
Ronald Austin and Linda Austin (“Mr.” and “Ms. Austin,” respectively) (“Plaintiffs,”
collectively) were neighbors of Angela Kay Plese (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs and Defendant
did not get along. At one point, Defendant posted certain statements on Facebook about
Ms. Austin, including that Ms. Austin had been convicted in Texas of deadly conduct with
a gun. While Ms. Austin had pled guilty many years earlier to a Texas statute called
“deadly conduct,” this was in the context of her reaching a better deal in a DUI case. Ms.
Austin’s matter did not involve a gun. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for defamation and false
light in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court
found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding $95,100 in total damages for Ms. Austin’s medical
expenses, damage to reputation, emotional distress, punitive damages, as well as Mr.
Austin’s loss of consortium.1 Defendant appeals. We vacate that portion of the Trial
Court’s award concerning damage to Ms. Austin’s reputation since the record contains no
evidence of such damage. Therefore, we modify the judgment to $75,100. Otherwise, we
affirm.

Appellant, Schiller Jerome, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on September 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The patron of a restaurant sued the business and its owner when she was injured attempting to sit on a bench outside the business. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the patron failed to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous or defective condition. We affirm.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Daryl A. Gray violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(d) and (e), 1.16, 4.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for six months. The violations stemmed from two separate complaints, both involving Mr. Gray’s representation of plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. After careful consideration, we too affirm.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Jasmin Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery and of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery). The trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of sixteen years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based upon an alleged violation of her right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in several evidentiary rulings, (3) the court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding unavailable evidence, (4) the court erred in permitting police recruits to attend the trial, and (5) she should receive a new trial due to the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors. We affirm the judgments of the criminal court.

The Defendant, Brandon Lee May, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, evading arrest, and criminal trespass, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years' incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that his sentence is excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Sonny Edmund Hudson, Jr., of two counts of attempted first-degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in confinement at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the attempted first-degree murder of James Theus. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial

In 2023, the Defendant, Jeremy Allen Stephens, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated child abuse. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted and that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Davarious Montral Taylor, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks us to review the trial court’s pretrial suppression of data from the Defendant’s cell phone. Before searching the cell phone, law enforcement officers sought and obtained a search warrant, which a magistrate authorized based upon its finding that probable cause existed to support the search warrant. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone, and the trial court granted the motion. The State asked for, and the trial court granted, an interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s ruling on the motion. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress.

This is an appeal from an order entered on January 2, 2025. The appellant filed her notice of appeal on February 24, 2025, together with a motion requesting an extension of time within which to file the appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the motion for extension and dismiss the appeal.  

This appeal addresses constitutional residency requirements for Tennessee municipal court judges. Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requires inferior court judges to be “elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned [and] have been a resident . . . of the circuit or district one year” prior to election. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4. The appellant, Robin McNabb, proceeding pro se, filed an election contest against the appellee, Gregory Harrison, contending that he was constitutionally ineligible to be elected as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. Ms. McNabb asserted that “district” in Article VI, Section 4 refers to Lenoir City, and that Mr. Harrison had not lived within city limits in the year preceding. The trial court found that “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 refers to the modern-day judicial district. Because Mr. Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the trial court found him to be eligible to serve as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but modified the trial court’s judgment, finding that Article VI, Section 4 required Mr. Harrison to be a resident of Loudon County, rather than the Ninth Judicial District. McNabb v. Harrison, No. E2022-01557-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 7019872, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2024). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court, “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 means Loudon County. Id. We respectfully disagree. We hold that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate running for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution required Mr. Harrison to reside in Lenoir City. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Chancery Court for Loudon County.

The Petitioner, Clarence Willis Moore1 , appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Class B felony drug convictions, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to review videotape evidence with him or to convey the State’s plea offer, and that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that the Petitioner was not a credible witness. Because the Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel was previously determined by the trial court in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial, we conclude that the issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The pro se Defendant, Marcus Fitts, attempts to appeal the Sumner County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to remove the sexual offender registry requirement from his judgment of conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery. Because the Defendant has no grounds to appeal the summary dismissal of his motion, we dismiss the appeal.

After an unfavorable judgment in a detainer action for real property in general sessions court, the Plaintiff sought relief in Davidson County Circuit Court. Two and a half years later, after numerous resettings, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Sergei Aleksandrovich Novikov, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in ordering a sentence of confinement without making proper findings that the Defendant was not entitled to alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Lamisha Lanea Haynes, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded testimony about the victim’s prior gun use; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight; and (4) her sentence is excessive. The Defendant also claims that the cumulative error of these issues warrants relief. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Royce Scott Earley, confessed to multiple acts of rape against his eightyear-
old daughter, and a jury subsequently convicted him of two counts of rape of a child
(counts one and three), two counts of incest (counts two and four), and one count of
aggravated sexual battery (count five), for which he received an effective sentence of 104
years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues for our review: (1)
whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession because it
was not voluntary; (2) whether the State introduced sufficient evidence to corroborate his
confession for counts three through five under the modified trustworthiness standard
outlined in State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2014); and (3) whether the trial court
imposed an excessive sentence.1 After review, we affirm.