APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

The petitioner, Michael Eugene St. Clair, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Williamson County, arguing the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition due to improper venue and failure to include the necessary transcript. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

A Giles County jury convicted the defendant, Jake Christopher Reynolds, of criminal trespass, preventing or obstructing service of legal process, and resisting arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of ten days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions and in incorrectly charging the jury on the statutory defense to criminal trespass. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Finding good cause, a trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that extension of the ex parte order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. We agree with the petitioner that the statute mandates extending an existing ex parte order of protection upon finding that a predicate act was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting.  The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

The Defendant, Rex A. Moore, pleaded guilty to theft of property and two counts of violating the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (“Sexual Offender Registry”). The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence and suspended the sentences, placing the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by misrepresenting his residence in violation of the Sexual Offender Registry requirements and by assaulting a corrections officer while incarcerated. After a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his suspended sentences and by failing to consider lesser sanctions. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were.

The Defendant, William Couch, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence and placed the Defendant on supervised probation. While on probation, the Defendant absconded from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences and ordered him to serve the balance of those sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Lorenza Zackery, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

A jury convicted Defendant, Stanley William Havens, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08% or higher (DUI per se), and it found that this was Defendant’s third DUI offense for enhanced sentencing. The offenses were merged, and Defendant was assessed a fine and sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement, with a release eligibility of 75%. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the redacted video of the traffic stop; (3) the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror for cause; (4) a statement during voir dire that he asserts constitutes prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) his sentence. We affirm and remand for entry of a corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3.

Defendant, Rikiya Joy Parks, appeals her Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convictions for aggravated child neglect, making a false report, and child abuse, challenging the admission of photographs of the minor victim, the admission of what she claims was improper character evidence, the exclusion of printed screenshots of Facebook messages, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm.

The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset.

A Knox County Jury convicted Defendant, Tyler Christian, of two counts of carjacking and one count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court merged the carjacking convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years’ confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s decision to supplement the pattern jury instructions with definitions of “force” and “violence,” and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Taivaun Marquise Mallory, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a firearm recovered after a traffic stop and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of attempted second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion.

In this appeal, we consider whether a retail store purchaser of products can be a “statutory employer” of the product vendor’s injured employee under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation statutes, potentially secondarily liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, and also protected under the exclusive remedy provision. Resolving this issue requires us to answer a threshold question: whether the term “subcontractor” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113(a) includes a product vendor who engages in only the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise. We hold that it does not. We hold that the term “subcontractor” in section 50-6-113(a) refers to a person or entity that performs labor or services for another; section 50-6-113(a) does not apply to a pure vendor-vendee relationship. To determine whether a vendor-vendee arrangement that includes services beyond the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise is governed by section 50-6-113(a), we adopt a version of the “predominant purpose” test often utilized in connection with the Uniform Commercial Code to ascertain whether a contract is predominantly for the sale of goods or services. In this case, there was an arrangement between a product vendor and the defendant retail store that required the vendor’s sales employee to perform services other than ancillary delivery of purchased merchandise. Applying the predominant purpose test, we hold that the predominant purpose of the arrangement was for the product vendor to sell merchandise to the retail store. Any additional services rendered were incidental to the vendor’s sale of merchandise to the retail store. Accordingly, the relationship between the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant retail store was one of vendor-vendee, not principal-subcontractor, and is outside the ambit of section 50-6-113(a). For that reason, the defendant retail store is not the plaintiff’s statutory employer for purposes of section 50-6-113(a) and is not shielded from the plaintiff’s injury claims by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

Petitioner, Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and first degree premeditated murder, for which he is serving two consecutive life sentences. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon (1) trial counsel’s conflict of interest stemming from representing two other suspects at the same time he represented Petitioner; (2) trial counsel’s failure to compel the same two suspects to testify at trial; (3) trial counsel’s failure to consult or call as a witness a firearms expert; (4) trial counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation and prepare for trial; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors. Petitioner also asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to inquire about trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to adjudicate Petitioner’s request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”). Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees.

In this appeal, we clarify the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases. We also explain when an aggravation injury is compensable under Tennessee workers’ compensation law. Plaintiff Jo Carol Edwards sought medical coverage and disability benefits after a work-related accident aggravated her pre-existing arthritis. Following a lengthy administrative process, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims awarded Ms. Edwards medical coverage and disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed. Ms. Edwards appealed. We hold that the standard of review for factual findings in Workers’ Compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence shows otherwise. The standard of review for factual findings applies regardless of whether the finding is based on live testimony or deposition testimony. We also hold that an “aggravation” injury under workers’ compensation law does not require proof of a permanent change or a permanent worsening of conditions to be compensable. Instead, an aggravation injury is compensable when an employee shows, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation injury primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. This means that an employee must show that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the aggravation. Then, the employee must prove, by a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation contributed more than fifty percent in causing death, disablement or need for medical treatment. Applying these definitions to the record before us, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Board, and reinstate the award granted by the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in its December 12, 2023 Order.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings of six counts of criminal contempt against Mother following a contentious, years-long custody battle. Due to the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal.