APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the denial of line of duty disability benefits to the appellee by a pension board. The denial went before an administrative law judge who reversed the decision of the pension board and determined the appellee was entitled to benefits. The appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the chancery court, which affirmed the ruling of the administrative law judge. This appeal followed. Because the record does not contain evidence showing that the board entered a final determination, we are without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

In this healthcare liability action, the trial court excluded the plaintiff’s proffered expert witness after concluding that the witness failed to satisfy the competency requirements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(b). Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his third state petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that his sentence is void and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Plaintiff sued a musician and the establishment where he performed for negligence after the Plaintiff climbed on stage and sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from the stage while being escorted therefrom. The jury found that the Defendants were not at fault. On appeal, the Plaintiff claims reversible error because of defense counsel’s statement during opening argument that Plaintiff hoped to be a “lottery lawsuit winner” and error in admitting evidence of medical leave benefits Plaintiff obtained from her work. We affirm.

Defendant, Clarence M. Porter, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of two counts of felony murder, one count of theft of property under $1,000, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. He was also charged with possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, but following a bifurcated trial, that charge was dismissed by the trial court. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence for the felony murder, theft, and especially aggravated robbery convictions. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting a hearsay statement by a co-defendant because the State failed to prove that Defendant was involved in a conspiracy with co-defendants; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because there was no independent proof to corroborate accomplice testimony and the State failed to prove that he was criminally responsible for the actions of his co-defendants or that he independently possessed any criminal intent to commit the charged offenses; that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s lead investigator to reference the Chattanooga Police Department’s “street gangs unit;” and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Following our review of the entire record and the oral arguments and briefs of the parties, we determine that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. Further, following State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223, (Tenn. 2024), because the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, we find that the evidence is insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against Defendant.

A mother sought the recusal of the juvenile court judge overseeing a custody case involving her minor child. After the judge denied two recusal motions, the mother filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court. The circuit court determined that it lacked authority to issue the writ of mandamus and dismissed the petition. The mother appealed. We affirm.

In this interlocutory appeal, at issue is the appropriate jury instruction to be given in a murder case for a crime committed in 2015 but tried in 2024. In the time between the murder and trial, the Tennessee Supreme Court released an opinion, State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. 2024), which abrogated the old common-law accomplice-corroboration rule. The State requested the new jury instruction pursuant to Thomas, and the trial court ruled that fairness concerns required the old common-law instruction. The State sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, it asserts that the trial court erred and that the jury should be instructed pursuant to Thomas. After review, we conclude that the Thomas court intended that the new law apply to trials commencing after March 7, 2024. Because the trial for this matter has not yet commenced, the jury in this case shall be instructed in accordance with Thomas and its conclusion regarding the jury instruction about accomplice testimony. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Dale Steven White, was charged with twelve offenses resulting from his fleeing from the police on three separate occasions on June 13, December 11, and December 13, 2021. The Defendant entered a "blind" plea to each charge on November 16, 2023, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive, that the trial court erred in imposing partially consecutive sentences, and that his judgment forms contain clerical errors. Following our review, we remand for entry of corrected judgments consistent with the trial court's pronouncement of the Defendant's sentence at the sentencing hearing. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, George W. Cosey, pleaded nolo contendere to Class E felony theft and received an agreed one-year sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the Davidson County Criminal Court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not inform him that, between the time of the offense and Petitioner’s plea, the theft grading statute had been amended. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jeffery Lynn Lane, Jr., was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, driving without a license, and driving without proof of insurance and received an effective twelve-year sentence to be served at eighty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to show he possessed the firearm, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, and that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ brief, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a property dispute between the decedent’s husband and the decedent’s only daughter, who is a child born of a prior marriage. The chancery court concluded that the husband had no interest in the property under the decedent’s will, as the property had instead passed directly to the daughter, not the decedent, under the terms of the grandmother’s will. Additionally, the chancery court concluded that any claim by the husband was also barred by an earlier settlement agreement reached by the parties. Under the terms of that settlement agreement, the chancery court also awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the daughter. The husband appeals. We affirm

Grandparents brought a criminal contempt petition against Father for alleged violations of a grandparent visitation order. After a bench trial, the trial court found the father guilty on all 23 counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him to the maximum sentence of 10 days per count to be served consecutively. Of the 230 days, 140 days were suspended, with a sentence of 90 days of actual confinement. Father raises multiple challenges on appeal to every count and also challenges the sentences imposed. We affirm 11 of the counts, reverse 12 of the counts, and remand for resentencing.

A Gibson County jury convicted Defendant, Eric Wayne Herndon, of violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. Defendant received an effective sentence of two years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. After review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for violation of an order of protection, and we reverse that judgment and dismiss that conviction accordingly. We also conclude the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, but we determine that the proof was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of stalking, which was charged to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction for stalking and for resentencing on this modified conviction.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a will contest for failure to prosecute.
We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this case that began as a breach of contract action, the defendant property owner attempts to appeal from two cases that were not consolidated in the trial court but resulted in the entry of a single order in favor of the plaintiff roofing company. Because the order appealed from did not adjudicate all of the claims of all of the parties, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Alonzo Fishback, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony, for which he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of seventy-five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions, and this court affirmed, and he then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the proven facts of his case did not meet the necessary requirements to be convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court denied this motion, stating that the Defendant’s claim was not colorable under Rule 36.1. The Defendant maintains his argument on appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash Plaintiffs’ post-judgment subpoena for financial records he alleges are statutorily exempt from the subpoena process. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment and that no good cause exists to waive the finality requirement. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Bassett, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for one count of first
degree murder; five counts of attempted first degree murder; three counts of attempted
second degree murder; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; eight counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and eight counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been convicted
of a drug offense, and his effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years. The Petitioner
alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Vincent Olajuan Morrison, appeals his convictions for aggravated
burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’
incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain statements through
the victim’s testimony, which violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause; (3) the State’s cross-examination of a defense witness improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the Defendant; (4) the trial court violated the “spirit” of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by permitting the Defendant to be tried by an all-white jury;
and (5) his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bernard Strowder, pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The parties agreed that he would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years but that the trial court would decide the manner in which the sentence would be served. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the full sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of an alternative sentence, but the State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because his notice of appeal was untimely. Upon our review, we agree that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the interest of justice does not require us to waive the timely filing requirement. We respectfully dismiss the appeal.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Because clear and convincing evidence supports that at least one of the termination grounds exists and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The parental rights of Chasity H.1 (“Mother”) were terminated by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on January 22, 2024. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

For over a decade, Leah Gilliam’s vehicle displayed a personalized license plate that read “69PWNDU.” The State eventually revoked the plate after deeming the message offensive. Gilliam sued state officials, alleging that Tennessee’s personalized license plate program discriminates based on viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. The State argues that the First Amendment’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination does not apply to the alphanumeric characters on Tennessee’s personalized license plates because they are government speech. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were government speech. 576 U.S. 200, 213 (2015). Although personalized alphanumeric combinations differ from specialty plate designs in some respects, a faithful application of Walker’s reasoning compels the conclusion that they are government speech too. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of the State.

This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured teacher. The trial court determined that the school district terminated the teacher without legal cause and ordered that she be reinstated with backpay but denied her request for attorney’s fees. Finding that the teacher waived any issue pertaining to whether the school board followed the procedural requirements of the Teacher Tenure Act, and that she engaged in conduct which constituted two of the three charges levied, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

An out-of-network hospital sued a TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”), seeking additional payment for healthcare services rendered to the MCO’s members. The MCO moved for summary judgment on the hospital’s claims for payment for post-stabilization services provided to both existing and retroactive members. With respect to the existing members, the MCO argued that the hospital could not show that the MCO had a legal obligation to pay for the post-stabilization services at issue. So the hospital could not establish that the MCO was unjustly enriched. The trial court agreed and summarily dismissed these claims. It also certified the dismissal as final. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.