APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found multiple
grounds for termination and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. We affirm.

Parents, on behalf of their deceased child, filed a health care liability action against an obstetrician, alleging that the infant’s death was the result of negligent medical treatment during delivery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the parents argue that the trial court erred in: (1) limiting the testimony of their causation expert and excluding his exhibits and demonstrative aids; (2) denying a motion in limine to prohibit a line of questioning and argument by the defense; (3) excluding evidence of the suspension of the defendant’s medical license; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction on informed consent; and (5) declining to grant a new trial based on misconduct of defense counsel during closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, James Patrick Spain, for review of the trial court’s order denying his “Motion to Reconsider Bond.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

Defendant, Nicholas Alberts, appeals his convictions for three counts of possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture a controlled substance; seven counts of various firearm offenses; and one count of failure to maintain his lane of travel—convictions for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, Defendant’s sole challenge is to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, arguing that police lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. After review, we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and affirm Defendant’s convictions.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary
dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable
claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his life sentence for first degree
murder is illegal and his judgment of conviction is void because (1) the trial court’s
comments regarding parole eligibility were in direct contravention of the relevant statute
and (2) the statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder
rendered his sentence unfairly disparate and in direct contravention to the purposes and
principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing
Act”). He further claims that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him
counsel despite the Petitioner’s indigent status. After review, we affirm.

Defendant, Dusty Mink, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, assault, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and evading arrest. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to sever the offenses, and the count charging unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon was tried separately.1 A jury convicted Defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon, and the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises seven issues: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon; 2) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s two motions for continuance based on the unavailability of expert witnesses; 3) whether the trial court erred by excluding a defense expert absent proof of Defendant’s drug use; 4) whether the trial court should have given the jury a Ferguson instruction; 5) whether the State’s closing argument was improper; 6) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles Defendant to relief; and 7) whether the trial court erred in classifying Defendant as a Range III offender. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Billy Joe Baggett, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Desmon Paul Rhea, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated burglary of a habitation. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant raises six groups of issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions for premeditated murder and the burglary-related offenses; (2) whether the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by conditioning the presentation of an insanity defense on the admission of his previously suppressed statements; (3) whether the State’s destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence requireda new trial under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (4) whether the trial court committed multiple evidentiary errors, each independently warranting reversal and cumulatively depriving him of a fair trial; (5) whether prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing argument rendered the trial fundamentally unfair; and (6) whether the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Alfonvo Montell Johnson, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, evidence tampering, abuse of a corpse, and attempted abuse of a corpse, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support certain of his convictions and that the absence of an election with regard to the charge of evidence tampering entitles him to a new trial on that offense. Because the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of abuse of a corpse and attempted abuse of a corpse, we reverse those convictions and dismiss the charges. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant, Christopher Strater Falls, appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to establish a theft of the victim’s vehicle or that he was the perpetrator of the victim’s murder. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements made by the victim, including large portions of a four-page letter she had authored expressing her fear of the Defendant and her desire to end their relationship, as well as pointing toward him as a suspect in the event of her death, under the “then existing state of mind” exception of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(3). After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Keith Richardson, appeals his Perry County Circuit Court convictions of five counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest, four counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count each of continuous sexual abuse of a child, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated rape, (2) he did not properly waive his right to a jury trial pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 23, and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we remand the Defendant’s judgments of conviction for rape in count 21and statutory rape in count 22for the entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant and Appellee agreed ona permanent parenting planthat provided for equal parenting timeof their minorchildafter their divorce.Appellee later sought to relocate with the childto pursue an employment opportunityin Georgia.One hundred four days after Appellee filed a relocation petition, Appellant filedan answer opposing the relocation. Thetrialcourt permitted the relocationand struck Appellant’s opposition because it was filedafter the expiration of the thirty-day period set forth inTennesseeCode Annotated section 36-6-108.The courtamended the parties’ parenting accordingly.Onappeal, Appellantargues the trial court erred in striking his response as untimely.We affirm thejudgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mena Mekhaen Boutrous, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion for due process tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to due process tolling because his mental health issues rendered him incompetent during the one-year limitations period. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Roy Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
asserting his case should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing or, alternatively, that
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,
we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the husband is
a business owner and that his business, known as Choice Pool Care, LLC, constituted a
marital asset. It then awarded the wife “a 20% share of the business.” However, the trial
court did not value the marital asset. The husband appeals, insisting that the trial court
erred in finding the existence of a marital asset and in its equitable division of the asset.
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the husband’s
ownership interest in the LLC as marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s ruling
regarding equitable division of the asset and remand for the trial court to value the asset
prior to equitably dividing the marital estate. The trial court’s rulings regarding child
support and alimony are likewise vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the
further proceedings that are necessary as to the division of the marital estate.

This extraordinary appeal involves whether a non-attorney individual may file a notice of
appeal in the Shelby County General Sessions Court on behalf of a limited liability
corporation. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the appeal
on this basis. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for
dismissal.

This matter concerns a plaintiff’s effort to revive a discrimination lawsuit. Having determined that the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2. Because Appellant’s petition fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.03, the appeal is dismissed.

The appellant filed the instant action seeking a copy of the property management contract between her condominium association and its property management company. The trial court determined that “a contract between a condominium association and its management company would not be included in those records that a condominium association would be required to provide to a unit owner.” The court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The appellant appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Defendant, Bruce Allen Watts, appeals the trial court’s decision revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his effective fourteen-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jereme Walker Amis, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of a firearm after having been convicted ofa felony crime of violence, a Class B felony, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of felony drug offense, a Class C felony, and violating the conditions of his community supervision, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions ofpossessing a firearm and sentenced himto an effective sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendantcontends thatthe trial court committed plain errorby refusing to accept his offer to stipulate tohis prior felony convictions,that the trial court abused its discretionby denying his request to bifurcatethe chargeofviolating the conditions of his community supervision, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A property owner brought suit against the owner of a neighboring property, seeking either an order awarding her land encompassing a driveway or an easement to use the driveway. The trial court referred the issues to a special master, who made detailed findings regarding the boundary between the properties and as to the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. Following a hearing on objections to the special master’s report, the trial court accepted the special master’s findings and recommendations. The neighbor appealed, raising issues regarding the court’s weighing of the evidence in finding the boundary line and granting of a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. We affirm.

Mortgage companies maintain that the Tennessee Housing Development Agency(“THDA”), which services mortgages through the trade name of Volunteer Mortgage Loan Servicing(“VMLS”), is liable for monetary losses following the use of an improper bank account number. THDA and VMLS contend that they are protected by sovereign immunity and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion because it found THDA was engaged in commercial activities. THDA and VMLS appealed. We reverse.

The Defendant, Scott A. Stiner, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-529(soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor)1(2018)(subsequently amended), 39-13-504 (aggravated sexual battery) (2018)(subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective fifty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1)he did not receive a fair trial because the allegations and acts that constitute the basis of the convictions were different than the allegations in the indictment and the bill of particulars;(2) the court erred by failing to sever the offenses during the trial; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age conviction in Count 6;(4) he did not receive a unanimous verdict for aggravated sexual battery in Count 3; (5) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) the court erred in admitting evidence in contravention of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) the court erred in admitting a diagram that was not properly authenticated; (8)the court erred by allowing expert testimony that went beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise; and (9) the court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing on all counts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s judgments and legal conclusions, save for one issue. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion regarding the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of an uncharged sexual assault of a baby pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I would find that the introduction of this evidence was in error; however, I would further find that the error was harmless in these circumstances and would affirm the convictions despite the error.