APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

he child’s mother, the child’s biological father, and the mother’s former husband who believed himself to be the child’s biological parent for the majority of her life. After the mother disclosed the child’s parentage to both men, the biological father filed a petition to be named the child’s parent and for a parenting plan to be established. The mother agreed with his petition in all respects. But the mother’s former husband soon intervened with a petition to be awarded stepparent visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-303. Following the filing of the stepparent visitation petition, the mother and the biological father, who at this point had never had any unsupervised or overnight visitation with the child, executed an agreed parenting plan in which they would share joint custody and equal parenting time with the child, as well as waive child support. After a joint hearing on both petitions, the trial court adopted the mother and biological father’s proposed parenting plan, except that the former husband was granted stepparent visitation with the child every other weekend and over the summer holiday; the former husband’s weekend visitation only occurred during the time that the proposed plan would have allotted to the mother. The mother now appeals this decision. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant sued appellees alleging breach of contract, fraud, and property damage. The trial court granted separate default judgments against the two appellees. Appellees moved the trial court to set aside the default judgments due to a lack of personal jurisdiction and due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The trial court set aside the default judgments over the objections of appellant, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court involuntarily dismissed appellant’s complaint at the conclusion of his case-in-chief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a health care liability case that centers around the application of the discovery rule. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining that the discovery rule did not toll the accrual of the statute of limitations to the time asserted by the plaintiff. The trial court based this determination on two independent bases. The first basis was predicated on certain information provided by the defendants, which was taken from the Tennessee Secretary of State’s website. The trial court took judicial notice of this information and determined that it indicated that a reasonable person would have been able to discover the identity of the defendant. The second basis, an express alternative finding, stated that even if the information was not considered, sufficient information existed in exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s complaint to support its determination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher O. Curry, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. More than a year after his judgment became final, the Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. The trial court granted appellee a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct by the appellant, divided the parties’ assets and debts, and entered a permanent parenting plan designating appellee as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, granting the parties equal co-parenting time, and providing appellee with sole decision-making authority with respect to the child. Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal; however, each of those issues has been waived due to appellant’s failure to comply with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court. Additionally, appellee argues that the trial court erred in awarding the parties equal co-parenting time and requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant mother against the appellee father. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the order of protection.

This appeal concerns the modification of a parenting plan. Alexander Georg Warnatzsch (“Father”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Ashly Camille Warnatzsch (“Mother”) in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to modify the parties’ parenting plan concerning their three minor children. Mother exercised most of the parenting time under the original plan. Following a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had proven a material change in circumstances and that the residential parenting schedule should be modified. Mother remained primary residential parent, but Father was granted equal parenting time. Mother appeals, raising various issues implicating the Trial Court’s discretion. We find no reversible error. We affirm.

The Defendant, Craig Kitt, has filed a motion seeking review of the trial court’s
order granting the State’s motion to continue the hearing on his motion to reduce bail. The
Defendant seeks relief pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. The State has filed a
response in opposition. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

The Defendant is charged with three counts of aggravated rape and five counts of
rape. The Defendant’s pretrial bond is currently set at $500,000. On July 18, 2025, he
filed a motion to reduce that amount, and a hearing was scheduled for July 28, 2025. The
State filed a motion to continue that hearing. The trial court granted the State’s motion and
continued the hearing until August 11, 2025. The Defendant now seeks review, pursuant
to Rule 8, of the trial court’s decision to grant the State’s motion to continue.

Rule 8 provides the procedural framework for obtaining appellate review of the trial
court’s actions regarding a defendant’s release. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144. That rule
states: “Before or after conviction the prosecution or defendant may obtain review of an
order entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of
Criminal Appeals granting, denying, setting or altering conditions of defendant’s release.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 8(a) (emphasis added). By its plain language, Rule 8 does not govern the
challenge presented by the Defendant here. This Court agrees with the State that review
of the trial court’s continuance order must be sought under Rule of Appellate Procedure 9
or 10.

Accordingly, the Defendant’s Rule 8 motion is hereby denied. Because the
Defendant is indigent, costs are taxed to the State.

The Defendant, Desmond Johnson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, in exchange for an agreed sentence of four years as a Range I offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Because the Defendant failed to file a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) certificate of eligibility for judicial diversion with the trial court, we conclude that the trial court was precluded from considering the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Joseph Atkins, of delivery of a
Schedule I controlled substance (acetylfentanyl) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone and
delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (fentanyl) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free
zone. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting his
statements to law enforcement because new testimony at trial corroborated his claim that
his statements were involuntary; (2) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on
the inference of casual exchange and the order of consideration; and (3) the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joshua Terelle Gaines, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense and received an effective sentence of life plus five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by redacting his psychological expert’s report and by limiting the expert’s testimony. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff in this non-compete dispute raised several causes of action in the operative complaint but later filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit as to one of the claims within the suit. The defendants did not object at the time but nearly two years later filed a motion to dismiss the entire suit. The defendants asserted that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 does not allow plaintiffs to dismiss one or more but fewer than all of the claims in a lawsuit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims without prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Zachary Rye Adams, for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The Defendant seeks to challenge the post-conviction court’s order granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude a recorded post-trial statement of his codefendant, Jason Autry. The Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the statement did not satisfy the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. See Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Based on the following, we deny the Petitioner’s motion for an interlocutory appeal.

The Defendant, Christian Workman, appeals from the revocation of his probation, arguing the trial court improperly revoked his probation based upon his failure to pay court costs and supervision fees. The State concedes error, and after review, we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the revocation warrant.

Following a divorce, a husband appeals the trial court’s classification of marital assets, division of marital assets, and alimony determination. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. We grant the wife’s request for reasonable attorney fees on appeal.

This is an appeal by a father of the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. The Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the father’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to his daughter’s removal persisted, that he had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his daughter, and that termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interest. The father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ivan Antjuan Burley, appeals from his Sumner County conviction for attempted possession with the intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his contemporaneous drug-related activities in Davidson County in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Additionally, the Defendant raises several other constitutional and evidentiary claims. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court approved a parenting plan jointly proposed by an unmarried Mother and Father, who at the time were living together. Their relationship, subsequently, deteriorated, and each parent later sought modification of the existing plan. With some minor alterations, the trial court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. Father appeals. We affirm.

Kentrel Moragne, Defendant, appeals from his conviction for unlawful exposure for which he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve fourteen days in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence on probation. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in this timely appeal. Because the statute is not ambiguous and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Antonio James, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because the sufficiency of the evidence was not challenged on appeal. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kyler Michael Price, was convicted by a Warren County jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and driving without a valid license, a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of thirty days for the misdemeanor conviction and two years as a Range II offender for the felony conviction, with six months to serve in the county jail. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain his reckless endangerment conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing irrelevant and prejudicial testimony by a police officer about the officer’s encounter with a different motorcyclist; and (3) whether the trial court erred by ordering confinement without correctly considering alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kejuan King, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine witnesses, investigate prior altercations and present evidence thereof, and argue for proper jury instructions. After review, we remand this case to the post-conviction court for entry of a written order that sufficiently addresses all grounds presented by Petitioner and states the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each ground as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b).

The Defendant, Isaiah French, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of attempted premeditated first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, two counts of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in prison without parole as a repeat violent offender plus 120 years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the remaining counts of the indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

On or about July 31, 2025, the Defendant, Martin Aron Harasim, filed a pro se notice of appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). He simultaneously filed a pro se motion seeking review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the sentence he received for his misdemeanor convictions in this case. Tenn. R. App. P. 8. As reflected in the judgment sheets, on July 25, 2025, the Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401), attempted assault on a first responder (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-116), and resisting arrest (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16- 602), all of which are misdemeanors. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation after service of sixty days in jail.

The Defendant is currently represented by appointed counsel and his case is still pending in the trial court, however. Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is premature. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) and (d). Moreover, it has long been the rule that a defendant may not be represented by counsel and simultaneously proceed pro se on appeal. State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).

Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice. At the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court, the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, may pursue an appeal to this Court, if appropriate. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b).

The pro se Rule 8 motion is denied for the same reason. Counsel may file the appropriate motion for review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the Defendant’s sentence, if necessary. According to the statements by the Defendant in 08/04/2025 2 his motion, the trial court ordered him to begin serving his sixty-day sentence on August 1, 2025. If that is true, the Court makes the following observations for the benefit of counsel and the trial court.

Subsection (b) of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-116 provides that the trial court may revoke bail immediately upon conviction, in applicable felony cases, “notwithstanding sentencing hearing[s], motion[s] for a new trial and related post-guilt determination hearings.” The Sentencing Commission Comments to that section advise that “[t]he standards for revocation of bail are set forth in Section 40-26-102.” Section 40- 26-102, entitled “Bail in felony cases,” governs admission to bail pending appeal. Subsection (e) of Section 40-26-102 provides that “[t]he setting of bail or release upon recognizance is a matter of right for one convicted of a felony and sentenced to confinement for less than one (1) year.” As discussed above, however, the Defendant in this case was convicted of misdemeanor offenses. The Sentencing Commission Comments to Section 40-35-116 further advise that bail in misdemeanor cases is addressed in Section 40-26-104. Both that statute and the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant has the right to bail pending appeal in misdemeanor cases. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-104; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(1). Section 40-26-104 provides: “In all misdemeanor cases, the judge or court shall direct the clerk of the circuit or criminal court to admit the defendant to bail in a sum prescribed by the judge or court, with sufficient sureties for defendant’s appearance at the circuit or criminal court in which judgment was rendered against the defendant, at the next term after the decision of the cause by the supreme court, to answer the judgment of the court.” Rule 32(d), which is titled “Release After Conviction, Pending Further Proceedings,” discusses release following conviction in both misdemeanor and felony cases. Subsection (d)(1) of Rule 37, which covers misdemeanor cases, provides simply: “A person convicted of a misdemeanor has a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.” Accordingly, it is clear the legislature intended those defendants convicted of a misdemeanor to be entitled to bail pending the exhaustion of post-trial and appellate remedies.

The Clerk shall forward a copy of this order to the Defendant, counsel of record, and the trial court clerk. Because the Defendant was declared indigent by the trial court, costs are taxed to the State.