Austin Powder Co., et al., v. Walter Thompson
The Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Blount County Circuit Court awarding the Plaintiffs discretionary costs including attorney fees. This appeal arises from an earlier action (second lawsuit) seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving the original lawsuit filed by the Defendant. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jami Allyson Ross Carter, v. Guy Marshall Carter
This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, v. Michael Anthony Pike
The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Elton Donald Bowers, A/K/A Rashid Qawwi
The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, v. Robert Willis Chance, Jr.
The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a class A felony. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Lee Grissom (Brown) v, Jeffrey Donald Grissom
This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the trial court's judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Broadwell, v. Thomas Michael Broadwell
This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Broadwell, v. Thomas Michael Broadwell
This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lynn Bernice Carraher, v. Michael Thomas Carreher
The plaintiff’s employer had a generous profit-sharing plan to which the plaintiff was not required to contribute. The trial judge declined to treat this fund as marital property because the “plaintiff didn’t earn it, and the defendant didn’t contribute to it.” |
Court of Appeals | ||
Mike G. Pauley, v. Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David Woolfork, Madison County Sheriff, Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson, et al.
Plaintiff, Mike G. Pauley, an inmate at the Madison County Penal Farm (Penal Farm), appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his pro se complaint against the defendants, 1 Plaintiff filed suit against Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David Woolfork, the Madison County Sheriff and Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson, the Penal Farm’s Head Controller and Acting Warden, Sergeant Jered, the first shift sergeant, Sergeant Evans, the third shift sergeant, Officer Steven Horner, and Officer Cleo King in their official and individual capacities. 2 4which include Madison County, the Penal Farm, and several of the Penal Farm’s personnel.1 |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Bernard Sanders, #76973, v. Jimmie L. Jones - Concurring
Plaintiff, Gary Bernard Sanders, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at the Cold Creek Correctional Facility, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Jimmie L. Jones, a correctional officer at the facility.1 |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
E.L. (Eldred) Reid, v. Jason Petty
Eldred L. Reid (Plaintiff) sued Jason Petty (Defendant) for “pain and suffering with mental stress” alleged to have resulted from the defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for pain medication. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the defendant was immune pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8- 307(h). |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Woodward Hamilton, v. Brenda K. Smith Hamilton
In this divorce action, the Plaintiff, Lawrence Woodward Hamilton, filed his petition 2 for divorce on July 20, 1993. The Defendant, Brenda Kay Smith Hamilton, filed a countercomplaint seeking a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted the Defendant’s request for a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded the parties’ marital residence as well as household furnishings to the Defendant. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay all outstanding marital debts other than the first and second mortgage on the marital residence, all expenses incurred by the Defendant as a result of this action including the Defendant’s attorney fees and $2,200.00 per month in permanent alimony. The trial court awarded the Defendant onehalf of the Plaintiff’s retirement proceeds and ordered the Plaintiff to maintain the Defendant on his health insurance policy for three years. The trial court further ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $50,000.00 life insurance policy naming the Defendant as the irrevocable beneficiary. The Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial court arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the Defendant permanent alimony and attorney fees. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie Heath, v. Jayne S. Creson, Waylon Wininger, and Pat Hutchinson, and A.C. Gilless
In this action, Plaintiff Eddie Heath (“Heath”) filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether he provides a taxable service under the Business Tax Act. Heath brought suit against A.C. Gilless (“Gilless”), the Shelby County Sheriff, Jayne S. Creson (“Creson”), the Shelby County Clerk, as well as two employees of the Shelby County Clerk’s Office, Waylon Wininger (“Wininger”) and Pat Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”). The trial court dismissed Heath’s complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Sanders, v. David W. Lanier, In his individual and in his offical capacities, and the State of Tennessee
Plaintiff's actin filed against the State pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-20-191, et seq. , was dismissed by the Trial Judge for failure to state of cause of action. T.R.C.P. Rule12.02( 6) . |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Jordan, v. Frances J. Marchetti
This case involves an action for rescission of a deed to land allegedly procured through promissory fraud and duress. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that it had been brought after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc., v. Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc., et. al.
Defendant Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc. (Ashland), appeals the judgment entered against it in this breach of contract action. The contract at issue was between Plaintiff/Appellee Southern Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. (Southern Rehab), andOakmont Healthcare Center (Oakmont). In imposing liability against Ashland, the trial court ruled that Pete Prins, the administrator of Oakmont and an employee of third-party defendant Monarch Nursing Homes, Inc. (Monarch), had the authority to bind Ashland to the contract between Southern Rehab and Oakmont. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the judgment against Ashland and remand for further proceedings. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Ann Wolfe, Bette L. Roberts, Patricia Pelton, Odie L. Mann, Boyd Stubblefield, and Richard G. Ray vs. The University of Tennessee and the University of Tennessee Space Institute - Concurring
I concur with the results of the Court’s opinion. Based on my independent review of the evidence both in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, I have determined that the six plaintiffs have not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the reasons given by the University of Tennessee Space Institute for the adverse employment actions taken against each of the plaintiffs were pretextual or that the employment actions were taken for prohibited reasons. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Metropolitan Nashville Fire Fighters Association Local 763 and B.R. Hall, Jr., v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al.
This case is before the Court on appeal from the Chancery Court of Davidson |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Prism Partners, L.P., v. Michael D. Figlio, v. Prism Partners, L.P. Larry Cherry
In this unlawful detainer action, Defendant Michael D. Figlio appeals the trial court’s final judgment which held that Plaintiff/Appellee Prism Partners, L.P., had free and clear 2 title to the subject property, ordered Figlio to vacate the subject property, and dismissed Figlio’s counterclaim for conspiracy. The trial court’s judgment also dismissed Figlio’s thirdparty complaint for fraud and conspiracy against Third-Party Defendant/Appellee Larry Cherry. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Kevin Nelson, v. The Application Group, Inc.
I concur with the court’s conclusion that The Application Group, Inc. is entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) relief under the facts of this case. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to state that I do not concur with the court’s sweeping conclusion that “Rule 60.02(1) relief should be granted when the lawyer realizes his [or her] oversight and takes steps to correct it.” I know of no precedent for the notion that efforts to correct an error, by themselves, are always enough to entitle a lawyer to post-judgment relief. They are only one of the many factors to consider when engaging in the fact-intensive analysis required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Ernest L. White, Conservatorship, v. Loretta DeLoach, Substitute Conservator
This appeal involves the adequacy of a conservator’s accounting of a disabled person’s estate. After the conservator filed her final accounting in the Probate Court of Davidson County, the personal representative of the disabled person’s estate objected to the accuracy and completeness of the accounting. The probate court conducted a bench trial and approved the conservator’s amended final accounting. On this appeal, the personal representative asserts that the final accounting was irregular and that the conservator has failed to account for all of the disabled person’s funds. We have determined that the conservator’s final accounting cannot be reconciled and, therefore, that the order approving the final accounting must be vacated. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Montee H. Carrutheres Johnson, v. Nathan Johnson
This is a divorce case involving an Illinois decree. An Illinois court granted a divorce to the husband and awarded the marital residence in Tennessee to the husband. The Tennessee trial court enforced the Illinois court’s award of property, and the wife appeals. Because the Illinois court did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald D. McKinna, v. Lasco, Inc.
We have for consideration a thoughtful petition to re-hear in which the employer insists that our enquiry was abortive since we failed (1) to examine the proffered reason for the employee’s termination, (2) to examine the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext, and (3) to find that age discrimination was a motivating factor in the determination. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
United American Bank of Memphis, v. Mylan Financial Services, Inc. and Stanley R. Waxman, Stanley R. Waxman, v. United American Bank of Memphis
This case involves an action to recover on a loan guarantee. The trial court entered a |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |